23. Ancient Rus and the Great Steppe, Gumilev

XXII. A string of troubles, 146. THE FIRST TROUBLE. 1201

[A period much more violent, and treachery was often added to the ferocity. The princes of the time were completely unprincipled. The populations might have been the same. It’s much more detail than the "standard" Battle of Kalka and few other movements in a synthetic history. How can you keep track of all the players? You would have to research 20 -30 different ancient societies. We're talking about Russia, but all the borderlands played their part. It could be taken as confusing. Or it is just the demonstration of the complex matrix of history.

Here we talk of the Pope's crusade against Orthodox, and some of the Mongols first conquests.]

For almost a century (1115-1201), glorious Ancient Russia did not experience invasions of foreigners. Princes, citizens and smerdas are so used to this that they could not even imagine that someone could touch them, much less offend them. Therefore, they stopped being interested in the diverse world that bordered the Russian land, and focused on internal squabbles that gradually turned into interstate wars.

Meanwhile, the Romano-German Catholic West was overflowing with the power of passionarity, which poured over the edge into Palestine, Andalusia and the Baltic States. If the first two theaters of aggression were far from Russia, then the third one had the most immediate significance for it. However, while the heroic Bodrichs, fierce Lyutichs, enterprising Pomorians and persistent Finns-Suomi restrained the iron onslaught to the East, in Novgorod, Pskov, Polotsk and Smolensk people felt calm and confident, believing that the events in the Baltic did not concern them. Ah, how frivolous they were!

In 1184, Archbishop Hartwick II of Bremen sent Canon Maynard to Dvina to establish an archbishopric on Russian lands [1]. Livs refused baptism, and then Pope Celestine III (1191-1198) proclaimed a crusade, "giving absolution to those who would go to restore the first church in Livonia"[2].

The Germans on 23 ships broke into the mouth of the Dvina, captured the Zemgol harbor and built the fortress of Riga. In order to have a permanent support, Archbishop Albert established the military monastic Order of the Swordsmen in 1202. And the conquest of the Baltic States by the Germans began.

By themselves, the Riga Archdiocese and the Order of the Swordsmen did not pose a danger to the vast Russia. But Riga became a springboard for the entire Northern European knighthood and merchant Hansa, and this could not but be a threat to Russia. However, the Prince of Polotsk was left to himself.

Worse, quarreling with the owners of the municipalities of Kukeynos and Yersike, Prince Vladimir of Polotsk left these lands without help, after which the Germans easily captured them. The Polotsk Principality itself survived, but two decades later it submitted to the Smolensk Principality. This untied the hands of the Germans.

It would seem that the rich and violent Novgorod Republic should have spared no effort in order to stop the German onslaught. Apparently, the Novgorod boyars understood this, but they acted sluggishly, which made it possible for the Germans to attract the Livs to their side and break the resistance of the Estonians. Other powerful princes - Vladimir, Smolensk, Chernigov - behave as if the invasion of the Germans in the Baltic States does not concern them.

What if they were right? After all, it follows from this that the Russian land as a unity had ceased to exist. This means that the subethnoses of the XI century. in the XIII century turned into separate ethnic groups that lost political ties and ethnic integrity, retaining only one force that still restrained decomposition - the Orthodox Church and its culture. However, this state of affairs characterizes rather a superethnos, the inertia of which was enough for another century and a half. It is also good that the Germans advanced slowly, and the Estonians resisted valiantly, otherwise the onslaught to the East could have been crowned with success.

147. THE SECOND TROUBLE. 1204

The only natural and therefore sincere friend of Russia was Byzantium. The Russians didn't like the Greeks themselves. They were considered "flattering", i.e. deceivers, and mercenary. But the culture of Constantinople did not depend on the crooks who traded in Chersonesos, and on the latifundials of Nicaea and Thessaly. The Russians did not communicate with these Russians, but they received philosophy, literature and art from educated and talented people, of whom, however, there were few left in Byzantium in the XIII century.

As already noted, this culture served as a cement that somehow held the Russian land together even with the decline of the passionary tension of the system. It was only thanks to the community of culture that the Novgorodians talked with the Suzdalians, Chernigov spared the Kievan, and did not sell him into slavery to the Polovtsians, the Galician boyar defended his city from the Hungarians and Poles, and the Smolensk knight repelled the Yatvyags. The source of this healing culture was Constantinople... and on the terrible day of April 13, 1204, he fell, captured by the French-Italian crusaders, enemies of Orthodoxy. This loss was perceived in Russia as the sudden death of a loved one. It was clear to all thinking people that there was nothing to expect from either the Ghibellines (in Riga) or the Papists (on the Bosphorus). Russia ceased to be a part of the grandiose world system, but found itself isolated; seized in a pincer by two crusading armies, from the north and south, it could be about to perish... but then the Polovtsy intervened. They came to the aid of the Bulgarian tsar Kaloyan and in 1205 defeated the Crusaders at Adrianople. The real danger disappeared, but the feeling of bitter loneliness remained and began to push individual figures in search of a way out... to a dead end. They tried to find a common language with Catholic Europe.

