28. Ancient Rus and the Great Steppe, Gumilev

XXX. The inevitability of reckoning (The third approximation is the level of the subethnos), 200. SOCIETY AND ETHNOS IN 1382

[I am posting a little bit longer, because we are getting so close to finish this book. It has been taking a very long time until now; the home stretch. Here is recounted the very complicated maneuvers of the Mongolian Hordes and Timur.]

It has long been believed that Tokhtamysh's raid was caused by Dmitry Donskoy's desire to liberate the Russian land from the Tatar yoke, which the supposedly prudent Tokhtamysh prevented. It is difficult to say who was the author of this version now, and perhaps it is no longer necessary: it has been repeated so many times that all historians have believed in it.

If Dmitry really wanted to get rid of the Tatars, why would he suppress the rebel Mamai? It would be advisable to leave him alone with Tokhtamysh and allow each other to weaken. Then, while preparing the deposition from the Horde, he should have kept the army ready, and not dismissed for feeding in the villages, it would not hurt to supply the capital with a garrison, and intelligence should be mobilized. But none of this was done, on the contrary, complacency reigned in Moscow, and the attack was a complete surprise.

And if Dmitry Donskoy was really going to change Tokhtamysh, then the latter's actions would be morally justified. Did the Khan of the Blue Horde deserve the wreath of a peacemaker who prevented an inevitable war, beneficial only to Lithuania? It can also be assumed that the khan was used by the enemies of Moscow, but even in this case the responsibility is not removed from him. We need to figure out who is a friend and ally, and who is an intriguer. The former khans were able to do this, and their actions were motivated.

Finally, from whom did the Metropolitan and the Princess and their children flee? It turns out, from their fellow citizens, who robbed and insulted them before leaving. This is no longer an ethnic conflict, but a social tragedy that neither Dmitry nor Tokhtamysh could have foreseen.

At that time, Moscow was the third (after Novgorod and Pskov) city in Russia. From an overgrown princely estate, it turned into a trade and craft center. But the most active part of the population in it were princely and boyar serfs.

In a feudal society, serfs are as necessary as their masters. They make up a single system. Not all slaves worked to exhaustion and wore rags. Many went after the boyar in luxurious caftans, on argamaks, with sabers and berdysh. Captivity was a way of subsistence for them, and a very good one. The nobles lived no worse - they ate the same food as the boyars, and their daughters wore the sarafans of the hawthorns. But bought friends are always unreliable, and forced cohabitation is painful. Insults, inevitable in everyday life, accumulated and waited for a way out, which suddenly appeared.

With the arrival of the Tatars, in the absence of the Boyars, the social system was simplified. The serfs got access to the cherished wines and stagnant honey, were tempted themselves and shared with the craftsmen of Khamovniki, Bronny, Khlebny and Tablecloth lanes. The actual power in the city passed into the hands of a drunken crowd. But, unfortunately, these new masters of Moscow were not experienced in military affairs and diplomacy, and both require professional skills. That's the result: a burnt-out city and 24 thousand corpses, whereas in the presence of combat commanders it was easy to defend Moscow and drive away the Tatars.

Not every social movement gives a positive result, and it is not always appropriate. But it can be impossible to foresee, and even more so to prevent it. This is how the zigzags of history arise, extinguished by the statistical regularity of ethnogenesis.

201. THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF THE TATAR KHAN

Unlike the aristocratic kingdoms of Western Europe and the bureaucratic empires of China, steppe uluses existed as military democracies. The khan was elected in the Kurultai, and his power was proportional to his popularity. In fact, the khan was not a king, but a president for life, with the only difference that he was not re-elected, because he could only cede the throne with his life. This was how the responsibility of the authorities to society was carried out.

The beks surrounding the khan had a more reliable support in their squads. The Nukers, literally "comrades" (cf. with the French les comptes), faithfully served their respected boss. In fact, each squad was a small consortium. The khan took advantage of the fact that the Beks, who were called emirs in Central Asia, constantly competed with each other and preferred to have a weak ruler, sometimes even a fictitious one. Thus, Timur, having already concentrated the actual power in his hands, kept with him a khan from the descendants of Jagatai, the keeper of Yasa.

This was the fundamental difference between the ancient and the new order. Genghis managed to use the passionate elite to unite the entire Mongolian people into a single complex system: after all, the "people of long will" were relatives of the Arats who served under their banners. This was possible with high passionary tension, in the phase of ascent, when each member of the system performed his function and risked his life for the common cause. But for 200 years, the number of passionaries in the ulus of Dzhuchiev has decreased, and sub-passionaries have multiplied in peaceful conditions; they began to dictate their style of behavior to both the beks and the khan himself, and there was nothing to oppose them.

Poor Tokhtamysh! Having sat on the throne of the Golden Horde, he found himself in a position above the level of his competence. At the same time, he did not imagine all the difficulties that the management of a multiethnic country was associated with, and did not realize what was threatening him and what he needed to save himself. Tokhtamysh believed that, having become the head of a huge ulus, he had already shown the talent of a ruler, although a combination of circumstances and the support of Timur, the enemy of his tribesmen, led him to the throne. The victory over Mamai was not won by them because there was no battle, and it was not needed, since Mamai lost the troops who left the rebel for the legitimate khan, the tradition of Genghis and Genghisids.

Tokhtamysh considered his personal courage and steadfastness sufficient to reign in foreign countries, in the Volga region and on the Irtysh, and make decisions without thinking about them. As a result, he became a toy in the hands of his beks, who were no smarter than him and equally uneducated. Most of them were not Muslims, but pagans, and it is difficult to say whether Tokhtamysh himself was a Muslim. This is important not because faith changes a person's character, which sometimes does not happen, but because familiarization with a particular culture broadens the ruler's horizons and helps him in solving political problems, especially those whose existence he previously did not even suspect. In short, Tokhtamysh was extremely harmed by his militant provincialism, as a result of which, having gone beyond Western Siberia, he did so many stupid things that in the end he lost both power and life.

Let us recall how cautiously the khans of the Golden Horde behaved towards Russia. Batu's son Sartak fraternized with Alexander Nevsky and in 1252 secured him the Grand Duchy of Vladimir; in 1269 Batu's grandson Mengu-Timur sent an army to Novgorod to repel the Livonian knights, and one military demonstration was enough to conclude peace "according to the will of Novgorod." Tokhta was friends with Mikhail Yaroslavich of Tver, Uzbek - with Ivan Danilovich of Moscow, and Janibek and his mother Taydula patronized Metropolitan Alexei.

During the "great jam", Russia could easily break away from the Golden Horde, but did not even make an attempt to do so. In 1371, Mamai, at a personal meeting, gave Dmitry of Moscow a label for the grand duchy, and two years later he devastated the possessions of Oleg of Ryazan, the enemy of Moscow. It seemed that the alliance was strong, as it was based on mutually beneficial defense against the aggressive Lithuania gaining strength. Neither Tver nor Ryazan had the strength to violate the Russian system integrity, but the Suzdal-Nizhny Novgorod Principality, relying on merchant cities on the Volga, resisted the political line of Moscow. It was Archbishop Dionysius of Suzdal who provoked the Russian-Tatar conflict in 1374. He did not even spare the Nizhny Novgorod residents, because he could not count on the fact that a punitive campaign of the Tatars would not follow for betrayal, and then his parishioners would become victims. This in 1377 pushed the Russians into an alliance with Tokhtamysh and a terrible massacre on Kulikovo Field, which cleared the way for the khan of the Blue Horde to the throne of Sarai.

