The History of the Hunnu Nation (part 3 of 3)

L. N. Gumilev - "MTF", 1974 – (part of the Steppe Trilogy)

Much of this book is derived from Chinese historical writings and corroborated by anthropology. Most of the period is 1,000 years B.C. and for that millennia. Clearly it is a puzzle to be unraveled by historians and social scientists. There is a great deal of discussion on Gumilev’s methodology. What are the possible ways to determine past events, and how can they be applied in a rigorous way?

It is a study of what is the essence of this science, and is interesting for that fact alone.

As usual Gumilev’s analysis is full of details, people, places, movements and wars won or lost, that many of us have not heard of before. So it is difficult to keep it all straight, if not impossible. It takes further study. But you surely get the taste of antiquity. (It was no picnic.)

Building the Great Wall

In ancient times, the Principality of Qin was a frontier fief fighting the Jungs. After the subjugation of the 12 Rong tribes, the Duchy included them in its fiefdom and largely absorbed their customs. The Qin, on the other hand, joined the Principality of Bo (in Shaanxi), founded by fugitives from the Shan-Yin kingdom, and adopted not Zhou, but the Shan lineage of Chinese culture. Both of these circumstances so distinguished Qin from the other principalities that they considered Qin a Rong possession and did not always agree to its participation in all-Chinese congresses and alliances170. However, the victories in the south and west, which gave Qin princes a vast territory with a bellicose population, made Qin the most powerful princedom in China.

In the north, Qin established ties with the nomadic Yuezhi. The Yuezhi received fabulous textiles and mirrors from Qin princes, which are still preserved in the Altai Mountain villages of today172, while the Qin adopted the horse system from the Yuezhi abolishing the unwieldy chariots172.   It is also interesting to note that, apparently, through Yuezhi in Iran and India they learned about the existence of the Chinese state in the East, which has been called by Indians and Iranians "Chin" or "Machin" (Great Qin) ever since173.

The military reform greatly strengthened the military power of Qin dynasty and facilitated its victories over the kingdoms of Eastern China. The creator of Qin power was the dignitary Shang Yang, who implemented a series of reforms that abolished communal land tenure, weakened the ancient aristocratic clans and transformed Qin into a centralized state that brought about the unification of China. The East Chinese fought back fiercely. The war lasted about 200 years. In Chinese historiography, this period is commonly referred to as the "War of the Kingdoms". Qin diplomacy skillfully fought the eastern Wangs between them, and the Qin army inflicted severe defeats. Finally, Prince Ying Zheng completed the conquest of the eastern kingdoms and took the title of the all-Chinese dynasty of Qin - Qin Shi-Huangdi. And not limiting himself to this.

169 Some commentators believe that the strongest warriors who captured an enemy leader, for which a reward of 100 gold pieces was due; others believe that these warriors were from wealthy families, whose fortune was estimated at 100 gold pieces (Sima Qian. Selected. P. 344, commentary by L. I. Duman).

170 Fan Wen-lan. The Ancient History of China from the Primitive Communal System to the Formation of the Centralized Feudal State. М., 1958. С. 120-121.

 171 Rudenko S.I. The Culture of the Altai Mountains Population in the Scythian Time. С. 356-357. 172 Maspero H. Le Shine antique. P. 385

173 Ibid. P. 384.

The Hunnu people were the most successful in the history of the empire. Then Ordos was conquered, and the Huns were driven away from Yingshan. Having huge funds, Shi-Huangdi decided to secure his northern border and undertook the construction of the Great Wall, which separated China from the Eurasian steppes. It was decided to link the already fragmented walls into a single strong chain of fortifications. Work was carried out day and night; when it became clear that there were not enough people, prisoners of war and convicted criminals were sent to build it. The working conditions were extremely harsh, and many corpses were buried in the earthen embankment of the wall. But now the construction was over. The wall stretched for four thousand kilometers. Its height was 10 meters, with watchtowers every 60-100 meters. When the work was finished, however, not all of China's armed forces were strong enough to mount an efficient defense against the wall. As a matter of fact, if one were to place a small detachment on every tower, the enemy would destroy it before its neighbors could muster and render assistance. If, on the other hand, you put more troops in smaller numbers, you create gaps through which the enemy can easily and unnoticed penetrate deep into the country. A fortress without defenders is no fortress.

Many Chinese nobles had a negative attitude to the construction of the wall. In 11 AD. Yan Yu in his report wrote: "Qin Shi-Huangdi, not bearing the slightest shame, not valuing the strength of the people, brought down the Long Wall for 10 000 li. The delivery of food supplies was made even by sea. But as soon as the fortification of the border came to an end, the Middle State was completely exhausted and the House of Qin lost its throne.174  Indeed, the wall did not stop the Xiongnu raids, and the Han dynasty returned to the system of maneuver warfare.

