9. About Ukraine

This was written 3 years after the coup but 5 years before the current war. The Donbass war had already been raging for these years.

         Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov said: "We cannot prevent storms, landslides, tsunamis, but we have the weather service, which predicts the weather.  Similarly, my theory of Ethnogenesis may have the applied meaning. But, unfortunately, it has not come to that yet.   These words of the scientist have a direct relation to the recent events in Ukraine.

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[In this chapter there is a large interpretation of past - present - and future events, about Russia. You may say “what is the basis to makes such and interpretation”? Of course you don’t have to adopt it. Maybe you are better informed? Or maybe skepticism is justified? This is one Russian scholar’s idea, Yevtushenko, and uses Gumilyov to back it up. Gumilyov himself didn’t say these words. But he lived in the Soviet Union, and was tempered by that.]

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         To begin with let's recall the history of Southwestern Russia. As already mentioned, the fate of the Russian people who fell under the rule of Lithuania and Poland was very sad. (I think even 500 years ago). Gumilyov wrote: "The Wielko-, Bilo- and Malorossians, who were subjects of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, were on the whole quite loyal to the Polish government. However Poles treated their Orthodox subjects with disdain and even contempt.  The Russian nobility of the lands occupied by the Poles, was deprived of all rights to the ranks, and hence any possibility to make a career; Russian merchants and urban craft population was completely forced out of trade by the Jews, who enjoyed the protection of the Catholic Church and the Polish pans.  The Russian population of Poland had a choice not so hard, but amoral in itself: Either convert to Catholicism and become Poles, or suffer all kinds of humiliation. Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians made enormous sacrifices in order to preserve not even freedom of conscience (they did not have this freedom), but the Orthodox faith itself.

        Orthodoxy in those circumstances acted as an indicator of belonging to a very specific ethnic group: "their own". To renounce faith meant renouncing your ethnicity. Russian people could not do that. But, as often happens, the top brass betrayed - the majority of the Orthodox Episcopate, supported by part of the Russian nobility, bent to the conclusion of a union, that is, union with the Catholics. In 1596 they recognized the primacy of the pope and the Catholic dogmas (while preserving the Orthodox rite) and became known as Uniates or Greek Catholics.

         After the adoption of the Catholic (Brest) Unia the position of the Orthodox in the western regions, which was already difficult, became simply unbearable. Orthodox priests who did not accept the Unia were banished from churches and forbidden to baptize, perform weddings or give masses at home. Monasteries were taken away and desecrated. People could not baptize their children, marry legally, nor administer the major Christian sacraments of confession and communion.

         In the cities, an Orthodox man had no right to enroll in a craft shop, which left him without a skilled job. The Orthodox had to live away from the center of the city, in separate quarters. A dead body could be taken out of the city only through those gates where the unclean were taken out. There were cases when the corpses of the Orthodox were ripped out of the graves and thrown out to be eaten by dogs. The Catholics and Uniats officially equated the Orthodox with bydło, the cattle, the Polish word for "cattle".

        In the countryside it was no better. Because the Polish magnates were lazy to manage their estates, they found for themselves vigorous intermediaries - Jews (who were invited to Poland back in the 14th century by king Casimir the Great).  The Jews became the managers of the Polish pans - the factors - and squeezed the money out of the Russian peasants. Gumilyov wrote: "Lands, water bodies, hunting grounds, hayfields and even Orthodox churches were taxed". The latter particularly angered the Orthodox: the Jew-factor used the keys to the church just as the keys to the barn, opening the church for service at will, depending on the payment of the parishioners of the appropriate amount."

         The Orthodox people endured all this bullying for a very long time, but when their patience ran out, it broke out. It began in Zaporozhye, where Russian and Ukrainian passionaries had long since fled from the nobility's oppression, and where, over time, a new sub-ethnos was formed - the Zaporozhian Cossacks. The Cossacks' rebellion was supported by other Cossacks of the Polish Ukraine, first of all by those whom Poles refused to enroll to the "registry", i.e. to the service class.

At the head of the rebels in 1648 was Bogdan Khmelnitsky, who had a personal grudge against the Polish panes. One of these Panas, an assistant to the governor, first robbed Khmelnitsky's farmhouse, and then ordered his ten-year-old son to be brutally flogged. On the third day the boy died. Bogdan Khmelnitsky, failing to obtain justice from the Polish government, went to Zaporizhia. There he threw out a cry: "Enough for us to tolerate these Poles, let us gather a Rada, and let us defend the Orthodox Church and the Land of Russia!" This call was picked up by all the Cossacks.

