24. Ancient Rus and the Great Steppe, Gumilev

XXIII. Finding a consistent version, 157. AMBIGUITIES; A very informative chapter.

There is an opinion, apparently correct, that the strongest wins in a military clash if there are no other circumstances. It is permissible to make an amendment to the randomness of military happiness, but only within the limits of one battle or skirmish; for a big war, this does not matter significantly, because zigzags on a long journey are mutually compensated.

But what about the Mongol conquests? The numerical superiority, the level of military equipment, the habit of local natural conditions, the enthusiasm of the troops were often higher among the opponents of the Mongols than the Mongol troops themselves, and in courage the Jurchens, Chinese, Khorezmians, Cumans and Russians were not inferior to the Mongols. Of course, the Mongols had several talented generals, but Vanyan Khada, Djelal ad-Din, Yevpatiy Kolovrat and many others were not inferior in abilities to Jebe, Mukhuli, Burundai, Elchidai, Chormagan and all others, except perhaps Subutai; but after all, one swallow does not make spring. In addition, the few Mongol troops simultaneously fought on three fronts - the Chinese, Iranian and Polovtsian, which in 1241 became Western European.

How could they win victories in the XIII century, and why did they suffer defeats in the XIV century? There are various assumptions and considerations about this, but the main reasons were considered to be some kind of special malice of the Mongols and their hypertrophied tendency to plunder. This accusation is banal and also clearly tendentious, because it is presented at different times to different peoples. And not only ordinary people sin like this, but also some historians [1].

As you know, we live in a volatile world. The natural conditions of the terrestrial regions are unstable. Sometimes the habitat of an ethnic group suffers an age-old drought, sometimes a flood, even more disastrous. Then the biocenosis of the host region either dies or changes, adapting to new conditions. But people are the top link of the biocenosis. This means that everything noted applies to them as well.

But this is not enough. The historical time in which we live, act, love, hate, differs from linear, astronomical time in that we discover its existence due to the presence of events connected in causal chains. These chains are well known to everyone, they are called traditions. They arise in various regions of the planet, expand their ranges and break off, leaving monuments to descendants, so that these descendants learn about the extraordinary, "strange" people who lived before them.

And where are the beginnings of these chains? After all, not in the lower and not even in the Upper Paleolithic? As we have seen, the beginning of the process is a mutation, not any, but a certain one, causing an explosion of passionarity, which is then slowly extinguished by entropy, after which an ethnic relic remains. These are the three parameters of ethnogenesis. It's like a theoretical background on which the events under study are developing. And all this applies to the Mongols of the XIII century .

It has been repeatedly noted that the Mongols had no idea about their predecessors in the Great Steppe, but there was no explanation for this. Now you can offer it. The drought of the tenth century made the steppe uninhabitable: the Hunnic tradition, which began in the third century BC, died out in the tenth century, and the Mongols had an explosion of ethnogenesis, i.e. they entered world history as a young ethnos. And it happened in the XI century, when the ancestors of the Mongols came to the green steppe from Siberia.

158. CRITICAL EPOCHS

The methodology we have adopted for distinguishing the levels of research allows us to make an important observation: ethnic history moves unevenly. In it, along with the smooth entropic processes of ascent, flowering and gradual aging, there are moments of radical restructuring, breaking of old traditions, suddenly something new, unexpected arises, as if a powerful shock shook the usual set of relationships and mixed everything up, like a deck of cards. And after that, everything settles down and goes on as usual for a thousand years.

With too detailed an account of the course of events, these crucial epochs cannot be seen: after all, people do not see the processes of mountain formation, since it takes millennia to detect them, and moths do not know that winter happens, because their active life fits into several summer days. And then Science comes to the rescue, synthesizing the experience of generations and working where personal and even national memory is fading under the influence of destructive time.

Turning epochs are not fiction. There were three of them in the Great Steppe, and all of them have already been mentioned. The first epoch, the most ancient and therefore most vague, should be considered the X-XI centuries BC. Then the Scythians appeared and Ancient China arose. The second epoch is the III century BC. This powerful outbreak of ethnogenesis can be traced to the flight, i.e. to the complete loss of inertia, when only "cooled crystals and ashes" remain. The third flash is the Mongolian rise of the XII century . His inertia has not yet run out. The Mongols live and create, their art is a testament to that.

In fact, there is nothing new in the stated thesis. This is just a dialectical-materialistic interpretation of ethnic history. The facts of abrupt development are observed by many sciences and do not cause distrust anywhere, as well as smooth formation in the intervals between jumps.