However, the construction of the Great Wall cannot be considered a nonsense. If China had had enough funds to maintain permanent garrisons on the wall, it would have been difficult for the Xiongnu cavalry to force it. But the Qin government was not solely concerned with defense when building the wall. The report of the official Hou Ying indicates that border tribes oppressed by Chinese officials, slaves, criminals and families of political emigrants all dream of fleeing abroad, saying that "the Xiongnu have fun"175.  And it was impossible to drag horses over the wall, even unguarded ones, without which it was impossible to move in the Asian expanses. This also hindered the raids of small nomadic units, making it difficult for them to choose ways to attack China's sedentary areas. Sometimes criminals were used to guard the wall, replacing their punishment by military service on the border, but they were unreliable troops prone to desertion. Sometimes, peasants were settled around the wall to guard the border, but that did not work either, as the peasants had no military training.

Eventually, the guards were given to the nomadic frontier tribes - descendants of the Jung and remnants of the Hu tribe. Although these border guards themselves were not averse to robbing or cheating and defecting to the Hun's side, they were still more reliable border guards.

The Xiongnu war with the Qin state.

After the above brief account of the Xiongnu, Chinese history does not mention them until the end of the third century B.C. One can only guess that during this period the Xiongnu lost most of their positions in the west, where the Yuezhi in a victorious attack reached Alashan, and in the east, where the hegemony was seized by the ancient Mongols, the Dunhu. The Huns' dependence on the Dunhu was apparently expressed only in the payment of tribute, as the Huns had their own chiefs who pursued an independent foreign policy. The Dunhu was not actually a state, but rather a union of tribes, ruled by the nominated from the masses by elders or chiefs, who did not differ from their fellow tribesmen either by wealth or position.

 174 Bichurin N.Ya. VOL. I. С. 107. 175 Ibid. С. 95.

The Xiongnu at this time already had a Shanyu, who was, as one might think, not an absolute monarch, but a permanent, even lifelong, chief. Therefore, the entry of the Huns into the sphere of influence of the Dunhu can only be explained by the fact that they had suffered serious failures before that, perhaps, in the struggle with Yuezhi or Sayan Dinlins, and therefore were not able to offer proper resistance to their eastern neighbors. It is possible that the situation of the Xiongnu was also affected by internal social changes, which will be discussed below.

The strengthening of China also adversely affected the Huns. In 214. Qin Shi-Huangdi sent the commander Meng Tian to the north with a 100,000-strong army176. He conquered the Ordos, built 44 towns along the banks of the Yellow River, and garrisoned exiled criminals there. The border mountains were used as fortresses: the gentle cliffs, turned into sheer cliffs, limited the passage of nomads through them. Finally, Meng Tian's troops crossed the Yellow River and occupied the foothills of the Yingshan. The Xiongnu lost the best lands in the mountains, "free forest and grass, abounding in birds and beasts", where they could prepare bows and arrows and from where it was easy to make raids177 and the Ordos steppes, inhabited by the Tangut tribes Leufan and Bayan, which were under their rule. The unprepossessing Xiongnu shanyu Touman and his people roamed into the Khalkh, fleeing from the Chinese infantry in the vastness of the Shamo Desert. But even there, to ensure peace, he had to give his eldest son Mode as a hostage to his Yuezhi neighbors. It seemed that the Huns were finished, and that their neighbors would divide among themselves the Hun's steppes. But history has judged otherwise! Who knows about the Yuezhi or Dunhu now, while the Hun's name is widely known.

The Fall of the Qin State

Qin Shi Huangdi died in 210 B.C. He had two sons. The eldest, Fu Su, was in Ordos at the headquarters of the general Meng Tian, head of the military party. Chancellor Li Sy, who led the Legists, and the eunuch Zhao Gao, an influential member of the court clique, feared Fu Su and was inclined to nominate the emperor's youngest son, Hu Hai. Hu Hai was unintelligent, weak-willed, and entirely under the influence of Zhao Gao.

To get rid of the rightful heir, Zhao Gao sent a false order to Prince Fu Su, allegedly signed by the emperor-father, directing him to commit suicide. Despite the entreaties of Meng Tian, the prince remained true to his son's duty and Chinese customs and slit his own throat. The young monarch had all the power of a young monarch, but he had no power in his own right.

The young monarch's power was seized by Zhao Gao, who used it to get rid of his rivals. Meng Tian and Li Sih were executed179. Zhao Gao was the most odious figure in the Qin government for broad sections of Chinese society. He did not seek to justify his regime in any ideological system180; confident in the strength of his lath- and arba-leaders, he openly oppressed the people. But his despotism was sharply opposed. Cheng Sheng and Wu Guang led the first rebellion. Although suppressed by regular troops, it was a spark in a powder keg. Revolts broke out all over the provinces. The most formidable of them was a rebellion in the Chu (Hubei) area, led by Syan Yu.  He came from a simple family, but, according to his biographer, from childhood was obsessed with ambition and dreamed of the throne.

176 An example of numerical exaggeration. Here is meant "with a large army" (compare: Bichurin N.Ya. Collected information... Vol. I. P.45).

177 Ibid. С. 94.

178 See: Sima Qian. Selected Works. С. 226-231.

179 After the execution of Meng Tian the Huns immediately returned to Yingshan without encountering resistance (McGovern W. The early empires of Central Asia. L., 1939. P. 116).

180 There were six systems in China during this era: the Yin-Yang School, Confucianists, Monists, Nominalists, Legists, Taoists, i.e. followers of Lao-Tzu (see: Sima Qian. Selected. p. 35).

