Russia, and Trade Relations of the Khazaria Epoch

ANCIENT RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS IN THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND NATURAL EXCHANGE1 A short and interesting piece.

Standard histories of the 18th, 19th, and even 20th centuries misrepresented the IX - XIV centuries with distorted bias. Perhaps they worked with all that they knew, and extrapolated the reasons they thought were behind it. Here Gumilev demonstrates an analysis to compare written records with each other and with the undeniable events that could only happen under certain scenarios. Trade was one of these events that provided a more accurate understanding.

Historical aspects of economic and social geography need clarification. So, in Ancient Russia there was both exchange trade and international trade, but the meaning and content of it were quite different from what we are accustomed to now.

Exchange trade between forest Slavs and steppe cattle grazers nearby was always carried out peacefully. Trade with spinners made of Ovruch slate was also carried out. This did not exclude constant wars, which, however, in the XI-XII centuries took place between Polovetses and Pechenegs or between Radimichs and Northerners, i.e. nomads fought with nomads, and farmers with farmers. Our present task is not to examine the reasons for these "feudal" wars.

International trade, which flourished along the caravan routes from China to Spain, looked little like the current struggle for markets. Only luxury goods were traded: silk, furs, wax, human slaves - and the buyers were only rich rulers (The 1%). In modern times, this trade would be called "foreign exchange”, FOREX, or illicit drugs.

These merchants did not take part in wars. On the contrary, by paying duties, they enjoyed the patronage of all kings, sultans, khans and princes. Market wars came later as a phenomenon inherent in capitalism.

But as soon as this is so, the conclusion is that medieval trade was of no importance for geographical [378-379] study of the people and therefore of no interest to us. This is fundamentally wrong! It had a very strong influence on interethnic contacts, and not simply, but in a complicated way. Sometimes this trade led to the death of peoples, sometimes - to their temporary flourishing, sometimes - to their economic breakdowns. And in this respect, the situations that took place in the Black Sea steppe region in the pre-Mongolian period, directly related to the fate of our Motherland and its peoples, and are most indicative. On this representative material, it is relatively easy to solve the problem of the role of trade.

The increased attention to the Russo-Slavic collisions has generated many private concepts, more or less witty and always contradictory. Their analysis would lead us from ethnology to the field of historiography [11, pp. 25-39]. But this gives a reason to characterize not the Slavs and Turks, but the Slavologists and Turkologists, which is not the task of our research. Therefore, we can limit ourselves to the analysis of two concepts: polito-logical and economic. The first one was formulated by A.E.Presniakov [17], anticipating A.Toynbee's theory of "challenge and response" [24, p.570], the second one by N.A.Rozhkov [18], whose views were continued in M.N.Pokrovskij theory of "trading capital" and struggle for trading ways [15]. This aspect of M.N.Pokrovsky's views is not organically linked to his other statements, although both were rejected in the course of further research [3, p. 112].

When explaining major historical phenomena, such as the emergence or the disappearance of a particular "civilization" (we call it "culture"), the question always arises: "why?" A. Toynbee rejects all natural influences - biological and geographical - and offers his original concept. "Man achieves civilization not as a result of a superior biological gift (heredity), or geographical environment (easy living conditions are meant), but as a response to a challenge in a situation of special difficulty that inspires him to make an unprecedented effort." [24, с. 570]. That is why one of the chapters of his work is entitled "The Dignity of Unhappiness”.

What are these challenges? Sometimes bad natural conditions: the swamp around the Nile, the rainforest in the Yucatan, the sea around Hellas, and in Russia - snow and frost. Or perhaps the cause of England's prosperity is the fog of London? The author is silent on this.

The second group of challenges - attacks of foreigners, which, according to A. Toynbee, also stimulates the development of civilizations, [379-380] because the attacks must be repelled. As an example, Austria appears, as if because it was overtaken by Bavaria and Saxony, because it was attacked in the seventeenth century by the Turks. But, as you know, the Turks attacked Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, and Byzantium, to which they responded by surrendering. And from Vienna, the Turks were driven away by the hussars of Jan Sobieski, whom the Turks did not summon at that time. The example does not confirm the concept, but contradicts it.