Social development in the Asian part of the Juchiyev ulus went a special way. However, life in the White and Blue Horde can only be called "development" conditionally. The Mongolian "drop" in the Kipchak "sea" dissolved almost without a trace. Only the dynasty remained, which was accepted by the population without resistance, since the Trans-Baikal and Siberian nomads did not see each other as strangers. Life, clothing, morals and demonology, which played the role of religion, were similar for both, the passionarity of this mixture was low, but the levels of tension close to homeostasis were the most stable.

Tradition suggested to Siberian nomads the task of preserving the borders of their ulus and rejection of alien cultures, including Muslim, which was introduced by Uzbek Khan in 1312 to please the townspeople of the merchant Volga region, but Muslim customs in the Steppe were observed extremely sluggishly.

202. FRIENDS AND ENEMIES OF THE BLUE HORDE

There is a very common opinion that the expansion of a state is associated with its economic or social rise. However, it often happens that the reason for the expansion is the weakening of the neighbors of this state, while it itself is in a state of ethnic homeostasis and social stability. In both cases, the balance of forces varies the same way, and it is not the absolute values, but their ratio that determines the successes or failures in long-term wars as characteristic manifestations of ethnic and especially superethnic contacts.

The Blue Horde was a weak power with a sparse population and extensive economy. For a hundred years it existed safely, being covered from the west by a Golden Horde, and from the east by a White One. When both of these powers spent the reserve of passionarity transferred to them by the Mongol Kaans, the Blue Horde turned out to be the least weak and took possession of the Volga region and the banks of the Irtysh. But even so, Tokhtamysh was forced to resort to the help of Timur and Prince Dmitry, to whom he should be grateful. But circumstances forced him to do something else: for the sake of an alliance with the Suzdal-Nizhny Novgorod princes, he made a frivolous raid on Moscow in 1382, and then in 1383 he captured Khorezm only to lose it immediately. But he acquired a disappointed vassal in Moscow and an implacable enemy in Kesh (Shakhrisyabze) - Emir Timur, who had already become the ruler of the Jagatai ulus.

Strangely enough, in the 80s of the XIV century. in Asia, the political conflict of the XIII century revived. The Mongol ulus was almost simultaneously opposed by China, renewed by the Ming dynasty, and the ideological heir of the Khorezm Sultanate, Timur. But their opponents, Togluk-Temur in Mongolia and Tokhtamysh in Siberia, were the epigones (opposite) of Genghis Khan and his associates. Despite the personal bravery of both khans, Beks and Nukhurs, their ethnic groups did not possess the high passion tension that allowed the Mongols of the XIII century not only to defend their lives and freedom, but also to win victories that surprised the world. The best descendants of the "people of long will" died in the internecine war of 1259-1304, and the survivors ceased to be steppe dwellers. They preferred the charm of the high Muslim culture to the ancient tradition and fertilized it, sacrificing themselves in the struggle with their brethren, who already seemed to them "backward" and "wild".

It was this alienation that allowed the descendants of the Mongols to unite with the Turks and Tajiks, although the creation of such a chimera cost the whole Middle East a lot of blood. Nevertheless, the regeneration of the superethnos was carried out, and the luxurious culture of the Timurids existed in Central Asia until the XVI century, and in India - until the XVIII century.

The war, which began in 1383 and was not averted, and was inevitable, dragged on for 15 years. Tokhtamysh went missing after the defeat. Timur broke down and died soon after. The soldiers of both sides showed genuine heroism, surpassing the courage of the Lithuanian, Polish and German knights, whom they encountered in 1399. And who won in this massacre... Russia, which has received the opportunity to turn into Russia.

Could things have gone differently? Could the Blue Horde resist Timur's veterans and protect their wives and children from bitter bondage in a foreign land? It is not customary to raise such questions, but still: what would it be?

It must be assumed that the outcome of the war was not a foregone conclusion. Tokhtamysh did not have enough loyal allies, who were there, but whom he pushed away from himself. Well, why would he demand the heir to the Moscow throne, Vasily Dmitrievich, as a hostage in 1383, immediately after the defeat of Moscow?

By and large, Lithuania was a natural opponent of both Russia and the Horde. In 1380, Yagailo went to support Mamai, and in 1381 treacherously killed his uncle Keistut and threw his cousin Vitovt into prison. Vytautas managed to escape by changing into a woman's dress, which doomed the girl who saved him to a painful death. Are such people worthy of trust? And in 1391 Tokhtamysh was looking for shelter and help in Lithuania. And he repeated the same thing in 1399. Well, could Orthodox Russians trust him?

However, Tokhtamysh had his own party in Russia. These were the Suzdal princes, who recruited squads with the money of Nizhny Novgorod merchants, who were dear to the trade route along the Volga, and not the Russian land. These did not have time to betray the khan, as they had previously been betrayed by their boyars. No, if the general course of ethnogenesis is programmed, it does not mean that the ruler can be stupid and irresponsible. Let only zigzags arise because of mistakes, it does not make it easier for contemporaries of events.

203. PASSIONATE OVERHEATING AND CONSCIENCE

The victory over Mamai equally elevated Dmitry and Tokhtamysh, but not the Suzdal princes Vasily, Semyon and their uncle Boris Konstantinovich, and therefore not their entourage – the rich Volga merchants, very smart and energetic. It is not for nothing that such a subtle researcher as V.L. Komarovich called the Suzdal-Nizhny Novgorod princes "Russian Medici" and "condottieri"[1]. They hated military-monastic Moscow, and social contradictions intertwined with sub-ethnic ones, which immediately led to political actions.

The details of the political intrigue did not, and could not, get into the annals, otherwise the intrigue would not have been a secret, and therefore would not have achieved success. But the logic of events speaks for itself. The Tatar-Moscow conflict was again provoked, and the cunning Nizhny Novgorod residents used Tokhtamysh's credulity. The raid on Moscow was a success solely due to the factor of surprise and unpreparedness of Dmitry Donskoy for a blow from a natural ally, to whom the war itself was unprofitable. It is only known that the Suzdalians accused Dmitry and Oleg of secret relations with Lithuania, but Tokhtamysh did not understand that it was a lie. Who is the culprit of the provocation? The archbishop or the princes are unclear; perhaps they are all.

The repetition of the tragedy of 1374 (the murder of ambassadors at the instigation of Dionysius) in 1382 (the deception of Muscovites by the Suzdalians) is so striking that there is undoubtedly only one "handwriting"[2].

And the purpose of the crime (because provocation with bloody gervais is a crime) is obvious. Boris Konstantinovich became a prince in Nizhny Novgorod, became a confidant of Khan Tokhtamysh and even received a label from him for the grand reign, and Dionysius of Suzdal in 1383, using the disgrace of Metropolitan Cyprian, went to Constantinople and was ordained metropolitan. Too successful a trip ruined him, because it was a temptation to power.

Dionysius did not go home by the usual route - through the Sea of Azov and the Don, but through the Dnieper and accordingly stopped in Kiev. There he was arrested by the Lithuanian prince, viceroy of Vytautas, and put in prison... from where he did not come out. What made him change his route? Obviously, there was a great danger waiting for him on the Don, which he knew about. They could have been relatives of Saraika, the ambassador killed by Dionysius in Nizhny Novgorod. For nine years, the memory of this event had not died, and Dionysius knew that the Tatars do not forgive betrayal. So he took a chance... and he lost, because the Lithuanians were guided not by emotions, but by state necessity[3]. So everything returned to its original position. In Lithuania, Cyprian, expelled from Moscow, ruled the church, Pimen returned to Moscow on Chukhlomy, and the modest monk Sergius of Radonezh was the actual church authority. And events flowed in their course, washing away the bloody zigzag of history.