In the troubled times Xiang Yu found his element.  As a program he put forward the restoration of the good old days of independence of the Principality of Chu and, having found a descendant of ancient princes, grazing sheep, proclaimed him Huai-wang. His assistant was Liu Bang, later the founder of the Han dynasty.

The Qin government had to defend itself. The new commander in chief Wang Jiang attacked the Principality of Zhao (Shanxi). Chu troops came to the aid of Zhao, and Xiang Yu engaged in fierce fighting with Wang Jiang. At this time, Liu Bang moved on the Qin capital of Xiangyang, and, taking advantage of the fact that most of the army had gone on a campaign, took the city.

During the fight the court clique hated by the people was destroyed, and with it, the Qin dynasty was killed (206). Liu Bang wanted to hold Xiangyang, but Xiang Yu approached the city and ordered it cleared. Liu Bang was forced to submit and agreed to a modest fief in Sichuan and the title of Han Wan. Xiang Yu became the true master of China and took the title of Ba-wang.

Xiang Yu was a great military leader and a brave man, but he was politically short-sighted and failed to carry out the reforms the people coveted. Liu Bang took advantage of this. In his Sichuan backwater he rallied all the dissenters who supported him on his way to the throne. Zhang Liang drafted a political program for him. Xiao He, an excellent administrator, brought order to the administration, while the military leader Han Xin ensured his military success. Liu Bang's ambitious plans did not escape Xiang Yu, and he decided to attack Sichuan. Then, in order to defend Liu Bang destroyed all the bridges on the mountain roads, and turned his area into a fortress with no entrances and exits. This way he was able to deceive the vigilance of Xiang Yu. In the meantime, a Han army under the command of Han Xin trekked along the only mountain path. Han Xin made a dizzying raid: capturing Chang Xin, he marched into the Jin (Shanxi) and Qi (Shandong) provinces and proclaimed there a new Han dynasty and its political program. This program included the reduction of taxes, the abolition of harsh laws, the simplification of judicial procedures, and freedom for scholars and philosophers of all schools and trends.

Han Xin's army grew like a snowball as people from all walks of life joined him, while Xiang Yu's forces were thawing. After Han Xin came Liu Bang and engaged in battle with groups of Xiang Yu near the Haishui River. Xiang Yu forced the Han army to retreat and drove him into the river. Liu Bang fled. However, having gathered new forces, he again surrounded Xiang Yu. The latter, seeing the hopelessness of further struggle, committed suicide. The Han dynasty was established in China.

On the ancient Chinese method of historical narrative

Liu Ban achieved victory and power in 202 BC, but traditional Chinese historiography regarded 206 as the foundation date of the Han dynasty, because the last emperor of the Qin dynasty surrendered to Liu Ban at the end of 207 AD. This cannot be considered a chronological inaccuracy, just as we cannot call huge exaggerations in number of troops or that the arrival of an ambassador from a distant country was called "acceptance of allegiance" a lie.

Here we have a system of expressions that cannot be taken literally. It is, therefore, appropriate to note some peculiarities of the Chinese historical materials, our main source, before proceeding further.  It is not our task to describe the development of Chinese history itself. For us it’s important only to determine the degree of accuracy of the information contained in the dynastic chronicles, and those features that are essential for the history of the Huns.

Historiography occupied a place of honor in China. Historical memory was considered the conscience of the nation, and in the hands of the chronicler was the reputation of the most powerful emperor.

Often emperors pampered their chroniclers for fear that they would not compromise them in the eyes of their descendants.  According to tradition, the dynastic chronicle was not published until after the end of the dynasty. But because historiography was an important state affair, only people whose political sympathies were not in doubt were allowed to compile chronicles. From all this it is clear that Chinese historiography fulfilled a government order and could not help but be to some extent biased. The first task of the researcher in such a case is to determine the nature of the distortion of reality. It should have been the historian's job to exalt China's role, importance, and military successes, so reports of this kind should be treated with extreme caution. On the contrary, reports of Chinese defeats and failures appear to have been downplayed and may be trusted tentatively. The numbers of their own as well as the foreign troops are almost always exaggerated, and round numbers are always given: 100,000, 300,000, 400,000, 1,000,000; these are not real numbers, but the way of putting it, like the old Russian "darkness".

The constant exaggeration of figures in Chinese historical works is not accidental. It has its basis and regularity, and thus its explanation. First of all, numbers up to 10,000 are usually given without exaggeration. For the ancient Chinese, 10,000 was not just a number, but a concept of innumerable multitudes, like the "abyss" for our ancestors, or "infinity" for modern mathematicians. That is why numbers over 10,000 are given approximately, as lying beyond the limits of possible measurement or calculus. However, it was necessary to operate with such numbers often and they began to be given, but not in comparison with a measurable interval up to 10 000, but in relation to each other and with rounding. If, say, Army A has a strength of 13,000, we can define it as 10,000 + X = 2 x 10,000 = 20,000. Army B is four times stronger than army A, so army B is 80,000. For later times, in the Tang era, it was possible to test this counting system several times and establish an average approximate exaggeration coefficient. This averaged out to 9. Since the tradition of historical science was not interrupted during this time, we must think that for antiquity the same coefficient is valid. But that's not all.