This long digression is caused by the fact that A.E. Presnyakov independently of A.Toynbee and before him (1907-1908) gave the same explanation of the blossoming of the Kiev principality: the threat of the nomads from the South Ossetia and the Ottoman Empire.

1 Izvestiya VGO, vol. 119, 1987, vol. 3, pp. 227-234.

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The creation of a military princely and druze organization in Kyiv was caused by these steppe people. [17, с. 1437]. But for its service to the cause of European culture the Kyiv area "paid with early tearing of its forces..." [17, с. 145]. Another version of the concepts of "the eternal struggle of the forest and the steppe".

In the interpretation of A. Е. Presniakov much, if not all, is unclear.     

Kiev was captured not by the Pechenegs, but by the Vikings, the Pechenegs were allies of Igor and Svyatoslav for a long time, whose tragic death is an episode worthy of a separate study. And then the Pechenegs supported Yaropolk and Svyatopolk against Vladimir and Yaroslav, i.e. participate in the strife, no more. The attack on Kiev in 1,036 is connected with the change of religions, and at that time and it really meant a change of political orientation.

The Oguz Türks asked Vsevolod I for an alliance and a place to settle. Kipchaks were defeated a month after an accidental victory on the river Alta by Svyatoslav of Chernigov at Snova, and 3,000 Rus' men were enough against 12,000 Kumans. The war of 1,093-1,116 was initiated by Russians, and in the XIII century Russians go to the Kalka to save Cumans from Mongols. Why would it be so?

And the principle itself?! If one need is enough to create a strong state, why are they created so seldom? Why the same state was not created in the XIII century, when the need was even more acute? And why the Kievan princes never subdued the Pechenegs and Polovtsians, but the Slavs? And how cruelly! Apparently, the Slavs did not need a strong power in Kyiv, although Kyiv was a center of trade with Europe. Furs and precious goods, expensive fabrics, wine and spices were carried from Kyiv and through Kyiv [17, p. 146]. And what went to Kyiv?

This is where N.A. Rozhkov's economic concept, accepted by A.E., comes into the dispute. Е. Presnyakov without criticism [17, p. 65]. [380-381] This is not a condemnation. N.A.Rozhkov appears to be quite right when he writes: "The foreign commerce of that time was characterized by two distinctive and extremely important features: firstly, trading activity was an occupation exclusively of the social top, Princes, their cohorts and a small group of wealthy citizens; the mass of the population did not participate in it, because they did not sell, but gave away hunting and beekeeping products as tributes; secondly, foreign commerce did not affect......the necessities... They received everything they needed in kind, sending only a surplus to the foreign market and exchanging only luxury goods" [19, p. 24-25].

But it is similar to "trade" with the Indians of Canada and the Zulus of South Africa. It is a way of enslaving a country by deceiving and the drinking of the rulers. It is the program of the "colonizers of the age of initial accumulation" of capitalism, destructive to the peoples who became its victims. And it is shared by N.A. Rozhkov. He, like all the above authors, argues that "in the 11th century with the fall of the Khazar kingdom and the triumph of the Polovtsians in the southern and southeastern steppes the trade with Arabs weakens and finally stops completely, because the Polovtsians cut and destroyed the former route for this trade. [18, с. 152]. Hence, N.A.Rozhkov concludes that the Kipchaks were the most dangerous for the Old Russian state [20, p.5-6].

Н. N.A. Rozhkov should have asked about the affairs of the Caliphate, which in the X-XI centuries was divided by the Karmatians, Deylemites and Seljuks. Warfare there was incessant. There was no one to trade with and nothing to trade with! We should know that merchants in the steppe, from China to Germany, enjoyed immunity, for which they paid duties.

