3. Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere, Gumilev

III. IS THERE AN ETHNOS

NO INDICATION FOR THE DEFINITION OF ETHNOS

According to our proposed definition, the form of existence of the species Homo sapiens is a collective of individuals, which opposes all other collectives. It is more or less stable, although it appears and disappears in historical time, which is the problem of ethnogenesis. All such collectives are more or less different from one another, sometimes in language, sometimes in customs, sometimes in the system of ideology, sometimes in origin, but always in historical destiny, they are different. Hence, on the one hand, ethnos is derived from the historical process and, on the other hand, through its productive activity, the economy, it’s connected with the biocenosis of the landscape in which it was formed. Subsequently, the nationality may change this relation, but it changes beyond recognition, and the continuity can be traced only with the help of historical methodology and the strictest criticism of the sources, for words are deceptive.

Before moving on, we should at least concede the concept of "ethnos," which has not yet been defined. We do not have a single real attribute to define any ethnos as such, although there has not been and there is no human individual in the world who is extra-ethnic. All of the listed attributes define an ethnos "sometimes," and the totality of them does not define anything at all. Let us test this thesis using the negative method.

The theory of historical materialism recognizes the mode of production, which is realized in socio-economic formations, as the basis of society. Precisely because self-development plays a decisive role here, the influence of exogenous factors, including natural factors, cannot be basic in the genesis of social progress. The concept of "society" means a totality of people united by concrete-historical conditions of material life common to them. The main force in this system of conditions is the mode of production of material goods. People unite in the process of production, and the result of this association - social relations, are formalized in one of the known five formations: primitive communal, slave-holding, feudal, capitalist and communist.

It is impossible to "unite into an ethnos," since belonging to one or another ethnos is perceived by the subject himself directly, and by all others.

It is stated as a fact not subject to doubt. Consequently, ethnic diagnostics is based on a feeling. A person belongs to his or her ethnicity from infancy. Sometimes the incorporation of foreign tribesmen is possible, but applied on a large scale, it degrades the ethnicity. Specific-historical conditions change during the life of an ethnos more than once, and conversely, the divergence of ethnoses is often observed when one mode of production is dominant.

Based on K. Marx's idea of the historical process as an interaction of natural history and human history [35], we can propose the first, most general division - into social stimuli arising in the technosphere and natural stimuli constantly coming from the geographical environment [36]. Each person is not only a member of a particular society at an age determined by the effects of hormones. The same can be said of long-lived collectives, which in the social aspect form differently characterized class states or tribal unions (social organisms), and in the natural one ethnoses (nations, and nationalities). The mismatch between the former and the latter is obvious.

ETHNOS IS NOT A SOCIETY

But there is also another point of view, according to which "ethnos... - is a socio-historical category, and its genesis and development are not by the biological laws of nature, but by the specific laws of the development of society"[37]. How is this to be understood? According to the theory of historical materialism, the spontaneous development of productive forces causes changes in production relations, which generates a dialectical process of class formation, followed by processes of class annihilation. This is a global phenomenon inherent in the social form of development of matter. But what does ethnogenesis have to do with it? Is the emergence of such famous ethnic groups as the French or English, that chronologically or territorially coincide with the formation of the feudal formation? Or did these ethnoses disappear with its collapse and transition to capitalism? And in the same France "socio-historical" category - the French kingdom included already in the XIV century besides the French the Celts-Bretons, Basques, Provencals and Burgundians. So weren't they ethnicities? Does not this fact, one of very many, indicate that the Kozlov's definition is one-sided? And if soon it is so, then this is a reason for a scientific dispute.

Dialectical materialism distinguishes different forms of motion of matter: mechanical, physical, chemical and biological, relating them to the section of the natural. The social form of motion of matter stands out because of its inherent specificity - it is peculiar only to humanity with all its manifestations.  Every human being and every human collective with machinery and domesticated animals and cultivated plants is subject to the influence of both social and natural forms of matter movement, incessantly correlated in time (history) and space (geography). In summarizing the material into a single complex accessible to observation and study (a historical geography), we are obliged to consider it from two perspectives - from the social and the natural side. In the first perspective we will see social organizations: tribal unions, states, theocracies, political parties, philosophical schools, etc.; in the second, ethnic groups, i.e. collectives of people arising and dissolving in a relatively short time, but having in each case an original structure, a unique stereotype of behavior and a peculiar rhythm, which has homeostasis in the limit.

As we know, classes are socio-historical categories. In pre-class society, their analogues are tribal or clan unions, such as the Celtic clans. In a broad sense, the concept "social category" can be extended to stable institutions, such as the state, the church organization, the polis (in Hellas) or the feud. But everyone who knows history knows that such categories coincide with the boundaries of ethnic groups only in the rarest cases, i.e. there is no direct connection here. Indeed, is it correct to say that workers, clerks, and Tatars live in Moscow? From our point of view.  But according to Kozlov's logic this is the only way.

So, the error lies in the postulate. But not enough of this, the economy, which is fully related to the social form of the motion of matter, breaks the national framework. It would seem that in the presence of a common European market, homogeneous technology, similarity of education in different countries and easy learning of neighboring languages, and the ethnic differences should be erased in twentieth-century Europe. But in reality?

The Irish have already fallen away from Great Britain, sparing no effort to learn their ancient and almost forgotten language. Scotland and Catalonia are claiming autonomy, although for the last 300 years they did not consider themselves oppressed.  In Belgium, the Flemings and Walloons, who hitherto lived in harmony, have begun a frantic struggle, reaching the point of street fights between students of both ethnicities [38].  And since in antiquity, too, there is only the occasional coincidence of socio-political and ethnic peaks (or recessions), it is obvious that we observe the interference of two lines of development or, to speak in the language of mathematics, the two independent variables. It is possible not to notice this only with a very strong desire to ignore it.

Let us try to reveal the nature of the visible manifestation of the presence of ethnicities - the opposition of ourselves to all others: "us" and "not-us". What gives rise to and feeds this opposition? Not the unity of language, for there are many bilingual and trilingual ethnic groups and, conversely, different ethnic groups speaking the same language. For example, the French speak four languages: French, Celtic, Basque and Provençal, and this does not prevent their current ethnic unity, despite the fact that the history of unification, or rather the conquest of France from the Rhine to the Pyrenees by the Parisian kings, has been long and bloody. At the same time, Mexicans, Peruvians and Argentines speak Spanish, but they are not Spanish. It is not without reason that streams of blood were spilled in the early nineteenth century just so that war-torn Latin America fell into the hands of the trading companies of England and the United States. The English of Northumberland speak a language close to Norse because they are descendants of the Vikings who settled in England, and the Irish until recently knew only English, but did not become English. Arabic is spoken by several different peoples, and for many Uzbeks the native language is Tajik, etc.

In addition, there are class languages, such as French - in England in the XII-XIII centuries, Greek - in Parthia in the II-I centuries BC, Arabic - in Persia from the VII-XI centuries, etc. Since the integrity of the nationality was not violated, we must conclude that it is not a matter of language.