And after all, the same picture is observed in all countries and all ethnic groups. In the VIII century BC, this is how the ethnic groups - the creators and carriers of ancient culture - Rome and Hellas arose and then, almost simultaneously (on a historical scale), went out. In the I-II centuries, the Goths began the great migration of peoples, the Dacians died in the struggle with Rome, and tiny Christian communities grew into a "golden Byzantium"; and also inertia was enough for 1200 years, except in cases where the process was interrupted by external forces. In the VI-VII centuries. Arabs, Rajputs (an ethnic group consisting of aborigines and migrants: Saks, Sogdians, Ephthalites), Tibetans, medieval Chinese and Japanese declared themselves. In the IX century. Viking campaigns, feudal wars, reconquista and the formation of "nations" began in Western Europe, of which only a few survived until the XX century. In the XIV century. Great Russians, Turks, Abyssinians appeared - now these are young peoples, the future is before them. We omit other examples, because the idea is clear: ethnogenic explosions are one of the phenomena of nature, the study of which is engaged in dialectical materialism.

To answer the question we are interested in about the relationship between Russia and the Great Steppe, it is necessary to understand what it was in the XIII century. The steppe united by the Mongolian ulus. Events there developed rapidly, sources are contradictory, details are numerous. Apparently, in order to solve this task, a concise generalization is needed, comparable with the well-studied history of Europe. Since we have already conducted a preliminary study[2], we will limit ourselves to a brief summary.

159. EXPERIENCE OF ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL CRITICISM

As mentioned above, Russia was a superethnos of eight "semi-states", steadily isolating themselves from each other and fragmenting within themselves. The ✓Novgorod Republic, ✓Polotsk, ✓Smolensk and ✓Turov-Pinsk principalities were not affected by the Tatars. ✓Ryazan suffered greatly, but more from the Suzdalians than from the Tatars. The northern part of the Grand Duchy of ✓Vladimir survived thanks to timely coups and capitulations with the provisions and horses to the advancing Tatar army. The affected cities, including Vladimir and Suzdal, were quickly rebuilt, and life in them was restored. The massacre of 1216 at ✓Lipitsa claimed more Russian lives than the defeat of Yuri II by the Burundai at the City. This battle on March 4, 1238 was awarded special attention only because the Grand Duke was killed there[3].

And did the Mongols have the means to destroy a large country? Ancient authors, prone to exaggeration, determine the number of the Mongolian army at ✓300-400 thousand fighters. This is significantly more than there were men in Mongolia in the XIII century[4]. V.V. Kargalov considers a more modest figure to be correct: ✓120-140 thousand, but it also seems to be overestimated[5]. After all, at least three horses were required for one rider: sled, pack and combat, which was not loaded so that it would not get tired by the decisive moment of the battle. It is very difficult to feed half a million horses concentrated in one place. Horses fell and went to the warriors for food, which is why the Mongols demanded from all the cities that entered into negotiations with them, not only provisions, but also fresh horses.

The real figure of N. Veselovsky is ✓30 thousand soldiers [6] and, therefore, about ✓100 thousand horses. But even this amount was difficult to feed. Therefore, part of the army, under the command of Monke, waged war in the Polovtsian steppe, recapturing winter quarters with hay supplies from the Polovtsians.

The same problem is connected with the arrival of reinforcements from Mongolia, where one young man was mobilized from each family[7]. The transition to 5 thousand versts with the necessary days took from 240 to 300 days, and using the conquered as comrades-in-arms is the best way to commit suicide.

Indeed, the Mongols mobilized Hungarians, Mordvins, Cumans, and even "Ishmaelites" (Muslims), but they made up shock troops doomed to death in the vanguard battle, and put barrage detachments of loyal soldiers behind them. The Mongols' own strength has been exaggerated by historians.

The destruction caused by the war is also exaggerated. Of course, there is no war without killing and fires, but the scale of disasters varies. So, in the spring of 1238, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich returned to his stricken principality, "and there was great joy for Christians, and God delivered them from the great Tatars," who really went to the Chernigov principality and besieged Kozelsk. Then Yaroslav put one brother in Suzdal, allegedly wiped off the face of the earth, the other in Starodub, and put the relics of the murdered brother in the Church of the Virgin in Vladimir-on-Klyazma [8] (contrary to the popular version, this monument remained intact after the invasion).

And after all, he had a considerable army. He immediately made a successful campaign to Lithuania, and sent his son Alexander with a select squad to Novgorod, which was threatened by crusaders: Germans, Danes and Swedes.

G.M. Prokhorov proved that in the Laurentian Chronicle three pages dedicated to Batu's campaign were cut out and replaced by others - literary stamps of battle scenes of the XI-XII centuries[9]. Let's take this into account and stay on the basis of proven facts, not random quotes.