That is not the main thing; but why did the Russians need the scarce trade? This is not "forest and steppe," but the worship of Mammon.

With the beginning of XX century the worship of transit and their own deficit trade in a number of historians turns into an obsession, inherited by some Soviet historians from the past era of the historiography of the problem. P.I. Lyashchenko saw the nomads of the "wild steppes of the south" as the cause of the slow historical development of the Eastern Slavs [10, p. 25,60]. How to understand this? Was it really so necessary for the eastern Slavs to give [381-382] their furs through their princes to merchants and usurers for free, in the form of tribute! С. V.V. Yushkov also bemoans the defeat of Khazar Khaganate, a state of predatory slave-traders and speculators, as a "negative" phenomenon in the economic development of Rus [22, p.9-10]. P.P.Tolovko points out that the defense and "protection of trade routes was headed by Kievan princes and was conducted in the interests of all Rus'" [21, 9-10]. [21, с. 6]. But why Kiev was sacked first by the Suzdal inhabitants in 1,169, and then by Chernigov inhabitants in 1,203?

Even V.V. Kargalov, who was very unkind to the small peoples of our Motherland, writes that in the XII century. "Rare quarrels did not happen without this or that prince inviting the pagan to his aid" [9, p.49]. Hence, the Kipchaks and Russians already formed a single ethno-social system, and the number of Russians reached 5.5 million, while the number of Kipchaks was several hundred thousand [16, p.98]. Of course, the trading relations of Rus' with the East in XII century suspended: the eastern beads disappeared from the stock of the village burials [9, p. 58]. It is a pity, of course, but one could not go to the East any more.

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Russian furs were coming in. And foreign merchants lost most of their income. But the tax pressure on the population decreased: to feed the prince and his cohorts of Slavic men was easy, but to saturate the world market, was probably, not under their power. Therefore, in the 12th century in Rus, there were people who sympathized with the Polovtsians, and there were those who hated them.

But if you think about it, this point of view is not so original. As was shown above, Chernigov and Seversk princes learned to find compromises with the Cumans, Vladimir Monomah spoke to the Cumans from the position of force. On the one hand, he suppressed their independence and included the western nomads into the Rus lands, on the other hand, he concluded with Kipchaks "19 worlds", i.e. used them as allies against other Rus princes. Both positions excluded injustice against the Cumans. With them the princes were able to come to terms, and even, perhaps, better than among themselves. For the contemporaries of the events, but their imaginative interpretation by the historians of the XIX-XX centuries would have seemed unreal.

There was a third program, however, only in Kiev, at the court of Grand Duke Sviatopolk Izyaslavich. It was carried out by "uny" (young) associates of Svyatopolk II. The name does not show their true age, it was simply the name of the party, which relied on merchant capital and had a Polish-German orientation. It was this party that pushed [382-383] the Grand Duke into wars, because the captives were sold into slavery to the merchants who took them to Regensburg and Venice for further resale in Egypt. Greeks were competitors to these merchants, and therefore the metropolis was in opposition to Sviatopolk, and Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra, the rival of the metropolis, Sviatopolk supported. The chronicler Nestor worked in Lavra: the orientation of the chronicler is obvious [6, p.171-172].

So, the Kumanophobia of XII century was a program of foreign merchants and their acolytes in Kiev. It was profitable for them, and their position can be explained. Historians of the XVIII-XIX centuries had not yet had time to study the history of the Great Steppe and were fantasizing about it. But for the science of the twentieth century, these fantasies are inappropriate. It is the views of this party that the listed authors repeat.

