7. Facing East, Rus 2 Russia
Having cast the most general glance at the history of the creation of the huge Mongol ulus, we are now entitled to return to Rus'.
Kalka
But before we get to the story of Russo-Mongolian relations at that time, let us remind the reader of early 13th century Rus itself. As already mentioned, unlike the "young" Mongols, Ancient Russia was then passing from the inertial phase to the phase of obscuration. Reduction of passionarity in the end always leads to the destruction of the ethnos as a unified system. Outwardly it is expressed in the events and deeds, incompatible with neither morality, nor with the interests of the people, but quite explainable by the internal logic of ethnogenesis. So, it was in Russia.
(Note: I am presently editing “Ancient Rus and the Great Steppe”, a more detailed description than this one. This century of Russian decline was met with unimaginable internal strife. Even when the Mongols were gaining ground, the Kievan princes were busy killing each other, and not organizing any defense.)
Igor Svyatoslavich, a descendant of Prince Oleg, the hero of "The Tale of Igor's Host", who became the Prince of Chernigov in 1198, made it his aim to destroy Kiev, the city where his dynasty's rivals were constantly strengthening themselves. He made a deal with the Smolensk prince Rurik Rostislavich and enlisted the help of the Polovtsians. Prince Roman of Volyn, who relied on allied troops of the Torks, defended Kiev - "the mother of all Russian cities".
В. M. Vasnetsov. After Igor Svyatoslavich's battle with the Polovtsy
Prince Rurik II. An engraving of 1805.
Prince Vsevolod III. Engraving of 1805.
Chernigov prince's plan was implemented after his death (1202). Rurik, the Prince of Smolensk, and the Olgovichi with the Polovtsians in January 1203, in a battle, which took place mainly between Polovtsians and Roman Volynsky's torcs, took the upper hand. Capturing Kiev, Rurik Rostislavich subjected the city to a terrible defeat. Tithe church and Kiev-Pechersk Lavra were destroyed, and the city itself was burned. "They created a great evil, which was not from baptism in the land of Russia," the chronicler left this message.
After the fateful year of 1203 Kiev no longer recovered. What prevented the restoration of the capital? There were talented builders, resourceful merchants, and literate monks. The Kievers traded via Novgorod and Vyatka, erected fortresses and temples, which survived to this day - chronicles say. But, alas, they could not return the city to its former importance in the Russian land. Too few people remained in Russia, who had the quality, which we have called passionality. And so, there was no initiative, no ability to sacrifice personal interests for the interests of their people and their state.
Under such conditions, a showdown with a strong enemy would be tragic for the country.
Meanwhile, the Mongol tumens were approaching the Russian frontier. The western front of the Mongols passed through the territory of modern Kazakhstan between the Irgiz and Yaik rivers and covered the southern tip of the Ural Mountains. At that time, the main enemy of the Mongols in the west was the Polovtsi.
Their enmity began in 1216, when the Cumans embraced Genghis's blood enemies, the Merkis. The Cumans pursued an extremely active anti-Mongol policy, constantly supporting the Finno-Ugric tribes that were hostile to the Mongols. The steppe Kipchaks (Cumans) were as mobile and maneuverable as the Mongols themselves. Genghis Khan was well aware that the way from the Onon to the Don was equal to the way from the Don to the Onon. Seeing the futility of cavalry skirmishes with the Cumans, the Mongols used a traditional military trick for nomads: they sent an expeditionary corps to the rear of the enemy.
The talented commander Subedei and the famous archer Dzhebei led a corps of three tumens (a tumen is 10,000 soldiers), across the Caucasus (1222). The Georgian king George Lasha tried to attack them and was destroyed with his entire army. The Mongols managed to capture the guides, who pointed the way through the Daryal Gorge (modern Georgian Military Road). So, they came to the upper reaches of the Kuban, to the rear of the Kipchaks. Here Mongols faced Alans. By the 13th century, Alanians had already lost their passion: they had no will to resist, no desire for unity. The people, in fact, disintegrated into separate families. The Mongols, exhausted by the crossing, robbed the Alans of food, and stole horses and other livestock. The Alans fled in terror. Kipchaks, having found the enemy in the rear, retreated to the west, came to the Russian border and asked for help from the Russian princes.