Chernihiv Principality suffered the most. In 1238, Kozelsk, the "evil city", was taken, and its population was exterminated. Mikhail Chernigov did not come to the rescue of his own city, rejected the peace proposals of the Mongols, abandoned his land and fled to Hungary, then to Poland, then to Galich, and after the capture of Kiev returned to Poland. When the news came that the foreigners "descended from the essence and (to) the Russian land," he returned to Kiev. Upon the return of the Mongols from the campaign in 1243, Mikhail escaped to Hungary through Chernigov. In 1245, he appeared in Lyon, where he asked the pope and the cathedral for help against the Tatars, for which, upon his return to Rus he was executed. And the principality abandoned by him was subjected to constant ruin and desolation [10].

In 1240 Batu took Vladimir-Volynsky "with a spear" and "beat the people without sparing", but the Church of the Virgin and others survived, and the population, as it turned out, managed to escape into the forest and then returned [11]. The same thing happened in Galicia; 12 thousand people died there during this war[12], almost as many died on the Lipitsa River in one day. But soldiers died on Lipitsa, and the number of raped women, robbed old men and orphaned children is not taken into account.

Based on this data, it should be recognized that Batu's campaign on the scale of the destruction produced, is comparable to an internecine war, common for that turbulent time. But the impression from him was grandiose, because it turned out that Ancient Russia, Poland, supported by German knights, and Hungary could not resist a bunch of Tatars.

If the behavior of the Russian princes leaves much to be desired, then maybe the people showed resilience in the fight against foreigners? Not at all!

My late friend Professor N.V. Timofeev-Resovsky told me from childhood memories that near Kozelsk there is a village of Pogankino, whose inhabitants supplied the Mongols with provisions who besieged the "evil city". The memory of this was so vivid in the XX century that the Goats did not match with the Pogankino girls and did not give their own in marriage to Pogankino.

The Mongol army needed replenishment, so the Mongols offered the captured prisoners to buy freedom at the price of joining their army. In the chronicle of Matthew of Paris, a letter from two monks is given, where it is reported that there are "many Cumans and pseudo-Christians (i.e. Orthodox. - L.G.) in the Mongolian army." The first recruitment among Russians was made in 1238-1241 [13].

Such a decrease in patriotism indicates a decline in the passionarity of the Old Russian ethnos even below the zero mark - homeostasis[14]. The time has come for negative meanings - obscuration, which was supposed to lead the people to degeneration and death, like the ancient Romans, or to enslavement by foreigners, like the Polabian Slavs and Prussians. But neither of these things happened; on the contrary, new Russia achieved greater glory than Ancient Russia. But between these two turns of ethnogenesis lay a dark century that had to be lived through. And it succeeded... thanks to the genius of Alexander Nevsky.

160. SECOND WIND

In those terrible years (1239-1241), when the bones of the Cumans littered the Black Sea steppe, when ✓Chernigov, ✓Pereyaslavl, ✓Kiev and ✓Vladimir-Volynsky burned, and Poland and Hungary already felt the first crushing blow of the Tatars, the pope, supported by his mortal enemy, the emperor, blessed the crusade in the Baltic.

From the point of view of reasonable politics, the alliance of Guelphs and Ghibellines was nonsense. Economically, the unification of the merchant cities of Northern Germany with Denmark and Sweden was extremely unprofitable for both sides. In the religious aspect, the pious Russians did not deserve condemnation, which cannot be said about Friedrich Hohenstaufen, who stated that "there were three great deceivers: Moses, Christ and Mohammed." But, according to the ethnological understanding of the anthroposphere, the countries of Western Europe formed a superethnic integrity opposed to other superethnoses: Muslim, Orthodox and Mongolian, which united the entire Great Steppe. And when it came to a clash at the superethnic level, the Guelphs united with the Ghibellines, Sunnis with Shiites, Mongols with Tatars, Keraites, Naimans and even Merkits. Only anti-systems remained overboard: the Albigensian Cathars, the Ismaili Karmats, the Manichaean Bogumils and the evil sorcerers of Siberia, whom the Mongols honored with the death penalty; the Russians also treated the Magi the same way. But it was difficult to catch all of them, as a result of which they existed all over the continent, trying not to catch the eyes of either the authorities or historians.

Against this background, a crusade against Eastern Orthodoxy began.

Political intelligence in the kingdoms of Western Europe was not bad. German and Scandinavian diplomats received information about the complete defeat of the Russian land by the Tatars in 1238 ... and believed them (as later historians based on sources without critical evaluation of them). Therefore, it is natural that they considered Novgorod defenseless and decided to take it in a pincer: from the Gulf of Finland - the Swedes, and from Lake Peipsi - the Germans. The task seemed to them easily achievable.

Their mistake was only that the Grand Duchy of Vladimir, which had let the Tatar army through its lands, retained its military potential and was able to help Novgorod. The Germans, Swedes and Danes did not take this into account.