No, the Russian science of the pre-revolutionary period was not backward, but not advanced. The Juridical school confronted the economic school in the most acute question of the history of Ancient Rus', the problem of the eastern neighbors. The conclusion of both schools was the same: "beat the savages". How this coincides with the American solution to the Indian problem: "The good Indian is a dead Indian!" And how disgusting that solution is today! Americans themselves are ashamed that their ancestors gave out bonuses for the scalp of an Indian, as for the tail of a wolf. We, fortunately, have no reason to be ashamed of the past. Our ancestors befriended Polovtsian Khans, married "red Polovtsian virgins", accepted baptized Polovtsians into their milieu, and their descendants became Zaporozhsky and Sloboda Cossacks, replacing the traditional Slavic suffix of belonging - "ov" (Ivanov) with Turkic - "emko" (Ivanenko).

Ethnoses appear and disappear in historical time, so in order to understand the geographical problem of ethnogenesis, we must learn historical science - the history of events in their connection and sequence. The history of not texts, not institutions, not cultural influences, but the history of deeds, and only then you can get the reliable material, which would not shock the reader who can understand what he read and critically perceive it.

Let us listen to the other side as well. We cannot reproach the above historians that they were inattentive to the chronicles, acts, glosses and ancient Russian literature. No, they knew it all perfectly well, and their research does not lose its value... under one, indispensable condition: the chroniclers themselves were men of their time and fixed their attention on extraordinary events, [383-384] devoted bright pages to them. But it would be a mistake not to notice the general background, which for the chroniclers and their readers was so obvious that they paid no attention to it.

That is why the most careful study of the annalistic information can only give a distorted picture of events. But using extensive material from the history of neighboring countries allowed A. I. Yakubovsky to treat critically the banal understanding of the history of Rus' and the Cumanian steppe as an eternal war not for life, but for death. Back in 1932, he wrote: "Historiography, filled with stories of military clashes with the Cumans, failed to notice the fact that the relations between the Russian principalities and the Cumans steppe are more typical and normal not for raids, but intensive commodity exchange". [23, с. 24].

Other researchers, whose competence does not arouse the slightest doubt, expressed even more confidently on this matter. "V.A. Parkhomenko [12, p.39] writes: "The idea of an eternal principal struggle of Russia with steppe is obviously an artificial and far-fetched origin.      В. A. Gordlevsky is even more categorical: "...the official, church-inspired idea of a people living not in cities, where the Christian faith was established, but in the steppes, comes... from the west... - The cultural ties between Kyiv and the West brought also the view of the Cumans as a "God's baton" - God's scourge" [2, 487]. [2, с. 487]. And below V.A. Gordlevsky points out that as the mutual habituation goes, there is a change of the political. In the 12th century they become closer and friendlier, and "grow into everyday life", especially by means of mixed marriages in all social strata [2, p.487]. Thus, we face two mutually exclusive concepts, solidly argued on both sides, which leaves the problem open. Let's try to solve it by the "panoramic" method, as the analysis of the annalistic texts was done by us in a special work [7, p. 92-100], thanks to which reliable information on which it is possible to base broad conclusions.

Cumanophobia is based on unconditional trust in the estimates of the author of the “Tale of Igor's Campaign”. However, although the genius and antiquity of the poem are not subject to doubt, a critical perception of it, as of any source, is mandatory. Evaluations often arise at the expense of personal sympathies of the author, his connections, tastes and purposes, which are unknown to us, descendants. [384-385] The credibility of the information can only be established by correlating the judgment of the ancient author with the undeniably established facts. It is enough to make such a comparison to make sure that the author of "The Tale of Igor's Campaign" was biased [8, p. 73-82].

On the other hand, the second concept corresponds to indisputable facts. In the 10th-13th centuries trade routes from Kiev to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov functioned freely, and Russian cities stood in the middle of the steppe: Belaya Vezha on the Don and Belgorod on the Lower Dniester, which would have been impossible if there were constant military clashes that took place within Rus' itself, like princely feuds.