Let's take a break from the presentation of events and talk about cultures. Cultures of different countries and centuries are diverse. They influence each other, sometimes attracting, then repelling those people with whom the bearers of a particular culture are in contact, because all people are attracted by the ideals of truth, goodness and beauty, manifested by different ethnic groups in their own way. The strength of this attraction - [3] - depends on the level of passionate tension of the ethnic system and the complementarity that allows you to make a choice between different cultures.

So, in the tenth century, the Russians bowed before the experienced beauty - Byzantium, and in the XIII century, when she grew old, they turned their attention to the young Romano-Germanic Europe, of course, excluding those who dared to remain faithful to the past. This is how the split of the ethnic system of Ancient Russia began, and it ended in the XIV century, when two fraternal ethnoses arose in place of the former unity, "motherly" - Ancient Russia - and therefore in the XVIII century. reaching out to each other. But before unity was restored, five difficult centuries had to be endured, and in 1205 no one could guess how this rift that had begun would end. And the troubles went one after another.

148. THE THIRD TROUBLE. 1205

Roman, Prince of Volhynia and Galicia, was born from the marriage of Mstislav Izyaslavich with the daughter of King Boleslav Krivoustoy of Poland and was brought up in Poland at the court of Casimir the Great. This circumstance determined a lot in his fate. Roman was brave, energetic, cruel, treacherous and very enterprising. All his life he fought "against", but not "for", excluding himself. He began with the reign in Novgorod and won a brilliant victory over the Suzdalians and their allies in the very year 1169, when Andrei Bogolyubsky took Kiev from his father and gave the "mother of Russian cities" to his warriors for a three-day robbery.

In 1173, the Novgorodians "showed the way" to Prince Roman. He had to leave for Volhynia, marrying the daughter of Rurik Rostislavich Smolensky on the way. From that time on, he knew no peace, no loyalty to his word, no success. He sometimes participated in the strife of his Polish relatives, then, having captured Galich, fled from it from the Hungarians, then quarreled with his brother Vsevolod over Volhynia, then fought with the neighbors of Russia - Lithuanians, Yatvyags and Polovtsy or with the Russian princes Olgovich, with his father-in-law Rurik and in 1197 with the Galician boyars. Here he stained himself with such cruelties that the Russian chronicler preferred not to mention these facts. Information about them has been preserved only in Polish chronicles.[4] But Roman himself said about this: "If you don't kill bees, you don't eat honey." His only sincere friends were the Torks. They helped him in January 1203 to defend Kiev from Chernigov, Smolyan and Polovtsy. But the Novel failed here too; after that, he turned his gaze to the West.

And Western Europe was still drenched in blood. In Germany, the Ghibellines were led by Hohenstaufen, Philip of Swabia, who relied on Eastern and Southern Germany, and his opponent, Otto IV, son of Henry the Lion and nephew of Richard the Lionheart, was popular on the Lower Rhine and in Westphalia; he was supported by Pope Innocent III. The forces were equal, and the war was intense.

In this situation, any support was welcome. In 1204, the pope offered Roman the royal crown, but Roman preferred to negotiate with the Ghibellines. A French chronicler of the XIII century wrote: "The king of Russia, named Roman, went beyond his borders and wanted to pass through Poland to Saxony (to join Philip)... by the will of God, he was killed by two brothers, the princes of Poland, Leshk and Konrad, on the Vistula River"[5]. Leshko and Konrad dedicated an altar in the Krakow Cathedral to Saints Gervasius and Protasius, on whose memorial day Roman was killed.[6] This alone shows the importance attached to the intervention of the Russian prince in German affairs.

In 1208, Philip was assassinated in Bamberg by the Palatine Otto Wittelsbach. The murderer was executed, but the victory went to Otto IV, and events flowed in a different channel; the same channel that fed the Hohenstaufen gradually dried up, despite the activity of Frederick II and his heirs.

South-Western Russia also lost. Roman's son Daniel was four years old after his father's death. The pace of development of the political power of the Galician-Volyn Principality was lost.