The organizer and coordinator of the anti-Russian campaign was the papal legate William, who received from Pope Gregory IX (Count Ugolino di Segni, 1227-1241) the task to force Novgorod to convert to the Catholic faith [15]. The chances for this were considerable. There were Germanophiles among the Novgorodians and Pskov residents who retained their hatred of the "Nizovtsy" and preferred profitable trade with the Hansa to a bloody war. Most of the Chudi, Vodi, Izhora resisted the introduction of Orthodoxy among them, and the Sum and em (Finns) have already submitted to the Swedes.

One should not think that in one or another phase of ethnogenesis all people are equally active or equally inert. Phase is a static concept, it is a background on which bright sparks of passionarity are not only possible, but also inevitable. Such a "spark" was Alexander Yaroslavich, appointed by the Prince of Novgorod and arrived in Novgorod "in a small squad". He gathered a small number of volunteers, replenished it with Novgorod passionaries and showed ancient Russian valor on June 15, 1240.

The Swedish army on many ships (augers) entered the mouth of the Neva and landed troops, but Jarl Birger, confident of victory, did not hurry with the offensive, which is why he lost pace. Prince Alexander managed to float a foot army along the Volkhov to Ladoga, and a horse army - along the shore to the mouth of the Izhora, where the Swedish camp was located. The Swedes did not expect a blow. Therefore, the sudden attack of the Russian troops did not meet with proper resistance. The Swedes were not helped even by their numerical superiority, because the selected Russian squads did not miss the initiative of the battle, which lasted from morning until dark. Under cover of night, the Russians withdrew, and the Swedes buried the dead, partly in the ground, partly by loading the corpses onto the boats. These boats sailed along the Neva and then sank into the sea.

The battle of Izhora was won not so much tactically or even more strategically, as morally: the military spirit of the Swedes was undermined. Alexander's small army, which also suffered losses by the "Suzdalians and Novgorodians", could not have held back the planned Swedish offensive if it had been realized. But Russian courage, although "in a small squad," again overcame the Scandinavian force, as it was in 1023 at Larch, and then in 1709 at Poltava.

Meanwhile, the German offensive was developing successfully. In 1240, the Livonian knights took Izborsk and Pskov, the gates of which were opened to them by the head of the Germanophile party, boyar Mikhail Ivankovich[16]. The Novgorodians, in the winter of 1240, "thanked" Prince Alexander by expelling him.

This is the phase of obscuration - simplification of the system - with all the characteristic symptoms - egoism, ingratitude, greed, self-will and political myopia. At the organizational level, such a change is attributed to sclerosis, and at the ethnic level, this is the first sign of insanity.

In 1241, the Livonians with detachments of hired Lithuanians, Estonians and Livs always ready for a fight, occupied Koporye, Tesov on the Oredezh River and approached Novgorod. Already 30 versts from the Novgorod walls, Livonian patrols seized merchants, took away livestock from the population and did not allow peasants to plow.

Then the Novgorod authorities came to their senses and went to Yaroslav for help. Alexander returned to Novgorod with the "grassroots" army and proved himself a master of maneuver warfare. Immediately he took Koporye, where he hung traitors from Vodi and Tschudi. At the beginning of 1242, he liberated Pskov, and on April 6 he won a famous victory on Lake Peipsi. Then, as a result of a series of successful operations in 1245, Alexander Nevsky defeated the Lithuanians and drove their detachments from Russia. Bishop Thomas (an Englishman) fled Finland at the same time from the rebellious emi, supported by the Russians. The Crusade in the Baltic was drowned.

And now, having outlined the course of events, we will proceed to the analysis in order to reveal the mechanism of the process.

The Novgorod land, untouched by the Tatar invasion, showed a complete inability to repel an external enemy, and there were even people ready for treason. But 30 years before that, the Novgorodians on the Lipitsa River showed undoubted heroism. What has happened over the years? And nothing! However, now a generation has changed, or in other words, the factor of historical time has worked: grandchildren have become unlike their grandfathers, and the ethnic system, having preserved (within the tolerance) the internal structure, has lost a large share of energy.

Novgorod was saved by the "grassroots" regiments who came from the Vladimir Principality - a country allegedly burned and carved by the Tatars. The very fact of such a campaign makes one think that the stories about the complete destruction of Russia in 1238 suffer from much exaggeration.

And here's another strange thing. The Russian principalities that were not affected by the Tatars - Polotsk, Smolensk, Turovo-Pinsk - did not provide any assistance to Pskov and Novgorod, as they had to Kozelsk a year before. How to explain such inertia of the population of the primordial regions of Ancient Russia?