As for the political unity of the steppe peoples, supposedly capable to resist the Kyiv Power in X-XII centuries, it is a myth. Constant internal clashes over pastures were aggravated by the institution of blood feuds, which left no room for reconciliation, much less unification. A steppe khan was more likely to find a compromise with a Russian prince who believed that "there is no judgment for daring in a fight", rather than with another steppeman entirely bound by the clan traditions. That is why the Hungarians, Bulgars, and Alans left their native steppe giving way to the Asians: Pechenegians and Terks, who were pressed by Cumans (Cumans or Kumans were a Turkic nomadic people from Central Asia comprising the western branch of the Cuman–Kipchak confederation who spoke the Cuman language.) in the Siberian and Aral steppes, just in the time when the powerful Kievan Khaganate strengthened in the Russian land. So is it possible to think that that sovereign state could be threatened by disparate groups of runaways, especially since the nomads were not able to take the fortresses? And raids and counter-raids are small-scale warfare, characteristic of all medieval countries.

When Vladimir Monomakh put order in Russia, and in 1,111-1,116 transferred the war to the steppe, the Polovtsy were defeated, split up into several tribal unions, and found allies with those princes who hired them for a fee. The independent or "wild" Kipchaks remained behind the Don and became allies of the Suzdal princes.

Indeed, if the Cumans did not capitulate in time, but continued the war against Rus, they would have been completely destroyed. The ox-drawn carts move across the steppe at a speed of 4 kilometers per hour, and over rugged terrain even slower. But Russian cavalry trotters could cover 15 kilometers, and in khlyntsev (quick pace) - 8-10 kilometers. So, the nomads, and even more so the winter huts, were in fact defenseless against Russian attacks, especially because the light Cuman cavalry could not withstand the onslaught of heavily armed [385-386] Russians, and maneuverability did not matter when defending wives and children in carts. Finally, the Polovtsian winter huts were neither mobile nor fortified, whereas the Russian fortresses reliably protected their inhabitants, and the forest was always a convenient shelter for fugitives. The Polovtsian Khans would have been unwise if they had not considered all these circumstances. But they were clever and preferred alliances with the Chernigov, Galitsk and Suzdal princes against the Kievan princes, because they relied on the Torks, with whom the Cumans were hostile. That's why the Kievan chronicles are so unfavorable to the Kipchaks. Presumably, Chernigov chroniclers wrote the same about the Oguz Torks and Black Clobukes, but, unfortunately, their works have not survived.

The steppe populated by the Cumans is cut by the wide river valleys, where remained a local population that did not submit to the newcomers, and did not merge with them. These were the descendants of the Christian Khazars - vagrants. Their presence deprived the Cumans of a reliable rear and made their position extremely unstable. And the order that the Cumans brought with them from Siberia did not correspond to the situation they faced in Europe.   

The decisive role in the weakening of Cumans was played, on the one hand, by their wide spreading out from Altai to Carpathians, and, on the other hand, by their wide emigration: for example, in 1,118, under the invitation of David IV, khan Atrak departed to Georgia with 45 thousand soldiers. Cumans appeared in Bulgaria, Hungary and Byzantium not less often, and many of them were sold at the slave markets of Iran and Egypt, where they were turned into gulyams, guards-slaves of Muslim sultans. There they made a career and even reached the highest levels of power, such as Ildegiz, who founded his own aga-beg dynasty in Azerbaijan.

Indeed, in the conditions of almost annual peace treaties and marriage contracts many Kipchaks began converting (often entire clans) to Christianity as early as the 12th century. Even the son and heir Konchak Yuri was baptized.

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В. Т. Pashuto calculated that despite the discord of Russian princes, Cumans' raids touched only 1/15 of the territory of Russia [13, p. 213], while Russian raids reached the Don and the Danube, bringing Cumans into submission.

The process of ethnic exhalation took place steadily, but slowly among the Kumans. This leaves an opportunity to find their place in the configuration of political forces. The enemies of Cumans [386-387], Pechenegs in XI c. willingly accepted Islam and were friends with Seljuks. It means that Cumans were in a contra version with the Muslim world and thus were forced to seek an alliance with the Orthodox Byzantium and Russia [1, p. 101-108]. Until the middle of the 13th century, the Cumans served as a barrier against the Seljuk onslaught from the east and as allies of Rus' in its confrontation with the Hungarians and the Poles. Everything changed only in the 14th century.

