8. The national question

On the errors in Soviet national policy

         We have already mentioned above the fallacy of the theory of building a world system of socialism. However, mistakes made by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in international relations were not limited to foreign policy. The same mistakes of orthodox Marxism were also made by the Soviet authorities in conducting national policy inside the USSR. 

         In this connection let us try to answer one more question, based on the theory of ethnogenesis: what are the ethnological preconditions for the collapse of the USSR? Much has been said and written about the collapse of the USSR, but as far as we know, this problem has not yet been seriously considered from the perspective of Gumilyov's theory.

          It is well known that true national equality reigned in the USSR. Unlike other empires, we did not have an economically and politically dominant nation; and not a single nation, (political ethnic group), even the smallest, had disappeared. So there have certainly been many achievements in Soviet nationality policy. However, along with this there were serious strategic blunders.

         The main mistake in the national policy of the VKP(b) - CPSU, ((b) means Bolshevik), was the installation on gradual leveling of all ethnoses under one template - "the Soviet people". That is, a people without nationality. This installation is derived from the ideology of Marxism, in which the first place, were the classes, and the nations comes afterwards. After the world revolution, gradually all the nations in the world were to merge into one fraternal cosmopolitan family. (That is why, let us note, the modern "Fininternian" globalists (International Finance), have a very favorable attitude toward the left-wing globalist Marx.) And it was not only orthodox Marxist theorists who believed this, but many Soviet leaders of the Stalin era as well. From Molotov, when he was already retired, the writer F. Chuev once asked: "Will national peculiarities be preserved under communism? - Well, it will be erased. - But that's bad! - Why bad? We'll get rich..."  And after all, Molotov was for a long time the second man after Stalin. Stalin, let us note, made no such statements.

        The installation of the leveling of ethnic groups according to the social pattern led to serious distortions in the Soviet nationality policy. In the first years after the revolution all religions and national customs (i.e. cultural-ethnic traditions), were attacked and declared to be remnants of feudalism. This affected Orthodox Christians, Buddhists, Shamanists, and, in particular, Muslims, most of whom lived under Sharia law before the revolution. For example, why was it necessary to "liberate the women of the East" if they did not need liberation, or to outlaw religious holidays and fasts, or to forbid kalym (bride price, dowry)? Why was it necessary to take children away from the northern peoples and place them in boarding schools, where they were torn away from their age-old nomadic and hunter-gatherer way of life, lost their traditional skills, and often turned into village homeless?

         It was an attempt, doomed to failure in advance, to correct (level down that is, to the lowest denominator), the ethnic stereotype of behavior, which, as we know, is the result of a long natural process - ethnogenesis. And which in principle cannot be "corrected" or meddled with.

         In addition, from the first years of Soviet power, the mixing of peoples within the USSR was encouraged in every possible way. First of all, the practice of relocating Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians to the national outskirts - to the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, then to the Baltics, Western Ukraine, and Moldavia.    

         This national policy of the party caused a natural discontent of the national minorities, and were associated (blamed on) the Russian authorities. And all these grievances they remembered.  Then it would come up in the late 1980s.

         Shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gumilyov said in one of his interviews: "There is no need to impose on people of other ethnic groups a way of life, which is not particular to them. There is no need to offend people because their behavior differs from ours. There is no need to force everyone to live together. It is better to live separately, but in peace.

        Thus, it turns out: the good that was in the ideology of socialism - the ideas of social justice, equality, friendship of peoples - helped build a unique state of the USSR. And the bad, or rather unrealizable, came into conflict with life, and was one of the reasons for the growth of local nationalisms in the Union and autonomous republics. After all, the same Uzbek or Yakut nationalists were not so much dissatisfied with "russification" as with unification by nationality.  Although they could call it russification. Such a dialectic comes out.

         Now we should say a special word about the situation of the Russian ethnos in the USSR. After all, what happened? First, as a result of the "internationalist policy" conducted by the Communist Party, the Russians lost a significant portion of their lands. The borders between the RSFSR and the Union republics, as well as the borders within the RSFSR, were drawn very freely, according to the principle - we draw, we live! As a result, not only Novorossia and Donbass and (later) Crimea were torn away from Russia, but also North Kazakhstan, the lands of the Terek and Ural Cossacks, and certain territories within Russia. The Russians did not even get their own statehood.

         Secondly, and this is the main thing, during the formation of the USSR under Lenin's plan, the national republics were given not only the right to be assigned territory, but also the right to secede from the empire. And this already contradicted the logic of the existence of the empire itself!

        Few people know, but Lenin's famous "right of nations to self-determination" stemmed not from the desire to protect small nations, but from the strategic orientation of the world revolution, in the prospect of which in 1922 Lenin still continued to believe. It was assumed that the European and Asian peoples, overthrowing their capitalists governments, would be able to voluntarily join such a free "union of equals. (The result would be the United States of the World, which Lenin wrote about back in 1915.) But these countries are unlikely to join the unitary, centralized Russian state that Stalin proposed (under the autonomy plan).

         It is indicative that already after the formation of the USSR, in early 1923, Lenin proposed to make even greater concessions to the national republics, and instead of a Union, to create a Confederation, with only a military and diplomatic center. The reason was the inflated "Georgian case" involving Ordzhonikidze, who "greatly offended" the Georgian Communists, which was inflated by Stalin's opponents. Fearing a split in the Party, which would have hurt the further advancement of the world revolution, Lenin was ready to meet the demands of the "national-deviationists," among whom the most zealous were the Georgian and Ukrainian party leaders. Lenin promised to speak in support of them at the next congress. And he would have, but his illness prevented him from doing so; after his third stroke, Lenin had not recovered.

         Another unpleasant result of the "internationalist" policy of the CPSU (b) leadership was the policy of "korenization" of the national outskirts, which was officially proclaimed in April 1923. This was a deliberate blow to the so-called "Russian chauvinism”. At the first stage of korenizatsiya it was planned to replace the Russian language with national languages in administrations, schools and cultural institutions. In Ukraine, for example, this program was called Ukrainization. The employees of the state institutions were to learn the Ukrainian language before January 1, 1926, under the threat of dismissal. It was decided to Ukrainianize newspapers, book publishers, theaters, signs, inscriptions, etc. That is, everything the eye can see.

         Eurasianist N. Alekseev, anticipating how such excess of national freedom can turn out, wrote in the late 20s: "By creating a large number of national republics within the Soviet Union ... the Communists ... helped to awaken local nationalism, which cannot but threaten to become an independent force.  This is extremely threatening phenomenon, perhaps one of the most dangerous for the fate of not only the Soviet government, but also the future of Russia".