I don't see any other explanation, except that this is a pattern of ethnogenesis. The Byzantine contemporaries of the Eastern Slavs behaved no better in the XIII century. The exceptions were the subethnoses who lived on the outskirts of the area and therefore did not lose their ancient passionarity - the Nicaeans (an analogue of the Suzdalians) and the Epirotes (a kind of Carpathian Highlander). As the comparison continues, it will become clear that these exceptions (at the sub-ethnic level) confirm the rule.

161. IN THE CARPATHIANS

Compared with Northeastern Russia, the Southwestern (Galician-Volyn Principality) suffered much less from the Tatars [17]. The Tatars could not take a number of cities, and the cities they captured were destroyed a little, and their population managed to hide. Moreover, the population of the southeastern lands - from Putivl, Ryazan, etc., deprived of the protection of the defeated princely squads and suffering from the anarchy common to border regions, fled to Volhynia, where Daniil Romanovich established order after the departure of the Tatars. But, alas, the Galician boyars continued their opposition to the princely power. It took more blood than the external war.

Galician boyars were the most reactionary force in Russia. They carried the most ancient tradition - the ancient Slavic tribal fragmentation. For the boyars, the Rurikovichi were usurpers, while for the townspeople they were natural defenders from boyar arbitrariness. The political ideal of the Galician boyars as a persistent convulsion was a weak government, even if foreign; for the townspeople, on the contrary, a strong government, why they supported the Volyn Monomashichs. But those, to their misfortune, turned out to be natural opponents of the princes of Vladimir and Chernigov, and therefore both the Galician boyars and the Volyn princes were looking for allies among their neighbors.

In 1243-1244, a complex alignment of forces emerged. Rostislav Mikhailovich of Chernigov, after much trouble, married the daughter of Bela IV (Hungary), and attracted the Lesser Polish king Boleslav the Bashful to the struggle for Galicia; Daniel teamed up with Konrad of Mazovia and the Lithuanian Prince Mindovg [18]. And about the Tatars, who left through Bulgaria and Moldova to the Volga, both sides... they just forgot about them.

The intense and very brutal war that ended with Daniel's victory over the Polish-Russian-Hungarian army under the walls of the city of Yaroslav on August 17, 1245, is described in sufficient detail [19], but its place in history requires additional analysis. The war in the Carpathians was fundamentally different from the war in the Baltic States. Alexander Nevsky defended his superethnos and its culture from the iron onslaught of Catholic Europe, or what is the same, from colonial enslavement. Therefore, he refused any cultural exchange with the West, even allowing religious disputes.

In the south-west, the war had a different character. Bela IV of Hungary, Boleslav the Bashful of Lesser Poland and Rostislav of Chernigov, who joined them, were in the Guelph bloc, (fought for the Pope). Konrad Mazowiecki called the Teutonic Order, which stood on the side of the Hohenstaufen, to his land; Daniil Romanovich continued the tradition of his father, who became an ally of the Ghibellines, (against the Pope), and Mindovg, a pagan, was ready to beat the Catholics wherever possible.

Thus, it is obvious that in the Carpathians the question was not about the protection of Orthodoxy from Catholicism, of course not in religious, but in ethnic terms, but about the participation of Southern Russia in Western European politics, the axis of which was the struggle of emperors against popes. The Chernigov princes joined the Papists and took part in the Council of Lyon in 1245, while Daniel Galitsky turned out to be an ally of Frederick II, excommunicated by the fleeing Pope Innocent IV. And Russia? Russia had nothing to do with this war.

And then suddenly a short letter came to Prince Daniel from Batu Khan: "Give Galich."

The winner of the Hungarians, Poles and seditious boyars was horrified. The war with the Tatars was very unprofitable, even hopeless, because the Volyn army won victories by extreme exertion of forces and, naturally, was tired. Warriors are not pieces on a chessboard where, having won one game, you can start another.

There was only one way out - to go to bow to the khan, and Daniel went to the Barn, having previously secured a security certificate. The khan received the prince kindly, allowed him to drink wine at the feast instead of koumiss, which was the highest courtesy, and gave him a label [20] for power in his principality, making Daniel his "layman". It was a great political success for both of them.

Batu secured his western border from the sudden attack of the Crusaders, because Pope Innocent IV at the Council of Lyon in 1245 declared a crusade against the Tatars, and Daniel, after a trip to Sarai, claimed his rights to the succession of the Kiev princes, appointed his "printer" (keeper of the seal) metropolitan, in 1246 sent him for approval to the patriarch in Nicaea and made peace with Hungary, which refused to support Rostislav.

It would seem that Daniel should be pleased, but he was a man of his time and his moods, which in Volhynia were pro-Western. Therefore, the chronicler wrote the fatal phrase: "Oh, the honor of the Tatar is more evil than evil," thereby determining the future of his people, his country, his culture. A successful agreement in Volhynia caused "crying about the prince's offense"[21]. Against such a categorical antipathy to the Tatars, the prince could not do anything, even if he wanted to. But, apparently, he was at one with his people.