Earlier, speaking about the events of the 11th - 12th centuries, we saw that the relations between Rus' and the Kipchaks did not fit into the primitive scheme of confrontation "sedentary - nomadic". The same is true for the beginning of the 13th century. In 1223 the Russian princes allied themselves with the Kumanians. Three strongest princes of Russia: Mstislav Udaly of Galich, Mstislav of Kiev and Mstislav of Chernigov, gathered their armies and tried to protect Kumans. (The 3 Mstislavs had no common command structure.)
Э. Sokolovsky. The Return of the Prince with Victory
Scheme of the Battle of the Kalka in 1223.
It is important that the Mongols did not seek war with Russia. The Mongolian ambassadors who have arrived to Russian princes have brought the offer on rupture of the Russian-Kolovtsian union and the conclusion of the peace. True to their allied obligations, the Russian princes rejected the Mongol peace offerings. But unfortunately, the princes made a mistake that had fatal consequences. All the Mongol ambassadors were killed, and since, according to the Yassa, it was an unforgivable crime to deceive a trustworthy person, war and vengeance could not be avoided after this.
However Russian princes knew nothing of this “Yassa” and actually forced the Mongols to accept the fight. A battle took place at the river Kalka: the eighty-thousand Russian-Polovtsian army collided with the twenty-thousandth Mongol detachment (1223). This battle, the Russian army lost because of its complete inability to organize in the most minimal way. Mstislav Udaloi and the "younger" Prince Daniel fled beyond the Dnieper, they were the first on the shore and managed to jump into the rooks. The rest of the rooks the princes cut down, fearing that the Mongols would be able to cross after them. Thereby they doomed their companions, whose horses were worse than princely ones. Of course, the Mongols killed everyone they overtook.
Grand Duke Constantine. Engraving 1805.
Mstislav of Chernigov with his army began to retreat across the steppe, leaving no rearguard. The Mongol horsemen pursued the Chernigovs, easily overtook them and cut them down.
Mstislav of Kiev positioned his soldiers on a large hill, forgetting that it was necessary to provide a retreat to the water. The Mongols, of course, easily blocked the detachment. Surrounded, Mstislav surrendered, succumbing to the entreaties of Ploskini, the leader of the Brodniks, who were allied with the monks. Ploskinya convinced the prince that the Russians would be spared and would not shed their blood. The Mongols, according to their custom, kept their word. They laid the bound prisoners on the ground, covered them with planks and feasted on their bodies. But not a drop of Russian blood was really spilled. And the latter, as we already know, was very important according to Mongolian beliefs.
Here is an example of how differently the peoples perceived the rule of law and the concept of honesty. The Russians believed that the Mongols had broken an oath by killing Mstislav and other captives. But from the point of view of the Mongols, they kept the oath, and the execution was a supreme necessity and the highest justice, for the princes had committed the terrible sin of murdering the trustees, the emissaries. Note that even by the norms of modern law, violence against a parliamentarian is strictly condemned and punished. Everyone, however, is free to take the position that is closest to his moral imperative in this case.
After the battle of the Kalka, the Mongols turned their horses eastward, eager to return to their homeland and report on the completion of their task of defeating the Cumans. But on the banks of the Volga the army was ambushed by the Volga Bulgars.
The Muslims, who hated the Mongols as pagans, unexpectedly attacked them during the crossing. Here the victors at the Kalka suffered a serious defeat and lost many men. Those who were able to cross the Volga went eastward through the steppes and joined Genghis Khan's main forces. Thus ended the first meeting of the Mongols and Russians.