        Initially, the Cossacks did not intend to secede from Poland at all. Their demands were brief: "first, to enroll in the Cossacks all those who wish ... second, to prohibit the propaganda of the Catholic union in Ukraine ... and to return the churches seized by the Catholics to the Orthodox, allowing everyone to freely practice his faith; third, to expel the Jews from Ukraine".

         At first the rebels were lucky, the Polish troops were defeated in several battles. A wave of severe Polish and Jewish pogroms swept through Ukraine. But then the Polish nobility gathered its strength and struck back. The Cossacks were threatened with complete defeat. And then Hetman Khmelnitsky turned to Moscow for help. Moscow government, after much deliberation, went along and in October 1653 made a decision to incorporate Ukraine into the Moscow state. "Unification with Russia saved the vast majority of the Orthodox population of Ukraine, and that is why on January 8, 1654 in Pereyaslav the assembled Rada supported the policy of joining Moscow by saying: "We will under the Moscow Tzar, an Orthodox". Soon the tzar of Moscow moved his troops, and the Poles were defeated along the entire front.

        However, the war for the Left Bank of Ukraine did not end there, it lasted another half century. Most of the hetmans and Cossack elders after the death of Khmelnitsky either defected to the Poles, or tried to fight for a "Free Ukraine" - independent from either Russia or Poland. The latter was Mazepa, who was supported only by part of Zaporozhyeans, already set against the union with Russia at that time. The point in the history of reunification of the brotherly peoples was put only in 1709, after the battle of Poltava.

         And now let's ask a question, why militant (then passionate) Poles still lost the war for Ukraine, and numerous attempts of Ukrainian hetmans to join Poland, or create an independent, "self-styled" state - did not lead to anything? If we look at this from the perspective of ethnogenesis, i.e. digging deeper, the answer to this question will be different from the many explanations given by Marxist or liberal historians (who take everything from "economics" and "politics").

          Gumilyov wrote: "Like most of our contemporaries, the Polish Pan and Ukrainian petty officers were convinced that their will, transforms life, and so they ignored objective natural dependencies. Thus Poles believed that it was enough to attract Cossack petty officers by giving them noble privileges, and all Cossacks would serve faithfully; that one could convince the Russian Orthodox that the Catholic faith was better, and they would become zealous Catholics.

        In fact, of paramount importance was the common super-ethnic affiliation of Russia and Ukraine, the mass support of "their own", which were co-religionists. Rational plans of strong-willed and clever power seekers were crushed against this universal feeling of unity, like waves against a rock. Two closely related peoples - Russian and Ukrainian - were united not thanks to, but in spite of the political situation, because the people's "volim" or "not volim" invariably broke those initiatives that did not conform to the logic of ethnogenesis.

        And here it is necessary to turn to modernity. If we look more closely, we see that the situation in Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR resembled in many ways the situation of the second half of the 17th century. Hetmans Kravchuk, Yushchenko and the other Timoshenkos were against Russia, while the majority of the population was for Russia. /* Note: This was the case before the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of an all-out information war against Russia, despite twenty years of "brainwashing" through the anti-Russian media and education system. Ukraine was shaken then for almost 60 years, today's Ukraine has been shaken for over 25 years. (The penultimate "shaking" occurred under Hetman Skoropadsky who sold out to the Germans in 1918, and then under Petlyura who surrendered Ukraine to the Poles. Everything went according to the same scheme: most of the people - to one side, most of the "politicians" - to the other).

         However, in terms of ethnogenesis, the situation today is more complicated. The people's "will" toward Russia still exists. Even if it is less pronounced. But firstly, Russia has not yet gained strength. Secondly, and this is the main thing, the former passionarity in the Ukrainian people is gone: "Volim, we will".  Who would do everything for us! There is none of that yeast - the Cossacks! Ukrainian (Little Russian) passionarity is lower than the Russian.

        Most Ukrainians-Malorussians have long turned into peaceful inhabitants living according to the "peripheral" principle: "I live on a farm, I don't touch anyone ... And you don't touch me". And this harmonious passivity, often bordering with subpassionality, has its own explanation: many Ukrainian passionaries for three centuries were drawn away by Russia, where they went to make a career (only in the XVIII century, the Razumovsky brothers, Chancellor Bezborodko, and many others). After all, Ukrainians by their stereotype of behavior even then were more diligent servants than Russians.