The Chinese are a people very capable of abstract thinking. When calculating the army, they are interested in its strength, and it does not always coincide with the number, because the combat efficiency of different military units is different. For example, if army A has 30 bogatyrs-raiders, of which each is estimated to be 100 rank-and-file infantrymen, the calculation goes like this: 30 men = 3,000 units of combat action, where the unit is taken as the combat ability of one soldier of the weakest kind of troops. If in this case army A has 8000 soldiers, then its strength will be calculated as follows: 8000 + 30 x 100 = 10,000 + X = 20,000 instead of the actual 8,030 or 11,000 combat units.

To this must be added the pride, which led the historian to exaggerate the fighting ability of his soldiers, on the one hand, and the fear of the Xiongnu, which led him to exaggerate their number and valor, on the other. Hence the huge armies, both their own and those of others. Of course, absolute numbers are far from the truth, but relative numbers are not very far, and proportionality is maintained. Therefore, although we are unable to make corrections to the source, we can follow the course of events with accuracy within the range of probability.

The figures of the spoils received are usually taken from the reports of the Chinese commanders and can hardly have been exaggerated, since the control and accounting of the spoils was done by the civilian officials who received them. A commander could have reduced the amount of his spoils by withholding them rather than exaggerate them, as he would have had to make up the shortfall from his own pocket. Bragging and deceit in reports were punished by deprivation of rank and even death.

The information on the internal state of the nomadic peoples was obtained by Chinese historians from the reports of Chinese intelligence. The exactitude of the reports is beyond doubt, but unfortunately, they are extremely brief, as the reconnaissance officers were interested only in the practical aspects, especially fighting ability, and the religion, culture, habits, etc. are described only in passing.

Of great interest are the original documents, reports to the Council of State, letters, and accounts, often in full, and sometimes in abridged form. But, as a rule, the historian cites only the report with which he himself agrees, while the opinion of his opponents is given in abridged form. However, this does not prevent the researcher from assessing events for himself.

When we compile a history of the Xiongnu, we should bear in mind that the Chinese, while giving a very detailed account of their relations with them, are extremely cursory about the wars waged by the Xiongnu in the west and north, because Chinese historians were extremely interested in these events.

Attempts to analyze the events, generally rather timid, are reduced to pointing out the will and character of historical figures, and the role of the popular masses is overlooked. At the same time, the historian inadvertently explains the behavior of nomadic leaders with the same motives, as if they were Chinese nobles.

These mistakes are very common; the European school of erudition suffered from them as well. Of course, one cannot ask the ancient Chinese to be materialistic, but one should always look for the causes of historical events, looking at their course and logic, when using their writings. Since for most of our study we have no parallel texts to apply the comparative method, the only method of historical criticism will be an analysis of the connections between events.  This way is difficult, but the only one, because the Greco-Roman information on the topic of interest to us is scarce and fragmentary and less trustworthy than the Chinese; the steppe peoples did not leave any documents about their past. The folklore is not to be trusted either, because we have no evidence to assert or even presume that the known versions of the Türkic bylases are so old, and the events themselves are orally distorted beyond recognition.

Thus, we see that Chinese sources, with their undoubted merits, such as chronological precision, awareness, and absence of fanciful fiction, demand a critical approach, so that the sources would not deceive us.

V. Whistling Arrows

Shanyu Mode and the emergence of the Xiongnu power

Shanyu Tumen had two sons from different wives. In order to secure the throne for his favorite younger son, he decided to sacrifice the eldest, Mode, and gave him as a hostage to the Yuezhi. By attacking the latter, Touman hoped that they would kill his son. But Mode turned out to be a man of determination. He stole a horse from the Yuezhi and returned to his father whose betrayal he knew of course. Touman, who admired Mode's courage, not only did not kill him but gave him the Tumen, 10,000 families, to rule over. Maudet (Mode) immediately began to train his cavalry and taught them how to use an arrow that made a whistling sound in flight181. He ordered everyone to shoot only after his whistling arrow; failure to do so was punishable by death. To test the discipline of his warriors, Maudet fired a whistling arrow at his argamak and ordered the heads of those who did not shoot the magnificent horse to be cut off. Sometime later, Mode shot his beautiful wife. Some of the retainers lowered their bows in terror, unable to find the strength to shoot the defenseless young woman. Their heads were immediately cut off. Thereafter, Mode pointed an arrow at his father's argamak in the hunt, and there was not a single evader. On seeing that the warriors were sufficiently trained, Mode, following his father on the hunt, fired an arrow at him, and the shanyu Tuman immediately turned into a hedgehog - so stabbed in his arrows. Maudet took advantage of the confusion and put an end to his stepmother, his brother and the elders who would not have obeyed the usurper and father, and declared himself shanyu (209 BC).

The Dunhu, learning of the feud, decided to take advantage of it and demanded a remarkable horse, a treasure of the Xiongnu and Maude's beloved wife. The elders in indignation wanted to refuse, but Mode said: "Why, living in the neighborhood of men, should one horse or one woman be spared for them?" - and gave both. Then the Dunhu demanded a strip of desert (southwest of Kalgan), inconvenient for cattle-breeding and uninhabited. The land was, in fact, nobody's land; the border kara-ules stood on its edges: the Huns on the west, the Dunhu on the east. The elders of the Huns felt that there was no need to argue over such an inconvenient land: "We may or may not give it away.