But if we move from the personal level to the population level, then a very curious conclusion arises. The population of the Russian land in the last years of Dmitry Donskoy's life did not yet represent ethnic integrity. But the Kulikovo battle was already in the past. On the contrary, Russian people, from princes to serfs, were looking for friends and helpers on the side, striving to conclude an alliance with the Tatars, then with the Lithuanians, then with the Poles, then with the Germans and Swedes. And internal wars had the character of ruthless reprisals. The Moscow troops more than once "laid the Ryazan land empty", and what was it like to restore it later?! There was a struggle of parties in Smolensk: one was supported by Vytautas, and the other by Oleg Ryazansky; no mercy was given to the defeated. Tver was squeezed in a vice and no longer claimed independence, but the Novgorod Republic stood out as an independent state.

The whole ancient Russian land became Lithuanian, but the greatest danger for Moscow was in the small Suzdal and its rich "suburb" - Nizhny Novgorod. The collapse of the Golden Horde, relations with which were established thanks to Metropolitan Alexei and Hansha Taidula, gave victory to the Blue Horde, and Khan Tokhtamysh favored the Suzdal prince, although he did not break off relations with Moscow. The situation was extremely acute, but the destinies of this world are fleeting. The die was cast in 1383, when the "iron lame man" Timur said his word.

NOTES:

[1] Komarovich V.L.Decree. op.p.84.

[2] See: Copy L.V. Decree.Soc. Vol. II. pp.416- 419.

[3] The patron of Dionysius, Prince Boris Konstantinovich, was married to the daughter of Algirdas, but this did not help either.

XXXI. The Duel of Giants

204. A TEST OF STRENGTH. THE CLASH OF SUPERETHNOSES

Tokhtamysh wanted to restore the Juchi ulus within its legal borders. During the "great jam", the Juchids lost Azerbaijan in 1357, abandoned by Berdibek, who preferred parricide to border protection, and Khorezm, annexed to Timur's empire in 1371. The Blue Horde set about correcting the Golden Horde's blunders.

It is hardly possible to attribute the unleashed war to the ambition of Tokhtamysh or his untenable calculations. As mentioned above, the khan had to reckon with the will of his beks and Nukhurs, and they wanted them to be ruled not by a protege of Timur-bek, but by an independent khan Genghisid, who would not force them to change the ancient faith and customs that were trampled in 1312 by the Uzbek. In other words, Siberia opposed the introduction of Muslim culture, represented by a group of Mangut "talba"[1], relying on "9 mists, mostly infidels", "... pagans, ruthless and vicious, with 12 oglans of the Juchi family, led by Bek-Pulad, with the emirs Isa-bek, Yagly-biy, Kazanchi and other noyons"[2].

Since the emotionality of the characteristics and assessments belongs to Muslim authors, there is no doubt that the victory of the Blue Horde meant a departure from the policy of Uzbek and Janibek, who relied on the urban population of the Volga region, mainly Muslim. This withdrawal meant war with Timur, the paladin of Islam.

In 1383, Tokhtamysh's power was restored in Khorezm, judging by the fact that coins with his name began to be issued. The details of this important event, unfortunately, are unknown, as well as why Timur did not react to the attempt on his territory. This apparently inspired Tokhtamysh to continue the war, this time in the Caucasus. In the winter of 1385, the Tatars marched through Derbent to Tabriz, took it and ruthlessly looted it, and destroyed mosques and madrassas, which already speaks of their anti-Islamic mood.

Having taken the loot, Tokhtamysh's troops went back, not trying to gain a foothold in Transcaucasia. The surprise factor brought them victory, but when in 1387 the Tatars tried to repeat the raid, they were repulsed by Timur's troops. Most of them managed to escape beyond Derbent, but many were captured.

To the surprise of his emirs and later historiographers, Timur showed mercy to the captives (suyurgal). He "asked them about Tokhtamysh's health and, showing affection and, said: "The rights of father and son are between us. Because of a few fools, why will so many people die? It should be that we observe the agreement and do not wake up the sleeping turmoil." Then he gave those prisoners money, clothes and dressing gowns and appointed a convoy to separate them from the army and send them to their state."[3]

It must be assumed that Timur feared a war on two fronts. From 1381 to 1387, he had to suppress the uprising of the Sarbadars in Khorasan, Ray, Kuhistan and the mountaineers of Luristan. There, prisoners were immured alive in the walls of fortresses and minarets made of skulls were stacked. It would be untimely to pull troops to the northern border. But the logic of events is stronger than the policy of the tsars.

Timur's generosity had a completely different effect than he had hoped for. Tokhtamysh could not forget that it was only thanks to Timur that he was saved and received the throne. Therefore, his aggressiveness seems to be regarded as black ingratitude. However, let's remember who surrounded him. For 200 years, the descendants of "people of long will", heroes loyal to the khan of Noyons, have turned into beks and oglans, self-willed provincials with extremely narrow political horizons and unrestrained emotions. The traditions they inherited were gradually deformed, the level of passionarity decreased, and only the memory of the insults that Muslims inflicted on their ancestors at the beginning of the XIV century remained.

It is unclear how much Khan Tokhtamysh shared these sentiments, but even if he had his own opinion, it did not matter in the conditions of an avalanche-like decline of passionarity, which reached equilibrium with instinctive impulses formed by the traditional culture of the Great Steppe. The khan's companions were brave, strong, hardy, even loyal, but they lost the ability to foresee, as did their neighbors, the Oirats - Western Mongols, conquered by Genghis, and the Semirechensk Mughals - Turks, who broke away from the Jagatai ulus due to the unrest there. In short, the steppe dwellers of the end of the XIV century reached the harmony of the ethnopsychological structure and were convinced that the halo of victory would always surround their bunchuki, no matter what gulyams Aksak Timur recruited for himself. Such naive arrogance is characteristic of the philistine level of any culture. In this case, it led to tragic consequences.

205. THE SEARCH FOR FRIENDS

Tokhtamysh was by no means stupid. He correctly assessed the character of his former benefactor, Timur, whom historical regularity turned into the worst enemy of his ulus. In fact, in 1388, the events of 1225 were repeated, and Timur was almost a copy of Jalal-ad-Din, but Tokhtamysh did not resemble Genghis at all, nor did his companions possess the talents of Jebe and Subutai. But, realizing that a collision was inevitable, Tokhtamysh tried to acquire allies.

From 1375, Timur waged a constant war with Mogulistan and its emir Qamar ad-Din. This war consisted of annual punitive campaigns conducted by insignificant forces, and therefore did not achieve the goal set by Timur - joining the Tianshan Highlands to the Jagatai ulus, between Lake Issyk-Kul, Kuch and Kashgar. The troops of Timur, reached the river. Or its tributary Charyn, but caused only the bitterness of nomads, whose families and property became prey to ruthless ghouls. Therefore, Qamar al-Din concluded a military alliance with Tokhtamysh, which secured his left flank.

On the right flank, an equally stubborn war was waged in the Khorezm oasis, whose population stubbornly avoided joining Timur's cultural power, preferring contacts with Siberian nomads. Finally, in 1388, Urgench was stormed and destroyed, and the Khorezm oasis was turned into a province of the Jagatai Khanate. This was a direct violation of the will of Genghis Khan, who bequeathed Khorezm to the descendants of Jochi. This alone could be a sufficient reason for war, but Timur was a consistent enemy of nomadic traditions, just as Tokhtamysh was their paladin. In the light of the described counter-examination, the personal sympathies of its participants could not matter much.

The rare population of the South Siberian steppes could not resist the rich and populous Central Asia if the ulus of the Jochids did not have a powerful rear - Great Russia.