        So, let us highlight the main thing: with the creation of national state formations within the USSR and the introduction of the paragraph on self-determination in December 1922, a time bomb was laid in the structure of the USSR, which exploded at the turn of the 1990s. And it struck first of all 25 million "foreign" Russians, most of whom found themselves living in the national republics, not of their own free will, and in one day. They were either artificially cut off from Russia when new republics were formed (Novorossiya, Northern Kazakhstan), or they departed in 1930-60s due to organizational selection - to raise economy and social sphere of national outskirts (that is, besides those who were evacuated during the war).

        Especially many Russians left Russia under Khrushchev, who, as a spontaneous Trotskyist, did not understand that in addition to the class approach, there was also a national approach! Khrushchev seriously intended to build communism in the USSR in twenty years (by 1980). And if so, the mixing of different ethnic groups was seen as a step toward merging the nations into a single "Soviet people" ("communist nation"), as a prerequisite for building communism.

        Ultimately, all these artificial displacements led to the fact that the main principle of the existence of peoples in a multi-ethnic state, formulated by Gumilyov: "Near but apart", was violated. When ethnic groups live in peace without interfering in each other's affairs (as already mentioned - ethnic symbiosis, or another version - xenia). At the same time, we emphasize that the main vector of migration then was directed not to Russia, but from Russia.

          Historical practice shows that national conflicts erupt when mass ethnic mergers and interpenetration take place. It is precisely mass, when the number of migrants is not in the thousands, but in the hundreds of thousands and millions. Gumilyov said: "Interethnic conflicts are as natural as ... the emergence of a spark from the arc of electricity.  And these conflicts are particularly acute when the mixing of ethnicities takes place at the super-ethnic level. This is what happened in the Baltics (a European super-ethnos), in Western Ukraine (a special region gravitating towards Europe), in the Caucasus (a super-ethnic crossroads) and in Central Asia (a Muslim super-ethnos).

         As a result, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, millions of Russians were persecuted (especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia) and were forced to flee from their "little brothers" back to their historic homeland in Russia. And those who could not flee ended up as second-class citizens in the former Soviet republics.

         Speaking about the situation of Russians in the USSR, we should pay attention to another distortion. It so happened that in the last decades of the Soviet Union, the standard of living of the Russian population was lower than in most ethnic republics. The national minorities in the Caucasus, the Baltic republics, and even parts of Central Asia lived richer than the national majority in perpetually poor Central Russia. And this is despite the fact that the national suburbs were lifted out of poverty mostly by Russians, and with Russian money. Enormous funds were thrown into creating local industry, science, education, and medicine. In Central Asia, for example, all this had to be raised from scratch. As a result, Big Brother gradually began to turn into a Poor Relative, drained of assets to prop up the Republics. And this, of course, did not add to the respect of non-Russians for Russians. After all, seek to be friends, as you know, with the strong and rich.

        So why are Russians in such a humiliated position? The roots go back there - to the Trotskyite-Bukharin "international", or rather - Russophobic policy. There is a well-known Bukharin's statement at the 12th Party Congress in 1923: "We as a former great-power nation ... must put ourselves in an unequal position ... Only with this policy, when we artificially put ourselves in a position lower than others, only at this price can we buy the trust of formerly oppressed nations".

        At the same time, the main task for such cosmopolitan leaders continued to be the fight against "Great Russian chauvinism”. Also in 1923 at the meeting of the Central Committee with the party leadership of the national republics it was stated that the bias towards local nationalism "is a reaction against Great Russian chauvinism”. The most ardent participants of the meeting called for "slitting the throat" of the "monster of great power" (Skrypnik), "eradicating it completely, cauterizing it with hot iron" (Zinoviev), not to relax, but to prepare for a long struggle, because "great Russian chauvinism will exist as long as there is a peasantry" (Mikoyan).  Here it should be emphasized - "for a long struggle".

        To this we should add that dislike of the Russian nation was, to a certain extent, inherited by many Marxists from their teacher, Karl Marx. During Soviet times, this Russophobia of Marx was hushed up, but the fact remains that Marx did not like Russia much, (and all the "Slavic scum", as he put it).

        He considered the Russian people as barbaric, "unhistorical", "counter-revolutionary", and therefore doomed to perish (!) in the fire of the world revolution. He seriously asserted: "Hatred of the Russians was and continues to be the first revolutionary passion. (So much for the "International"! -Author.)

          As for Lenin, he did not fall into such Russophobic extremes. However, his position on the national question was not unambiguous. Much here depended on the specific political situation. When necessary, Lenin called himself a "Great Russian," when necessary - he branded "Russian chauvinism". But more often he stigmatized it.

        Especially remarkable in this respect is his article, On the question of nationalities and "autonomization", dated December 30, 1922.  (the day of the formation of the USSR). In it, Lenin defends the nationalism of the oppressed "little nations" and angrily condemns the nationalism of "big nations". (Although the opposite has happened in history: small nations have oppressed large nations.) In addition to attacks on "Russian nationalism," the article speaks of Stalin's "fateful role". The expression "chauvinistic Great Russian scum" (!) is applied to him and it is explained that a Georgian can be "a coarse Great Russian bastard". At the same time it hits a supporter of Stalin, the Pole Dzerzhinsky.  On this subject Stalin would later say: "It's not Lenin speaking - it's his disease that speaks".

          It should be noted, however, that not only Lenin was sick with this disease - called the syndrome of the world revolution - but almost all of the "old Bolsheviks" were sick with it. And so it is not surprising that after the death of the leader of the world proletariat, Stalin had to enter into a bitter struggle with these old Bolsheviks, which lasted for 15 years and ended, as we know, in Stalin's victory. (Alas, a tactical victory.)

        Once in power in the late 30s, Stalin began to pursue the exact opposite national policy. This manifested itself in the deployment of personnel (the main thing!), in the economy, and in culture. The anti-Russian distortions of the 20s were overcome, the program of unbridled korenization was curtailed, and attacks on "Russian chauvinism" ceased. The concept of "Big Brother" began to take shape in the ideology. And during the creation of a unified economic complex, emphasis was placed on strengthening the economy of the native Russian regions. It is no exaggeration to say that the Stalinist national policy, even taking into account individual mistakes, was quite calibrated, without extremes - neither towards narrow nationalism, nor towards excessive internationalism. Shortly before the war, Stalin outlined his position as follows: "It is necessary to develop the ideas of combining a healthy, properly understood nationalism with proletarian internationalism. Proletarian internationalism must be based on this nationalism. (Here the word "proletarian" is a concession to Marxism.)

         On the whole, this was a return to the traditional nationalist policy pursued in the Russian Empire since the sixteenth century. Of course, that is as far as it was possible within the Soviet political and ideological framework. And the tzarist national policy, let us note, was very balanced and thoughtful.