And now let's move on to ethnological analysis. Social aspect: both in Europe and in Russia there were feudal wars. But the phases of ethnogenesis were different: by 1205 Europe had lived less than a third of the normal cycle. There passionarity was in the akmatic phase. Everyone was fighting for something. Some are for the Holy see. Others - for the imperial crown, others - for the freedom of their city commune, the fourth - for the right to consider the world a creation of Satan, the fifth - for the Holy Sepulchre, the sixth - for the lilies of France, etc. And Slavic princes fought against each other, and Roman Mstislavich is a vivid example of this. He "rushed at the filthy like a lion, angry like a lynx, destroyed like a crocodile, passed through their land like an eagle, and was brave like a tour"[7]. But these "filthy" were neighboring Lithuanians, Yatvigs and Polovtsian women, whom Roman filled at a time when their men went to the aid of the Bulgarian tsar Ioannitsa, who sought to conclude a decent peace with the Greeks (1201). Roman's raid was made in 1202, obviously to please his loyal allies and sworn enemies polovtsev - torkam.

For the rest of his life, he shed Russian blood, from Novgorod to Galich, betrayed friends and relatives and never spared the weak. Roman was more like a Roman soldier emperor of the III century or a Turkic emir of the XV century than the Count of Aquitaine, Lombardy or Saxony. But he was drawn to them, and if he managed to establish contact with the Hohenstaufens, Volhynia would turn into a European kingdom like Bohemia or Poland. But then the transition to Catholicism would be inevitable, and the loss of ancient Russian culture is a foregone conclusion, as it subsequently happened in Galicia.

149. THE FOURTH TROUBLE. 1208

In the first half of the XIII century, a fierce struggle for political supremacy unfolded on the territory of Eastern Europe between the Rostov-Suzdal land with its capital in Vladimir-on-Klyazma and the Seversk land with its capital in Chernigov. Vsevolod III The Big Nest extended his power to Kiev, and the sphere of influence to Novgorod.[8] However, during the long war (1206-1210), he could not cope with Vsevolod Cherny Chernihiv. And during this war, the following happened.

Ryazan was located between the warring parties, and, consequently, there were supporters of both principalities. Since the ethnic substratum of the Ryazan people were the Vyatichi, some of whom lived in the Chernigov Principality, the sympathies of the Ryazan people were rather on the side of Chernigov, as well as his allies, the Polovtsians. Back in 1177, Ryazan Prince Gleb Rostislavich made a raid on Prince Vsevolod III, and burned Moscow, but was defeated on the Koloksha River and captured along with many Ryazan residents [9], the Suzdalians did not take the Polovtsians captive. At the request of the people, Vsevolod was forced to blind some Ryazan princes, but, risking himself, he released the younger Ryazan princes, which led to further troubles. The execution took place after a second mutiny. Does this look like feudal skirmishes? There is an old enmity here, no longer at the sub-ethnic, but at the ethnic level, and, oddly enough, the prince is more humane than the people.

In 1187, after another uprising of the Ryazan people, the Suzdalians "emptied their land and pozhgosh all"[10]. Ryazan weakened, and for some time the Ryazan princes supported Vsevolod III, but in 1207, at the height of the war with the Chernigov Olgovichi, it turned out that the Ryazan people were going to betray him and were just waiting for an opportunity. Vsevolod arrested six Ryazan princes, and sent his son Yaroslav to reign in Ryazan with a detachment of Suzdalians. The Ryazan people swore allegiance to Yaroslav, but then they began to grab and chain his people, and buried some alive in the ground. In 1208 Vsevolod approached Ryazan with an army, led the inhabitants out of the city, and burned the city. This greatly weakened the Ryazan Principality, which affected even after 19 years, when the Tatars approached Ryazan.

It is hardly possible to condemn Vsevolod for cruelty. He briefly outlined his program for the protection of Russian unity. "When he heard that the Olgovichi were fighting the Russian land with the filthy ones, he regretted it and said: "Is that one fatherland - the Russian land, and we are no longer the fatherland?" [11]. But this last paladin of ancient Russian unity could not resist the process of impending political disintegration. And when Vsevolod III the Big Nest died on April 14, 1212, things got even worse on Russian soil.

150. THE FIFTH TROUBLE. 1211

Under Roman Volynsky, Galicia was the leading edge of Russia, but after his death it became the field of struggle of Hungary, Poland and the Chernigov Principality, and the local population - princes, boyars, townspeople - were forced to join either side. A detailed description of the course of events would take us far away from the topic of changing the phases of ethnogenesis, and besides, it is done at a high level and does not require revision.[12] We will confine ourselves to a brief story and experience of interpretation.