The Great Western campaign
Victory at the Kalka did not mean the final defeat of the Cumans. Since the Mongols' military policy was based on the principle formulated by Genghis Khan, "War ends when the enemy is defeated", the fight against the Cumans should have continued. However, the Mongols had no excessive forces, for in parallel with the fight in the west, the Mongols fought the Jurchen empire of Qin and the Tangut state of Xi-Xia. Only after the capture of Peking (1215), the Tangut capital Zhongxing (1227), and the fortresses of Kaifing and Caizhou (1234) did the Mongols have the opportunity to complete the war with the Kumans. The kurultai of the Mongol noyos, which assembled in 1235 on the banks of the Onon, near modern Nerchinsk, decided to bring the struggle against the Cumans to an end. The Great Western campaign began.
It was called "the Great" for a reason. The troops were to pass all of Mongolia and, through passages in the mountains, reach the Kazakh steppes. They had to cross them and reach the Aral Sea, while the main part of the way goes through the Betpak-Dala desert, where only Karagach grows. Mongols crossed the desert steppes in winter, when people and horses could use snow instead of water. Caravanserais and dug-out springs were spotted here and there on their way from the Aral Sea through the Ustyurt Plateau to the Volga, but the crossing was difficult as well. At the end of the road, in the lower reaches of the Volga, the Mongols were waiting for military action. The average tribe traveled 25 kilometers a day, so the whole campaign, started in 1235, ended only in the fall of 1236.
Khan Batyi Subaday
Mongol horsemen.
The Mongol forces assembled for the western campaign were small. Of their 130,000 men, 60,000 had to be sent on permanent duty to China, another 40,000 went to Persia to suppress the Muslims, and 10,000 troops were permanently at the headquarters. Thus, a corps of twenty thousand men remained for the campaign. Understanding its insufficiency, the Mongols carried out an urgent mobilization. Each family took their eldest son into service.
However, the total number of troops marching to the west could hardly exceed 30-40 thousand men. After all, when crossing a few thousand kilometers one cannot do without a horse. Every warrior had to have a packhorse in addition to a rider. And they needed a warhorse for the attack, because to fight on a tired or untrained horse was tantamount to suicide. Troops and horses were needed to carry the siege weapons. Consequently, there had to be at least three or four horses per rider, which meant that a force of thirty thousand men had to have at least 100,000 horses. It was very difficult to feed such a herd while crossing the steppes. It was impossible to carry provisions for people and forage for a large number of animals. That is why the figure of 30-40 thousand seems to be the most realistic estimate of the Mongol forces during the western campaign. It, incidentally, coincides with the well-known estimate of N.I.Veselovsky.
The first to be attacked by the Mongols were the Volga Bulgars, who in 1223 defeated the troops of Subedei and Jebei. The city of Bulgar was taken and destroyed. At the same time other Volga peoples who had opposed the Mongols - the Burtasians and Bashkirs - were subdued. After crossing the Volga, the Mongol army was divided. The main forces, led by the strong-willed and clever Munke Khan, son of Tului, began pursuing the head of the Cumans - Kotyan Khan, pushing him to the borders of Hungary. Another part of the army, led by Batu Khan (Batu), approached the borders of the Ryazan princedom.
Ryazan princes, as well as Suzdal and Vladimir, did not participate in the battle at Kalka, and therefore Batu was not going to fight with them. However, the further movement of the army required a constant change of horses and constant receipt of products. And Batu sent parliamentarians to Ryazan, seeking to obtain food and horses from the Ryazanians. Ryazan princes, not bothering to find out with whom they are dealing, said: "If you kill us, everything will be yours. And so, it happened.
The two armies converged near Ryazan. When the Mongols turned lava - the Ryazanians trembled and ran. Leaving the battlefield, they encamped in Ryazan. The city was only recently rebuilt after it was destroyed in 1208 by Prince Vsevolod the Big Nest of Suzdal, and was therefore ill-prepared for a siege. Ryazan was taken, the princely family was killed, all property became the property of the Mongols, but the Ryazanians still had troops. The Mongols, taking the food and horses they needed, left Ryazan. Eupatiy Kolovrat, an active boyar from Ryazan, with his squad caught up with the Mongols, attacked their rear and stopped their advancement. Batyi was forced to turn the front to defeat Yevpatiy Kolovrat. On both sides the warriors fought heroically, but the outcome of the battle was not difficult to predict: the companions of Eupatius and he himself perished, although they inflicted considerable damage to the enemy.