        In any case, it remained so until the second half of the 19th century, when under the influence of Western ideas, there was an attempt to Russify Poland, the Baltic states, and Bessarabia. But even taking into account these liberal-conservative excesses (especially under Alexander III), we can say that the Russian Empire was not a "prison of peoples". Only two ethnic groups were limited in their rights: Jews (first for economic and religious reasons, and later for political reasons), and Poles (for political reasons). The other peoples actually had the same rights as the Russians. Moreover, the tzarist government granted the national outskirts certain benefits (in taxes, military service, etc.) and gave them complete freedom in the field of culture, religion and traditional way of life.

        That is, the Tzar did not try to remake different peoples into a kind of "community". The principle was simple: political and administrative control without interference in the "personal lives" of any nation. At the same time, the traditional tolerance and kind attitude to non-Russians was combined with the special status of the Russian people, as the main imperial people. In addition, pre-revolutionary Russia tried to prevent mass migrations and the mixing of ethnic groups, especially at the super-ethnic level (with the exception of the settlement of German colonists under Catherine II and Alexander I).

       Thus, the national policy of the "White Tsar", as a whole, was conducted in line with the Eurasian multi-ethnic tradition inherited by Russia from the ancient nomadic empires of the Huns, Turks, and Mongols. Red Emperor Stalin became the continuer of this traditional imperial policy in the extreme conditions of Russian breakdown. But - not for long.  After Stalin's death as the father of nations, the Trotskyist-Bukharin "international" line, was restored, although not in full.

        Under Khrushchev, all sorts of "cosmopolitans" came back to life. The persecution of the Orthodox Church resumed. The Russian village, custodian of traditional culture, was attacked. Once again, the straightforward attitude toward the formation of a chimerical ethnic construct called the "communist nation" prevailed. As a result, the RSFSR began to turn into a cash cow for numerous smaller brethren. Almost into an "internal all-Union colony”.

        There were four donor republics in the USSR: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Everyone else was subsidized. This naturally led to growing dissatisfaction among the Russian population: "Well, how much more can you feed them!" And it became one of the reasons for the political indifference that the majority of the population of Russia displayed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. (Solzhenitsyn played on this Russian discontent in his time, when he explained to us "how to build Russia").

          Thus, it turned out that the good Russian authorities, who conducted not even an international, but some kind of super-international policy, helped the poor and weak neighbors become richer and stronger. And formed in each, their own national elite, which naturally wanted to get more power and money, and therefore fell into extreme nationalism. Here's another reason for the growing separatism. How did nomenklatura Uzbeks or Georgians reason in the 80's? We live very well as it is, and we will live even better without Russians, who are a little bit boring! Friendship is friendship, but we want to live independently, after all, this is our land.

          And, by the way, one can fully understand them - every nation wants to live independently. The question is who will give it to you? The world has become very crowded. Therefore, there will always be a master for a small, homeless ethnic group, especially if it lives in an economically and strategically important region. But at that time our little brothers did not think about this. Just like they didn't think that Russia was sending them oil, gas, electricity, building materials almost for free. And they sold their apricots and tangerines in Russia at a high price. They got used to it, like they get used to breathing air. But when that oxygen was cut off, the nationalist frenzy of the early 90s gave way to a hangover.

         True, not all of them were. The thing is that many ethnic groups living in the Soviet Union had their own, so to speak, fifth column. It included those ethnoses, which were formally part of the Soviet empire, but not only were not part of the Russian super-ethnos, but were negatively complimentary at the super-ethnic level. They were a foreign, superfluous element in the super-ethnic system. These are, let us recall, the Balts, Western Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, and certain North Caucasian peoples. It is no accident that during the war, these peoples, for the most part, supported Hitler.

        For what they were according to the laws of wartime repression by Stalin. And it is no accident that it was there, in the late 80s, that the strongest explosion of nationalism, even more - their chauvinism occurred! It was among these peoples that Russophobic sentiments were strong, both in Soviet and pre-Soviet times. (Note that the USSR was no exception in this respect: for example, the Chinese super-ethnos does not include (and is negatively complimentary to) Tibetans and Uighurs, the European one includes Serbs and Greeks, the Indian one includes Kashmiris, etc.)

        If to look the problem of ethnic "fifth column" from Gumilyov's theory point of view (the scientist didn't touch upon this question very much), then it turns out that there is no one to blame. There is a violation of the laws of ethnogenesis on the one hand, and the logic of the formation of a military empire on the other. After all, the territories inhabited by these uncomplimentary peoples were conquered and included in the Russian state by necessity because they had the most important geopolitical (defense) value, especially the Baltic and Northern Caucasus.

        Of course, ideally, they should not have been included in Greater Russia at all, like, for example, Poland and Finland, which had become a headache for the tzarist authorities. Such alienated ethnic groups, no matter how much they might be pampered, would still dissent and strive to go back to "their own. Like, for example, after the collapse of the USSR, the Baltic returned to theirs, albeit to Europe's backyard, as provincials.

        However, this has always been the case in world history: all empires, during the period of passionate rise, went beyond their super-ethnoses (ethnos). At first, the new ethnic construction looked relatively well, but as the imperial power (passionarity) decreased, separatisms broke out on the outskirts, primarily non-complimentary. This, combined with other causes, led to the collapse of all empires without exception. Some of them collapsed in the acmatic to failure phases: the Mongol Empire, the Arab Caliphate, and the Ottoman Empire. Others were in the phase of obscuration: the Roman and Byzantine empires. Others (colonial) are in the phase of inertia: Spanish and British colonies.

        This natural ethnological pattern has a direct bearing on the question of why the Soviet Union collapsed.

        As long as the central power in the USSR was strong, the situation in the North Caucasus, Western Ukraine, the Baltics and other national areas was controlled. With the weakening of imperial power and a decrease in the passionarity in the Russian super-ethnos at the end of the fracture phase, marginal nationalisms naturally erupted.

        It should be stressed once again that in addition to the ethnic factor discussed above, the growth of local nationalism was also influenced by another factor - ideological (related to ethnicity!). As already mentioned, the separatism of the outskirts from the very beginning of the formation of the USSR was strongly fueled by the Marxist attitude towards the gradual erasure of national distinctions. Therefore, the outbreak of local nationalisms in the late 1980s was also prepared by the leftist-globalist nationalist policies that had been pursued with varying intensity by the Soviet government for many decades (with a break during the late Stalin).

        The separatist aspirations of small nations were a natural defensive reaction of many national identities against the attempt to deprive them of their own self, that is, of their, cherished by each nation, otherness. It was a natural reaction to the systematic policy (partly successful) of combining all the peoples of the USSR into one big ethnic chimera!

        As a result, it was the ideological factor that catalyzed the centrifugal processes in the great ethnic system called the USSR.

         Gumilyov said in a memorable 1991: "The 'parade of sovereignties' was not programmed in the course of ethnogenesis. It could well have been avoided if not for the "party line" pursued by the communist government. It consciously ignored the very fact of the existence of ethnic groups with their own traditions and stereotypes of behavior in the country, and thus provoked these peoples to secession.