Moreover, linguistic diversity often finds practical application, and this practice brings multilingual peoples closer together. For example, during the U.S.-Japanese War in the Pacific, the Japanese learned to decipher American radio transmissions, that the Americans lost the ability to transmit as classified information by radio. But they found a witty and unexpected solution by teaching Morse code to mobilized Indians. The Apache transmitted information to the Nawahu in Athabaskan, to the Assiniboine - Siusu in Dakota, and the receiver translated the text into English. The Japanese disclosed the ciphers, but retreated in powerlessness before the overt texts. Because military service often brings people closer together, the Indians returned home, gaining "paleface" fighting companions. But there was no assimilation of the Indians either, for it was their ethnic characteristics, including bilingualism, that the commanders valued. So, although in some cases language may serve as an indicator of ethnicity, but it is not the cause of ethnic community.

Note that the Veps, Udmurts, Karelians, and Chuvash still speak their languages at home, and study in Russian at school, and in the future, when they leave their villages, they will be virtually indistinguishable from Russians. The knowledge of their native language does not hinder them at all.

Finally, the Ottoman Turks! In XIII century Turkmen leader Ertogrul, fleeing from the Mongols, brought to Asia Minor about 500 horsemen with their families. The Sultan of Iconium settled the arrivals on the border with Nicoya, at Brusse, for the border war against the "infidel" Greeks. Under the first sultans, "gazia" volunteers from all over the Near East flocked to Brusa for booty and land to settle. They made up the cavalry, the "Spagi. The conquest of Bulgaria and Macedonia in the 14th century allowed the Turkish sultans to organize infantry of Christian boys (sold into slavery), who were torn from their murdered families, taught Islam and military skills and placed in the position of guards - "new army", “Janissaries”. In the fifteenth century a navy was created, manned by adventurers from all shores of the Mediterranean. In the 16th century light cavalry - "akinji" from conquered Diarbekr, Iraq and Kurdistan were added. French renegades became diplomats, and Greeks, Armenians and Jews became financiers and economists. And wives were bought by these men in slave markets. There were Polish, Ukrainian, German, Italian, Georgians, Greeks, Berber women, Negro women, etc. These women in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries turned out to be the mothers and grandmothers of Turkish warriors. Turks were an ethnicity, but the young soldier listened to the command in Turkish, talked to his mother in Polish and to his grandmother in Italian, traded in Greek in the bazaar, read poetry in Persian and prayers in Arabic. But he was an Ottoman, for he behaved as befitted an Ottoman, a brave, pious warrior of Islam.

This ethnic integrity was shattered in the nineteenth century by numerous European renegades and Paris-trained Young Turks. In the 20th century the Ottoman Empire fell and the ethnos fell apart: the people became part of other ethnic groups. The new Turkey was raised by the descendants of the Seljuks from the depths of Asia Minor, and the remains of the Ottomans lived out their days in the alleys of Istanbul. So for 600 years the Ottoman ethnos was united not by language but by religious commonality.

IDEOLOGY AND CULTURE

Ideology and culture are sometimes a trait, but also a must. For example, only an Orthodox Christian could be a Byzantine, and all Orthodox were considered subjects of the Constantinople emperor and "their own." But this was broken as soon as the baptized Bulgarians went to war with the Greeks, and Russia, which also embraced Orthodoxy, but had no intention of submitting to Constantinople.

The same principle of single-mindedness was proclaimed by the Caliphs, successors of Mohammed, and it could not stand competition with living life: within the unity of Islam again emerged ethnicities. As we have remembered, sometimes preaching unites a group of people who become an ethnos: for example, the Ottoman Turks (see p. 72) or the Sikhs in Northwest India. Incidentally, there were Sunni Muslims in the Ottoman Empire who were subject to the Sultan but did not consider themselves Turks: Arabs and Crimean Tatars. Even linguistic proximity to the Ottomans did not play a role for the latter. Thus, religion is not a common sign of ethnic diagnosis either.

A third example of the confessional self-assertion of an ethnic group is the Sikhs, sectarians of Indian origin. The caste system established in India was considered obligatory for all Hindus. It was a special structure of ethnicity. To be Hindu meant to be a member of a caste, even the lowest, of the untouchables, and all others were placed below animals, including captured Englishmen. There was no political unity, but the stereotype of behavior was held firmly, even too harshly. Each caste was entitled to a certain occupation, and those who were allowed military service were few. This enabled the Afghani Muslims to take over India and abuse the defenseless population, with the inhabitants of Punjab suffering the most.

In the 16th century a doctrine emerged there proclaiming first non-resistance to be evil and then aiming at war with the Muslims. The caste system was abolished, and the Sikhs (the name of the adherents of the new faith), separated themselves from the Hindus. They detached themselves from the Hindu integrity by endogamy, developed their own stereotype of behavior, and established the structure of their community. According to the principle we have adopted, the Sikhs must be regarded as an emergent ethnos that opposed the Hindus. This is how they perceive themselves. The religious concept has become for them a symbol, and for us an indicator of ethnic divergence.

It is impossible to consider the Sikh doctrine only as a doctrine, because if someone in Moscow had fully embraced this religion, he would not have become a Sikh, and the Sikhs would not consider him "one of their own". The Sikhs became an ethnos on the basis of religion, the Mongols on the basis of kinship, the Swiss on the basis of a successful war with the Austrian feudal lords, which united the population of a country where four languages are spoken. Ethnoses are formed in different ways, and our task is to grasp the general pattern.

Most large nations have several ethnographic types, constituting a harmonious system, but very different from each other both in time and in social structure. Let us compare at least the 17th century Moscow, with its boyar hats and beards, when women were spinning behind mica windows; the 18th century Moscow, when noblemen in wigs and camisoles took their wives to balls; the 19th century Moscow, when bearded nihilistic students educated young ladies of all estates, who began to mix with one another; add the 20th century decadents. Comparing them all with our era and knowing that they are the same ethnos, we see that without knowledge of history, ethnography would mislead the researcher. And just as revealing is the spatial cross-section on one year, let us say, 1869. The Pomors, Petersburg workers, Old Believers in the Trans-Volga, Siberian gold prospectors, forest and steppe peasants, Don Cossacks and Ural Cossacks looked quite different from each other, but it did not destroy the national unity, and the closeness in everyday life of, say, the Greben Cossacks or Chechens did not unite them.

Strange as it may seem, this proposed point of view met with active opposition in precisely the places where it should have found understanding. Some ethnographers opposed the author with their own views both on the relationship between ethnography and geography, and on the history of the issue, i.e. historiography [39]. Not seeking to enter into polemics, I nevertheless cannot ignore the concept claiming (without sufficient grounds) to be canonical. This would be academically incorrect.

The formation of ethnography as a science by V. I. Kozlov and V. V. V. Pokrzyzewski see it this way. Until the middle of XIX century, geography and ethnography developed together, and then ethnography divided into social-historical and geographical directions. The first includes L. G. Morgan, I. J. Bakhofen, E. Taylor, J. Fraser, L. J. Sterenberg, to the second - F. Ratzel, L. D. Sinitsky and A. A. Kuber, as well as the French school of "geography of man". There is a significant defect in the proposed classification, which practically reduces it to nothing. Representatives of "directions" were interested in different subjects and paid their attention to different topics. And as long as this is the case, then their opposition is unwarranted.