Unfortunately for Tokhtamysh, the traditional union of Russia and the Horde was violated by a frivolous raid on Moscow in 1382. Therefore, since 1385 Tokhtamysh began to show mercy to the Suzdal Prince Boris Konstantinovich, despite the fact that he was married to the daughter of Algirdas, the enemy of the Tatars."[4].

But diplomacy, not backed up by an army, is ineffective. Moscow was stronger than the Volga merchant cities and quickly regained its predominant position. In 1386, Sergius of Radonezh achieved reconciliation between Oleg of Ryazan and Dmitry Donskoy[5], which allowed the latter to assist the Suzdal princes Vasily and Semyon Dmitrievich, thanks to which they expelled their uncle Boris from Nizhny Novgorod in 1387[6]. Tom had to run to Tokhtamysh and seek protection from him.

The timing of this request was extremely unfortunate. Tokhtamysh gathered an army "from Russians, Circassians, Bulgars, Kipchaks, Alans, (residents) Crimea with Kafa and m-k-s (moksha)" [7] for a trip to Timur. Boris Konstantinovich was appointed to this army. And the Moscow government was saving up its strength, betting on the younger generation.

The situation of the Moscow Principality under the Blue Horde was much more difficult than during the Golden Horde. Then the Russian grand dukes - from Alexander Nevsky to Simeon the Proud - enjoyed the intercession of the Khans and were not afraid of either the Lithuanians or invasions from the East. Therefore, even during the "great jam", they continued to carry the "exit" (tribute) to the khans, hoping that order would be restored. The Suzdal intrigue and the bloodshed of 1382 shattered Moscow's political ties with Sarai. Tokhtamysh knew that he was to blame for this, and, as always happens, he did not forgive the offended partner. Contrary to the age-old tradition, he demanded Vasily, the heir to the Moscow throne, as a hostage, but the prince, having been in the Horde for two years (1383-1385), escaped and returned home through Lithuania.

Meanwhile, an event occurred in the West that changed the balance of power - the union of Lithuania with Poland. The Russian subjects of Lithuania were subordinated to the Catholics, which led to a number of legal restrictions. Back in 1370, Prince Svyatoslav of Smolensk submitted to Lithuania[8]. The Lithuanian threat is hanging over Moscow. Moscow and the Russian Metropolia had nowhere to wait for help, because Byzantium, Moscow's natural ally, itself barely held out against the Ottoman Turks and Italian merchants.

It seemed that by the time of Dmitry Donskoy's death, his state had no chance of surviving, but Moscow not only won, but also united Great Russia around itself. How did it happen? The answer requires a broad historical panorama. So let's go back to the East.

206. EXCHANGE OF BLOWS

In the East, information about events diverges quickly. Therefore, Tokhtamysh received information about Timur's brutal war with the Persian shah Muzaffarids, who owned Kirman and Fars. In 1387 Timur approached Isfahan, who surrendered without bloodshed. The residents were spared for a significant contribution, for which a small garrison was left in the city - about 3 thousand soldiers. However, the victors behaved so disgracefully that one night a spontaneous uprising broke out and the garrison was exterminated by the people. Of course, the city was taken and punished. "According to the order," Timur's warriors brought 70 thousand. severed heads, of which towers were built in different quarters of the city.

Shiraz was taken after Isfahan, where Timur spared the poet Hafiz not only for his wonderful poems, but also for a witty answer[9], but it was far from complete victory, since the ruler of Khuzistan, Shah Mansur, managed to organize resistance to the invader. As soon as information about this war reached Tokhtamysh, he decided that his time had come.

In the autumn of 1387, Tokhtamysh's army with a wide front - from Khorezm to Semirechye - "countless as raindrops", without meeting resistance, rolled to Amu Darya, reached Termez. However, the fortress walls of Bukhara, Samarkand and Termez saved the cities from looting[10].

Meanwhile, the news of the sudden invasion of the steppe army reached Timur. He immediately stopped the war with Shah Mansur and threw 30 thousand horsemen [11] to Samarkand, where Omar Sheikh, Timur's son, valiantly defended himself. Following the vanguard, Timur himself arrived in Samarkand at the head of troops defending individual fortresses, such as Karshi. His arrival caused panic among the steppe dwellers, who spread out over such a large area that they could not be organized for battle. So they rolled back to the north.

Tokhtamysh began to pull together his forces, but on the way to Khojent Timur overtook him, forced him to take the fight and inflicted a cruel defeat on him. The winter of 1388 proved to be the turning point of Tatar military happiness.

After Tokhtamysh retreated beyond Yaik, it was the turn of Khorezm (in 1388) and Mogulistan (in 1389). Khorezm was destroyed, its inhabitants were brought to Samarkand, and the ashes were sown with barley. Only three years later Timur allowed to restore this ancient city.

Timur's Gulyams paid off equally radically with the Semirechensk Mughals[12]. The details of this epic are worth paying attention to.

In 1389 Timur made a decisive effort and threw his veterans to Semirechye. These selected troops crossed Ili and Il-Imil, bypassing Ala-Kul, reached Tarbagatai, the "heart" of Moghulistan[13]. Continuing the offensive, they reached the area of Sovr. Kuldzhi and Chuguchak, and the vanguard reached the Black Irtysh.

After this throw, the Timur troops split up: one detachment moved east to the Bagrash-Kul Lake and reached the Turfan oasis, the other detachment crossed the spurs of the Tien Shan and took Karashar, which solved not only a military, but also an important political problem.

Among the princes of the Jagatai house was a young Khizr-Khoja. At the time of the coup committed by Qamar al-Din, he managed to escape from the murderers from Kashgar to the Pamir mountains, there he went through a difficult time, and in 1390 he returned to East Turkestan, to Khotan and Lob-Nor, where he founded an independent state, converting local Uighurs to Islam. Timur, without a moment's hesitation, attacked this last stronghold of the Genghisids and defeated it. Poor Khizr-Khoja fled to Gobi. Timur celebrated his victory in Karashar and divided the spoils among his warriors, after which he returned to Samarkand.

But the indefatigable Qamar al-Din gathered loyal companions and liberated the Semirechye. In 1390, Timur again sent an army against the nomad leader, which drove Kamar ad-Din into the Altai Mountains, "the land of martens and sables", and since 1392 no one has heard of Kamar ad-Din anymore. But Khizr-Khoja returned and, with the help of the Mongolian Duklat tribe, restored the lost state. Instead of resuming the war, Khizr-Khoja sent his daughter to Timur's harem in 1397 and quietly ruled in Mogulistan until his death in 1399. Timur was not up to him.

The only person who managed to benefit from this unsuccessful war was the Suzdal Prince Boris Konstantinovich. Being mobilized by Tokhtamysh in 1389, he accompanied the khan on a campaign for 30 days, "and then the tsar spared him, let him go back from the place called Uruktan (?! - L.G.), and told him to wait for himself in the Sheds, and he went to fight ..." (Resurrection Chronicle) [14].

The defeated Tokhtamysh, expecting the continuation of the war, was looking for allies. He tried to establish an alliance with Egypt[15], which was pointless because of the distance, and with the Russian Prince Vasily Dmitrievich. But while the resumption of friendship with Moscow was in the future, the khan gave rich Nizhny Novgorod to Boris, who drove his nephews out of there. Vasily Dmitrievich Kirdyapa received a tiny town on the bank of the Volga, just above Nizhny Novgorod, and Semyon turned out to have no inheritance at all and began to serve the Tatar khan for food.

Vasily Dmitrievich went to the Horde in 1390 and bought a label for the Principality of Nizhny Novgorod: "Beseech the princes of the tsars to grieve for him to Tsar Tokhtamysh. They also took a lot of gold and silver and great gifts, so did King Tokhtamysh..." [16] (Nikon Chronicle). But did Tokhtamysh think that with this he signed the death of his state? Apparently not!