In 1205-1206, Chernihiv and Polish troops, with the help of the Polovtsians and Berendeyev, tried to seize Galicia, but were repulsed by the Hungarians. As soon as the Hungarian garrison left Galich, the local boyars expelled Roman's widow Princess Anna and little Prince Daniel to Krakow and invited the three sons of Igor Chernigov, the hero of the famous "Word" and the initiator of the defeat of Kiev, to which he did not live only a month. His children have left behind an unkind memory.

They immediately quarreled with each other. Roman Igorevich, with the help of the Hungarians, drove his brother Vladimir out of Galich. Then he himself was expelled in 1210 by Rostislav Rurikovich of Smolensk and restored by the Hungarian king Andrew II. However, Andrew II then sent an army that captured Roman and captured Galich. And at this time, the Poles undertook the conquest of Volhynia.

The regime of the Hungarian invaders caused the indignation of the townspeople and part of the boyars in Galich. The scribe Timothy called the commandant of the city - palatine Benedict Bohr the antichrist, because he "tormented" the boyars and citizens, dishonored their wives and even nuns. Roman Igorevich fled from Hungary to his native Putivl to his brother Vladimir. A third brother, Svyatoslav, arrived there from Poland, and the brothers accepted the invitation of the Galicians to liberate them from Hungarian rule, "poidosha ratya", easily occupied Galich... and then they showed themselves.

The "liberators", having taken power, exterminated over five hundred "great" boyars, plundered their property, and distributed their possessions to their supporters. The surviving boyars fled to Hungary and asked King Andrew to give them Daniel as prince. Andrey agreed and sent a large army to Galicia, which occupied Zvenigorod and Galich, capturing Roman and Svyatoslav Igorevich at the same time. Galician boyars redeemed the Igorevichs from Hungarian captivity and solemnly hanged them in Galich with their relatives.

The massacre of the Igorevichs provoked the indignation of Princess Anna, who called the Hungarian troops and the Volyn princes. The boyars were captured, but one of them - Volodislav - was taken to Hungary, the others bought off, the Volyn princes returned home to defend their land from Prince Leshka of Krakow. The power in Galich remained in the hands of the boyars, and in 1213 Volodislav "became a prince and sat down on the table." It was an impudent usurpation, which had never happened in Russia before.

And finally, the Hungarians concluded an alliance with the Poles, occupied Galich in 1214, proclaimed the prince Coloman king, returned the already mentioned Palatine Benedict Bohr and the following year, 1215, began persecution against the Orthodox clergy, as Pope Innocent III blessed the union of churches. It became bad for Russians in Galich.

Galicia was saved by Mstislav Udaloy in 1219. His first offensive choked, but when he invited the Polovtsians to help, the Hungarian troops were defeated, Galich was liberated, King Coloman was captured, and the Hungarian soldiers were killed by the townspeople and villagers, none of them managed to escape. However, the boyars Mstislav not only spared, but also attracted to his side. Thanks to this, he stayed in Galich, which only in 1234 returned to the legitimate Prince Daniel Romanovich, who had previously been sitting in Vladimir-Volynsky. But this is a different period of history.

Now let's try to understand the Galician tragedy, the culmination of which was the fateful year 1211. It is difficult to say who was to blame here, rather it can be concluded that none of the victims were right. Galicia was located on the outskirts of Russia and therefore had to reckon with the problem of contact at the superethnic level. Poles and Hungarians of the XIII century supported the Guelphs, i.e. supporters of Pope Innocent, who blessed the massacre of Byzantium and the creation of the Latin Empire. Prince Roman died as a supporter of the opposite party, but what do Russian people care about German-Italian squabbles? However, they were drawn into this grandiose war and suffered severely from the Hungarians, although they tried to get along with them in 1208-1210. When it became clear that a compromise was not feasible, the Galicians invited their own - Chernihiv, Orthodox descendants of Vladimir and Yaroslav the Wise. And those, instead of defending the country, began to crack down on the boyars they disliked, which forced them to again seek protection from foreigners. Having won, the boyars executed the princes "for revenge", which led to the division of Galicia between Hungarians and Poles in 1214 and persecution of Russian culture.

The logic of events was inexorable and irreversible, but neither the princes could spare the boyars, nor the boyars – the princes, because everyone was weak. It turned out that Russia was not able to defend its borders, although before that it expanded its possessions. Deeds were replaced by deeds of patriotism - short-sighted selfishness, heroism - shkurnichestvo, (nobility – cruelty). This shows that the phase of ethnogenesis has changed, that obscuration has come.

Of course, in Russia in the XIII century. there were also valiant knights, but they did not determine the course of events, as they were paralyzed by the sluggish majority of princes, vigilantes and smerdov. Mstislav Udaloy had to invite the Polovtsians, since homeostasis is better than obscuration, because zero is greater than negative values.