After all, when F. Ratzel tried to justify the geographicality of ethnographic zoning, he by no means disputed the concepts of animism, sympathetic magic or the ritual murder of the priest, i.e. the subjects to which J. Fraser devoted his famous "Golden Bough". It is, however, to the diverse interests of diverse scholars that the authors attribute the separation of ethnography from geography, and the rebirth of it as a social science. There is some confusion, fraught with unfortunate consequences. Any science develops by expanding the range of research, not by simply changing topics. Consequently, if the achievements of geographical ethnography are added to historical aspects - it is progress of science, but if some subjects are replaced by others - it is a trampling in place, always extremely flawed.

This is obviously clear to the scientists themselves, who devoted another passage to the geography of the population, which is at the intersection of both sciences, but does not include ethnic geography. The difference, in their opinion, is that "for economic geographers; man, –  the most important subject of production and consumption, while for ethnographers  -  He is the bearer of certain ethnic peculiarities (cultural, linguistic, etc.)" (p. 7). 

Here it is impossible to agree with the authors of the above-mentioned article. Well, is it possible to study the Eskimos without noticing their hunt on the sea beasts and limiting oneself to the grammatical forms of the verb or ideas about the evil spirits of the sea and tundra? Or describing the Hindus without mentioning their labor in the rice fields, but detailing the theory of karma and the reincarnation of souls? No, the nature of labor processes, consumption, war, the creation of a state or its fall are as much objects of ethnographic study as are wedding rites or ritual ceremonies. And the study of peoples in phases of their development and in their opposition to their neighbors is inconceivable without taking into account the geographical environment.

Similarly, ethnography should not be replaced by the doctrine of "economic and cultural types characteristic of peoples who are approximately at the same level of socio-economic development and live in similar natural and geographical conditions (for example, types of "Arctic sea-beast hunters", "dry steppe cattlemen", etc.)"[40]. This direction is fruitful for economic geography, but has nothing to do with ethnography and cannot have any relation to it.

For example, the Chukchi reindeer (i.e. shepherds) and the Chukchi are sea-beast hunters.  The proposed classification should be divided into different sections although they are one ethnos. Aren't the Russian peasants of Moscow region, Pomors and Siberian sable hunters one ethnos?

Indeed, the examples are endless. V.I. Kozlov's proposal boils down to the abolition of ethnography and replacing it with demography, taking into account the occupations of the population. However, this topic will not arouse interest among us.

It is equally wrong to equate ethnos with biological taxonomic units: race and population. Races differ from each other by physical traits that are not essential for human life [41]. A population is an aggregate of individuals inhabiting a certain territory, where they interbreed freely and are separated from neighboring populations by some degree of isolation [42]. Ethnos, according to our proposed understanding, is a collective of individuals with a unique internal structure and an original stereotype of behavior, both of which are dynamic. Hence, ethnos is an elementary phenomenon, not reducible to either sociological or biological or geographical phenomena.

The reduction of ethnogenesis to "linguistic and cultural processes" distorts reality, diminishing the complexity of ethnic history, as pointed out by Yu. Bromley, who suggested the introduction of the terms "ethnocos" and "ESO" (ethno-social organization) in order to clarify the issue [43]. I admit that one may not be satisfied with his solution, but it is not correct to ignore it completely.

In conclusion, let us verify V.I. Kozlov's thesis by consistently applying it to phenomena of common knowledge. According to the logic of his postulate, people capable of learning different languages must belong to several ethnic groups at the same time. This is nonsense! Although there are many bilingual and even trilingual ethnic groups, they do not merge on the basis of linguistic qualification. After all, A.S. Pushkin and his friends did not become French! Conversely, Mexicans and Peruvians speak Spanish, practice Catholicism, read Cervantes, but do not consider themselves Spaniards.

Moreover, they ruined a million lives in a war they called "liberation. And at the same time, the Indians of Upper Peru and the Chaco Desert fought for Spain, with which they had nothing in common in culture, economy or language. But it is quite understandable, if to consider that enemies of Indians were not far away Spaniards, but local inhabitants - mestizos who have partially become commoners, but opposed to their former tribesmen, as they, by the beginning of XIX century had formed into independent ethnoses. From the position of V. I. Kozlov, such late ethnogenesis is inexplicable.

DESCENT FROM A SINGLE ANCESTOR

In ancient times it was considered obligatory for an ethnos, to have a founding father, often in the role of the ancestor, or for the absence of a real figure was an animal, not always a totem. For the Turks and Romans it was a wolf-feeder, for the Uighurs a wolf who impregnated a princess, for the Tibetans a monkey and a female rakshasa (a forest demon). But more often it was a man whose appearance was distorted beyond recognition by the legend. Abraham is the forefather of the Jews, and his son Ishmael is the ancestor of the Arabs,

Cadmus is the founder of Thebes and the founder of the Boeotians, etc. Strangely enough, these archaic views have not died, only in our time they try to put some ancient tribe in the place of the persona - as the ancestor of the current ethnic group. But this is just as wrong. Just as there is no person who has only a father or only a mother, so there is no ethnos that is not descended from different ancestors. And one should not confuse ethnicities with races, which is done often but without justification. The basis for the temptation is the preconceived notion that the processes of racio-genesis which probably evolved in certain regions of the world and were determined by the specific natural environment of those regions, i.e. climate, flora and fauna of the geographical zones [44]. Here is an unacceptable substitution of the object, i.e. the primary race, that is arbitrarily equated with ethnos. Let's get this straight.

In the Upper Paleolithic epoch, when subarctic conditions prevailed in Europe, and in a highly arid climate, the Rhone valley was inhabited by the Negroid race of Grimaldi, and in the African tropical forests was inhabited by the Khoisan race which combined the Mongoloid and Negroid features. This race is ancient and its genesis is unclear, but there is no reason to consider it a hybrid race. The Negro-Bantu people displaced the Khoisanian to the southern outskirts of Africa in a quite historical era, around the 1st century A.D., and later the process continued until the 19th century, when the Bichuans drove the Bushmen into the Kalahari Desert. At the same time, there was no emergence of Negroes in Equatorial America, although its natural conditions are close to those of Africa.

The arid zone of Eurasia was populated by Cro-Magnon-type Caucasoids and Mongoloids, but this did not lead to the similarity of racial traits. In Tibet, Mongoloid bots were neighboring with Europoid tribesmen and Pamirians, and in the Himalayas, Gurkas with Pathans. But the similarity of the natural environment did not affect the racial appearance. In short, we should admit that the functional connection between the anthropological features between different populations and the geographical conditions of the regions they inhabit is not clear. 

Moreover, there is no confidence that it exists in nature at all, the more so because this opinion runs counter to the achievements of modern paleoanthropology, which constructs its racial classification not by latitudinal zones, but by meridional regions: the Atlantic region, to which are assigned Europoids and African Negroids, and the Pacific region, to which are assigned Mongoloids of East Asia and America [45]. This viewpoint excludes the influence of natural conditions on race, since both groups were formed in different climatic zones.