         As Academician Panchenko said in this regard, "everyone was offended, and Russians were also offended".

On Nationalism and Internationalism

        Now let's try to answer the questions, what is nationalism and what is internationalism? We must emphasize again that internationalism under Lenin and internationalism under Stalin are two different internationalisms. Under Lenin, internationalism was cosmopolitan.

        Under Stalin, internationalism became great-powered. And that was it! Such a system of inter-ethnic relations, typical of the Eurasian space, Slavophiles called "unity in diversity".   Stalin, as a non-Russian man, was well aware of all the subtleties of imperial national policy. He was well aware of the dangers of narrow nationalism. Stalin by his pre-revolutionary experience in the Caucasus knew what the local nationalism is and how it likes to inflate the national intelligentsia. And what it could be fraught with for the imperial power. Stalin was well aware of the feudal psychology of the national elites, all these local princes, bays, noyons, beks and their nukers. And he kept them all in his fist.

        Red Emperor Stalin was clearly aware that the Russians were the backbone of the empire. That they are the center of power. That is why, as already mentioned, at the banquet to celebrate the victory in 1945, he called the Russians the most talented and guiding people. And then, already in a narrow circle, he added that he actually considers himself "Russian of Georgian origin”. And this is quite revealing. If in his early youth Stalin was a romantic Georgian nationalist, over time, he naturally turned into a Russian imperialist. That is, he rose from the ethnic level, to a more complex - super-ethnic.

         It is this kind of nationalism, at the level of super-ethnos, that we need. For Russia can either exist as a Eurasian military empire (super-ethnos plus complementary allies), or not exist at all! The times of narrow nationalism ("Russia for Russians!", "Yakutia for Yakuts!", "Bashkiria for Bashkirs!"), which some hotheads are still calling for, ended with us - back in the 16th century. When, with the annexation of the Volga region and the beginning of the annexation of Siberia, the small Moscow Kingdom (the Great Russian ethnicity) began to turn into a huge Russian empire, where over time more than a hundred other peoples united around the core Russian people. Narrow nationalism since then has been self-isolation followed by fragmentation from within. As, for example, it was with the very first Russian nationalists - the Old Believers.

        It is in this kind of national isolation that our enemies, who dream of dismembering Russia and returning it to the borders of Muscovy in the early 16th century, are interested! And those "Russian nationalists", who are calling today to unite with the "white people" from Europe to fight against "all the blacks", pour water on the mill of our enemies. The source of this "nationalism" is well known to us. It is Nazism. Or, in the language of ethnology, the Nazi anti-system, which by its destructive nature is no different from the anti-system of cosmopolitanism.

        All of the above, however, does NOT mean that nationalism as a cultural and spiritual phenomenon and even more so as an ideology of national liberation struggle ("defensive nationalism"), does not have the right to exist. There are no ethnicities on earth without nationalism. Not a single one. For when the national feeling disappears, the ethnos itself disappears.

        From the ethnological point of view - nationalism is that "unconscious sense" of intra-ethnic complementarity, which is expressed in a sense of patriotism, and which underlies the natural opposition of one nation to all others: "we are not us".

        And, again, this sense of unifying the ethnic collective should not be confused with chauvinism and fascism, which are ideologically aimed not at maintaining ethnic diversity (totality of nationalisms) and a complication of the ethnic systems (super-ethnoses), but at their simplification and destruction!

         Gumilyov said: "True nationalism consists not in borrowing from foreign ethnicities, and not in imposing their skills and perceptions on their neighbors, but in self-knowledge". This definition, at first glance unassuming, is in fact very profound. It means that we should not monkey around in someone else's way, and we should not teach others how to live, but be ourselves. And as God's gift to preserve our ethnic uniqueness. That is the inner strength of the people!

        As for broad nationalism at the super-ethnic level, based on Gumilyov, we can give it the following definition. Super-ethnic (imperial) nationalism is a feeling of all the peoples living in one geographical area of the sense of common historical destiny.

         Our geographical area is the Northern Eurasia - a vast territory from Brest (in Belarus, not from Lisbon!) to Vladivostok, and from "the southern mountains to the artic seas". Therefore it is even possible to expand our definition and call such imperial nationalism - Eurasian nationalism. More precisely, it will no longer be nationalism, but a geopolitical Union of Nationalisms. And in this union, of course, the main role must be played by the core, system-forming Russian people. Because without the Russian people, all the other peoples of Northern Eurasia will not be able to unite. This is a geopolitical axiom. (Well, for example, how can the Kazakhs and the Belarusians unite? And the basis of such a Eurasian Union should be the golden principle of "unity in diversity". For a complex system is stronger!

        Here it is important to emphasize that the idea of Eurasianism, of which we note, narrow nationalists don't have the slightest idea, is not to "let Tajiks into our cities," but to have Tajiks live (and work) at home, and at the same time not let the Chinese in. The Kyrgyz do not let Americans in. The Uzbeks do not let the Turks in.  Because Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan - this is also our land. Our common Eurasian land.

        Eurasianism is not a pernicious mixing and "self-dissolution in Asia". Eurasianism is an imperial (centralized) order, which is beneficial to all peoples, and covers everything from the regulation of migration flows to the construction of an integrated economy and the establishment of joint defense. Once again, let us recall Gumilyov's most important Eurasian thesis: "For the peoples of Eurasia, unification has always been much more beneficial than disintegration". Disintegration deprived strength and resilience; disunification in Eurasia meant making oneself dependent on neighbors, not always unselfish and gracious. This is what true Eurasianism is all about! The rest is from the evil one.

        But let's return to our history. If we look at the Soviet national policy from this angle, we see that in the Soviet Union the unifying principle (of Eurasian integration), in general, was respected. And this was the strength of the Red Empire. But another principle was not respected: "to be ourselves." And this was its weakness!

        In one of his last articles (in 1992, co-authored with V. Y. Ermolaev), Gumilyov wrote: "Local national movements perceive communist policy as a Russian national policy". Such aberration is the greatest delusion, because since October 1917, Russians were just as deprived of the opportunity to conduct their national policy as all other peoples.

        It is difficult not to agree with this. Everything is correct. However, in view of the material we have considered, let us make one correction. The strongest blow to the Russian everything, as already mentioned, came during the first wave of Bolsheviks - the Trotskyists. Who, for the most part, being Jews by birth, did not identify themselves with any nation at all. They were national-less and irreligious (as expected of globalists). Recall the famous definition of Trotsky - "nomads of the revolution" and the statement of Mekhlis: "I am not a Jew, I am a Communist".

        Therefore, we must still separate the Soviet national policy before and after Stalin. The facts show that under Stalin in the period from mid-1930 to 1945, this policy has changed to a patriotic Russian one. Although, of course, not completely. But, again, in the realities of the time, with the monopoly of Marxist ideology, this turn to the national rails and could not be completed. (Take, for example, the rather dark "Leningrad case," when an entire faction of "Russian nationalists" was destroyed.)