The same pattern was observed in Constantinople, in late imperial Rome and in China at the decline of the Han Empire, and then at the fall of the Ming Dynasty. Having lived for more than a millennium, any ethnic system weakens, as at the organizational level, noble old age, equivalent to the phase of inertia, is replaced by decrepitude, i.e. obscuration.

The difference between an ethnic system and an individual is only that an ethnic group can become a relic, and a person can only become a corpse. The extensive system of a large ethnic group, and even more so a superethnos, is protected by the culture accumulated over the past centuries, and therefore the sunset of Rome is decorated with the names of Ammianus Marcellinus, Sidonius Apollinaris and Julian Apostate, and in Byzantium in the XIV century Gregory Palamas preached, despite all the horrors surrounding him. So, in Russia of the XIII century, culture, both material and intellectual, continued to shine with gold against the gloomy background of political disintegration.

151. THE SIXTH TROUBLE. 1223

The decrease in the level of passionate tension of the ethnic system affects primarily the behavioral stereotype of the ruling elite, not the masses. In our case, the indicator of the process was the crowded offspring of Rurik, more precisely, Yaroslav the Wise. The knights who rushed into crushing attacks under Berdaa and Dorostol are gone, and after them the disciplined warriors of Vladimir Monomakh fell into oblivion. Russia disintegrated a century after the death of the unifier of the Russian land, and the combat capability of the Russian soldiers decreased noticeably. The armies became 5 times more numerous,[13] but in meetings with opponents showed their weakness. And the reason was not in the rank and file, but in the commanders.

As long as the Russian princes fought against each other with Polovtsian help, the onset of a new, final phase of ethnogenesis was ignored by contemporaries and later historians. But in 1222, two unexpected conflicts arose on the southern outskirts of the Polovtsian land: in the Crimea and in the Caucasus. The Russians intervened in both as allies of the Polovtsians. And then the "disease of Christians" was revealed, as the author of the "Words about the Destruction of the Russian land" called it.

In 1221, the Seljuk Sultan Ala ad-Din Keykobad accepted the complaint of a merchant who was robbed "at the Khazar ferry". The Sultan decided to restore order and sent an army to the Crimea, which defeated the Polovtsian-Russian army at Sudak.  A Russian prince appeared with reinforcements, he had to confine himself to negotiations on the ransom of Russian prisoners; the Polovtsy were abandoned to death. The pike perch has fallen.[14] Who was the "Russian prince", it was not possible to establish, but it is not important, but the unscrupulousness and infidelity to the allies that he showed. Previously, the princes behaved differently.

For a long time, the Polovtsians fought with the Mongols at the turn of the Yaik, holding the Mongol troops behind the Emba and Irgiz with the help of the Bashkirs. Steppe warfare usually consists of raids and skirmishes, as a result of which it is usually fruitless. But then the Mongols had the opportunity to hit the Polovtsy from the rear. Having defeated Khorezmshah Muhammad in 1219-1221, who owned all of Iran, the Mongols entered the Caucasus, defeated the Georgians, and in 1222, bypassing the impregnable Derbent, three Tumens [15] marched to the steppe expanses of the North Caucasus, inhabited at that time by the Alans.

The Alans, or Yasi, - the ancestors of the Ossetians and the descendants of the militant Sarmatians - were a numerous people, but very old. In the phase of the ethnic ascent, the Roxalans stopped the Roman legions in Pannonia; in the phase of the break, the Alans were defeated by the Huns and partly retreated to Spain, partly dispersed to the foothills of the Caucasus and waited out a difficult time there; in the inertial phase, the Alans adopted Greek Christianity and suffered from the Khazar kings for this; in the XII-XIII centuries. Quite naturally, they had a phase of obscuration, which was described by the Hungarian monk-traveler Julian, who visited the Caspian in 1236, in search of the ancestral homeland of the Hungarians. In Alanya, "as many villages as there are leaders... There is a constant war going on there... villages against villages"[16]. "All the villagers go to plowing with weapons, as well as to harvest, and to any other work, except on Sundays, when the murders of neighbors are not carried out. In general, homicide among them does not entail any punishment or blessing... They pay such reverence to the Cross that poor people, local or newcomers... they walk safely both among Christians and among pagans if they put a cross on a spear with a banner and carry it, raising it up"[17].

Even from this brief description it is clear that the Alans lost the passionarity of their ancestors so much that they could not retain their former culture and statehood, preserving the veneration of the cross not as a symbol, but as an amulet. Therefore, they could neither be a threat to their neighbors, nor organize defense in case of an enemy invasion. It must be assumed that gene carriers were preserved among them, because some part of the Alans, which retreated to the slopes of the Caucasian ridge, has been preserved to this day.