Ethnoses, on the contrary, are always connected with the natural environment due to active economic activity. The latter manifests itself in two ways: by adapting oneself to the landscape and by adapting the landscape to oneself. However, in both cases we are confronted with ethnos as an already existing phenomenon, although the reason for its emergence is not clear.

And it is not necessary to reduce the diversity of the topic under study to any one thing. It is better simply to establish the role of these or those factors. For example, the landscape determines the possibilities of the ethnic group at its emergence, and the newborn ethnos changes the landscape according to its requirements. This mutual adaptation is possible only when the emerging ethnos is full of strength and is looking for its application. And then comes the habit of the created stop, which for descendants becomes near and dear.

Denial of this inevitably leads to the conclusion that peoples do not have a homeland, understood here as a heartily beloved combination of landscape elements. Hardly anyone would agree with this.

This alone shows that ethnogenesis is not a social process, for the spontaneous development of the sociosphere only interacts with natural phenomena, rather than being their product.

But the very fact that ethnogenesis is a process and that the directly observed ethnos is a phase of ethnogenesis, and therefore an unstable system, rules out any comparison of ethnoses with anthropological races and thus with any racial theories. Indeed, the principle of anthropological classification is similarity. And the people who make up an ethnos are diverse. There are always two or more components involved in the process of ethnogenesis. Crossing of different ethnoses sometimes gives a new stable form, and sometimes leads to degeneration. So, the Great Russian nationality developed from a mix of Slavs, Ugrians, Alans, and Turks, and the formations that included Mongolo-Chinese and Manchurian-Chinese mestizos, which frequently appeared along the line of the Great Wall of China during the last two thousand years, turned out to be unstable and disappeared as independent ethnic units.

In Central Asia, the Sogdians lived in the 7th century, and the term "Tajik" as early as the 8th century.

The term "Tajik" meant "Arab", i. e., a warrior of the Caliph. In 733 Nasr ibn Seyyar suppressed a rebellion of Sogdians and was forced to supplement his thinning army with Persians of Khorasan who had already converted to Islam. He recruited many of them, and therefore the Persian language began to dominate his Arab army. After his victory, when the Sogdian men were slaughtered, the children sold into slavery, and the beautiful women and flowering gardens divided among the victors, a Persian-speaking population similar to the Khorasans appeared in Sogdiana and Bukhara[46]. But in 1510 the destinies of Iran and Central Asia parted ways. Iran was seized by Turk Ishmael Sefevi, a zealous Shiite, and converted the Persians to Shiism. The Central Asians inherited the Sunni Uzbeks, and the Persian-speaking population living there retained the old name "Tajik", which had been ignored until the fall of the Mangytes dynasty in Bukhara in 1918.

The old name "Tajik" was retained until the fall of the Bukhara Manggah dynasty in 1918. When Uzbek and Tajik republics were formed in the former Turkestan, the descendants of Khorasan Persians, invaders of the 8th century who lived in Bukhara and Samarkand, were registered as Uzbeks in the census, and the descendants of Turks, invaders of the 11th and 16th centuries who lived in Dushanbe and Shakhrisabz, as Tajiks. They knew both languages from childhood, were both Muslims, and did not care how they were recorded. Over the past 40 years, the situation has changed: Tajiks and Uzbeks formed into socialist nations, but how to consider them until the 20s, when religious affiliation determined the ethnicity (Muslims and Kafirs), and the Tajiks had no clans? And both ethnic substrates, Turks and Iranians, were "imported" ethnic groups in Central Asia a thousand years ago, a period long enough for adaptation. Apparently, there is a certain regularity which should be uncovered and described. But it is clear that common descent cannot be an indicator for determining ethnicity, because it is a myth inherited by our consciousness from the primitive science of primitive times.

ETHNOS AS AN ILLUSION

But perhaps "ethnos" is simply a social category formed during the society? [47]. Then "ethnos" is an imaginary value, and ethnography is a meaningless pastime, since it is easier to study social conditions. This point of view is erroneous, which becomes obvious if speculation is replaced by observations of natural processes accessible to a thoughtful person. Let us explain this with real examples. In France live the Celtic Bretons and the Iberians of Gascon. In the forests of the Vendée and on the slopes of the Pyrenees they dress in their costumes, speak their language, and clearly distinguish themselves from the French in their homeland. But can it be said of the Marshals of France, Murat or Lannes, that they are Basques and not French? Or d'Artagnan, the historical character and hero of Dumas' novel?

Can the Breton nobleman Chateaubriand and Gilles de Retz, an associate of Joan of Arc, not be considered French? Isn't the Irishman Oscar Wilde an English writer? The famous orientalist Chokan Valikhanov himself said about himself that he considers himself as a Russian and a Kazakh. Such examples are numerous, but they all indicate that ethnicity, which can be found in people's consciousness, is not a product of consciousness itself. Obviously, it reflects some side of human nature, much deeper, external to consciousness and psychology, by which we mean the form of higher nervous activity. After all, in other cases, ethnic groups for some reason show great resistance to the influences of their environment and do not assimilate.

The Gypsies have been disconnected from their society in India for a thousand years, have lost touch with their homeland, and yet they have not merged with the Spaniards, with the French, nor with the Czechs or the Mongols. They did not adopt the feudal institutions of the societies of Europe, remaining an alien group in every country wherever they went. The Iroquois still live as a small ethnic group (only 20,000 of them), surrounded by hypertrophied capitalism, but do not take part in the "American way of life".

The Mongolian People's Republic is inhabited by Turkic ethnic groups: the Uyots (Oranghais), the Kazakhs, and others. And yet "the level of development of society, the state of its productive forces" are the same. Conversely, the French immigrated to Canada in the eighteenth century and still retain their ethnic identity, although the development of their forest settlements and industrial cities in France is very different. The Jews in Thessaloniki have lived as an endogamous group for over 400 years after their expulsion from Spain, but, according to 1918 data, they look more like Arabs than like their neighbors, the Greeks. Likewise, the Germans of Hungary look more like their countrymen in Germany and the Roma look more like the Hindus.

Selection changes the ratio of traits slowly, and mutations are notoriously rare. Therefore, any ethnos living in its familiar landscape is almost in a state of equilibrium.  One should not think that changing conditions of existence never affects ethnoses. Sometimes it affects them so much that new traits are formed and new ethnic variants, more or less stable, are created. We need to understand how these processes take place and why they produce different results.

The famous Soviet researcher S. A. Tokarev put forward a sociological concept where, instead of defining the concept of ethnic community, it referred to "four historical types of nationality.

✓The tribe, in communal-patrimonial formations, encompasses the entire group of people in a given territory, uniting them by blood and blood ties; ✓demos, in slave-holding formations, only free population, not including slaves; ✓nationality, in feudalism, all the labouring population of a country, not including the ruling class; ✓in capitalist and socialist formations, all strata of population divided into antagonistic classes' [48].

The above excerpt shows that a very different meaning was put into the concept of "ethnic community," which, perhaps, helps in some ways, but lies beyond the field of view of historical geography and the natural sciences in general. Therefore, a dispute with this concept would be unfruitful, as it would come down to what to call ethnos. And what is the use of arguing about words?

BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

As we have been introduced to the cultures of the Mediterranean, we have been in the midst of familiar notions and assessments. Religion meant belief in God, the state meant a territory with a certain order and authority, countries and lakes were in certain places.

Except that the familiar names "West" and "East" did not behave quite geographically: Morocco was considered "East," while Hungary and Poland were considered "West. But to this convention all had time to apply, and there was no confusion of concepts. This was greatly aided by the familiarity of the subject, even to non-specialists, through the reading of fiction and the presence of a living tradition.

But as soon as we cross the mountain passes separating Central and East Asia, we enter a world of a different frame of reference. Here we will encounter religions that deny the existence not only of deity, but also of the world around us. Orders and social arrangements will be contrary to the principles of the state and authority. In nameless countries we will find ethnicities without common language and economy, and even sometimes a territory, and rivers and lakes will roam like herders-pastoralists. Those tribes that we used to consider nomadic will turn out to be sedentary, and the strength of the troops will not depend on their numbers. Only the patterns of ethnogenesis will remain unchanged.

Other material requires a different approach to itself and, consequently, a different scale of research. Otherwise, it will remain incomprehensible and the book will become unnecessary for the reader. The reader is used to European terms. He knows what a "king" or a "count," a "chancellor" or a "bourgeois commune" is. But there were no equivalent terms in the east of the Oikumene. "Hagan" was not a king or emperor, but a military chief chosen for life, who part-time performed ancestor worship rites. Can one imagine Richard the Lionheart serving a requiem mass for Henry II, whom he had given a heart attack? And that this mass was attended by representatives of Gascon and the English nobility? This is nonsense! And in the east of the Great Steppe he would have been obliged to do so, or else he would have been instantly killed.

Such names as "Chinese" or "Hindus" are not equivalent to "French" or "Germans," but to Western Europeans in general, for they are systems of ethnicities, but united on other cultural principles: the Hindus were bound together by the caste system, and the Chinese by hieroglyphic writing and humanitarian education. As soon as a native of Hindustan converted to Islam, he ceased to be a Hindu, for to his countrymen he became an outcast and fell into the category of untouchables. According to Confucius, a Chinese living among barbarians was regarded as a barbarian. But a foreigner who observed Chinese etiquette was regarded as Chinese.

To compare the ethnoses of the East and the West, we need to find the right correspondences, with an equal division price. For the sake of this, let us examine the properties of ethnicity as a natural phenomenon inherent in all countries and all centuries.

In order to achieve our goal, we must be very attentive to ancient traditional information about the world, without rejecting it in advance merely because they do not correspond to our modern notions. We constantly forget that people who lived several thousand years ago possessed the same consciousness, capacity, and desire for truth and knowledge as our contemporaries. The treatises that have come down to us from different peoples of different times testify to this. This is why ethnology is a practically necessary discipline, for without its methodology much of the cultural heritage of antiquity remains inaccessible to us.

To understand the history and culture of East Asia, the conventional approach is no good. When we study the history of Europe, we can distinguish sections: the history of France, Germany, England, etc., or the history of ancient, medieval, and new. Then, when studying the history of say, Rome, we touch the neighboring peoples only insofar as Rome encountered them. For Western countries such an approach is justified by the results obtained, but in the study of Middle Asia by this method we will not get satisfactory results. The reason for this is profound: it lies in the fact that the Asian concept of the term "people" and the European understanding of it are different. In Asia itself, ethnic unity is perceived differently, and even if we discard the Levant and India and Indochina as not directly related to our topic, there would still remain three different understandings: Chinese, Iranian, and nomadic. The latter, however, varies especially greatly from epoch to epoch. It is not the same in Hunnish times as it was in Uighur or Mongol times.

In Europe the ethnonym is a stable concept, in Central Asia it is more or less fluid, in China it is absorptive, in Iran it is exclusionary. In other words, in China, in order to be considered Chinese, a person had to absorb the basics of Chinese morals, education and rules of conduct; origin was not taken into account, neither was language, since even in ancient times the Chinese spoke different languages. Therefore, it is clear that China was inevitably expanding, absorbing smaller peoples and tribes. In Iran, on the contrary, one had to be born a Persian, but, over and above that, one had to venerate Aguramazda and hate Ahriman. Without this, one could not become "Aryan. The Medieval (Sassanid) Persians did not even think of including anybody in their ranks, because they called themselves "noble" (nomdoron), and did not include others in their ranks. As a result, the number of the people was falling steadily. It is difficult to judge about the Parthian understanding, but, apparently, it did not differ fundamentally from the Persian one, only it was a little wider.

In order to be considered a Hun, one had to become a member of the clan either by marriage or by command of the shanyu, in which case one became one's own. The descendants of the Xiongnu, the Turkuts, began to incorporate entire tribes. On the basis of perception, mixed tribal unions emerged, such as the Kazakhs, Yakuts, etc. The Mongols, generally very close to the Türks and Huns, were dominated by a horde, i.e. a group of people united by discipline and leadership. It required neither origin, nor language, nor creed, but only courage and willingness to obey. Clearly, the names of hordes are not ethnonyms, but with hordes, ethnonyms disappear altogether, as there is no need for them - the concept of "people" coincides with the concept of "state.

In this connection we must firmly remember that the concept of "state" in all the above cases is different and indispensable in translation. The Chinese "go" is represented by a character: a fence and a man with a spear. This does not correspond at all to the English "state," or to the French "etat," or even to the Latin "imperium" and "respublicae. Just as distant in content are the Iranian "shahr" or the above-mentioned term "horde. The nuances of difference are sometimes more significant than the elements of similarity, and this determines the behavior of the participants in history: what seems monstrous to a European is natural to a Mongol, and vice versa. The reason is not in the different ethics but in the fact that the subject, in this case the state, is not identical.  Therefore, we will record not only the similarities but also the differences, so as not to force the peoples we study into the Procrustean bed of the scheme.

Of course, we cannot but be saddened by the widespread opinion that all state forms, social institutions, ethnic norms and even manners of speech that are not similar to European ones are simply backward, imperfect and inferior. Banal Eurocentrism is sufficient for ordinary people's perception, but not suitable for scientific understanding of the diversity of observed phenomena. After all, from the point of view of a Chinese or an Arab, Western Europeans seem inferior. And this is just as wrong, and for science, unpromising. Obviously, we should find a frame of reference in which all observations are made with an equal degree of accuracy. Only this approach makes it possible to compare dissimilar phenomena and thus draw reliable conclusions. All of the research conditions listed here are mandatory not only for history, but also for geography, since it connected with man and geographical names. In the West, countries are distinguished by names, but in the East?