162. THE SEARCH FOR A WAY OUT

The compromise policy of Daniil Romanovich did not give the positive results that could be expected from it. Let's not forget that the ruler of a small power depends on his subordinates no less than they depend on him. The order can not be executed, escape from the ranks of the army, distort the diplomatic mission, the prince cannot be praised, but condemned or ridiculed. Feudal opposition is diverse and elusive; it is only important that people have the opportunity to choose between political programs and directions, and here there were as many as three.

In the Rostov-Suzdal land, the Tatars were treated positively. The appanage princes went to Batu's headquarters, where they were granted their own possessions and let go home in peace. In Great Russia, they agreed that the Russian land became the land of "Kanovi and Batyev", i.e. they recognized the suzerainty of the Mongol khan (although the throne was vacant at that time) and Batu as the eldest in the Borjigin family, and that "it is not appropriate to live on it without bowing to them"[22].

This decision was justified by the foreign policy situation. There was a brutal war on the western border, and the Livonians were hanging Russian prisoners. The force was on the side of the Crusaders, who had unlimited resources in the European chivalry, supplied by the merchant Hansa and led by experienced politicians - prelates of the Catholic Church. Submission to the papal throne was a prerequisite for peace. For the Vladimir Principality, the second front in these circumstances would be ethnic suicide. And vice versa, Batu wanted to establish a sincere friendship with the Russian princes.

The Mongols had qualified intelligence from among the foreigners accepted into the army. The Hungarian monk Julian tells about the Tatar people who knew Hungarian, Russian, Cuman (Turkic), Teutonic (German), Saracen (Arabic) and, of course, Tatar (Mongolian) languages[23]. The Tatar leader, captured by the Czechs at Olmutz, turned out to be an English Templar named Peter. The Mongols were aware of the sentiments of the "Christian world" and supported the Orthodox countries - Nicaea, Georgia, Uyguria, the Monophysite Little Armenia and Russia - against the Catholics who began a crusade against the Mongols and "schismatics", Orthodox.

And in Russia, Grand Duke Yuri II forbade Dominican monks to preach Catholicism to pagans and in the winter of 1237/38 expelled them from his land[24]. This principled political line was supported not only by the people of Suzdal, who did not want to change their profession and lose the acquired and perceived culture, but also by major figures. Former "printer" (Chancellor) Daniel, Metropolitan Kirill, "did not agree with the political course of the Kholmsky court and in 1250 joined the policy of Alexander Nevsky" [25] the most consistent fighter for Russia. For this line he was canonized in 1547, although his veneration as a saint began immediately after his death.

So, the Old Russian mood split, and with it the ethnos also split. At the same time, the division was based on complementarity, i.e. every Russian person could choose the culture that suited him best: Western, Catholic, or Eastern - Orthodox, Nestorian and Monophysite, in Central Asia merged in 1142 with Nestorian [26]. It is clear that the leading role belonged not to dogmatics, but to attitudes sympathetic to each other.

But there was also a third direction - the desire for unconditional unification with Western Europe in its Guelph version. Mikhail Vsevolodovich Chernigov, the father of the already mentioned Rostislav, having owned Kiev for a very short time, appointed his man, Abbot Pyotr Akerovich, as metropolitan. Daniel Romanovich overthrew him and dispersed his bishops, after which Rostislav conducted an unsuccessful war with Daniel and stayed in Hungary, and Peter Akerovich, at the behest of his prince, went to Lyon to ask Pope Innocent IV for help against the Tatars.

Mikhail lived for some time in Hungary, but, offended by the disparaging attitude towards himself, returned to Chernigov. Obviously, he assumed that his negotiations with the pope would remain unknown to the Tatars. It wasn't though! Batu had sufficient information about the treasonable activities of the Chernigov prince. However, he gave him the opportunity to justify himself. The Tatars had a kind of "lie detector": the suspect had to pass between two large bonfires, and the sorcerers watched the fire and thereby established the truthfulness of the testimony.

It is difficult to say how effective this method is, but Prince Mikhail refused the procedure and was executed. Of course, it is a pity for the prince, but what government would not punish a trusted person holding a responsible post and convicted of treasonable ties with the enemy!

It was a tragedy not only of Prince Mikhail, but also of the entire Chernigov Principality, which from that time ceased to exist independently[27].

163. NADIR [28]

Simultaneously with Chernigov, Polotsk began to decline, having lost the war with the Germans for Podvinye, the Polotsk Principality became a victim of Lithuanian raids that lasted from 1216 to 1246. The history of this period can be restored extremely fragmentary, but it is clear that already in 1258 the Polochans opposed Smolensk together with the Lithuanians, and then Polotsk land was considered as part of the inheritance of Mindovga (Lithuania)[29].