Perhaps here lies the reason for the transient scientific error. The usual situation for the inhabitants of Moscow Rus', which lasted until the XVIII century, i.e. before the conquest of the Crimea, was extrapolated into antiquity, in the IX-XIII centuries. Three hundred years of war on the southeastern border of Russia obscured the phenomena of quite a different nature, because the Crimea and the Nogai hordes could hold on for so long only because the powerful Ottoman Empire stood behind them. But the Polovtsians and Torks had no such support.

Even in the gymnasium (first schools) textbooks, which formed the thinking of the future historians, the invented term "steppe-nomads" appeared, though in fact the ethnoses which inhabited the Great Steppe differed among themselves in the mode of economy, life, religion, and historical destiny. It was enough not to take that into account for the correct conclusion to become unattainable.

Ancient Rus', losing its strength, bears little resemblance to Moscow's energetic, industrious, swelling with new passionarity. We, the people of the 20th century, are used to the rhythms of the acmatic phase - the youth and maturity of an ethnos. That is why it is difficult for us to imagine that our ancestors, who gave way to us in life, lived to a deep old age, which also has its own charm, but not the one we are waiting for.

The discreteness of ethnic processes is difficult to imagine for people brought up on evolutionism, but even those had a hard time overcoming medieval notions of history as “a simple change of rulers”. However, if we overcome the innate sluggishness of thinking, we can get rid of many perplexities, avoid many strains, and come closer from the answer to the questions "what" and "how" to the answer to the questions "why" and "what to what" in Rus', and in the Kipchak steppe.

All of the authors mentioned above and those omitted considered the problem from one side, the Russian side, i.e. biased. And if the same thing and in the same way was written by a miraculously survived Kipchak historian? Everything would have turned out just the opposite and just as incomplete! For example, V.V. Kargalov [387-388] lists operations of Suzdal and Chernigov princes, in which Polovtsians took part ... and concludes that Polovtsians are bad people [9, p. 49-54]. And M.S. Grushevskiy writes about disastrous campaigns of Suzdal and Smolnian to Kyiv... And condemns "katsapi" [5]. What is it: two equal biases; or Science?

And after all it is possible to do without profanation of the problem. B.D.Grekov suggested to give up the traditional simplified view of nomads as purely "external force" in relation to the Rus [3, p.112]. The power of Russia in comparison with scattered hordes was undoubted, and therefore they acted as mercenaries and federates, gradually becoming “russified” and drawn into the general life of the Kiev state [4, p. 462-466].

S.A. Pletneva made a great contribution by introducing the periodization of the Cumans history [14, p. 260-300]. Indeed, if someone wanted to compare relations between Russia and France and wrote that they have always been friends, he would hardly be approved. Relations between states change, and the patterns of change are not simple. To denigrate it gives not only an academic error, but also an excuse for chauvinism and racism, which is very bad. Therefore, let us try to offer a solution that excludes violations of scientific historiographical methodology.   

The transition of the three passionary groups, separated from the three steppe peoples: the Kangols (Pechenegs), the Oguzes (Torks) and the Kumans (Polovtsians) in a collision with the Kievan Kaganate, created a situation of ethnic contact. But because both Steppe and Slavs had their own ecological niches, a symbiosis was created, which gave rise to another zigzag of history.