A COUNTRY AND A PEOPLE WITHOUT A NAME

Between the eastern border of the Muslim world and the northwestern edge of the Middle Empire, which we call China, lies a country that has no definite name. This is all the more strange because the geographical boundaries of this country are very clearly defined, its physical and climatic conditions are original and unique, and its population is numerous and has long been involved in culture. This country was well known to the Chinese, Greek, and Arab geographers; it was visited by Russian and Western European travelers; there were repeatedly conducted archaeological excavations ... and all called it by some descriptive name, but it did not have a self-name. So let's just point out where the country is.  From Pamir to the east, there are two mountain ranges: Kun-Lun south of Tibet and Tien-Shan. Between these ranges lies the sandy desert - Takla Makan lies between these ranges, cut through by the watery Tarim River. This river has neither source nor mouth. Its beginning is considered to be the "Aral," i.e., the "island" between the the branches of three rivers: the Yarkand-Darya, the Aksu-Darya, and the Khotan-Darya. Its end is sometimes lost in the sands, sometimes it reaches Lake Karaburankel, and sometimes it fills Lob-nor, a lake that constantly changes place[49]. In this strange country the rivers and lakes are nomadic, and the people huddle at the mountain foothills. Fresh streams flow down from the mountains, but immediately disappear under piles of screes and come to the surface at a considerable distance from the ridges. There are oases there, and then the rivers are lost again, this time in the sands. In this extra-arid country is the deepest depression, the bottom of which lies 154 m below sea level. This depression is home to the ancient cultural center, the Turfan Oasis. How could people be engaged in science and art in conditions of the summer heat reaching 48 +С and winter frosts reaching -37 +С, incredible dryness of the autumn air and strong spring winds? But they did, and with considerable success.

The ancient population of this country did not have a self-name. Nowadays, it is customary to call them Tokhars, but this is not an ethnonym, but a Tibetan nickname, which means "white-headed" (blond). The inhabitants of the various oases spoke various languages of the Indo-European group, among which was even Western Aryan, not unlike those known in Europe. In the southwest of the country, at the foot of Kundun, roamed Tibetan tribes, who were in close contact with the inhabitants of Khotan and Yarkent, but did not mix with them [50].

In the first centuries A.D. the Saks, who had settled south of Kashgar as far as Khotan, and the Chinese emigrants who had fled the horrors of the civil wars at home, entered this country from the west. The Chinese set up a colony in the Turpan oasis - Gaochan. It lasted until the IX century and disappeared without a trace.

As you can see, it is impossible to pick up a name for the country by its ethnonym, but it was a cultured population, which established the economy, which should be considered the best in the Ancient world.

The nature of the oases of Central Asia has long been brought into harmony with the needs of man. Turfan people mastered the Iranian system of underground water supply - qanats, due to which the irrigated area fed a large population. The crops were harvested twice a year. The Turfan grapes melons, watermelons, apricots from spring to late autumn; long-fiber cotton crops are protected by pyramidal poplar and silkworm trees from the winds. And all around is a stone desert of cracked rocks, rubble and boulders, through which 51] not a tree nor a bush can penetrate. It is a reliable defense of the oasis against large armies. It is very difficult to move a foot army across the desert, because one must carry not only food, but also water, which excessively increases the transport. And raids by light nomadic cavalry are not afraid of the fortress walls. The second large center of this country - Karashar lies in the mountains near the fresh water lake Bagrash-kul. This city "has fertile lands... Abundant in fish... It is well fortified by nature itself and easy to defend in it"[52]. The Konchedarya, which feeds the Lob-nor, flows out of Bagrash-kul. Along its banks one can, without suffering from thirst, reach the abundant water Tarim, fringed with thickets of poplars, tamarisk, buckthorn and tall reeds, which hide herds of noble deer and wild boar[53].

The ancient ideology of the sedentary inhabitants of this country was Buddhism in the form of Hinayana ("little crossing" or "little chariot," i.e., the most orthodox of Buddha's teachings without admixtures), which cannot be called a religion. Hinayanists deny God, putting in his place the moral law of karma (causal sequence). The Buddha is a man who attained perfection and is an example for any other man who wishes to be free from suffering and rebirth by attaining nirvana, a state of absolute peace. Nirvana can be attained only by a goal-oriented person--an arhat (saint) who does not depend on divine mercy or outside help. "Be a lamp unto yourself," say the Hinayanists.

It goes without saying that "becoming on the path of perfection" is the work of a few. What about the rest of us? They simply went about their daily business, respected the Arhats, listened to teachings in their spare time, and hoped, that in future rebirths they could become saintly ascetics themselves. But we have already seen from other examples how little influence dogma has on ethnic stereotypes of behavior. The Arhats, merchants, warriors and farmers of Turfan, Karashar and Kuchi constituted a single system for which Buddhism was only a coloring.

The coloring of the subject, however, plays a role, sometimes a significant one. The Hinayana community survived until the fifteenth century, while the Mahayana, a vague, diverse and complex doctrine, in Yarkand and Khotak, evidently gave way to Islam as early as the eleventh century for a reason.

The nomadic Uigurs who came to Turfan practiced Manicheism,[54] but, apparently, just as formally as Turfan people practiced Buddhism. As an independent confession, Manicheism disappeared before XII century, but Manichean ideas were incorporated into some Buddhist philosophical movements and into Nestorianism, which made a victorious march across Central Asia in XI century. During these centuries the inhabitants of Turfan, Karashar, and Kutcha began to call themselves Uyghurs.

Nestorians in Uyghuria got along with Buddhists, despite their inherent intolerance. Apparently, Christianity was desirable for people of a religious disposition far removed from the atheistic abstractions of Hinayana. Merchants also became Christians, for the Buddhist doctrine forbade those "set on the path" to touch gold, silver and women. Therefore, people who were religious, but who took an active part in economic life, were forced to look for a creed that would not prevent them from living and working. Consequently, we can conclude that suitable ecological niches were found for both ideological systems.

The wealth of this country was mainly based on its favorable geographical location: there were two caravan routes through it, one to the north, and the other to the south of the Tien Shan. Along these routes, Chinese silk flowed to Provence, and luxury goods of France and Byzantium to China. In the oases, caravan drivers rested from their arduous journeys across the deserts and fattened their camels and horses. In this connection, the local women quite developed the "first ancient profession", and the husbands allowed their wives these earnings, part of which went into their pockets.  And the Uyghurs were so accustomed to this business that even when, thanks to the alliance with the Mongols, Uyghuria became fabulously rich, its inhabitants asked the Mongol khan Ugedei not to forbid their wives to entertain travelers[55].

This custom, or more correctly, an element of ethnic stereotype of behavior, proved to be more enduring than language, religion, political structure and self-name. The stereotype of behavior is formed as an adaptive trait, i.e. as a way for an ethnos to adapt to its geographical environment. The names here changed more frequently than the ethnic groups that bore them, and the change of ethnonyms was explained by the political conjuncture.

The rich and numerous population of these fertile oases could easily feed the warlike nomads, the more so because first the Uigurs, and then the Mongols assumed the protection of their subjects from external enemies. Within three hundred years, the Uighurs had dissolved among the natives, but forced them to change their Tocharian language to Turkic. However it was not worth their efforts, because in the XI century all the peoples, from the azure waves of the Marmara Sea and the wooded slopes of the Carpathians to the jungles of Bengal and the Great Wall of China, were speaking Turkic languages. The steel widespread Turkic language made it a convenient language for oases of trading operations, and the inhabitants of both halves of Central Asia were equally fond of trading. That is why the change of the native, but little-used language to a commonly understood one took place without difficulties not only in the northeastern part of the Tarim basin, but also in the southwestern part, where the role of Uighurs took over the role of the Turkic tribes: Yagma and Karluks. However, the difference between them and the Uighurs was enormous. The Uigurs did not affect the life, religion, or culture of their subjects, while the Karluks, who accepted Islam in 960, turned the oases of Kashgar, Yarkend, and Khotan into the likeness of Samarkand and Bukhara.