But Mode declared, "The land is the foundation of the state, how can you give it away?!" - and he cut off the heads of all those who advised him to give it up. After that, he marched on the Dunhu. They did not expect the attack and were utterly defeated. All their territory, livestock and property went to the victor. The remnants of the Dunhu settled near the Wuhuan Mountains and later became known as Wuhuan. The whole steppe part of Manchuria fell into the hands of the Mode. On his return from the campaign against Dunhu he did not disband the troops, but attacked Yuezhi and drove them to the west. From that time a long war between the Huns and Yuezhi began, the details of which we do not know. About 205-204. Mode subdued the Ordos tribes Leufan and Bayan and made the first raids on China, where the Qin dynasty had just fallen and a civil war was raging. The number of Mode's army was estimated at 300,000 men. These are the details of the foundation of the Hunnish empire, reported by Sima Qian182. Much here has probably been added and embellished by the historian, and his informants, but the main point is apparently true: Mode united 24 Hunnish clans and created a power so strong that the Chinese compared it with the Middle Kingdom.

181 For a description of whistling arrows see: K?halmi K.U. ?ber die pfeifenden Pfeile der innerasiatischen Reiternomaden // Acta Orientalia. Budapest, 1953. VOL. III. S. 45-70.

182 Bichurin N.Ya. The collection of information about people who lived in Central Asia in ancient times. VOL. I. M.; L, 1950. С. 46-48.

The First War of the Hunnu and Han.

In 203-202 Maude (Mode) waged war on the northern frontier, where he subjugated the possessions of: the Huns, a tribe related to the Huns; the Queshe, the Kipchaks (a Dinlin tribe that lived north of the Altai); their eastern neighbors, the Dinlins, who lived on the northern slopes of the Sayans, from the upper Yenisei to the Angara; the Gagun, the Kyrgyz who lived in western Mongolia, near Lake Kyrgyznor183, and the unknown Tsaili people. Having secured his rear, Mode turned his attention to China. In 202, the Chinese civil war ended with the victory of Liu Bang, the founder of the Han dynasty, known in Chinese history as Gao-zu. But the country had not yet recovered from the devastation, and at that time the Huns poured in from the north. They laid siege to the Mai fortress, and its commandant, prince Han Xin, was forced to surrender. According to the Chinese tradition, surrender was tantamount to treason, and meant a switch to the victor's subject. No circumstances excused the surrendered, because it was assumed that he could commit suicide, and if he did not, then betrayed his duty. Therefore, all avenues of retreat were cut off for prince Han Xin, and he became a faithful servant of his new master184. 

The Xiongnu successfully moved south and, having crossed the Geoju range, in the winter of 200 came to the capital of the northern Shanxi, the city of Jinyang. Gao-tszu personally led an army against them, but as a result of severe frosts about a third of soldiers got frostbitten hands.

Maode's nomadic trick was to divert China's best troops into an ambush by pretending to retreat and encircle the advance guard of the Chinese army with the emperor in the village of Baidin, not far from Pingcheng. Curiously enough, Mode already had four military units, determined by the colors of the horses: raven, white, gray and red. For seven days the Chinese army remained surrounded without food and sleep, enduring incessant attacks of the Xiongnu. Finally, the Chinese spy got to Mode's wife and managed to bribe her. She advised her husband to reconcile with Gao-tsu, "a man of genius"185; she said that if the Huns could acquire Chinese lands for themselves, they would not be able to live on them anyway. This message, and to an even greater extent the suspicion of the infidelity of the Han Xin prince, who did not send the promised reinforcements in time, made Mode refuse to fight further, and he ordered to open the passage to Gaozzu's troops.

The Chinese army marched through the open passageway with their bows drawn and turned toward the Xiongnu and joined their main forces, and Mode turned back. This was one of the Huns' largest campaigns, but when one looks at the map one is struck by how shallow the Huns could have entered China. The whole campaign took place in Shanxi: the towns of Mai and Pincheng were 90 and 40 km from the border, while Jinyang (modern Taiyuan) was 250 km away. The whole military operation was concentrated at Pincheng near the village Baidyn186, and Sima Qian estimated the strength of the Chinese army at 320 thousand soldiers (which is real, because that number included military personnel, often forming from half to four-fifths of the staff in the eastern armies), the Huns numbered 400 thousand horsemen, which is clearly exaggerated. These 400 thousand people had to be situated in a mountain basin 30x40 km, i.e. even if we assume that the Huns did not have wound horses, the area per horseman was 30 square meters, and if we consider that a Chinese detachment stood in the middle and was repulsed, even less.

The absurdity is obvious. Probably Sima Qian exaggerated the Hun's forces by 10-20 times. However, if we accept this coefficient and presumably determine Mode's force at 20-40 thousand riders, it becomes clear why he sought peace, because the huge Chinese army, stretched almost for 600 km, even if the vanguard was completely lost, it was stronger than he was.  Gaozzu and Mode concluded a treaty of "peace and kinship" (a diplomatic form of surrender).