The Alans had no state organization and therefore were not capable of resistance. The Mongol army marched to the Don, naturally taking from the local population everything they needed for themselves. In the Middle Ages, this was how all the advancing armies behaved. The Polovtsians did not come to the rescue of the Alans, since, obviously, the Mongol raid took them by surprise.

On the Don, the Mongols found allies. It was an ethnos of the Brodniks, descendants of the Orthodox Khazars and ancestors of the grassroots Cossacks.[18]  (Brodniks were not considered Jews because having a Jewish father and pagan mother, Jewishness is passed by the mother, not by the father. So, they had no rights in Kazaria and moved out to the Crimea.) Brodniki inhabited the floodplain of the Don and coastal terraces, leaving the Polovtsy watershed steppes. Both these ethnic groups were at enmity with each other, and therefore the allies supported the Mongols. Thanks to the help of the Brodniks, the Mongols hit the Polovtsian rear and defeated Yuri Konchakovich, and Khan Kotyan, Mstislav Udaly's father-in-law, was driven beyond the Dniester.

The Polovtsy began to beg the Russian princes for help. Although Russia had no reason to go to war against the Mongols and, moreover, they sent an embassy with peace proposals, the princes, having gathered "on the snem" (council), decided to defend the Polovtsians and killed the ambassadors.

The rest was described repeatedly: the Russian-Polovtsian army of about 80 thousand warriors pursued the retreating Mongols to the Kalki River, forced them to take the fight, but they were completely defeated by the Mongols. After which the Mongols went east, but when crossing the Volga they were defeated by the Bulgarians. Few were able to escape from the encirclement and return home. Reconnaissance by battle cost the Mongols dearly.

The reasons for the defeat of the Russian-Polovtsian army have also been clarified. It turns out that the Russians did not have a common command, because the three Mstislavs - Galitsky (Udaloy), Chernigov and Kiev - were in such a quarrel that they could not bring themselves to act together. Then the instability of the Polovtsians, by the way, has long been known, was noted. Finally, ataman Brodnikov Ploskin was accused of treason, who persuaded Mstislav of Kiev to surrender to the Mongols so that they would let him out, whether for ransom. Let's say the prince would have been redeemed, and his soldiers, who had no money?! What would have become of them? They would certainly have been killed, which in fact happened.

But to characterize the phase of ethnogenesis, details that have not been paid due attention are important. Historians, except G.V. Vernadsky [19], mention the murder of ambassadors in passing, as if it is a trifle that does not deserve attention. But this is a vile crime, homicide, betrayal of the confidant! And there is no reason to consider the Mongols' peace proposals a diplomatic trick. Russian lands, covered with dense forest, were not needed by the Mongols, and the Russians, as a settled people, could not threaten the indigenous Mongolian ulus, i.e. they were safe for the Mongols. The Polovtsians, allies of the Merkits and other opponents of Genghis, were dangerous. Therefore, the Mongols sincerely wanted peace with the Russians, but after a treacherous murder and an unprovoked attack, peace became impossible.

However, the Mongols did not show hostility and vindictiveness to all Russians. Many Russian cities were not affected during Batu's campaign. Only Kozelsk was declared an "evil city", whose prince Mstislav Svyatoslavich of Chernigov was among those "great" princes who decided the fate of the ambassadors. The Mongols believed that the evil ruler's subjects were responsible for his crimes. They had it that way themselves. They simply could not imagine the prince outside the "collective". Therefore, Kozelsk suffered.  (I read that the Mongols sacked and burned 15 out of 300 Russian wooden cities.  And even those were rebuilt after a year or two.)

And Mstislav Svyatoslavich himself on May 31, 1223, together with the Chernigov army, fled from the battlefield. Of course, he himself was killed, and his son, and "the hero Alexander Popovich with seventy brothers" [20]. Russian losses reached 90% of the fighters.

Mstislav Mstislavich Udaloy, even before the battle, captured the wounded Tatar knight Gemyabek, whom the Tatars left "in the mound"[21], since he could not mount a horse. Well, all right, I would have killed him myself; no, he gave him to the Polovtsy for torment! And after the battle, when he reached the Dnieper and got into the rook, he ordered the other rooks to be cut down, instead of organizing the crossing of the comrades who rode after him. Panic? Yes! But also, irresponsibility and ruthlessness... Is it good?

Each "figure" of the historical process is the fruit of his time, or the phase of ethnogenesis. In our time, such generals are judged, but we are not in the phase of obscuration. Of course, one can attribute these outrages to feudalism, but not all feudal lords behaved in this way, and it was not the feudal lords of Novgorod who showed a year later what the patriarchal republic, which is in the same phase of ethnogenesis, is capable of.