Deshalit. Siege of Ryazan
Grand Duke George. Engraving of 1805.
The encounter with the detachment of Yevpatiy Kolovrat confirms our estimate of the size of the Mongolian army. Eupatii's squad had about two thousand warriors. If the ranks of the Mongols really had hundreds of thousands of men, no amount of heroism from Kolovrat would have delayed the movement of the Mongol army. Most likely, his detachment simply would not have been seen. But for certain Batyj had no more than half of the Mongol forces, i.e. 15 - 20 thousand soldiers, and therefore Kolovrat's attack on the Mongol rear was so sensitive.
From the defeated Ryazan Batu Khan led his troops to the Vladimir principality. Unfortunately, Prince Yuri Vsevolodich of Vladimir was a shortsighted politician and a bad commander. As early as the 1210s, he exhausted the forces of his principality in quarrels with his own uncle, supported by the Novgorodians. In the battle of Lipitsa, which ended this strife, more than nine thousand Russian people, mostly from Vladimir and Suzdal, died needlessly, losing the battle. So, what could Yuri do in the winter of 1237-1238, when, after capturing Ryazan and disbanding the Russians, who had hastily gathered at the river Kolomna, Batu Khan moved his armies to Vladimir? The prince had either to try to negotiate with the Mongols, or, leaving Vladimir's cities and lands, to withdraw north and fortify himself in the rugged forests.
Yuri chose the third option - the most unsuccessful. He ordered to defend Vladimir without providing it with a garrison, and he left his own family in the city. The prince himself under the pretext of gathering an army left to the banks of Mologa and stopped at the place where small river Siti flows into it. Of course, Vladimir was taken by the Mongols. But since the city, in accordance with Yuriy's order, did not surrender immediately, it suffered quite severely. Yuriy himself on the City was accidentally caught by a detachment of the Mongol thousandman Burunday. The Mongols stumbled upon an unprotected and unguarded Russian camp because the prince did not set up a patrol and did not send a detachment. As we can see, Yury did not do anything that should have been done by a commander waging war with a capable and strong enemy. Of course, the entire detachment, taken by surprise, perished along with the prince.
By the summer of 1238 the Mongols had returned to the Lower Volga, where they spent the winter. A new movement to the west, which also captured the southern Russia, began in the spring of 1239. In the land of Novgorod, the Mongols refused to subdue the town of Torzhok because Novgorod had promised to help them. However, Novgorodians gathered too slowly and did not arrive in time to fight. Torzhok was taken by the Mongols and its population was slaughtered.
Then the Mongols marched south. On their way was the town of Kozelsk, under the walls of which the memory of Kalka led them. After all, 15 years ago, Prince Mstislav of Chernigov and Kozelsk was involved in the murder of the Mongol ambassadors. Although Mstislav had already died by this time, the Mongols, guided by the concept of collective responsibility, sought to avenge the "evil" city for the deed of its prince. Of course, from the point of view of modern people, the behavior of the steppe monks may seem unjustifiably cruel. But let us not forget that they followed their ideas just as we follow ours. According to the Mongols, all subjects of a prince shared with him equal responsibility for an atrocity, simply because they agreed to have him as their prince. Perhaps the reasons for the cruel massacre of Kozielsk were well understood by the contemporaries: the Mongols had been besieging Kozielsk for seven weeks, and none of the Russians came to the aid of the city.
The devastation of Vladimir by the Mongol Tatars during the invasion of Batyi in 1238.
The invasion of Russia by Batu Khan. Seventeenth-century miniature.
Battle of the Russian troops with the army of Batyi Khan. Seventeenth-century miniature.