On January 19, 1391, Timur decided to oppose Tokhtamysh. He sent Timur an embassy with peace proposals, explaining the past war by "unhappy fate and the advice of evil people"[17]. If this was true, which is likely, then this only confirms the assumption that in the ulus of Juchiev Khan was a puppet of his Noyons and beks, and these latter inherited the traditions of not "people of long will", but the Polovtsy conquered by them, and not passionate, but persistent, who were in homeostasis. As such, they had heightened emotionality and a weak imagination.

Timur reminded the ambassadors of the benefits they had rendered to Tokhtamysh and his black ingratitude, treacherous invasions of Azerbaijan and Central Asia and ended with a statement that since one cannot believe, one must fight. On February 21, Timur's army marched to the north.

Indeed, the instability of the Blue Horde, unlike the Golden Horde, in compliance with contracts and promises caused insincerity in the neighbors. Prince Boris of Suzdal was deceived, because, having received a label for Nizhny Novgorod, he was immediately deprived of the khan's support. In Moscow, they could not forget the massacre of 1382, which also occurred as a result of a vile deception. Although the Russians did not rebel against Tokhtamysh and continued to assist him [18], they did so so sluggishly that their participation in the course of events was not reflected. The war flowed according to Timur's plan, and he knew how to think through campaigns.

207. FOLLOWING THE SPRING

The main difficulty of the steppe war is the problem of supplying not so much people as horses. To be combat-ready, each soldier of the advancing army had to have three horses - marching, pack and fighting, the last walking empty. In addition, there was a wagon train with a supply of arrows and siege engines and the personal horses of the generals and their wives. It was very difficult to stock forage for all the horses and, most importantly, to carry it with you. That is why the Chinese of the Han and Tang eras limited their campaigns to Inner Asia, and invaded Sogdiana only by providing warehouses along the route of the army.

Timur took this difficulty into account and overcame it "in a phenological way", using foot food. The army marched in February, when the southern steppe was already green, and moved along with the spring warmth to the north, finding meltwater in the pits and feeding the horses with fresh grass. So in four months Timur's troops passed the steppe between Tobol and Emba without loss. Since the warriors were running out of supplies, a roundup of animals was arranged along the way: deer, saiga and moose. They got more meat than they could eat.

Having crossed the Yaik in its upper reaches without hindrance, Timur's army reached the Ik River (a tributary of the Kama). There Timur found out that Tokhtamysh had not known about the campaign for a long time and only when the Jagatai troops crossed the Yaik (Ural), he began urgently to gather soldiers. The number of Tatars and Jagatai was equal[19], but Tokhtamysh was expecting reinforcements from Russia.

Sheref ad-Din reports that the testimony of the prisoners revealed Tokhtamysh's complete unpreparedness for Timur's invasion. The Tatar khan could not imagine that an army of sedentary urban residents could cross the wide steppe and not die of hunger[20]. Therefore, he retreated, hoping that Timur's soldiers, exhausted by the campaign, would disperse in search of food. Thanks to his mistake, Timur had time to deploy his forces and press the Tatars to the Volga bank, forcing the Kondurcha River (a tributary of the Volga) north of the Sakmara River. June 18 , 1391 Timur overturned the heroically fighting Tatar cavalry and pressed the Tatars to the bank of the Volga, the crossing of which at this time of year was impracticable. Tokhtamysh somehow managed to escape, but his army was defeated, and his wives, children and property went to the victors.

However, contrary to the interpretation of the event by Sheref ad-Din, Timur's victory was expensive. This is evident from the fact that he did not develop success, did not cross to the right bank of the Volga, but limited himself to collecting scattered Tatars and cattle.

Apparently, the massacre at Kondurcha took so many winners to another world that the survivors were happy to take away the loot on carts captured from local residents. Now the South Siberian autumn was advancing on Timur's army, fleeing from which he quickly crossed the desert, reached Otrar in October and returned to the "paradise region of Samarkand" [21] in order to soon find out that the war with Tokhtamysh was not over.

In fact, the entire right bank of the Volga was not affected by the enemy. Vasily Dmitrievich with the Moscow army, although he came, "called by the tsar," to help the khan, but managed to evade participation in the battle of Kondurcha and escape beyond the river. Ik [22] and beyond the Volga. From there, he bypassed the Ryazan and Suzdal lands and ran across the steppe beyond the Don. His guides got lost, and Prince Vasily got to Kiev. To get out of there, he married Vitovt's daughter Sophia and brought her to Moscow[23].

After the victory at Kondurcha, Timur was approached by the princes of the White Horde, who were in his service, with a request to entrust them with the collection of people from their former uluses to bring them to submission to the conqueror. Timur trusted them and gave them labels to complete the assignment. Those, "cheerful and contented, went to find their il" [24] and did not return. This negated the success of the campaign.

208. INFIDELITY

Timur's victory at Kondurch hurt the Suzdal-Nizhny Novgorod Principality. Boris Konstantinovich, deprived of Tatar support, was forced to ask for loyalty from his boyars, and they betrayed him. The elder boyar, Vasily Rumyants, persuaded Boris: "Don't be sad, Mr. Prince! We are all loyal to you and ready to lay down our heads for you and shed our blood!" The Blush itself was sent with Grand Duke Vasily.

The fact that Vasily Dmitrievich did not break with the broken khan was wise. Returning from Kiev with a Lithuanian wife and a Tatar ambassador in 1392, he sent this ambassador along with his boyars to Nizhny Novgorod. Boris did not want to let them into the city, but succumbed to the persuasions of Blush, who advised the prince to avoid conflict. But as soon as the Khan's ambassador and the Moscow boyars entered the city, the bells rang, it was announced to the people that Nizhny Novgorod belonged to the Moscow prince, and Prince Boris boyar Vasily Rumyants declared: "Mr. Prince! Don't rely on us. We are no longer with you, but with you." And they shackled Boris, his wife, children and supporters. They were taken to Moscow prisons, where they died.

After Boris Konstantinovich's death in 1394, his nephews Vasily and Semyon Dmitrievich led the resistance to Moscow, but they had to leave Suzdal due to the inertia of the people. The descendants of the ancient Russians could not and did not want to compete with Moscow, where passionate energy was boiling and bubbling. The princes turned out to be lonely. For ten years they hoped for the help of Khan Tokhtamysh, but in vain. In 1401, Semyon's family was captured by the Moscow voivodes, and then he himself surrendered to the Muscovites and died in Vyatka five months later. Vasily died in 1403 at home, in Gorodets, which then went to Moscow.

The acquisition of Nizhny Novgorod land immediately consolidated the primacy of Moscow in Great Russia. But how could it be realized? The Suzdal princes were not inferior to the Moscow princes in enterprise, energy, and abilities, but they were betrayed by the boyars, townspeople, and even peasants who did not provide them with the necessary support. Not that the Nizhny Novgorod people opposed the Suzdal princes, but they behaved so sluggishly that their position could well be considered treason, since it opened the way to Nizhny Novgorod for the Moscow army.

However, the accusation of treason to their people could also be thrown by citizens to princes who began to use Tatars and Mordvins to protect their rights. In 1399, Semyon Dmitrievich brought a thousand Tatars to Nizhny Novgorod. After a three-day siege, the residents of Nizhny Novgorod opened the gates for a promise not to rob them and not to take them prisoner. The Moscow drama was repeated: Nizhny Novgorod residents were stripped naked, and the prince took responsibility from himself, because he is "not free in the Tatars."