        In addition, in XVII-XVIII centuries. many passionate Ukrainians ran from Polish Right Bank Ukraine to Left Bank (before the annexation of the Right Bank to Russia in 1793) and settled in the border lands of Slobozhanshchina - the modern territories of Sumy and Kharkiv regions. 

That is why the eastern Ukrainians were more passionate than the central Ukrainians. Well, under Catherine II, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, which for a long time drew in the most desperate Ukrainian passionaries, were finally abolished and the "degree" decreased. Part of the Cossacks, after a long ordeal, resettled to the Kuban and began to be called Kuban Cossacks.

        But still the main difference from the situation of the XVII century is not even in the reduction of the overall level of passionarity, but in the fact that today there is simply no united Ukrainian people. After annexation of the western lands to Ukraine in 1939 - torn off (!) since the 13th century - a foreign element - Galicians (western Ukrainians) was artificially included in the composition of Ukrainians, which is a separate non-complementary ethnos. Which, we must emphasize, in a large part was chimerized by close contact with an alien European super-ethnos.

         Gumilyov didn't write about this zigzag in the history of the Western Rus, (Ukraine) but we know that according to the theory of ethnogenesis, the ethnic chimeras appear not just anywhere, but in the areas of super-ethnic contacts, when the incompatible ethnic substrates are simmering in the same cauldron for a long time. In Galicia, deeply wedged into the territory of Europe (see map) such substrata were: Russians of Galicia, Poles, Jews, Czechs, Germans, Hungarians, Wallachians, etc. In other words - representatives of at least two different ethnic groups. That is - representatives of at least three (!) super-ethnoses. As a result of this centuries-old brew and appeared "Euro-Ukrainian" ethnic chimera that gave birth to a religious anti-system - uniatism - an unnatural hybrid of Catholicism and Orthodoxy.

        Western Ukrainians-Uniats are comparatively few, but they have what the central Ukrainians-Malorussians lack - high passionarity. And there is an explanation: according to Gumilyov's observation, in chimerical ethnic constructions there is always a release of negative energy.  It is the Western Galicians who are now the very yeast that is stirring up Ukraine. But, alas, their energy is aimed not at gathering, but at destroying the country. Hence the conclusion: as long as these two completely different, mutually repulsive ethnic systems - the "Ukrainians-Galician" and Ukrainians-Malorossians - live under one roof, there will be no peace in Ukraine. Not under any circumstances.

        And the point here is not only the negative complimentarity between the Galicians and the Little Russians (not to mention the Russians). The fact is that the anti-system by its destructive nature cannot get along with anyone - it is fatally set up for the destruction of the world around it. Therefore, from the point of view of modern Ukro-fascists - it is necessary to kill everyone: first the Russians, then the "wrong" Ukrainians, then the Poles, Hungarians, Romanians and so on. And if suddenly there is no one to kill, then we must look for enemies among our own people, and also kill them.

        The Uniates are a typical psychology of sectarianism. The first Greek Catholics of the 16th and early 17th centuries. - are renegade traitors who, out of fear and self-interest, abandoned the faith of their fathers. It was with them that the negative selection began. Over time, the descendants of the first traitors were joined by new apostate traitors. And then the Uniate anti-system began to reproduce itself, including the "chimerized" people (often anti-humans) torn from their ethnic groups. The accumulation occurred gradually, mainly through mixed marriages and illicit relations, and by the beginning of the 20th century the quantity turned into a destructive ethnic quality. Therefore it is not by chance that Bandera was the son of a Unitarian priest, and Hrushevsky was the son of a Uniate high school teacher. Let us note, however, that today the Ukro-fascist anti-system includes not only the Uniate Church, but also totalitarian sects, Nazi organizations, and a considerable part of the intelligentsia, who are always and everywhere the weak link.

        In addition, numerous sectarians who fled to Ukraine from Russia, beginning in the 16th century, also made their historical contribution to the negative selection. From the first Protestants and Khlysts (from the 17th century) to Dukhobors and Molokans (resettled in the 19th century).  In addition, the German colonists, from whom the heresy of Shtundism-Baptism originated, also had a negative influence. And various dissenters. (This, by the way, goes back to the question of why in modern Ukraine there are more sectarians than in Russia ("per capita") and why superstition, divination, and other occult practices are widespread).