183 Kiselev S.V. Ancient History of South Siberia. M., 1950. С. 560-561.

184 See: Bichurin N.Ya. VOL. I. С. 50-51. - In the biography of Han Xin this fact is omitted (see: Sima Qian. Selected Works. M., 1956).

185 Bichurin N. Ya. VOL. I. С. 51. 186 Ibid.

The peace and kinship treaty stipulated that the Chinese court, in giving away its princess to a foreign ruler, would send him annually a number of gifts as agreed in the treaty. This was a tribute in disguise. Although Mode accepted the princess and the gifts, he continued to support Han Xin and other renegade rebels. In fact, the war continued.

Han Xin and his supporters ravaged the northern regions of China. In 197 Chen Xi, the head of the Zhao and Dai provinces, defected to Han Xin's side. He concluded an alliance treaty with the Huns. But soon the empress Liu Hou managed to lure Han Xi to the capital, where he was beheaded187.

The Chinese army under the leadership of Fan Kuai after a two-year war crushed a rebellion, but did not dare to go abroad, as a new rebellion arose in the principality of Yan (Hebei province). The rebel leader Lu Guan went over to the Xiongnu, and the raids had already spread to the eastern regions of China. In the Chinese wars treason of warlords became a frequent phenomenon. Wearied by failures Gao-tszu died in 195. When the heir was young, the empress-mother Liu Hou became regent and the feuding intensified under her rule188. In 192, Mode proposed marriage to the empress. In his mind, this meant that the Chinese empire should go as a dowry for his wife, and he hoped to gain all of China in this way. The Empress was so furious that she at first wanted to execute the envoys and renew the war, but was persuaded not to be offended by the "savage", and a polite reply was sent to Mode where the refusal was motivated by the old age of the bride. Contrary to the misgivings of the Chinese ministers, the Xiongnu ruler was satisfied with his reply and did not unleash his formidable armies on China, exhausted and overwhelmed by strife.

The horror wrought by the Xiongnu in the previous war had not yet passed. The songs sang: "It was truly bitter under the city of Pihin-chen; for seven days they had no food, they could not draw a bow"189.    Eight turbulent years had passed since then, and the young empire's strength was insufficient to repel an external enemy, and yet Mode, knowing this, did not start a war. But the reason was by no means his peacefulness. On the western border the war with the Yuezhi continued unabated (the available sources do not provide the details). The victories over the Dunhu and Sayan-Altaic tribes were so easy for Mode, the struggle with the western nomads was so hard. Here the fates of Asia were decided; the duel between Yuezhi and Huns for 2 thousand years determined the predominance of the Mongolian element in the great Eurasian steppe, which was of great importance for the ethno- and rasogenesis.

Mode, not wishing to dissipate his forces, left China alone. In doing so, he allowed the Han dynasty to recover and strengthen. The empress regent's government cracked down on the frontier guards, most of whom died in the struggle and the most obstinate ones fled to northwestern Korea. How important peace in the east was to the Huns can be seen from the following fact. In 177, one of the Xiongnu frontier princes attacked China. Emperor Wen-di mobilized cavalry and chariots (85 thousand) to repulse the enemy, but the Huns did not accept the attack and retreated. Wen-di was going to move the war to the steppe, however, the rebellion of the frontier warlord Shin Gyu190 forced him to refuse to make an immediate appearance.

187 Sima Qian. Selected Works. С. 280.

188 Empress Lui Hou was very energetic and overbearing. Even during her husband's lifetime, she had great influence on politics. The successor of Gao-zu (Liu Ban) Hui-ti was in the hands of the empress and her relatives - Liu Chan and Liu Lu. Both of them received the titles of Wang and in 184, after killing the heir to the throne, wanted to establish their dynasty. But the Han dynasty program managed to acquire a lot of supporters, no one in China wanted a return to Qin Shi-Huangdi order. In 180 the empress died, and in 179 her successor Wen-di exterminated the Liu wans, their families and their supporters. But even this did not bring the struggle to an end. In 177 Xing-gui's rebellion broke out, and in 154 the princes of Wu, Chu, Zhao and others rebelled. But the Han dynasty still pursued its political line of patronizing peasants and scholars at the expense of the aristocracy. The system of restricting imperial power to the Wangs and the privileges of the Wangs were abolished, and this bore fruit. Under Wen-di (179-156) and Jing-di (156-140) China became rich and developed into a world power.

189 Bichurin N. Ya. VOL. I. С. 53.

At that time, an embassy with apologies came from the Huns and reported that the pro-guilty prince was removed from the border and sent to the west. There he atoned for his guilt by defeating the Yuezhi. The Chinese court, given the strength of the Xiongnu, accepted the apology and somewhat later restored peaceful relations with them. According to the treaty, the Xiongnu power was recognized as equal to the Chinese empire, and the kings referred to each other as brothers. This was an unprecedented success for the Xiongnu: until now no nomadic prince had dreamed of equaling the Chinese emperor. A letter of the Hun's Shanyu shows us that in 177 the Hun's troops were brought from all over the country and defeated the Yuezhi. The results of their victory were quite tangible as the Huns captured all the principalities of Eastern Turkestan, Wusun and the land of the Qiangs.