        And then we should not forget that Soviet nationality policy was conducted under the worst conditions of ethnic breakdown, i.e. at a time when any ethnic system suffered irreparable losses. Regardless of the anthem and flag. At such times, as mentioned above, one often has to choose between the bad and the very bad.  Therefore, far from idealizing Stalin, we must admit: everything that was done in Soviet national policy before and after him was done worse.

        Under Khrushchev (1953-1964), the leftist-globalist course of "internationalization" once again prevailed, with all of the consequences it entailed. (Khrushchev even suggested removing the nationality line from passports shortly before his dismissal!) Then, under the early Brezhnev (mid-1960s to early 1970s), this process was somewhat suspended. The globalist formula of "communist nation" was replaced by the less annoying "multinational Soviet people".  Khrushchev's open-door policy under the Iron Curtain was somewhat sheltered, the cosmopolitans were somewhat reined in, and the anti-Stalinist campaign was quietly shut down.

       At this time there was even an attempt at a Russian cultural revival. In literature, art, and film, the Russian theme resounded again (writers-villagers F. Abramov, V. Belov, V. Rasputin; filmmakers V. Shukshin, S. Bondarchuk; artist I. Glazunov, art critic S. Yamshchikov; patriotic magazines Molodaya Gvardiya and Nash Sovremennik).

        Interest in Orthodoxy revived. Among the humanities intelligentsia a movement of Russian-born authors (V. Kozhinov and others) emerged. Even Russian samizdat appeared. (V. Osipov).

        However, this national-patriotic revival did not last long, and from the mid-1970s the familiar liberal-internationalist line again prevailed. In accordance with which the fight against the Pseudo-Pentists and Russian patriots was unleashed. At the same time, the insidious neo-pagan project was launched against the Orthodox Church, within which the KGB had previously worked. Andropov was behind all of this liberal policy. His famous phrase: "the main concern for us - Russian nationalism"; dissidents later - we will take them overnight.

         Parallel to this was the process of power degradation: after Stalin's death, the imperial power began to weaken rapidly, and as soon as it finally weakened under Gorbachev, it erupted on the fringes. Again, friendship, even if one does not really want to be friends, is always with the strong.

         And here we come to very important questions. Why did the Soviet government, that is, the ruling Communist elite, degenerate and weaken? Why did it so quickly become bourgeois and almost lost its national identity, i.e. - its Russianness? Why did it allow the formation of a powerful "fifth column" within the system?

         By answering these questions, we will also answer the question of why the Soviet Union collapsed. After all, those mistakes in national policy, which were discussed here, could have been corrected. If the Russian people had not ceased to be the leading people. And if the ruling class had not rotted away. And had not given our country up to desecration and looting.

               Why did the Soviet Union fall apart? The ethnic aspect.

         Here we must again return to the phase of fracture, a key phase for us. As we already know, in the crisis the number of passionaries, the people who are the core of the ethnos, is sharply reduced. At the same time, the number of sub-passionarians - bums, "drunks," slackers, petty criminals, etc. - increases sharply.

        This goes to the question, "Where have the men gone?" If you put a Russian man from the 17th century side by side with an average Russian citizen of the 21st century, you will see a big difference between the two. Warriors, monks, pioneers and robber Cossacks have been replaced by petty bourgeois. We cannot say that the Russian harmonists have completely displaced the Russian passionaries, but obviously there are fewer heroes and more indifferent philistines. Now it's easy to answer the question of why we in the 17th - 18th centuries we were taking territories, and in the 20th century we began to give them away.  Incidentally, the current, so far peaceful expansion of China in Siberia and the Far East is very similar to the Russian expansion of 400 years ago. The same high passionarity on the one hand and sparsely populated territories with a "peaceful population" on the other. Force always tends to the zone of least resistance. This is such a physical law.

        As we remember, with a sharp loss of passionarity in a kink the moral bonds of an ethnos weaken: morality falls, religious feeling weakens, traditional values are destroyed, the family degrades. As a result, the atomization of the ethnos grows - collectivism gives way to selfishness. We must admit that in Russians, at the end of the Soviet period, all these "late-normal" signs manifested themselves to no small extent. At a time when many non-Russians, especially in Central Asia and the Caucasus, had a high level of collectivism and mutual assistance, the birthrate was growing and there were almost no homeless. At the same time, moral norms were much more strictly observed and traditional values were preserved. And, accordingly, the woman remained in her place and the man in his place.

        By the end of the XX century it was clear that the majority of these peoples had a higher passionarity than ours. Not radically higher, but relatively higher. And if in some cases it was not higher, it was compensated by the absence of anti-systems (or their underdevelopment) and by the greater ethnic cohesion, that is - by the absence of split in the ethnos, by the kinship ties and compactness of residence.

        For the sake of clarity we will give the following reference material.

        Take an indicator such as the ratio of Russian and non-Russian population of the empire. At the beginning of XX century Russians together with Ukrainians and Belarusians were 72%, i.e. absolute majority, by 1991 - about 60%. In 1989 Russians amounted to 50.8% of the population of the USSR (actually less, because even non-Russians could write "Russian" in their passports back then). By the end of the Soviet period Russians came close to the critical threshold, which is from half to two-thirds of the indigenous population of the country. This fact also has a direct bearing on why the USSR collapsed.

        In this connection, data about demographic situation in former Soviet republics of Central Asia and North Caucasus are very indicative. After 1991, for 20 years, population of these provinces has increased by an average of 1.5 (!) times.

Most of all in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Chechnya. And this is despite the low wages, unemployment, and other troubles that befell our smaller brothers after the collapse of the USSR. In the same period Russia lost about 15 million people! Of course, the cause here is not only a decrease in Russian passionarity. There are several reasons, as always, both natural and non-natural (first of all it is purposeful "liberal-market" genocide of Russian people), but passionarity factor is one of the fundamentals.

         Another example. In the Azerbaijani city of Baku in the early 20th century, almost a third of the population were Russians. In Tiflis - even more. And Grozny was a Russian city until the end of the 19th century. (The author's grandmother, a purebred Belorussian, was born in Grozny in 1917). Today in Moscow alone there are more than a million Azerbaijanis, not counting the rest of the Caucasus and Central Asia. This is to the question of migration.

          And the last note for comparison. By 1914, the population of Russia reached 163 million people (excluding Poland and Finland). This meant that just one hundred years ago, approximately one in eight (12.5% !) inhabitants of an Earth whose population was less than 1.4 billion lived within the Russian Empire. Today there are 140 million indigenous people living in what is left of the empire, i.e., the Russian Federation. That is about 2% percent of the 7 billion population of the world. Even if we take into account losses in two world wars and one civil war, the difference is enormous.