        We know that any anti-system that penetrates a weakly-passionate environment begins to develop in it like a cancerous tumor, launching metastases into areas of least resistance. Initially the Greek Catholics absorbed Galicia, then its suburbs (except Transcarpathia), and from the late 19th century they began to spread their influence on the indigenous Ukraine - Little Russia. The First World War, which caused repression of the surviving Orthodox population of Galicia, stimulated this expansion. Then, after the Trotskyist campaign of "korenization" in the 1920s and the annexation of Western Ukraine in 1939, the process of ideological infection of the Little Russia was sharply accelerated. Well, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the long-awaited holiday came on Bandera street! And the total "Ukrainianization" began.

        It was this home-grown Uniate (Catholic/Orthodox mixture), anti-system, and not the Austrians and Germans who used it, which in the XX century gave rise to the Nazi ideology of "Ukrainianism", which today the "pig-headed" Western Ukrainians in aggressive form impose "non-vidual" Ukrainians, i.e. Little Russians.

        It is this destructive anti-system and its sectarian "allies" that are the source of that aggressive "metaphysical nihilism" that fueled all the Ukrainian Maidans from below and, after the 2014 coup, became the ideology of the war in Donbass!

       This is the real reason for the rabid Russophobia.

       The reasons for the split in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is this.

       The reasons for blatant immorality, total criminalization and rampant gangsterism - is this.

        Now the question is: Who benefits? The answer is obvious. All this benefits the second, "governing" Ukrainian anti-system - the liberal and oligarchic, which is now under the control of the third, global anti-system - the Fininternals, which, in fact, is the main customer and beneficiary”.

        Thus the misfortune of Ukraine lies in the fact that in the conditions of the decline of passionarity, which began in the pre-truth period, in its weakened body nested not one anti-system, as in Russia, but two: liberal and cosmopolitan and Ukro-Nazi! (Moreover, "liberal" today - more powerful than in Russia, and even more - in Belarus, which in this sense is luckier). This one means that in addition to headquarters and commanders, they have soldiers. These fascist soldiers were first used on the Maidan, then armed, and thrown into the Russian East. Hence the conclusion - this is for the long haul.

         To understand what happened to Ukraine, it is enough just to list the "heroes" who came to power on the wave of the liberal-fascist revolution of 2014. They are: the oligarch president, with the psychology of a typical gangster; his aides: the Baptist speaker and the prime minister Scientologist (i.e. a "scientific" Satanist). Then come the homosexual minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine, a CIA agent, a number of deputies-pedophiles.  And many, many other "heroes", whom the judicial psychiatry diagnoses as incurable sociopaths, i.e. misanthropists. (In general, this gop-company is even worse than the one that came to power in Russia in the 90's.) If we draw up a collective portrait of the liberal anti-system of 2014, we will see the glassed-hating eyes of Madame Tymoshenko, the hysterical grimace of the homo-radical Lyashko, and the sly smirk of Mr. Kolomoysky.

        Thus, we can state that the conflict that has broken out in Ukraine has purely ethnic overtones: the dual liberal-Banderov anti-system has launched a total war against the resurgent Russian system, which, it should be emphasized, includes not only the ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, but also the Little Russians and other peoples friendly to the Russians. The same, we note, occurred in Yugoslavia in 1991-95, where the Catholic-Croatian anti-system, the Nazi Ustasha, was activated against the Orthodox Serbs.

        In terms of ethnology, the purpose of the overseas customers of this war is to prevent the unification of fraternal nations, which began in the Russian world, at the super-ethnic level. That is, the "Maidan" in Kiev is a direct reaction of the globalizers to the revival of Imperial Russia and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (then - the Customs Union). In this way, they kill two birds with one stone: they drive a wedge between the Russians and the Little Russians, and get a convenient springboard and a weapon to attack Russia.

        The war unleashed by Kiev in the spring of 2014 has already been called a civil war, which is incorrect (a civil war is a war within an ethnic group); this, we repeat, is an inter-ethnic conflict provoked and managed by "liberals" under the overall leadership of foreign structures. The two poles of this war are the "Westerners" of Galicia and the Russians of the Southeast. And the fact that Ukraine uses mostly zombified Little Russian majority as cannon fodder does not change the essence of the matter, but is an elaborate technology for the extermination of the Slavic brothers.