Nomadic Tibetan Qian.

The Jungs (ancestors of the Tanguts) and the Qian Tibetans, who had survived the wars of extermination, lived on the western border of China, neighboring the Qin domain. Qin Shi-Huangdi, having completed his conquest of eastern China, disposed of the Jungs. His general Meng Tian in 225 "banished the Jungs" 191 to the mountain steppes of Tsaidam, where the Tang Huts, who were independent of China, continued to live. Having got rid of their ancient enemies, the Jungs, the Chinese encountered the nomadic Tibetans-Kyans who lived in the upper reaches of the Yellow River.

At the time they were a small and poor people who did not risk attacking the great empire. The fall of the Qin dynasty deprived the Chinese of their newly gained hegemony in the area, and the Xiongnu, subduing the Tibetans, swept across the Chinese border from the west. For both the Xiongnu and China, the possession of the mountainous region of the upper reaches of the Yellow River was only of strategic importance, but the Qian from that time embarked on a path of intensive development, and they became allies of the Xiongnu,192 as did their neighbors, the Usuns.

Usuns

The question of the Usuns is quite complicated. According to the Chinese traveler Zhang Qian, the ancient Usun land was located between Dunhuan and Qinjiang, but the Yuezhi also lived there. Shiratori wondered193 how two self-governing peoples could live together on the same territory. Even if their territory extended as far west as Lobnor and as far northeast as the lower reaches of the Edzin-gol194, the desert land could not support two numerous peoples195.   But, apparently, these peoples possessed the specified territory in turn. The Shiji text confirms this view, stating that in the area of Guachzhou, western part of the modern Gansu province, before Dun-huan "in the Qin and Han dynasties lived Wusun, then Yuezhi and, finally, Huns who banished them"196. The rotation of peoples is evident here. V. Uspensky suggests a hypothesis according to which the ancient inhabitants of this area were ancestors of Tibetans - Sizhuns, and nomadic Usuns pushed them into the mountains during the Zhangho period197 .

190 Ibid. С. 54.

191 Iakinth. History of Tibet and Huhunor. VOL. I. St. Petersburg, 1833. С. 17.

192 I find it necessary to note that this fact was not noticed by McGovern, who believed that Tibet was "equally free from Chinese and Hunnic control”.

193 Shiratori K. ?ber den Wu-sun Stamm in Centralasien.

194 See: Richthofen F. China. Berlin, 1877. S. 49, 447.

195 Grumm-Grzhimailo G.E. Western Mongolia and the Uryankhai Krai. VOL. II. L., 1926. С. 99.

196 Ouspensky V. The country Kuke-nor or Tsin-hai, from "Notes of IRGO, Department of Ethnography". Т. VI. SPb, 1880 (separate print). (St. Petersburg, 1880). С. 51.

Uspensky disagrees with Bichurin, who claimed that at that time the Kyans (i.e., Tibetans) occupied the entire present-day Huhunor198, which seems to be true. The disagreement arose because Ouspensky considered the Jungs to be Tibetans, whereas in fact they were a special people, and the Usuns descended from the Jungs199. Thus, the migration hypothesis is no longer necessary and the validity of the term "Shiji" - "ancient Usun land" - is confirmed for the foothills of Nanshan.

At the end of the 3rd century, the Usuns fled the Danhe River valley. Apparently, it was caused by the Yuezhi200. According to Grumm-Grzhimailo201, Usuns fled to the Western Hulhu. There they engaged in combat with Modhe-shanyu warriors, and their lord was killed202. The Huns treated the defeated Usuns with mercy. They were neither slaughtered nor dispersed. The son of the murdered ruler, Shanyui Mode, took him to his headquarters and brought him up, and then entrusted him with the rule of his people with the title of Gunmo203. The Usuns were entrusted to guard the "Western Wall border"204. Grumm-Grzhimailo considers the fortified Gao-kyesai gorge in the northwest corner of the Ordos, where the border was unnecessary at that time because the loyal Moda tribes of Leufan and Bayan lived there. It is most likely that here was meant the western frontier of the Hunnu, where lived the enemies of Usuns, the Yuezhi. It explains the fact (which gave rise to some hypotheses)205 that Usuns appeared in Western Jungaria and Semirechye, and agrees with the version from the biography of Chjan Qian, where it says that young Gunmo, after receiving a shanyu permission to avenge their defeat, invaded Yuezhi and drove them to the west. So, during the Mode era, Usuns acted as vassals of the Huns206.

The structure of the Hunnu state

Clan and tribal unions of the upper stages of the primitive communal system repeatedly created very high forms of social organization. They differed from class societies in that they were essentially the product of an entire society, rather than a single part of it. "We see the dominance of customs, the authority, the respect, the power held by the elders of the clan... But nowhere do we see the particular class of people who are singled out to manage others, and to have, in their interest, to manage systematically, permanently, the particular apparatus of coercion, the apparatus of violence that at that present time ... The Xiongnu people were ruled by their clan elders who relied not on the army but on the people's militia.