         To illustrate the fact of the decrease of the level of passionarity in the Russian ethnos (Russian super-ethnos) let us remember the same acmatic 17th century. This was the time when the Russian and Ukrainian Cossacks made daring sea raids on Turkey, Crimea and even Iran! A striking example is the campaign "for zipunami" of Stepan Razin's hordes. Then Russian Cossack robbers terrorized the Muslim population of Dagestan and Azerbaijan. Russia was bursting with excessive passionarity, while the Caspian Muslims were in hibernation.

        Another example is the conquest of Siberia. In 1582, 800 Cossacks led by Yermak crossed the Urals and captured the capital of the Siberian Khanate, defended by several thousand soldiers. Then Cossack troops for 50 years (!) reached the Pacific Ocean, putting on the road dozens of fortresses, ostrogov. And this in conditions of no roads, severe frosts (XVII century was cold), and resistance of the local population. One of the hottest spots was Krasnoyarsk "land", which before the arrival of Russian in 1628 owned by Yenisey Kyrgyz. Here the war lasted for 75 years! Many times Krasnoyarsk burg was stormed, set on fire, once they killed almost half of the garrison, but could not take it. This episode can be compared to a more ambitious event of the same time - the famous "Azov Sitting" of the Don Cossacks in 1641, when 5 thousand Cossacks were able to repulse the 100 thousand Turkish army!

        More than three hundred years have passed since then. During this time a lot has changed. The passionate excitement received from the "Russian" shock of the XIII century noticeably decreased, while the new, "Asian" shock of the XVIII century awakened the entire southern part of the Eurasian continent from Japan to North Africa. It passed, as we remember, through Korea, China, North India, Iran and the Middle East. The powerful passionary drift that followed this push directly affected Russia's underbelly: the Caucasus and Central Asia. The results of this last passionariy superpulse, stirring up the huge masses of Asian population, we see today on the whole territory of Russia - from Moscow to the Far East.

         All this, however, does not mean that Russia, as a Eurasian power, already has no perspective in its development or is doomed to be populated by migrants from the southern countries. Let us repeat, today our passionarity is far from zero, its level is closer to the average. With average passionarity it is quite possible to live, and even very well, but only if the ethnic system is not split apart and is in a state of balance. And the balance, as we know, comes only in the phase following the break - the inertia, when the ethnos is recovering and gaining strength again.

           And now let's remember how our people reacted to the collapse of the USSR in 1991. We must admit that they, for the most part, reacted quite lukewarmly. No, - of course our people voted for the preservation of the Soviet Union, but when it collapsed, they did not even get off the stove! And why? Same reason - worsening of the disease and collapse of my strength. And of course - illusions. Under the smokescreen of "perestroika" our trusting people were greatly deceived. Left without guides and confused, they were quickly taken over by evil demons. They promised them a capitalist paradise, cleared their minds about the horrors of Stalinism, embittered them with queues and artificial shortages, and then killed them with coupons for soap, sugar and vodka. All this is true.

But, ... But the question arises: why did they, the people, give up so easily? After all, there were people who understood what was happening, and who said: "You fools! Where have you gone! "Reforms" and "democracy" are the death of Russia! But the people did not listen to these few wise people and chased them away.

          We must admit that during the Khrushchev-Brezhnev period, the Russian people ceased to be a guiding people. They lost faith in the "bright future" and somehow became bourgeois very quickly. Descended, for the most part, to the "harmonious", kulak and philistine level. He became greedy. Easily seduced by the sausage-car delights of the Great Western Supermarket.  He was simply tired of being a heroic people.  This is always the case in the final break - the reserve of energy has dried up. After Stalin's over-mobilization our people sat down to rest, then lay down, and - relaxed.  After over-taxation you always need a breather, but our breather was very long.  Pavel Korchagin gave way to the heroes of "service novels" and "autumn marathons".  And here the enemies attacked him, lying on his back! Who was to blame? The enemies? No, it's their own fault! You mustn't relax! They'll devour him in a jiffy. Wolves are always around.  The big ones!

         Thus, the reason for the collapse of the Soviet empire lies in ourselves. And if even more precisely, the root cause lies in the natural law of ethnogenesis, according to which at the end of the phase of breakdown inevitably comes passionate depression.

        In the last decades of the 20th century, the core, state-forming Russian people, through which for several centuries everything was held together, gave way and ceased to be the center of power. Ceased to be the nucleus which for a long time attracted many nations. Once again, the laws of ethnic history are, fundamentally, the laws of nature. As the sun attracts the planets, so large, strong nations draw many small nations into its orbit.

        As for our enemies, they simply took advantage of our growing weakness. They waited;  After all, Russia has always had external enemies. In the East, in the South, and especially in the West. NATO has been moving eastward since the Crusaders in the 13th century. Europe has dreamed of destroying Russia all these 800 years. But, first the Moscow Empire and then the Russian Empire not only held on, but grew stronger from century to century. Because there was a passionate rise! Note, over the entire millennial history of Rus-Russia, the external enemies were able to conquer our land for a long time just when the East Slavic ethnos, having lost passionarity, became sick and weak. It happened in XIII century in the last phase of Slavic ethnogenesis - obskuratsiya.

         Of course, speaking of geopolitical threats in our time we must make allowance for new technologies and globalization. Today's external enemies have serious advantages over their predecessors, who in the old days were unable to wage full-scale financial and information-psychological warfare, and who did not have missiles and aircraft carriers at their disposal. (But on the other hand, the examples of North Korea and Iran, not to mention China, show that it is possible to successfully confront the enemy in these new types of wars as well.) 

         Speaking of internal enemies, from the very same anti-patriotic party, they began to multiply actively when the Russian super-ethnos fell ill, that is, there entered a major crisis, beginning in the 1920s-30s - from the Decembrists-Masons to nihilists of all stripes. Again, when the body is weakened, germs are always to be found. But it is fair to say that by the beginning of the twentieth century, we had too many of these antisystemic germs - hordes of them. And by the end of the Soviet period - too. At the same time, they have proven to be well-organized and very active microbes.

         It should be noted that speaking of the collapse of the Soviet Union, for some reason it is rarely mentioned that only in the XX century, the Russian Empire collapsed twice: in 1917 and in 1991. Think about it: from the 14th century there was a passionate rise, conquest and annexation of vast territories - up to Alaska and California, creation of a powerful state. And yet only one crisis - the Troubles of the early seventeenth century (growth crisis). And from the second half of the nineteenth century there was a hundred and fifty-year-long decline, although with a serious break in the decline for the Stalinist regeneration. More than 500 years of progressive development, and then failure - two systemic crises in one century! This is no longer an accident, but, as they say, a trend. It’s the links of one chain. And, it must be said, after February 1917 the events developed not less, but even more catastrophically, than after August 1991. V. Rozanov wrote about that time, "Russia faded away in two days, at most in three. No kingdom, no church, no army ...".