        Other conflict factors: ecclesiastical, political and even social, from the point of view of ethnology, are consequences stemming from underlying ethnic contradictions, exacerbated by the introduction of anti-systems.

       For example, the church split in Ukraine virtually coincides with the division along ethnic lines. Greek Catholics are mostly Galicians (Western Ukraine). The schismatic "Filaretists" (UOC-KP) and "autocephalists" (UAOC, etc.) are the same "Westerners" and some of the Little Russians infected with the Galician virus of nationalism - mainly representatives of the "staretshchina" and "svidoma" intelligentsia (Western Ukraine and partly Center). The true Orthodox (UOC MP) are the majority of Little Russians and all Russians in Ukraine (Center and Southeast). Therefore, it is not surprising that the chimerical President Poroshenko is popularly dubbed "semi-uniat," since he, as a half-Jew, takes communion with both Greek Catholics and Orthodox. At the same time, sincerely considering neither one nor the other as his own.

/ *Note: In 2019 Ukrainian schismatics and heretics united into the so-called PCU, but the essence of the matter did not change. At the same time, the UOC MP was purged of foreign elements, which strengthened it and brought it to the forefront of the fight against ecumenism. (In contrast to the ROC, which has yet to undergo such cleansing.

[/*Note: The events in Novorossia have shown that the first ones are already visible. Besides, they don't need many of them.]

       If we take the social (anti-oligarchic) component of the "people's revolution," we will find that it is also directly connected to the main, ethnic component, because there is not a single ethnic Malorussian or Russian among the leading Ukrainian oligarchs.

        The conflict in Ukraine is complicated by the fact that in this situation, the demoralized majority of the population, the Little Russians, are caught between two fires. And sometimes literally. On the one side are the liberal fascists, frightening with repression and appealing to Ukrainian patriotism, and on the other are the Russians who rebelled in Donbass. Native Ukraine is at a loss: the majority of Ukrainians are with the Russians at heart, while their minds, damaged by anti-Russian propaganda, are in doubt. It takes time for the Ukrainized brothers -Malorossians to come to their senses and realize what a trap they have fallen into. As long as it takes to "tighten their bellies."  And "make their heads snap". And then a little more.

                            There is, alas, no other way...          

         As for the Ukrainian statehood, knowing the theory of ethnogenesis we can safely assert that there will be no "independent state" in Ukraine. Never! And if there will be anything, it will be totally dependent. As a matter of fact, we observe the presence of such a "state" today.

        Time will show how events in this "state" will develop, but in either case the uniatical Western Ukraine will have an unenviable fate. Exhausted, sooner or later it will go to the West - which will be very correct from the ethnological point of view - and probably will be used as a tool against the new enemies in Europe. Most likely, in this war it will be finished off, just as Hitler was once finished it off. Ethnic history shows that with the positive dynamics of ethnogenesis, the local anti-system is doomed: it is either destroyed by the anti-system-protector, or destroyed by a positive system, or it destroys itself. It is a matter of time.

        As for the indigenous Ukraine, it simply doesn't need an independent state. Because it was and remains part of Greater Russia. As the saying goes, "one doesn't look for the good". Which, however, does not exclude the presence of formal signs of statehood in the future cultural-national autonomy.

        But even if to dream and imagine that the Ukrainians suddenly want to build a sovereign state, they are unlikely to succeed. And not only because the corrupt-bourgeois element guided by self-interest is too great among the indigenous Little Russians, but because they lack the most important thing - the state tradition, embodied in the flesh and blood, that is - in the ethnic archetype. It happened so that since the XIV century Ukrainians lived either under someone or with someone, and they, naturally, could not develop state instinct. Instead, they developed an individual and local instinct, oddly mixed with the instinct of the Cossack and partisan.  (And that is why, as historian Kostomarov said, "the soul of the Southern Russians is not as open”).

        In terms of ethnogenesis, we are dealing with that rare case in which the formation of the ethnic stereotype of behavior in addition to the main natural-climatic factor (mild climate, fertile land - individual-hutor, (farmstead), petty-bourgeois psychology) was noticeably influenced by the disturbing borderland, and most importantly - the factor of "pressing" ethnic surroundings in the buffer super-ethnic zone (Poles, Jews and others). This, we repeat, is pure geography - the contact zone of the three super-ethnoses.