Thus, geographically the monolithic region turned out to be divided into two ethno-cultural regions, not at all friendly to each other. But the forces were equal, and the distances between the oases were vast and difficult to pass. Therefore, the situation stabilized for a long time.

This situation explains why the country remained without a single name. In ancient times, the Chinese called it Siyu, i.e., "Western Region," and the end of it was considered the "Onion Mountains" - Pamir and Alai. The Hellenes called this country "Serica," and the precious commodity obtained from it was "sericum" (silk). I do not undertake to explain the etymology of this word.

In the New Age they were also used conventional names: Kashgaria, Eastern Turkestan, or Xinjiang, i.e. literally "new frontier" established by the Manchus in the 18th century. all these names are not suitable for our era. What for the ancient Chinese was the "West" became the middle in the 12th and 13th centuries.

To call "Turkestan" a country inhabited by Indo-Europeans, who learned to understand Turkic speech, is preposterous. Kashgar has not yet become a capital, and the "new border" did not even loom on the horizon. It is better to leave the geographical name - Tarim basin. The river is a reliable reference point, at least neutral and durable. In addition, the term "Xinjiang" includes Dzungaria (also a conditional and late name), located north of the Tien Shan, which had a completely different historical fate.

It is difficult to determine the eastern border of Uiguria. Over the past centuries, it changed significantly, and many of the changes are undated. One might think that the oasis of Hami and perhaps the cave city of Dunhuang, a treasury of Buddhist art. But the more eastern lands, the oases of the Nanshan foothills, were taken away from the Uighurs by the Tanguts. It is a people that no longer exists, just like the Uighurs, although there are people who call themselves that. But this is a mirage, too. Those who call themselves Uigurs are Fergana Turks, who migrated to the East in XV-XVIII centuries. And those mistaken for Tanguts are nomadic Tibetans, a relic ethnic group, once the worst enemies of the Tanguts.

So, historical criticism has shown that in Asia the meaning of names and their sound do not always coincide. To avoid unfortunate and, alas, frequent mistakes, it is necessary to develop a system of reference that would be valid for Europe, and for Asia, and for America, Oceania, Africa and Australia. But in this system, meaning is preferred to phonetics, i.e., it is based not on linguistics, but on history.

"ETHNOS" - A WORK BY S.M. SHIROVA

The first general concept of ethnos as a phenomenon independent, rather than secondary, belongs to S. M. Shirokogorov[56]. He regarded ethnos as "a form in which the process of creation, development and death of the elements that enable humanity as a species to exist occurs"[57]. At the same time, ethnos is defined "as a group of people united by the unity of origin, customs, language and way of life."[58] Both of these theses mark the state of the science of the early XX century. In terms of geography, it recognizes "the environment to which an ethnos adapts and to which it submits, becoming a part of that environment”, its derivative. This concept was resurrected by V. Anuchin under the name of "unified geography," but it has not received recognition. Social structure is seen as a biological category - a new form of adaptation, the development of which comes at the expense of the ethnic environment: "Ethnos receives impulses of change from its neighbors, raising, so to speak, its specific weight and giving it the properties of resilience"[59]. Here S.M. Shirokogorov's concept echoes A. Toynbee's view of "challenge and response", where the creative act is interpreted as a response to the "challenge" of the environment[60].

There is less resistance to S.M. Shirokogorov's "general conclusions": "1. The development of ethnicity takes place... along the path of adaptation of the entire complex... And along with complication of some phenomena, simplification of others is possible. 2. Ethnoses themselves adapt to the environment and adapt it to themselves. 3. Movement of ethnoses follows the line of least resistance"[61].

This is now nothing new. And the fact that Shirokogorov's views have become obsolete in half a century is not surprising. Worse is the mechanical transposition of zoological laws to history, which is the source material for ethnology. Therefore, the application of Shirokoirov's principles immediately encounters insurmountable difficulties. For example, the thesis "for an ethnos any form of existence is acceptable if it ensures its existence - the purpose of its life as a species" [62] is simply wrong. The Indians of North America and the nomads of Dzungaria could have survived under the rule of the United States or China at the cost of giving up their identity, but both preferred an unequal struggle with no hope of success.

Not every ethnos agrees to submit to the enemy just to survive. This is clear without further argument. That "the striving to capture territory, to develop culture and population numbers is the basis of every ethnos' movement" [63] is incorrect also, because relic ethnoses are by no means aggressive. The statement that "less cultured ethnic groups survive"[64] is only partially correct.

The statement "the more complex the organization and the higher the form of special adaptation, the shorter the existence of the species" (i.e. ethnos) is absolutely unacceptable. (i.e. ethnos)[65]. On the contrary, the disappearance of ethnoses is associated with the simplification of the structure, as will be discussed below. Still, Shirokogorov's book was a step forward for its time, for it broadened the perspective of the development of ethnography into ethnology. And what I write will probably be rethought in half a century, but that is the development of science.

Unlike S. M. Shirokogorov, we have a systems approach, the concept of ecosystems, the doctrine of the biosphere and living matter (biochemical), as well as material on the emergence of anthropogenic landscapes on a global scale, All this makes it possible to offer a better solution than it was possible before.

"CONSTITUTIONS" AND 'PROCESSES'

The totality of the facts cited shows that the system of categories underlying the concept of formations is not fundamentally applicable to ethnogenesis. This system fixes the "states" of society determined by the mode of production, which, in its turn, depends on the level of productive forces, in other words, on the technosphere. This system of reference is very convenient when studying the history of material culture, state institutions, styles in art, schools of philosophy, in short - everything that has been created by human hands. Over the last century, it has become so familiar that it has been mechanically transferred to the analysis of ethnogenesis, declaring, for example, the following theses: 1) "ethnos is a social community of people,"[66] 2) "ethnos, like the class, is not a social organization, but an amorphous state taking any social form - tribe, tribal union, state, church, party, etc., and not just one, but several at the same time".

In addition, it is recommended "not to confuse ethnos with biological categories, such as races, and with various kinds of social organization...."[67] If the first definition immediately breaks down with the examples given above, the second deserves a thorough examination, since empires were built and collapsed on this basis, however unconsciously, which of course affected the fates of subordinated peoples.

The concept of "state" occurs in both nature and society. In nature, there are four states; solid, liquid, gaseous, and plasma. Transition of a molecule of a solid substance from one state to another requires additional energy equal to the latent heat of melting or vaporization. This transition occurs in a small jerk, and the process is reversible. In the living matter of the biosphere, such a transition is associated with the death of the organism and is irreversible. This could mean that there are only two states for the organism: life and death, but since death is annihilation of the organism as a whole, if we could call it as a whole, it is absurd to call this moment of transition a "state". As for life of an organism, it is not a "state" but a process: from birth through maturity and old age to death. Analogous to the process of life in matter is crystallization of minerals and their subsequent metamorphization into amorphous masses.