152. THE SEVENTH TROUBLE. 1224

Much more formidable was the iron onslaught of the crusading West on the Baltic States. Brave and freedom-loving Estonians since 1210 - after the peace of the Livonians with Prince Vladimir of Polotsk - experienced the full power of crusading chivalry. This was a direct attempt on the zone of influence of the Novgorod Republic, which until 1216 was engaged in a struggle with the Vladimir-Suzdal princes. The Novgorodians destroyed 9,233 Russian soldiers on the Lipitsa River, and the Germans in the same year captured part of Southern Estonia and built the fortress of Odenpe. In 1217 The Novgorod-Estonian army recaptured Odenpe, where a truce was concluded, but the order received constant replenishment from Catholic Europe. The Estonians were defeated at Veden, and Russian aid in 1218 did not give anything.

And then Denmark intervened. In 1219, the Danes, having captured a piece of Estonia, built the Revel fortress. Estes were taken in German-Danish ticks. In 1220, the Danes captured the northern part of Estonia and in 1221 joined the Germans advancing from the south, from Riga. In 1222, the Estonians rebelled, the Russians came to their aid. In 1223, the Danish king Valdemar II made an alliance with the order "against the Russians and against the pagans." Russian knights defeated the Estonians on the Imere River and took Fellin, but the Russian prisoners were "all hanged in front of the castle on the fear of other Russians"[22].

The Estonians asked for help from the Russians, and Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich in the autumn of 1223 sent a 20,000-strong army led by his brother Yaroslav to the Baltic States [23]. Russian Bishop Adalbert, supported by the Livs, took the Russian city of Yuryev in 1224, and did not spare a single Russian. The Germans won this stage of the war and reached the frontier of indigenous Russia.

The fall of Yuryev, on the site of which Dorpat was built, was less famous, but more important than the Battle of Kalka. It was even suggested that the defeat of the three Mstislavs with the Mongols affected the situation in the Baltic States, and consequently, "objectively, the Mongols played the role of allies of the Crusaders in the Baltic States"[24]. It seems that this opinion is incorrect.

In fact, the culprit of the defeat, Mstislav Udaloy, commanded the Novgorod army at Lipitsa, where the selected detachments of Yuri and Yaroslav Vsevolodovich were killed. It was here in 1216 that the might of the Grand Duchy of Vladimir, Novgorod's only ally in the war with the Crusaders, was undermined. And it is unlikely that Mstislav Udaloy would have come to the aid of his enemies Vsevolodovich. And if he had appeared with an army on the banks of the Narva, then with his character he would only have intensified the discord, and, perhaps, a massacre similar to the one on Kalka would have been repeated.

No! The causes of the disasters suffered by Russia in the XIII century lie deeper than they are usually thought. They are not in the mistakes of the rulers, but in the nature of things. Therefore, studying the course of events, we will find in it the breath of the biosphere.

Fortunately for Novgorod, the Germans were not unanimous either. The Order quarreled with the bishop of Riga, a protégé of the pope, and refused to obey him. Frederick II in May 1226 gave the knights a charter that exempted the order from subordination to the Bishop of Riga and placed it in direct subordination to the German king.[25] Thus, the struggle of the Guelphs with the Ghibellines, because of which Roman Vodynsky died, gave Novgorod and Pskov an important respite, maybe even salvation.

For 10 years, the Lithuanians managed to become more active, who defeated the Livonian knights at Memel, forcing the Livonian swordsmen to ask for help from the Teutonic Order in Prussia. The master of the Teutons, Heinrich Salza, did not want to accept these violent people for a long time, but in 1237, yielding to the desire of the pope, agreed to the unification. A constant threat loomed over Russia, delayed only by the heroic resistance of the Prussians and Lithuanians. Novgorod, hemmed in by the Swedes, Danes and Germans, was waiting for its fate.

153. THE EIGHTH TROUBLE. 1235

Considering the situation that has developed on Russian soil after the death of Grand Duke Vsevolod III, we have to make two sad conclusions: The  Russian state as a whole did not exist at that time, and 2) the opposition of the Russian land Polovtsian field has lost its meaning. The heirs of the mighty Vsevolod, Yuri II and his brother Yaroslav, did not enjoy any authority either in the Novgorod Republic or in the south, where the descendants of the princes who died on Kalka continued senseless wars, outbidding the help of the Polovtsian khans. The latter willingly "traded their sabers", because their passionary tension was no longer the same. They learned to get rid of all the tribesmen who violated the traditions of militant mediocrity, the one that was the ideal of Polovtsian ethics. And this meant that not only cowards, thieves, traitors, fools were expelled from society, but also geniuses, initiative braves, dreamers, ambitious people, etc. all those who could or wanted to disrupt the harmony of the Polovtsian with his beloved steppe.