        Gumilyov, in one of his interviews, spoke about the Little Russian stereotype of behavior:   "...You can't fight the Ukrainians for their desire to eat galushki with sour cream, have a garden and a table nearby, and not to build factories, which they are not interested in".   And we can add: not to engage in big politics, which they are also not interested in.

         That is why there has never been and can never be a normal political elite in Ukraine. What is commonly called the Ukrainian political elite has always resembled, on the one hand, a dexterous cheat, whose task is to deceive everyone without getting punched in the face, and on the other - a shameless whore, ready to sell herself to anyone who pays more.

        And, strictly speaking, there is no one to blame. It's such an ethnic story. In order simply to survive under the brutal pressure of the Polish pope, the Jewish factor and the Catholic Church, the Little Russians had to constantly adapt to the situation: tolerate, cunning, twist, and to some, like the Registered Cossacks, to serve themselves. In the end, they had to revolt.

         All the passionarity of the Ukrainians for centuries has been directed not on building their own state, as the Russians, but to the liberation from the Polish captivity and to defend the Orthodox faith.         

         In this difficult struggle Ukraine held out - the brother-Malorossians preserved their national-religious identity, setting an example of survival in the most adverse geopolitical and ethnic conditions! This was their main historical task, which they fulfilled. Therefore it is senseless and even harmful to try on someone else's historical tasks and demand from Ukrainians something more, from the point of view of ethnogenesis.

        Thus, we can state that the fate of the fraternal Ukraine is directly dependent on the fate of Russia. Ukraine itself cannot cope with the misfortune that fell on it. Today it is the weakest link in the Eurasian super-ethnic system. That's why the western globalist financiers (and not only them!) took it seriously. They have invested a lot of money and resources in the "self-management" of Ukraine, and they are not going to give it up so easily. Brzezinski stated bluntly that if Russia and Ukraine were to reunite, "it would again be an empire”. And this cannot be allowed.  Besides the geopolitical and military interests, the West also has economic interests. (This is the third hare to be slaughtered.)     

        Of course, in its current, weakened state, Russia cannot afford to make any sudden moves. It takes time to gain weight after a serious illness. But something can already be done, and it is being done. Since 2014 the Russian geopolitical vector is quite defined: the gathering of lost lands began.

        Obviously, the fight for Ukraine today is a fight for Russia. However, we repeat, one should not count on a quick victory. And the point here is not only in the still insufficient economic potential of Russia for a major war. It's all about the underlying factor - the ethnic factor. Only when Russia comes to its senses after the breakdown, finds its own internal Russian unity, and finally gets rid of the "liberal" fifth column, will the two brotherly peoples, Russian and Ukrainian, be able to reunite. And the pledge of this future unification is the fact that, despite the rabid anti-Russian propaganda, many Little Russians still associate their future with Russia; as they were and remain part of the Russian super-ethnos. Today, these people are frightened and disoriented, but the time will come and they will have their say. 

         And now the question: So does Gumilyov's theory have an applied meaning, or is it nothing more than a "novelist's fantasy from history"?  

On patriotism and anti-patriotism. The pendulum of history

         Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov taught to see history "from the height of the flight of an eagle". If, using his method, to look at the whole period of Russian breakdown from a certain angle, we will see a very interesting oscillating dynamics. This is the dynamics of the confrontation of already known to us forces - national and anti-national. Let us attempt to trace all of the Russian reigns in a given parameter over the past two hundred years.

         Under Alexander I (1801-1825), the anti-patriotic party in the ruling elite and in "society" finally forms and gains strength. (This party appears under Peter I. Then, during the "Bironovshchina" period, it strengthens; under Tzarina Elizabeth Petrovna a small patriotic reaction follows, but under Catherine II the Westerners are again strengthened.) After the defeat of the Decembrist-Mason revolt, the invasion of liberalism in Russia is suspended; under Nicholas I (1825-1855) follows a harsh conservative-patriotic reaction (more conservative than patriotic). But during the reform era of Alexander II (1855-1881), liberalism - already with a revolutionary undertone - breaks out, and the anti-patriots sharply increase their influence. Under Alexander III (1881-1894) there is again a turn in the direction of patriotism and follows "freezing of Russia", although not very deep. Under the last Tzar Nicholas II (1894-1917), anti-patriots gather into a serious political force and seize power in February 1917. The Provisional Government pursues an openly pro-Western, anti-national policy. The empire begins to fall apart.

        So, for the first hundred years, the dynamics are negative.