When the Moscow troops came to the rescue of the Nizhny Novgorod people, the Tatars fled, and the Muscovites fought the Bulgarian land, the Nizhny Novgorod people sincerely became loyal subjects of the Moscow prince. So who should be considered traitors: boyars or princes?

It seems that it is equal to those and others. The picture of the death of the Suzdal land is too reminiscent of the tragedy of Ancient Russia, which broke up into fiefs, unscrupulously and ruthlessly dealt with each other. Already in the XIII century, the category of loyalty itself disappeared from the consciousness of princes and boyars, which is characteristic of the obscuration phase. The masses, as always, followed the example of the rulers and became more helpless from year to year. Why was Moscow the exception?

This also follows from the theory of ethnogenesis. There was natural selection in the villages. Passionate young men became "youths" serving princes and boyars in campaigns. They were then called "boyar children", which by no means implied kinship.

Passionate girls, as well as non-passionate ones, sought to get married successfully. But in that rebellious time, the heroes of their maiden dreams were brave warriors, and the prospect of widowhood faded before this dream. So Moscow gradually accumulated the passionate gene pool of Russia.

Of course, the "youths" had to be fed and clothed. But the rich metropolis supported Moscow not only spiritually, but also financially. Therefore, Grand Duke Vasily had enough money not only for household needs, but also for the "exit" of the Tatar khan. Tokhtamysh took this into account and betrayed friendship and his word of honor: he did not stand up for his friend Boris Konstantinovich, but in 1392 gave Vasily Dmitrievich a label for Nizhny Novgorod, Gorodets, Meshchera and Tarus [25]. With this, the khan secured his rear in the future war with Timur, which his own beks and oglans demanded from him. And the fact that by this act he laid the foundation for the future greatness of Russia was not known to him. Therefore, he does not deserve gratitude for this act.

The spirit of betrayal was no less rampant in Timur's camp. When Tokhtamysh captured the White Horde, his enemies were the children of Urus Khan Koirichak-oglan and Temir-Kutlug and their friends Kunche-oglan and murza Yedigey (Idigu), - they came to Timur and asked to take them into service. Timur showed them affection and mercy, gifted them, and often played backgammon and chess with Kunche-oglan[26].

While the battles with Tokhtamysh were going on, the tsarevichs showed themselves to be heroes, but in 1391, having found themselves in their native steppes, they asked to collect the scattered people. Of these, only Kunche-oglan returned. Temir-Kutlug and Edigey preferred to engage in the revival of the White Horde. Kunche-oglan returned, but when he heard that Temir-Kutlug sat on the throne of the White Horde, "his heart split", and one night he fled to his native steppe, and later even moved to Tokhtamysh and participated in the battle on the Terek against Timur, because he hated Temir-Kutlug [27].

Only Koirichak remained faithful to Timur, for which he was elevated to the throne of the ulus of Juchiyev in 1395, but "died after a while"[28]. Nevertheless, the White Horde was reborn, led by Temir-Kutlug, who obeyed his adviser Murza Edigei. This circumstance had huge consequences for world history.

209. IN THE CAUCASUS

At the same time, Tokhtamysh returned to the Horde and gathered oglans and beks around him. This formulation is characteristic of the traditional historical methodology, but taking into account the data of ethnology, it should be rotated 180∞. The Oglans and beks of the Blue Horde called back the fleeing khan, rallied around the throne and forced Tokhtamysh to lead them against the hated jagatai, who killed their brothers and took their beautiful wives and daughters into captivity.

It is unlikely that they were guided by political calculation. Timur lost so many people during the victory at Kondurcha that it would be more profitable for him to win victories in Front Asia over the Turkmens of the Black and White Sheep [29] than to lose people in a hopeless steppe war. He had to be satisfied with the revival of the White Horde, where the princes (children of Urus Khan) Koirichak, Temir-Kutlug, Kunche-oglan and Murza Yedigey, being enemies of Tokhtamysh, formed a barrier between Samarkand and Sarai. Although Central Asia was reliably isolated from Siberia, the beks and Oglans of the right bank of the Volga found a way to strike at the hated enemy.

They forced Tokhtamysh to negotiate with the Georgian tsar George VII about the passage of Tatar troops to Transcaucasia through the Daryal Gorge. Timur, having learned about this, threw troops into Georgia (in 1394)[30], but was not successful. And during this time Tokhtamysh led the army through Derbent and reached the lower reaches of the Kura.

Timur immediately withdrew the army from Georgia and, combining it with the Iranian corps, moved against Tokhtamysh. The Tatar army, not accepting the battle, retreated beyond Derbent, which gave Timur a respite until the spring of 1395.

Timur didn't need this war at the moment. Therefore, he sent Tokhtamysh an ultimatum letter: "In the name of Almighty God, I ask you: with what intention did you, Khan of Kipchak, controlled by the demon of pride, take up arms again? Have you forgotten our last war, when my hand turned your strength, wealth and power to dust. Come to your senses, ungrateful one! Remember how much you owe me. But there is still time, you can get away from retribution. Do you want peace, do you want war? Choose. I'm ready to do both. But remember that this time there will be no mercy for you."[31]

According to Sheref al-Din, Tokhtamysh was ready to compromise, but "his emirs, due to extreme ignorance and perseverance, resisted, brought confusion to this matter, and... Tokhtamysh Khan as a result of the speeches of these unfortunate people... in his response to Timur's letter, he wrote rude expressions"[32]. Timur became angry and moved the army north through the Derbent Pass.

The first victim of Timur's troops was the Kaitaki people, a tribe that lived on the northern slopes of Dagestan. Timur ordered the extermination of "these infidels." This caused a delay in the offensive, and Tokhtamysh managed to send the vanguard of his army with the task of detaining Timur at the turn of the Koi-Su River. This was reasonable, since the Koi-Su flows in a very deep gorge and crossing such a fast river is difficult.

But Timur transferred a select detachment upstream, to the fortress of Tarki, and threw the Tatar detachment beyond the Terek. Pursuing the enemy, Timur crossed the Terek, and Tokhtamysh pulled his army there. There was a battle that decided the fate of the Tatar ethnic group.

There are sometimes fateful moments in history that determine the course of further events for a relatively short period. These zigzags of history sooner or later merge with the main direction of ethnogenesis or sociogenesis, but they bring either glory or death to the participants of the events and even generations, and their consequences last for decades or one or two centuries. Where probability reigns, determinism is irrelevant.

The clash of Tokhtamysh with Timur was not an accidental war of local significance. It took place at the superethnic level, because the great steppe culture was protected from the equally great urban culture of the Middle East - the Muslim one. The rivalry of these superethnic holistically flared up and faded repeatedly, but the period we describe began in the XI century (migration of Cumans from Siberia to the Black Sea region) and ended in the XVI century (the victory of Sheibani Khan over Babur). In 1395 The participants of the events remembered the campaigns of Genghis, but none of them could predict the results of the war, which was destined to change the face of Eurasia. It didn't seem important to them. It was essential that either the Blue Horde would survive and suppress the rebellious emirs of Transoxiana, or it would fall and crumble to dust, and Timur's gulyams would bring gold, furs and hairy beauties to Samarkand and Bukhara.

And one can imagine with what trepidation the results of this battle were awaited in Moscow, Ryazan, Tver and even in Smolensk. The latter temporarily stopped resisting the Lithuanians and surrendered to Vytautas, an ally of all knightly Europe, whose power was praised by minstrels and minnesingers.