197 Ibid. С. 52.

198 Iacinthus. History of Tibet and Huhunor. VOL. I. С. 5.

199 Gumilev L.N. Dinlin problem // IVGO. 1959. No 1. (I will upload this.)

200 L? vi S. Notes sur les Indo-Scythes // Journal Asiatique. 1897. IX serie. Vol. IX. P. 13.

201 Grumm-Grzhimailo G.E. Western Mongolia... С. 100.

202 Bichurin N.Ya. VOL.II. С. 155.

203 Ibid.

204 Grumm-Grzhimailo G.E. Western Mongolia... С. 100.

205 Ibid. С. 100-101; Vernadcky G.V. Ancient Russia. New Haven, 1952. - Vernadsky compares the ethnonym Usun with the ethnonyms: Asians-Asians-Ases-Yases (Oses)-Alans, and regards Usuns as an Alanian tribe, conquered by Yuezhi.

206 Grumm-Grzhimailo G.E. Western Mongolia... С. 101. - He does not trust the last information, based on the author's confusion: that Gunmo's father was killed by Yuezhi, but not by Huns. In my opinion, this error is unimportant and does not change the matter: the Usuns were enemies of the Yuezhi and subjects of the Xiongnu. By the time of Chjan Qan's trip the Hunmo was already old, and had ten sons and many grandchildren (Bichurin N.Ya. Collected Information... Vol. II, p. 191). As he was born around the 208 years (N.Ya. Bichurin. Collected Information... Vol. II, p. 155), then by 139 year he was 70 years old, the age data coincide. In addition, by the 139 year, the Usuns were already habitual inhabitants of the Jeti-su, mixed with Saks and Yuezhi, who remained in situ, but this information reached China only through Chjan Qian.  The language of Usuns is unknown. Grumm-Grzhimailo lists them as Turks, and McGovern as Iranians, and both note the lack of evidence.

207 The Xiongnu were ruled by their clan elders who relied not on the army but on the people's militia. The Shanyu was simply the chief among the others and had no real power other than personal authority. When his activities did not command the respect of the tribesmen and, consequently, their support, waging major wars was naturally almost unthinkable. The role of the individual in the course of historical events is not always the same, but in the absence of an apparatus of power, a chief's abilities sometimes decide the outcome of historical events determined by combinations of coincidences.208 This explains why the Huns, the Aeuje and not the Dunhu were the leading tribes in steppe Asia, although the general course of events would not have been broken if the Huns had been defeated.

К. Marx notes: "...communal ownership... may... manifest itself either in such a way that small communities subsist independently one beside the other... Or in such a way that unity may extend to communality in the very process of labor, which may develop into a system, as in Mexico, especially in Peru, in the ancient Celts, in some tribes of India209.

But this is not only true for the land-tilling, sedentary peoples. The nomadic pastoral economy of the Huns in the first millennium B.C. was much more highly organized than that of their sedentary neighbors. "The main branch of labor of the Turanians was domestication and only then the breeding and care of livestock.” The pastoral tribes stood out from the rest of the barbarians: this was the first major social division of labor. Not only did they produce more than the other barbarians, but their livelihood was also different... This, for the first time, made possible a regular exchange.210 The development of the economy entailed the complication of forms of social life. The ails that had been separated in the conditions of semi-nomadic nomadic pastoralism began to form conjoined groups in the transition to the circular annual migrations. "In nomadic pastoralist tribes the community is always in fact gathered together”; it is a society of companions... A caravan, a horde, and forms of sub-ordination develop out of the conditions of this way of life.211

The need arose for the organization of these small communities for defense against enemies and for maintaining order within the tribe. Only trusted individual members of the communities could carry out such organization. This germ of state power is more ancient than the institution of the state, which is based on the violence of one class against another. This was noted by Engels, as was the difference between power in pre-class and class societies: "In every such community there are from the beginning certain common interests, the protection of which has to be entrusted to individual members, even if under common control”: resolution of disputes and suppression of offenses by individuals, supervision of irrigation... some religious functions. Such offices are found in primitive communities at all times... They are endowed... with certain powers and represent the germ of state power... It is only important for us to establish here that political domination was everywhere based on the exercise of the social... function ... and that the political dominion only lasted for as long a time insofar as it fulfilled that social function212.

The statements of the founders of Marxism about the nature of society at the stage of the tribal and clan system are fully applicable to the Xiongnu in the third century B.C. In 209 B.C. the Huns confederation of 24 Hunnu clans was a step up in social development: the union turned into a "power".

 Lenin, V.I. On the State // Essays, 4th ed. Vol. 29. С. 437.

208 Marx K., Engels F. Selected Letters. М., 1948. С. 264.

209 Marx K. Forms preceding capitalist production. М., 1940. С. 7.

210 Engels F. The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. М., 1953. С. 165.

211 Marx K. Forms preceding capitalist production. С. 24.

212 Engels F. Anti-Dühring. М., 1938. С. 185-186.

The political system, social order and culture of the Xiongnu of the Mode era and his successors differed significantly from their previous way of life. Therefore, we have the right to assume that the development of the Xiongnu society had gone a long way before it took the form in which history finds the Xiongnu. At the same time, we should remember that Mode's creation of the Xiongnu power was late compared to the development of the Xiongnu people and society. Mode only improved and slightly reformed the existing system.

End of Condensed Excerpt

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