         And here it is necessary to consider the extremely important question of what has happened to the Russian ruling elite over the past seven centuries.

        The ruling class of the nobility began to form in Russia in the XIV century. At that time it was the Moscow servant class, which was mainly engaged in warfare. Under Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century, the first mass purges and renewal of the top ruling class - the boyars. And more cleansing than renewal. After 130 years, and under Peter the Great there is a second purge and renewal. But then with the emphasis on renewal. And after that for 200 years there is no purge! The ruling noble class, which in the eighteenth century was still doing a good job, in the nineteenth century begins to decay. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Russian political elite, diluted by foreigners over two centuries, loses its passionarity and rots away almost completely. In the series of political crises between 1900 and 1917, the elite was doomed: the liberals at the top are plotting, the people from below are crushing, and the revolutionaries are creeping up from behind!

        In February-October 1917, the iron law of the elites comes into effect - the old nobility elite, having lost passionarity, but not allowing "outsiders" to rise, is swept away by a powerful passionate wave. It is important to emphasize that in this wave, the main worker-peasant passionate potential (from within) is directed by anti-systemic revolutionaries (from outside). A complete change of the ruling class takes place. People come to power not only fanatically devoted to their idea, that is, passionate, but more importantly - at that time, the best organized (Lenin).

        After the Stalinist purge of 1937-38, the remnants of the old Bolshevik elite are joined by a large group of nationally oriented young leaders, mostly of worker-peasant origin. As a result, the radically renewed elite solves the super-tasks facing the country in the '30s and '40s. And for a while thereafter. However, by the beginning of the 70s, the Soviet ruling class is ossified and begins to rapidly decay. The question arises: Why so soon? Peter's noble elite lasted 200 years (if you count from Ivan the Terrible, longer), but the Soviet - only 70! It turns out that the margin of safety of the Soviet ruling elite was initially less than their predecessors. And why less?

         The fact is that the Soviet ruling class was never able to find unity and integrity. There was an inherent contradiction, which the repressions of the 1930s could not resolve. Two parties, which can be conventionally called patriotic and anti-patriotic, were constantly fighting each other in the political elite. And the anti-patriotic party won in the end.

        It should be recalled that the Stalinist period is an ethnic regeneration, however not complete, but partial. This is what happened because anti-systemic and conflictual elements remained in the ethnic system, especially – Trotskyites - cosmopolitans and Westerners of the bourgeois type. The ethnic disease continued to smolder somewhere inside, and by the end of the twentieth century, it was out in the open again. The underlying reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union were rooted in this internal ethnic division, which had not been overcome to the end, and which was exacerbated by the influence of anti-systems.

        Still, why was the patriotic or "Russian party" in the Soviet ruling elite weaker, and why did it eventually surrender its positions almost without a fight? Three factors should be noted here. First, the patriots were confronted not just by a force, but by a very powerful force in the form of the anti-patriotic party, which acted on the principles of an organized anti-system, and which has always enjoyed the active support of the West. This "liberal-cosmopolitan" party has changed over time (from Speransky and Pestel to Kerensky, Trotsky, Yakovlev, and Gaidar), growing stronger or retreating into the shadows, but it has always been a very serious destructive force.        

          On this basis, the second factor in the patriotic party's defeat can be formulated as follows: it simply lacked fighters - strong, courageous leaders - passionaries. There were not many of them to begin with. After the 1917 revolution, of course, they scooped a lot from the mass of the people, but it was not enough. The challenges facing the country were enormous, the conditions were extreme, and the level of passionarity in the phase of breakdown was no longer the same. During the Khrushchev-Brezhnev period, the few patriotic passionaries who remained were forced out by bureaucratic mediocrities who did not belong to any party and were quietly pursuing their bourgeois-squeezed interests. And with their tacit support, other passionaries from the anti-patriotic party first brought Gorbachev to power in 1985, and then prepared the coup of '91.  (It is not surprising therefore, that 70% of the Soviet elite were incorporated into the new "democratic" elite.) All this was happening against the background of the relaxation and emancipation of most Soviet people.

         Thus, the third factor in the defeat of the Communist patriots was the already familiar bourgeois man, who by the end of the phase of breakdown had greatly proliferated and already represented an independent force. In his desire for wealth, he was a natural ally of the anti-patriot cosmopolitans.

         In this case, very telling is the fact that after Stalin's death there were no passionate patriots among his inner circle. There were either hidden Trotskyites and Bukharinists, (Khrushchov, Beria, Mikoyan), or apparatchiks-conjurers (Malenkov, Kaganovich, Bulganin), or conditional orthodox (Molotov). A certain number of passionate patriots were in the second echelon of party leadership (Shelepin, Semichastny, later Demichev, Mazurov, etc.) and in the middle tier; but their stock of passionarity was sufficient only for the weak conservative rollback of the early Brezhnev period. As a result, by the time Gorbachev came to power, the "Russian Party" was neutralized and "virtually driven into hiding”.

           And one more important – ideological point. After Stalin, the Party ideologists could not come up with anything new in the theory of socialism. Soviet ideology in the Khrushchev-Brezhnev period simply rusted and stopped working. The national was completely subordinated to the class. As a result, in the 1960s-80s, it was the time of faithlessness: nobody believed in communism, and the Soviet regime abolished God.

        All of this confirms the well-known truth that the social doctrine cannot replace religion in principle. It is better than faith in money, but worse than faith in God. Social teaching is a surrogate for religion. A substitute. It is, alas, characteristic of a kink.         

        Now, as Gumilev said, let us stop and conclude.

        If we look at the problem from the usual positions of socio-economic and political history, the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet empire (on a visible level) are:

        1) In the "bourgeois rebirth" of a large part of the Soviet people, who turned into urban kulaks and wanted to live "like all normal people" under capitalism.

        2) In the destructive work of the neotrotskyite moles (Yakovlevs-Shevarnadze) within the CPSU leadership, who took advantage of the small number of patriotic communists and the connivance of the bourgeois communists who multiplied. And they (the "moles") were indeed actively assisted by external enemies - the CIA and other Brzezinski's.

         3) The dogmatic attitude to ideology, which led the CPSU to an ideological dead end.

        4) The Party leadership's serious mistakes in national policy, as detailed above.    

        But if we ask the question: What are the reasons for all the above-mentioned reasons? Why was it possible and rebirth - relaxation, and destructive work of moles, and loss of faith, and many other things? That is, - where do the deep roots of these unpleasant phenomena come from?

        All known theories do not answer this question, or answer it only partially. But Lev Gumileyov's theory of ethnogenesis answers it quite convincingly. The underlying cause is that our people have become sick. This disease began almost 200 years ago. It is a fracture. And the main scourge of fracture, let us repeat, is a sharp decline in the number of passionaries (with the dominance of sub-passionaries, who eat away at the body of the ethnos from within), and the splitting of the ethnic system into warring camps that begin to fight among themselves. First, the war is cold, then - hot, then - cold again. And so it goes several times.