On the banks of the Terek River, the fate of not only the Blue Horde was being decided, but also "Holy Russia", the pillar of Orthodoxy, collected by the works of Metropolitan Alexei and Sergius of Radonezh. The Russian people of the XIV century knew how to behave with the Tatars, they fully understood what the emir Aksak Timur was, since Russia's relations with Georgia were frequent at that time, and this long-suffering country had already experienced Timur invasions three times: in 1386 Tbilisi fell, in 1393 Samtskhe and the Kars region were devastated, in 1394 G. A punitive expedition was sent to Georgia for the negotiations of George VII with Tokhtamysh. In Russia they knew what to be afraid of…

In fact, the victory over Mamai's diverse crowd on Kulikovo Field is rightly regarded as a feat, but the Arab Shah's Zayak nomads were stronger and more capable than Mamai's troops, and their children already served Tokhtamysh. According to the logic of events, it fell to their lot to restrain Timur's Gulyams; thanks to this logic, Russia was saved from the fate of Khorasan, Hindustan, Georgia and Syria. Saving themselves, the Tatars protected Russia from such a fate, which is scary to think about.

Map "Between two fires. A. The campaigns of Timur and Tokhtamysh. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the XIII-XV centuries (176 KB)"

[Sorry, I cannot make out the key.]

http://gumilevica.kulichki.net/maps/args16.gif

210. DECISIVE BATTLE

On Tuesday, April 14, 1395, both troops converged and put up trench shields, and on Wednesday they raised banners, and the Tatars began the battle. The numbers of the armies, apparently, was approximately equal, the weapons were approximately the same, but each army had its own psychological attitude.

The Tatars defended their fragrant steppes, herds of their horses, steep-horned sheep and, of course, their wives, who were threatened with heavy, humiliating captivity. They should not have been driven to war; on the contrary, they forced the khan to lead them into battle, since most of them were "infidels", and the Muslims in their midst cared more about their homeland than about faith. All of them were excellent horsemen, shooters and wielded a curved saber from early childhood. But still, they are more used to peaceful cattle breeding than to hiking, teams and discipline.

And Timur had professionals working for him. An experienced rider at full gallop caught a wedding ring with a spear, shot from a tight bow, dismounted and hid behind a trench shield, and their commanders were trained in a complex maneuver.

Both leaders, Khan and bek, fought in the ranks of the soldiers in the thickest battle, but were not even wounded, because their loyal friends were next to them. The battle took place as a series of counterattacks, and by evening Timur's troops put the enemy to flight. Tokhtamysh fled with his fighters, and Timur, developing success, appointed a chase.

Pursuing the fleeing Tatars, Timur reached the Lower Volga, pressed the fugitives to it and dealt with them mercilessly. Only those who managed to make rafts and cross to the left bank of the Volga were saved. All the towns and villages that survived in 1391 have by now been plundered up to the Samara Bend.

Timur proved himself not only a commander, but also a skilled politician. He gathered those warriors of the White Horde who had been stuck in his army since the 70s, when they fought against Tokhtamysh, gave them the son of Urus Khan Koirichak-oglan as their leader and ordered the latter to gather the people and found a ulus. Koirichak crossed the Itil (Volga) and began to carry out the assignment, but "after a while he died"[33].

In this event, the most important thing is that the Koirichak detachment is called "Uzbek brave men" who were among the "servants of the highest court"[34]. So, it was a consortium of emigrants, opponents of Tokhtamysh, who later, in the XVI century, took possession of the heritage of Timur and the Timurids. This should not surprise the reader: all ethnic groups, even the most powerful, grow out of successful consortia like an oak from an acorn.

But the sudden and unexplained death of Koirichak is really amazing. It must be thought that there were more steppe patriots than Timur himself saw. However, he was soon convinced of this.

211 BETWEEN THE DNIEPER AND THE DON

Timur easily got the eastern part of the Dzhuchiyev ulus. Tokhtamysh fled to "Bular" (to Kama, not to Poland). But the right wing, the steppe between the Don and the Dnieper, was not going to submit to the conqueror.

Timur turned west, towards the Dnieper. His vanguard under the command of Emir Osman reached the Dnieper (Uzi River) and near Kiev (Mankerman) [35] plundered the camp of Bek-Yaryk-oglan, who had already fought with Timur's army: at Kondurcha and on the Terek. The Bek-Yaryk ulus was destroyed, and people from the ulus, which is called "Uzbek", also suffered[36].

Bek-Yaryk with a few companions escaped from the encirclement, but was again surrounded on the banks of the river Tan (Don). On exhausted horses, he and only his son left the encirclement and fled, apparently, to Russia. Timur took the family of Bek-Yaryk under guard, gifted her and sent her under escort after the escaped hero. Obviously, the descendants of Bek-Yaryk live among Russians, forgetting about the glory and grief of their ancestors.

Timur, on his way to the west, took and destroyed the border town of Yelets. Whether Yelets was the "Russian city of Karasu" where Bek-Yaryk-oglan took refuge is unclear[37]. But it is interesting that Sheref ad-Din Yazdi and Nizam ad-Din Shami tell about Timur's campaign to Mashkav, i.e. to Moscow[38], which did not exist. Nevertheless , the description of the victories over the "emirs of the Russians ... outside the city" and the enumeration of the captured loot in great detail: "ore gold and pure silver, eclipsing the moonlight, and canvas, and Antioch homespun fabrics... shiny beavers, a myriad of black sables, ermines... lynx furs... shiny squirrels and ruby-red foxes, as well as stallions that have not yet seen horseshoes. In addition to all this, there are many other treasures that the mind gets tired of counting"[39].

How to understand this maxim? The Russian invasion did not happen, and therefore, the listed loot, and "Russian women like Peri - as if roses stuffed into a Russian canvas" [40] could not have been the prey of Timur robbers. How to justify outright disinformation?

I propose a hypothesis: Sheref ad-Din gave wishful thinking. Apparently, Timur was planning a campaign on Russian soil to reward his soldiers. The advertisement for the loot was already drawn up, but the campaign did not take place. Only the steppe tribes were robbed, "confused and stunned," after which Timur's troops retreated to the south. What saved Russia this time?

The forces of the Golden Horde were broken, but not crushed. There were still many brave warriors in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, Don and Crimea, and the steppes between the Don and Kuban were controlled by Circassians. To move north, leaving so many enemies in the rear, would be madness. Therefore, Timur turned his troops to the south.

One of his detachments invaded the Crimea, the other went down the Don River and took Azov (Azak). Now the war took on the character of jihad - captured Muslims were spared, and gentiles were exterminated. There were no such religious persecutions in the Golden Horde, but constant references to the fact that the initiators of the raids were "infidels" apparently prompted Timur to resort to genocide, compared to which the terror practiced before seemed child's play.

Autumn was approaching, and the grass was drying up. The Circassians burned the dry grass between the Don and the Kuban, which caused the cattle that served as provisions for the Timur army to die from starvation. Nevertheless, Timur's vanguard reached the Kuban and robbed the Circassians, except for those who fled to the mountains.

Then it was the turn of the aces and mountaineers of Dagestan. The Gulyams took their fortresses, and the defenders were tied up and pushed into the abyss. There was already a war of extermination.

Winter has come, and very severe. There could be no question of marching to Moscow, and it was necessary to pay off the soldiers. Timur gave them Hadji Tarkhan (Astrakhan) and a New Barn to plunder, after which he went home through Derbent pass, where in the spring of 1396 his soldiers engaged in the extermination of the mountaineers of southern Dagestan, both "infidels" and Muslims. Having fortified Derbent anew, Timur made it the border of his state[41], and the Great Steppe, bloodied and devastated, received a new khan from the hands of the victor.