         After October 1917, the Bolshevik internationalists stop the collapse and begin to assemble the empire, but not for the sake of national greatness, and in the name of world revolution. They are even more anti-patriotic than the liberal Westerners. However, in the 1930s, there is a Stalinist patriotic upheaval and a change of course. The country moves to the national rails. But not all the way through. (Ideally, the next step would have been a turn in official ideology - a transition from Marxism-Leninism to Russian socialism.)

        After Stalin's death in 1953, under Khrushchev there is again an anti-patriotic backlash. Under the early Brezhnev, as under Alexander III, a moderate-conservative reaction follows. But ten years later, from the mid-1970s, the same liberal, anti-national line is reinforced. Under Brezhnev, who is still alive but powerless, there is a creeping revolution in the party elite, orchestrated by Andropov. The heirs of Trotsky and Bukharin - the "liberals" - take the upper hand, and they prepare for "perestroika. Well, since 1985, it was the turn of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the destroyers of the red empire. In the early 90s, radical reformers of the Chubais type come to power, who begin to conduct antisocial and anti-national policies simultaneously. These are no longer just anti-patriots, but fierce anti-patriots. By the end of the 90s, the country was approaching a precipice - a little more and total collapse.

        But this does not happen, and under Putin there is a turn toward patriotism, albeit weak and inconsistent at first, but still. Again the national instinct for self-preservation kicks in. Slow regeneration of an almost completely paralyzed national organism begins.

        So, over the past hundred years, the dynamic has been half-hearted, positive and negative. There have been setbacks, but there have also been patriotic rises: the most powerful was in the 1930s-1940s.

        We conclude. If we look closely at the more than two-hundred-year history of the struggle between patriotic and anti-patriotic parties in Russia, we see that it is a pendulum swinging back and forth. Russia is beaten, but it does not surrender. However, it cannot win either. It cannot return to its soil, to its Russian home. It almost came back once, under Comrade Stalin, but not for long, and only “almost”.

          We have to admit: in almost 200 years of passionary decline, our ethnic system has suffered a significant loss. It's still pretty far from zero (the passionarity is average), but compared to what it was, the losses are serious.

        How can this end? Obviously, according to the logic of ethnogenesis these two hundred year swings of the pendulum should end with a stable conservative-patriotic reaction, which would mean the entry of Russia into a stable phase of inertia. Therefore, we have every reason to believe that the post-independent patriotic swing will be much more powerful and prolonged than all the previous ones. It is also supported by the fact that in recent years patriotic sentiments, including among young people, have intensified and Stalin's popularity is growing. And this despite all the efforts of liberal propaganda and the degradation of education.

        It took us through the "wild 90s" not only for ordinary Russian people (who quickly realized everything), but also for many idealistic intellectuals and our homegrown bourgeoisie to finally realize that under the smokescreen of "democratic reforms" we had all been trivially robbed. And the country - lowered. It became clear that no one in the West is waiting for us and that, if anything, we have nowhere to flee to. We are all in the same boat. We have to pick up and defend our own country. And from now on, to the surprise of the traditionalist patriots, bourgeois patriots began to appear in our country, although it’s not very consistent.

        Nevertheless, this gives hope that, in the transition to the phase of inertia, the age-old red-white-green split in our ethnos will be overcome in a natural, peaceful way. In any case, the fact that the imported "colored" contagion did not take root in Russia in the post-Yeltsin period suggests that the days of the radical liberals of the 90's are over. They have been rejected by leftists, rightists, and those in between. The immune system of the national organism, although it has been working with some creaking, but it has been working.

        Again, the Russian bear weakened considerably in the crisis, but it did not die. Such things have happened in history: they thought he was killed, but it turned out he was only wounded.

         When we finally come to our senses and return to our Russian home, the first thing we must do is to take a large broom and sweep out all the foreign ideological contamination that has accumulated in us for 300 years. On the ideological line: Protestantism - Enlightenment (18th century) - liberalism - left-wing globalism (20th century) - modern globalism.

         Let us stress once again that the ideology of national revival must absorb everything that has been developed by Russian culture over a thousand years. There should be no place for imported "isms. The new state ideology must be based on its own, national foundation. And first and foremost - on the Russian collectivist tradition and Orthodoxy. And also on the centuries-old tradition of strong, imperial power. This is our main resource. Like it or not, but a thousand years of Orthodox culture and four hundred years of Eurasian empire-building simply can not be removed from the history of Russia. (It can only be done in the obscuration phase.)