Smolensk held out the longest of all the Western Russian cities, but in 1274 they also preferred the voluntary joining of the Lithuanian occupation over the Golden Horde. But the Tatars did not even come close to Smolensk.

Against this universal sad background of decomposition, the figure of Daniil Romanovich of Volyn-Galicia, who became the leader of the Russian "Westerners", stood for some time. Daniel understood that dependence on Catholic Europe obliges to many things, even dangerous and unpleasant, but apparently public opinion in the southwest was adamant. It is not by chance that in 1254 Daniel accepted the crown and sceptre from the pope and "raised up a host against the Tatars" [30].

In 1246, celebrations were held in Karakorum on the occasion of the election of a new khan. This time Guyuk, the son of Ogedai and merkitka Turakina, Batu's worst enemy, was elected.

Back in 1238, when Guyuk and his young nephew Buri (grandson of Jagatai) served under Batu's command, they decided to quarrel with him: at a feast, when Batu raised the first cup, they insulted him. Batu sent them out of the army to their fathers. The khan was terribly angry at his son, who dared to violate military subordination, but thanks to the intercession of his entourage, he forgave him and sent him back to the army to Batu [31]. Relations between the tsarevichs have not improved.

And so Guyuk became khan, the leader of 130 thousand warriors, and Batu and his brothers had only 4 thousand horsemen. Yaroslav began to choose a suzerain and an ally. They flirted with him, he took the first place at the feast. Guyuk was a friend of Orthodoxy and an enemy of Papism[32]. It would seem that everything was going well for Yaroslav, and therefore for Russia. But suddenly it turned out that the Grand Duke died of poison, allegedly given to him by the dowager Khan Turakina, who received a denunciation from boyar Fyodor Yarunovich, who reported that Yaroslav had come into contact with Pope Innocent IV and the Lyon Cathedral.

Turakina was a Siberian, i.e. she was gullible and impulsive. But even so, her accusation of poisoning the guest was not confirmed. This version was reported by Plano Carpini, the papal agent, i.e. the person concerned[33]. But one way or another, the prince died, and his children Alexander and Andrew killed the informer. [34].

So, the attempts of the grand dukes to lead the country out of a severe crisis did not lead to anything, and could not lead, since the cause of the situation was the natural process of aging of the system, a decrease in the level of passionarity, which none of the Russian people was to blame, although it was not easier for them all.

The iron onslaught of the West and an unexpected hurricane from the East collided on the territory of the Kievan state, and it ceased to exist. Why did this rich, healthy, beautiful country not put up proper resistance to its neighbors, who did not surpass it either in technology, economy, or culture? The answer to this question was contained in the enumeration of a string of troubles, (last chapter), far from complete. However, it is not necessary to increase the number of mentioned facts. The above is necessary and sufficient. Now it can be stated that the inertia of the passionate push has faded and the system has disintegrated, and part of it has entered the Western European supra-ethnos, the other part has preferred an alliance with the Great Steppe, united by the Mongolian Ulus.

There was nothing else to choose from, because the revival of Byzantium did not inspire anyone with hope, and the "rotting" of the Abbasid Caliphate was steadily going on.

It would seem that Russia should have become prey to predatory neighbors or, at best, disintegrate into relics that somehow resist external blows and internal decomposition. Instead, there was an explosion of passionarity and a new round of ethnogenesis began. How and where did this happen?

And here is the transition from history - the science of events - to ethnology - the science of changing behavioral stereotypes. So far, we have noted the political and state decline of Ancient Russia, the collapse of the unified system into eight "semi-states", the weakening of all-Russian patriotism, etc. But the impulses that gave rise to these phenomena were still positive, although insufficient for the prosperity of the whole country and culture. Now negative phenomena have appeared: betrayal, which is the worst, and venality, in which it is impossible to establish governance of the country.

It is unfair to attribute the introduction of these qualities to the Mongols. Firstly, they did not possess them themselves, and therefore could not teach them to anyone. Secondly, they were interested in the loyalty of the Russian princes, and not in treason and deception. Since the pope declared a crusade against the Tatars, the Mongols needed an alliance with the Orthodox like they needed air.

Russians were also favored by Catholics to raise up against the Tatars in order to wage war on Russian territory and with Russian hands. Therefore, it is clear that it was the papal diplomats who were interested in the death of the princes at the hands of the Tatars. And then it was possible to deal with the damned "schismatics" and build a second Latin Empire on Russian soil.

So it happened in the XIV century. throughout Western Russia, and Eastern Russia survived thanks to the original alignment of forces, which provided Russia with a half-century respite. This turned out to be enough to save the most valuable heritage - the cultural tradition.