The mixing on the border went on, but as mestiziation, i.e. a process taking place not on the population, but on the organismic level. The children of mixed marriages were part of the ethnic group in which they were raised. Racial conflicts were ruled out, while confessional conflicts were solved painlessly thanks to the two-faith beliefs of that time.  No one needed the fusion of peoples, i.e. integration of the ethnic groups, because the Rus' people did not want to live in the watershed steppes, without the river and forest, and it would be too difficult for the Cumans to graze their cattle in the forest. But the Polovtsians needed carts, axes, and utensils, and it was convenient for the Russians to get meat and cottage cheese at cheap prices. Exchange trade, which did not yield profit, connected the steppe and the Slavs of the forest-steppe strip in economic-geographical system, that also led to the formation of military [388-389] political alliances, characteristic for the left-bank princedoms and Ryazan. The zigzag of the historical process gradually straightened by the XIII century.

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LITERATURE

1. Belyavsky V.A. About the eternal antagonism between the agricultural and nomadic populations of Eastern Europe. - In the book: Slavic-Russian ethnography. L., GO USSR, 1973, pp. 101-108.

2. Gordlevskiy V.A. What is a "Bare Wolf"? - Selected Works. Т. 2. Moscow, Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. 1961.

3. Grekov B.D. Kievan Rus and the problem of the origin of Russian feudalism by M.N. Pokrovsky. - In: Against the historical concept of M.I.Pokrovsky. Collection of articles. M.-L., 1939, part 1.

4. Grekov B.D. The Kievan Rus. М., 1949.

5. Grushevskiy M.S. The Kievan Rus. St. Petersburg, 1911.

6. Gumilev L.N. The Tale of the Khazar Tribute (Experience of a critical commentary of the annalistic plot). - "Russian Literature", 1974, No 3, pp. 164-174.

7. Gumilev L.N. Does a Geography Need for Humanitarists? - In: Slavic-Russian ethnography. Л., GO USSR, 1973, pp. 92-100.

8. Gumilev L. N. Can a work of fine literature be a historical source? - Russian Literature, 1972, No 1. pp. 73-82.

9. Kargalov V. V. External political factors of development of feudal Russia. Moscow: Nauka, 1967, pp. 4-61.

10. Lyashchenko P. I. History of Russian national economy. M.-L., 1927.

11. Mavrodina P. M. Kievan Rus and the nomads (Pechenegs, Thorks, Polovtsi). L.: Nauka, 1983, p. 86.

12. Parkhomenko V.A. Traces of the Kipchak epos in the annals. - Problems of source study. М.- L., 1940, p. 3, с. 39.

13. Pashuto V.T. The foreign policy of Ancient Rus'. Moscow: Nauka, 1968, p. 462.

14. Pletneva S.A. The Polovtsian land. - In her book: Ancient Russian principalities of the 10th - 11th centuries. M., 1975, pp. 260-300.

15. Pokrovskiy M.N. Russian history in a very brief sketch. М, 1933. [389-390]

16. Popov A.I. Kypchaks and Rus. - Uch. zap. Leningrad State University. Ser. of History, Sciences, 1949, issue 14.

17. Presniakov A.E. Lectures on Russian history. M., 1938, vol.1, 1939, vol.2.

18. Rozhkov N.A. Russian history in comparative-historical light. 4th ed. M.-L., 1930, т. 1.

19. Rozhkov N.A. A review of Russian history from a sociological point of view. PART I. Kievan Rus. 2-е  2-d Edition. М., 1905.

20. Rozhkov N.A. Russian history in comparative-historical light. 4th ed. M.-L., 1930, т. 2.

21. Tolochko P. P. The Kiev land. - In the book: The Old Russian Principalities of the 10th - 11th cc. M.: Nauka, 1975, с. 5-57.

22. Yushkov S. V. Feudal relations and Kievan Rus. - Uch. zap. of Saratov University, 1924,  Vol. 4, pp. 9-10.

23. Yakubovsky A.U. Feudal society of Central Asia and its trade with Eastern Europe in X-XV centuries. X-XV centuries. - Materials on the history of Uzbek and Turkmen SSR. Vyp. 3 - Л., 1932.

24. Toynbee A. J. A Study of History. Abridgement of volumes I-VI, by D. C Somervell. N. Y. Toronto:  Oxford Univer. Press., 1946. [390-391]

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