But not all cities suffered the fate of Vladimir, Torzhok and Kozelsk. The inhabitants of the rich trading city of Uglich, for example, quickly found a common language with the Mongols. By giving up their horse and prowomen, the Uglichi saved their town; later almost all towns of the Volga region did the same. Moreover, there were Russians who joined the ranks of the Mongol armies. A Hungarian chronicler called them "the worst Christians".
Batyi took Chernigov, followed by the capture of Kiev, which had not recovered from internal strife. Abandoned by the prince and defended by Ksyatskim Dmitry, the city had no forces to fight - there was no one to defend the walls of Kiev. Then Batu Khan passed through Volhynia. Volhynians' opinions were divided: some resisted the Mongols, but the Bolkhov princes, who lived on the southern outskirts of Volyn, preferred to negotiate with the Mongol Khan.
In pursuit of the Cumans, who left for Hungary, the Mongols moved further through Galicia, seeking to establish an unbreakable western border of their power. Their ambassadors first visited Poland, but were killed by the Poles. In the war that broke out, the Mongols took Krakow and then defeated the Polish-German army at the Battle of Lignitz in Silesia. Death also befell the Mongol ambassadors in Hungary. The Mongols routed the Hungarian king's forces at the Battle of the Szajo River and burned most of Hungary's castles and cities. Apparently, having learned by bitter experience, the Mongols did not send any more ambassadors to the Czechs. The Mongol and Czech armies met at the Battle of Olomouc, and the Czechs defeated the steppe army.
Э. Sokolovsky. Battle of the Russian troops with the Tatars
By 1242 the Great Western campaign was over: Batu Khan's troops reached the Adriatic Sea. The outcome of the campaign was very favorable to the Mongols, and a further war made no sense to them. The Mongols had secured their western frontier, for neither Czechs, Poles, nor Hungarians could reach Mongolia: they had no desire or opportunity. The original enemies of the Mongol ulus, the Kipchaks, could not threaten them either: they were driven into Hungary, and their fate turned out to be sad.
Cumans Khan Kotyan submitted to the Hungarian king, but the arrival of Cumans caused displeasure of the Hungarian magnates, who killed the Khan and began treating Cumans contemptuously and cruelly. Then part of the nomads left through the Balkans for Byzantium and settled near the city of Nicea in Asia Minor. Another part of the Kipchaks stayed in Transylvania. Later they converted to Catholicism and largely joined the ranks of the small Viennese nobility.
It would be more correct to call Batu Khan's great westward march a great cavalry raid, while the march to Russia we have every reason to call a raid. There was no question of any Mongolian conquest of Russia. The Mongols did not leave any garrisons and did not think to establish their permanent power. With the end of the campaign Batu Khan left to the Volga, where he founded his headquarters - the city of Sarai. In fact, the khan limited himself to the destruction of those cities that, being on the path of the army, refused to reconcile with the Mongols and began armed resistance. The only exception was Kozelsk, which, as we remember, was dealt with by the Mongols in revenge for the murder of their ambassadors.
In its consequences, the western campaign was also a typical nomadic raid, albeit on a grandiose scale. We must assume that contemporaries were well aware of the nature and purpose of the campaign. And from this point of view, one should not condemn the Russian people of the XIII century for such weak resistance to the Mongols. There was no sense to conduct unnecessary military operations when they could be done with them without it. After all, for 20 years after Batyj the Mongols didn't collect any tribute, taxes and duties from the northern Russian principalities. It is true, the southern principalities (Chernigov, Kiev) were taxed, but the population has found a way out.
Russians began to actively move to the north: in Tver, Kolomna, Moscow, Serpukhov, Murom and other cities of Transvaal Russia. So, all the Russian traditions together with the people moved from the outskirts of the forest-steppe and steppe to the forest belt. This geographical factor, a change of landscape as a result of migration, was extremely important for the further course of ethnogenesis of our country.
Remains of the ancient Tithe Church
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