When investigating "states" and "processes," we always apply different methodology. For "states" - classification, according to any arbitrarily accepted principle, convenient for viewing the phenomenon as a whole. For "processes," especially those involving evolution or form formation, a taxonomy based on the hierarchical principle-subordination of similar, though not identical, groups of different ranks is necessary. This is the systematics of Linnaeus, perfected by C. Darwin. The hierarchical nature of the system of the organic world is determined by the course and character of evolutionary processes, which are inseparable from life and are obligatory for it. But as soon as life dies down, a "state" emerges, more or less quickly corroded by the influence of the environment, even if the latter consisted of other dead "states" also subject to irreversible deformation. So, for an organism, including a human being, there is only one way to get into a "state" - to become a mummy, and for an ethnos - an archaeological culture.

The technosphere and its associated industrial relations are a different matter. There are "states" here. It is easy to turn a tractor into a garbage truck. It is only necessary to expend some (alas, not insignificant) energy. There are "states" in social life as well. At present, they are called civil states and registered by the registry office. Earlier they were called estates (etat). In a figurative sense, one can call class affiliation a "state," but one must remember that it is a product of production relations and productive forces, i.e. also of the technosphere. This state is extremely unstable. A captive warrior became a slave, and after escaping, he could turn into a feudal lord. There is no place or need for a hierarchical principle in the fate of such a person; a simple fixation is enough here. Thus, the changes of social states are similar (although not identical) to the changes of natural states: they are reversible and require additional energy for transition from one to another.

But is the ethnos the same? Is it possible, by making an effort, to change one's ethnicity? Apparently not! But this alone shows that ethnos is not a "state" (much less a civic state), but a process. The aberration that fuels the concept of "state" is related to the observer's lack of historical perspective. The complete decay of the ethnogenesis process without extraneous disturbances fits into 1200-1500 years, whereas a researcher devotes two years, three at most, to a planned subject.

Therefore, the past appears to him as a kaleidoscope, without a system and regularity, and he, having recorded a few changes in a limited region and one era, he sees only a collection of "states" that are not connected to one another, but only coincide in place and time. Thus, before the appearance of geomorphology, people did not connect the presence of terraces with the erosive activity of rivers flowing somewhere below, and mountains were considered eternal, almost the original forms of relief. Alas, all evidence in science is valid only with a certain degree of erudition of the opponent. Even the heliocentric system of Copernicus-Kepler convinced only those who knew astronomy enough in the 17th century, and H. Mendel's discovery was repeated by De Freese.

The second argument against the concept of "state" is the blurring of boundaries between ethnic groups in areas of ethnic contact. If the civil (i.e. social) state can be changed at once, for example, by the granting of nobility, demotion to soldiers, sale into slavery, liberation from captivity, etc., then ethnic contacts in the Huanghe Valley, Constantinople or North America is always a painful, long and highly variable process in the sense that the results of mestization are often unexpected and certainly always unmanageable. The latter is mainly due to the lack of a developed ethnological theory that would allow one to act not blindly, but with an eye to the consequences of ethnic processes.

NOTES

[34] Migration responds to extremely complex human motivations and driving forces. Hunger arises when severe conditions are created for the production of grains, and it is never possible to decipher them a priori climatically, since it may be... meteorological events, sometimes short-lived and insignificant in the climatic sense" (Ibid. P.17).

[35] See: Marx K., Engels F. Op., Vol. Z. P. 16.

[36] Semevsky B.N. Methodological bases of geography // Bulletin of Leningrad State University. 1968. - 24. С. 58-60; Kalesnik S.V. Problem of geographical environment // Ibid. 1968. - 12. С. 94.

[37] Kozlov V. I., Pokshishevsky V. V. Ethnography and geography // Soviet ethnography. 1973. - 1. С. 9-10.

[38] Kon I. С. Dialectics of the Development of Nations: Lenin's Theory of Nations and Modern Capitalism // The New World. 1970. - 3. С. 133-149.

[39] Kozlov V. I., Pokshishevsky V. V. Ethnography and geography. С. 3-13

[40] Andrianov B.V., Cheboksarov N.N. Household and cultural types and problems of their mapping //Soviet ethnography. 1972. - 5.

[41] Roginsky Ya. Ya., Levin M.G. Fundamentals of anthropology. М., 1955. С. 325-329.

[42] See: Timofeev-Resovskiy N. V. Microevolution. Elementary phenomena. Material and factors of microevolutionary process // Botanical Journal. 1958. Т. 43. - 3.

[43] Bromlech K). V. Experience of typology of ethnic communities // Soviet ethnography. 1972. - 5. С. 61.-And, probably, it is not by chance that in the same journal a year later was published another philological study of the term "ethnos", which substantiated its use in the sense in which it appears in L.N.Gumilev and in Bromley (see: Poplinsky Y.K. To the history of the term "ethnos" //Soviet ethnography. 1973. - 1).

[44] Kozlov V. I., Pokshishevsky V. V. Ethnography and geography. С. 10. [45] Alekseev V.P. In search of ancestors. М., 1972.

[46] Gumilev L.N. Ancient Turks. М., 1967. С. 359-360.

[47] Kozlov V.I. Dynamics of the number of peoples. М., 1969. С. 56.

[48] Tokarev S.A. Problem of types of ethnic communities //Voprosy philosofii. 1964. - II. С. 52- 53. See also: Agaev A. G. The nationality as a social Community // Problems of Philosophy. 1965. - II. С. 30.

[49] Murzaev E. M. The nature of Xinjiang and the formation of deserts of Central Asia. М., 1968. С. 185-190.

[50] Gumilev L.N. Terracotta figurines of monkeys from Khotan (experience of interpretation) // Messages of the Hermitage. 1959. VOL. XVI. С. 55-57.

[51] An excellent description of the nature of these places see: Murzaev E.M. Travels without adventures and fantasy. М., 1962. С. 52- 58.

[52] Bichurin N. Я. (Iakimf). Collection of information on the historical geography of East and Middle Asia / Compiled by L.N.Gumilev, M.F.Khvan. L.N.Gumilev and M.F.Khvan. Cheboksary, 1960. С. 558.

[53] Murzaev E.M. Travels without adventures and fantasy. С. 113-129. [54] For more details see: Gumilev L.N. Ancient Turks. С. 381-386.

[55] The Book of Marco Polo / Edited by I.P. Magidovich. MOSCOW, LENINGRAD, 1956, PP. 81-82.

[56] Shirokogorov S. M. Ethnos: A Study of the Basic Principles of Change Una (Shanghai). 1923. XVIII. Т. 1. Preface. С. 4-6.

[57] Ibid. С. 28.

[58] Ibid. С. 122.

[59] Ibid. С. 124-126.

[60] Toynbee A. J. Study of History /Abridgement by D. Somervell. London, New York, Toronto, 1946.

[61] Shirokogorov S. M. Ethnos. С. 126-129. [62] Ibid. С. 100.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid. С. 118.

[65] Ibid. С. 119.

[66] Kozlov V. I. What is ethnos? //Priroda. 1971.- 2. С. 74. [67] Artamonov M.I. Again, 'heroes' and 'crowd' // Ibid. С. 77.

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