NOTES:

[1] See: Gumilev L.N. Apocryphal dialogue//Neva. 1987.№ 3, 4.

[2] See: Gumilev L.N. The Search for a fictional Kingdom.

[3] V.V. Kargalov provides information interesting for the characterization of Yuri Vsevolodovich. After learning about the defeat at Kolomna, the prince left his family in the capital, although he could evacuate it in a timely manner. The garrison was insufficient, and the people who had fled to the city were not used for defense. Because of this, on February 7, 1238, the impregnable city fell. On the City, Yuri stood "having no guard" and was taken by surprise. The Russian regiments did not even have time to form up and "fight before the foreigners." The Mongols themselves did not attach much importance to this battle. Rashid al-Din believes that it was just a chase after the prince who fled and hid. The fact of psychological degeneration against the background of ethnic obscuration is obvious (see: Kargalov V.V. Foreign policy factors...Pp.94-100).

[4] SeeMunkuev N.C. Notes on the ancient Mongols//Tatar-Mongols. M., 1970. p. 367 et seq.

[5] See: Kargalov V.V. Decree.op.C.73.

[6] The total number of Mongol troops for the war on three fronts was 129 thousand people (Rashid-ad-Din. Vol. 1, book 2. p. 266) and 2 more tumens: Jurchen - for the maintenance of combat vehicles - and Kara-Khitan. A thousand Jurchens (Khins), a thousand manguts and auxiliary troops were sent to Russia.

[7] See: Veselovsky N. Golden Horde//Encyclopedic Dictionary of F.A.Brockhaus and L.Efron. St. Petersburg., 1894. Vol. 24. pp. 633-635.

[8] See: Munkuyev N. Ts. Decree. op. p. 369.

[9] See: PSRL. Vol. 25. p. 130.

[10] See: Prokhorov G.M. Codicological analysis of the Laurentian Chronicle//Auxiliary historical disciplines. L., 1972. pp. 77-104; the same. The story of the Batu Invasion in the Laurentian Chronicle//TODRL. T. XXVIII. L., 1974. pp. 77-98.

[11] See: Nasonov A.N. Mongols and Rus. p. 23.

[12] See: Pashuto V.T. Essays ...p.229.

[13] See ibid. p. 138.

[14] See: Nasonov A.N. Decree.op.S.54-55.

[15] The fact of the internal restructuring of the ethnosystem is determined either by the accumulation or waste of the biochemical energy of the living matter of the biosphere, and the stability of the heterogeneous system is determined by the law of unity and the struggle of opposites. The discreteness of ethnogenesis and ethnic history, or, what is the same, the existence of "beginnings" and "ends", is a direct manifestation of the law of negation, according to which the birth and death of any system are inextricably linked with each other.

[16] On the coordination of military actions of the Germans and the Swedes, see: Shaskolsky I. P. The struggle of Russia against crusading aggression on the shores of the Baltic in the XII-XIII centuries. LD 1978. pp. 156-157.

[17] The pro-German, Westernist group in Pskov existed since 1229 (see: Pashuto V.T. Foreign Policy ... p.294).

[18] M.V. Vladimirsky-Vudanov, M.S. Grushevsky, A.B. Presnyakov, B.D. Grekov; see: Pashuto V.T. Essays ...P.229.

[19] See: Ibid. pp. 230-231.

[20] See: Ibid. pp.231-234.

[21] The label is a pact of friendship and non-aggression. He did not assume any real dependence. Batu sent labels to the rulers of Rum, Syria and other countries independent of him.

[22] Solovyov S. M. History of Russia... Book II. Vol. III. M. 1988. P. 170.

[23] Nasonov A.N. Mongols and Rus. pp. 10-11.

[24] See: Anninsky S.A. Decree. op. p. 81.

[25] Ibid. p. 89.

[26] Plow about V.T. Essays ...p. 271.

[27] See: Bartold V.V. About Christianity in Turkestan ... p.11; Gumilev L. N. The Search for a fictional kingdom. p. 133.

[28] See: Zaitsev L.K. Chernigov Principality//Ancient Russian principalities of the X-XIII centuries. p. 117.

[29] Nadir is a point of the celestial sphere diametrically opposite to the zenith.

[30] See: Alekseev L.V. Polotsk land//Ibid., p.239.

[31] Cit. according to: Pashuto V.T. Essays... p.259.

[32] Sokr. sk. I 275, 276.

[33] "He invited priests from Sham (Syria), Rum (Byzantium), Osov (Ossetia) and Rus" (Rashid-ad-Din. Vol. II. S.121); cf.: Gumilev L. N. The search for a fictional kingdom. p. 330.

[34] See: Travels to Eastern countries... p. 7

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