        Simply put, a fracture is when their own beat up their own, and the outside others help them.

         And now for the main thing. The Ethnological reason of these internal conflicts lies in the fact that in peril, on the background of the split of ethnic field (which causes confrontation between people on the level of feelings!) there is a continuous breaking of behavior stereotype - painful transition from religious-heroic (action phase) to bourgeois-socialist (inertial phase) type of behavior. Which leads first to the deformation and then to the destruction of the stereotype as such, that is at the mental level - to a cacophony of worldviews! This is why the ethnic system is out of balance and the plane, figuratively speaking, goes into a dive.  And we are no exception here. All nations, having lived half their lives, then fall ill. This disease, which leads to splitting of the "collective unconscious" can be called ethnic schizophrenia, proceeding on the background of a sharp decrease of the ethnos' immunity.

        Moreover, a serious correction should be made with regard to the Russian breakdown.  Our ethnic disease has been exacerbated, first, by the invasion of Western culture ("ideological aggression") and, most importantly, by the introduction of a powerful cosmopolitan anti-system into the body of the ethnos, which has absorbed all manner of mercenaries. These catalysts of fracture were active in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they are still active today. As long as they are still in effect.

          Therefore, a hardening of the regime under Nicholas I, "freezing" of Russia under Alexander III, and finally, Stalin's "intensive therapy" should be seen as attempts to bring the ethnic system, shaken and corroded by microbes, to its normal state; as a treatment of the sick by various means. Lenin and, later, Stalin carried out a revolution "not according to Marx" because at the beginning of the 20th century, the disease became so serious, that the pills that were used by Nicholas I and Alexander III did not help. It was necessary to do surgery. And do it quickly. Lenin understood this before anyone else, and did not wait for capitalism in Russia to "mature to its limits”, (a step in the theory of Marxism).

         Another thing is that Lenin did not intend to restore historical Russia. But the main thing here is that Lenin made an accurate diagnosis of the Russian Empire ("the wall, yes rotten...!"). And Stalin prescribed it an intensive treatment. It helped for several decades.

 Is a new Union of Peoples possible?

         If we look at the entire Soviet period, we see that it is a complete round of ethnogenesis in miniature. All phases have been passed: under Lenin - the beginning of the rise; under Stalin - the rise and the acme phase; under Khrushchev - the breakdown; under Brezhnev - inertia; under Gorbachev - Yeltsin - obscuration.

        If we look at the averaged ethnogenesis curve (see Appendix A), we see a small spike in the middle of the breakdown phase. We got a pretty big spike: the late 20's - early 50's. That was the Stalinist regeneration.

        Today we have to start all over again. An archival question is on the agenda: what should the future Russian state be like? Is it possible to revive the Union of Peoples, and with it to restore the might of power? According to the Eurasianist concept and Gumilyov's theory of ethnogenesis, it is possible. After all, sooner or later a breakdown comes to an end. The ethnic system, in contrast to the social system, is more elastic, i.e. - viable! Even an ethnic system weakened by a disease can regenerate, due to its redundant passionarity. Therefore, the core of super-ethnos, during the transition to the phase of inertia, always regenerates (although it becomes smaller).

         Hence, it follows that the collapse of the USSR should not be considered an irreversible geopolitical catastrophe. Because with the restoration of the super-ethnic system, imperial (centralized) statehood will also be restored. And when the Russians finally emerge from the crisis, regain their strength and spirit, then other ethnic groups will unite around them. First at the level of Greater Russia, and then at the level of the entire Eurasian space. But of course, this will happen on a new basis - not all of the former republics of the USSR will be part of this new Union; some uncomplimentary slices have already been cut off forever. We have to be realistic: we will no longer be able to achieve the former power and scope - the passionarity is not the same. But, sooner or later, most of the former Soviet republics will have to gather around Russia. Time will tell which republics, and in what political form.

         In the late 80's, as if anticipating what would happen to our country, Gumilyov said: "Every ethnos, moreover constituting a state, should not think about how to make enemies - they will always be found, but about where to find true friends".

         And it is necessary to notice that our opponents understand all these things perfectly well, therefore they have seized with a dead grip on Ukraine, hold Georgia behind themselves, "work" in Moldova and Transcaucasia. And that is why all these years they were making nasty things to Batka Lukashenko (in Belarus), and trying to arrange the colored revolutions in Central Asia.

         But the globalists are technocrats, and think that the laws of nature can be bypassed (these globalists - aliens really, have some other "Martian" brains). And they, these laws, are still working for us. Firstly, the geography of Russia-Eurasia itself contributes to the unification of peoples living on this vast territory, protected from three sides - from the north, east and south - by natural barriers: mountains, deserts, oceans. As Eurasianist leader P. Savitsky wrote: "The nature of the Eurasian world is minimally favorable for the development of various kinds of separatism, whether political, cultural or economic.  The vast system of plains called the Russian-Eurasian world is like a colossal assimilationist cauldron created by nature itself. Whereas in Europe and Asia at times one could live only by the interests of one's own bell tower.

         Today, many former national-separatists, especially those in Central Asia, have already realized that they cannot survive alone. And that the Americans were much worse than the Russians. And the Chinese, too.  If you put your finger in, they will bite your hand off. Freedom and autonomy is certainly a good thing. But is it worth risking national security over it, not to mention personal power?

          Another Eurasian, G. V. Vernadsky, wrote back in the 20s, "The prerequisites of historical development have changed, because now Eurasia is a geopolitical economic unity, which she did not have before". It remains to add that today the role of economic cooperation has increased manifold. Therefore, it is no coincidence that in "zero years" economic ties of Russia with several former Soviet republics began to strengthen more and more, which eventually led to the creation first of the Customs Union, and then the Eurasian Economic Union. So far, only between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. But this is a beginning. And a promising beginning! How not to recall the great prediction of Gumilyov: "...if Russia will be saved, then only as a Eurasian power, and only through Eurasianism". Therefore, the slogan of today must be: "Either together, or we will all be crushed"!

         And most importantly. Our geopolitical opponents can't understand in any way what is clear even to a schoolboy acquainted with the theory of ethnogenesis.   The fact is that it is possible to destroy an empire that is rotten from the head, but it is impossible to destroy a super-ethnos that has not yet lost its passionarity.  After all, a super-ethnos is a living organism. Invisible kinship ties, primarily between Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians (Little Russians), were, and still are. They cannot be easily severed, even under the conditions of the ethnic division and the tightening of the information war. We are still one big people. But still, the ruling "elites" tend to renew themselves, and sometimes very strongly.

                                                                                  Buy the pot and then the lid!

                                                                                  folk wisdom

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