         What is the Russian imperial type? This is a person who feels all of Greater Russia - from Brest to Vladivostok - as his own land. And not just feels it, but is ready to fight for it! (Let us repeat that patriotism, in its deepest essence (!), is an innate quality. It stems from a keen sense of one's own land and is transmitted at the genetic level, from distant ancestors.) For example, the author of these lines is a typical Russian imperialist. My maternal ancestors came to Siberia back in the 17th century. Therefore, Siberia is my land! Other ancestors migrated from eastern Ukraine in the nineteenth century. And Ukraine is my land! My ancestors on my father's side are from near Mogilev. And Belarus is my land! And there are millions of us in Russia. Gumilyov calls it a super-ethnic community. This is our strength!

        (The problem of "liberals" is that they, in general, have no sense of the earth!)

         For the last hundred years Russia has gone through the most terrible ordeals: it was sick with liberalism from the beginning of the 20th century, then milled by the international Bolshevism of the 1920s-30s, and today is grinding up the "liberalism" of the 1990s.  It's time to come to our senses.

          Russia's enemies have studied Russian history very well, and know all of our strengths and weaknesses. (A. Zinoviev accurately noted that, "They studied the USSR as a hunter studies an elephant to kill it with one shot.) That is why Brzezinski said straightforwardly back in 1993 that after the collapse of communism in Russia, the main threat to the West would be "Russian nationalism, coupled with Orthodox fundamentalism". The Russians have nothing left. Everything is correct. There is nothing left.

         We have already talked about "Russian nationalism", but what is "Orthodox fundamentalism"? It's not a very good term, but if you look at the changes that occurred in our country after 1991 from the religious point of view, the thousands of churches that were restored from the ruins and rebuilt again in just twenty years - that's "fundamentalism". And the millions of Russian people who came to take communion with the relics of Mount Athos is "fundamentalism". And the work of "traitors in cassocks" to corrupt the church from within, and anti-church propaganda in the media - this is a reaction to "Orthodox fundamentalism"!

        But the true meaning of the spiritual revival of Russia is not even in this, but in the fact that the deep, metaphysical core of the Orthodox consciousness of the Russian people - weakened, but spiritually alive - is still the messianic idea of "Moscow - the Third Rome"! And here we need to emphasize - "messianic". This means that "the fate of the Russian people" - is a continuation of sacred history from the Creation.  This means that after the sacred history of the Old Testament, the New Testament, the First Rome, and the Second Rome-Constantinople, Russia "was granted from above to become the repository of the true faith until the Second Coming of Christ and the Last Judgment". Because the Fourth Rome "shall not be".

         It follows that the Russian people are not only the heir to its own millennial history, it is the spiritual heir to the entire Christian sacred history. And in this sense - he is the chosen people. Not towering above other peoples, but carrying a heavy cross. The Russian people since the 16th century are holding back the world from the fall into the kingdom of the Antichrist. Until now! It’s Despite the temptation of 19th century materialism, and falling away from the Church in the Soviet period, and the demonic temptation of the "consumer society" in the post-Soviet era.  And it is precisely because of this salvific hold on the Russian people that they are so hated by those forces that have already worshipped the Antichrist.

        The Third Rome today is the last bastion on the path of Satan's army to world domination. In a spiritual sense, Russia is the main obstacle to the enemies of humanity; much more serious than the high-passionate and populous civilizations of Southeast Asia and Latin America. For the main front is spiritual!

        With the Russian man, who understands all this, and who feels such a responsibility before God and before the world - nothing can be done! He cannot be bought or intimidated! Such an Orthodox fundamentalist is invincible. And so, of course, he poses the main danger to Russia's enemies.

        Some will say: Well, when was all this! Since the elder Philotheus prophesied about the Third Rome, 500 years have passed! And there are no people like that left, you say yourself that the passionarity is not the same. - Yes, not the same. The losses are great. But there are people left. There are fewer of them than there were, but they remain. They're just not visible yet. It's these people who still hold everything together!

        Remember Dostoyevsky: "...the sick man will be healed and will 'sit at the feet of Jesus'... and everyone will look on in wonder...".

         From the scientific point of view, the main engine of history is passionarity. From the spiritual point of view - the will of God. And God is on our side.

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                                               Where your treasure is,

                                               there your heart will be also.

                                                                    (Matthew 6:21)

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