So, in 1388-1396, professionals defeated amateurs, which, however, is not surprising. Discipline in the army is a condition for victory, but it is possible only with an intelligent commander who fairly rewards his soldiers and commanders. However, here lies the inferiority of a system built on the use of mercenaries who spare their lives for the sake of reward, and not for the Motherland. Such an army was very expensive, even for the rich Central Asia. The pay for the soldiers had to be obtained by conquering and robbing the vanquished, and because of this, the war becomes permanent, the mercenaries do not need territorial acquisitions, but the victorious army, departs leaving a desert full of corpses of innocent people. This disaster struck first Iran and Semirechye, then the Volga region and the Caucasus, then Iraq, Syria, Turkey and stopped only with the death of the leader, whose victories turned out to be ephemeral, since the "power of things", or the statistical course of events, is beyond the capabilities of one person.

Timur was a smart politician. In 1397, Ambassador Temir-Kutluga and Emir Yedigey's man arrived to him from the Steppe, and Ambassador Khizr-Khoja-oglan from Semirechye[42]. They asked on behalf of their rulers to accept their citizenship, which translated into the language of modern diplomacy meant the conclusion of an alliance of the weak with the strong in order to have help and protection. Thus Temir-Kutlug, the grandson of Urus Khan, was recognized as the khan of the ulus of Juchiev on condition of "submission". In fact, this etiquette did not oblige the khan to anything, but it gave him Timur's mighty moral support, and he really needed it. On the other hand, Timur need not guard the northern border, since there was not an enemy behind it, but a friend. Everything seemed to have subsided, but new unrest arose immediately.

Khan Tokhtamysh did not lay down his arms. With a handful of associates, he retreated to the Crimea, but since the Moscow government stopped paying tribute to him [43], he had nothing to eat himself, much less feed the army. We had to look for an object for robbery, and already in 1396 Tokhtamysh besieged Kafu [44]. It was a hopeless undertaking. The Genoese resisted, and Temir-Kutlug's troops struck from the rear. Tokhtamysh managed to escape to Kiev, which then belonged to Prince Vitovt.

Vytautas received Tokhtamysh and helped him. In the summer of 1397, the Lithuanian-Tatar army, equipped with new weapons - squeakers and cannons, marched from Kiev to the Crimea and on September 8, at the walls of Kafa, defeated the small forces of Temir-Kutlug and Edigey[45]. Tokhtamysh rejoiced and sent envoys to invite loyal Tatars to him. But in the winter of 1398 Temir-Kutlug defeated him and forced him to flee back to Lithuania. There Tokhtamysh agreed with Vitovt on the partition of Russia and the cession of Moscow to Lithuania, which was considered a Khan's ulus. On these terms, Vytautas agreed to go to war with Temir-Kutlug and Edigey.

During a campaign to the Crimea in 1397, Vytautas led the descendants of the Khazars - Karaites out of Bakhchisarai and settled them in Troki (modern Trakai) to replenish the light cavalry. They still live there today.

NOTES:

[1] See: Tiesenhausen. Vol.II. p.109. The word "talba" is left without translation.

[2] Ibid., p. 151.

[3] Ibid. P . 110.

[4] See: Instantirsky A.V. Decree. op. Vol. II. pp.416-417, 419.

[5] See: ibid., p. 589.

[6] See: ibid., p. 419.

[7] Tiesenhausen. Vol.II. P. 156.

[8] For this, Metropolitan Alexei excommunicated Svyatoslav (see: Shabuldo F.M. Decree. op. p. 107).

[9] Hafiz's poem: "If a Shiraz Turkish woman carries my heart with her hands, I will give both Samarkand and Bukhara for her Indian birthmark." Taking Shiraz, Timur ordered to find Hafiz and said to him menacingly: "O unfortunate! I spent my life glorifying my favorite cities - Samarkand and Bukhara, and you want to give them to your whore for a mole!" Hafiz replied: "O Lord of the faithful! It is because of my generosity that I am in such poverty." Timur burst out laughing, ordered to give the poet a robe and let him go. Timur strangely combined terrible cruelty with generosity and bravery. His activity was such that it gave rise to another zigzag of history, which straightened out only after 100 years.

[10] See: Tiesenhausen. Vol. II. p. 154.

[11] See: ibid.

[12] See: Muller L. The history of Islam. Vol.III. 1896.P.319

[13] Grolisset R. L'Empire... P.500-503.

[14] See: PSRL. T. 8. St. Petersburg.. 1859; cf.: Nikon Chronicle (PSRL. Vol. II, p. 121), Rogozhsky Chronicler (PSRL. Vol. 15. Ed. 2. Issue 1) and Simeonovskaya chronicle (PSRL.T. 18.under the year).

[15] See: Grumm-Grzhimailo G.E. Juchida.

[16] Cit. by: Solovyov S.M. History of Russia... Book II. Vol. IV. P.660.

[17] Tiesenhausen. P. 160.

[18] "The same summer (1391. - 71.G.) the Great Prince Vasily Dmitrievich went to the Horde, was called by the tsar" (PSRL. Vol. III. 1841 - Novgorod I Chronicle).

[19] Tiesenhausen. T.P. 164. Note. 2: I understand the existing inconsistency of the texts so that with the arrival of reinforcements, Tokhtamysh's army would be twice as numerous as Timur's. But the reinforcements were too late. "Prince Vasily Dmitrievich left Tsar Tokhtamysh for Yaik (Ik. - L.G.)" (PSRL. T.IV. Ch. 1. 1925 - Povgorodskaya IV chronicle).

[20] Tiesenhausen. T.P.S. 15.

[21] The Sofia Temporary (PSRL. T. V. Ch. VI. SPb., 1851).

[22] In the published text - Yaik?, but this is incorrect (see: Tiesenhausen. Vol. II. p. 294, commentary).

[23] Ustyuzhsky chronicle. M.; L., 1950. See under 1390 (6898): "The same summer on Taktamysh, the king was strong in the Shamarchic (Samarkand. - L.G.) land, and they had a great sich. The same summer, the great Prince Vasilei Dmitrievich was on the Horde in that sich at Taktamysh and beyond the small drain at the sich and beyond the Volga. And running for the Don, chasing after, and the leaders got lost, and came to Kiev" (Archangel chronicler).

[24] Tiesenhausen. Vol. II. pp. 171-172.

[25] See: Instantirsky L.V. Decree.op.T.II.Pp.420- 421.

[26] See: Tiesenhausen. T.II.P.118.

[27] Ibid. p. 173. Note 2.

[28] Ibid. pp. 178,212,214.

[29] Two confederations of Turkmens pushed back by the invasion of the Mongols (see: Bosworth K.E. Muslim dynasties. p.221.).

[30] See: Janashia S.N. et al. History of Georgia, Tbilisi, 1946. p. 293.

[31] Cit. by: Grumm-Grzhimailo G.E. Juchida. p. 35.

[32] Tiesenhausen. Vol. II. p. 174.

[33] Ibid. p. 212, 214.

[34] Ibid. p. 178.

[35] Ibid. p. 37. Note. 17.

[36] It is generally believed that fanatical Muslims of the Golden Horde at the end of the XIV century adopted the name of the Uzbeks in honor of the khan who converted their ancestors to Islam, which is confirmed by the reports of Sheref ad-Din about a large number of "infidels" surrounded by Tokhtamysh. This indicates an internal split of the ulus of Juchiyev, since at the same time "Nogai" - supporters of Edigey, and a little later - Kazakhs, opponents of the "Uzbeks" appear. Modern Uzbeks are the diverse Turks of Central Asia, who took the name of their conquerors and merged with them into a single ethnos.

[37] Yelets was the only Russian city destroyed by Timur's troops.

[38] Tiesenhausen. Vol. II. p. 180. 121.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid. p. 187.

[42] Ibid. p. 187-188.

[43] See: Shabuldo F.M. Decree.op.C.142.

[44] Ibid. p. 145.

[45] Ibid., p. 147.

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