But with the neighbors who inhabited the edge of the forest zone, the Polovtsians established contacts, both economic - the exchange of surplus natural products, and dynastic - khans married Russian hawthorns, and small appanage princes - "red Polovtsian girls." And in 1235, these mestizos, equally close to the Polovtsians and Rusichs, under the banners of the Seversky Prince Izyaslav Vladimirovich, grandson of the famous Prince Igor, took and plundered Kiev once again, and thoroughly. Iziaslav's rival, Daniil Romanovich Volynsky, also knew how to get along with the Polovtsians. After the victory, the Chernigov Prince Mikhail wanted to develop success in Volhynia, but the Polovtsy "did not want" to go to Daniel. Apparently, they were more satisfied with the political balance in Russia, because in this decade the Russian princes did not dare to fight without outside help.

So, in the XIII century, the Russians considered the Polovtsians "their own", especially the baptized; the Polovtsians ceased to act as opponents, which cannot be said about the Mordvins and especially the Kama Bulgarians, who captured in 1219. Ustyug and were repulsed at Unzha.

Bulgarians who converted to Islam entered the system of another superethnos and for a long time tried to push the Russians away from the Volga. In these wars, the Polovtsy fought on the side of the Russians. And as we have seen, the Russian princes in 1223 came out in defense of the Polovtsians and laid down their heads on Kalka. The worst enemies are not protected at the cost of their lives.[26]

Conversely, the clashes between the fragments of the Kievan state were much more violent, and treachery was often added to the ferocity. So Torzhok suffered in 1178 from the rampage of Vsevolod III's soldiers against the princely will, as the warriors declared that the besieged could not be trusted, because "Novgorodians kiss the cross on one day and break the oath"[27]. For this, the Novgorodians repaid with the massacre of the Suzdalians on the Lipitsa River in 1216. It was disgusting that Gleb Vladimirovich of Ryazan killed six of his brothers invited to the feast, as well as the boyars and servants accompanying them (1217). The murderer fled to the Polovtsy and died there in madness. But where did this pathology come from, if not from the influence of the social environment? After all, not only the crazy prince was to blame for the murder of the guests, but also all his accomplices.

So, the desolation and "destruction of the Russian land" occurred not through the fault of evil neighbors, but as a result of a natural process - the aging of the ethnic system, or, what is the same, a decrease in passion tension. A similar conclusion was reached by S.M. Solovyov, who gave a brilliant description to the last paladin of Kievan Rus - Mstislav Udaly: "... a prince famous for glorious but useless exploits, who clearly showed the insolvency of the old, Southern Russia, its inability of further state development:

Southern Russia began to live out its age in endless quarrels of the Monomahovichi with the Olgovichi, Rostislavichs with Izyaslavichs"[28].

And Northern Russia, called the Zalessky Ukraine, "lagged behind" Southern Russia in the process of decomposition. It still retains elements of the inertial phase, because passionarity, as a recessive trait, moves to the outskirts of the area and disappears later than in the center. Thanks to this regularity, the Grand Duchy of Vladimir extended its existence until the middle of the XIII century, i.e., until the incubation phase of a new passionate impulse manifested in the XIV century. The culture, material and spiritual, inherited from Ancient Russia has been preserved here, because cultural genesis always lags behind ethnogenesis in time, which makes it possible to pass the baton to a new ethnic group. But the latter assimilates his heritage only as much as it suits him; much remains lost and is revealed only by the sciences - archeology and philology. The period of timelessness, more precisely, inter-timelessness, is always difficult!

154. THE NINTH TROUBLE of 1237-1240.

In the autumn of 1236, the Mongol troops took the Great Bulgar, and in the spring of 1237 attacked the Alans and Kipchaks. In the Volga Delta, the "bravest" of the Polovtsian leaders, Bachman, died, and the troops of Khan Kotyan retreated beyond the Don. However, the Mongols' frontal offensive to the west choked.

Then the Mongols used the tactics of circumvention and encirclement. Without weakening the pressure on the Polovtsians in the North Caucasian steppes, they moved a detachment to the north and in the autumn of 1237 subdued the Burtas, Erzya and Moksha, approaching the borders of the Ryazan Principality. The campaign against Russia began. At the head of the Mongol army was the grandson of Temujin (Genghis Khan) - Batu, and the southern army was commanded by his cousin - Monke.

Batu's campaign has been described repeatedly, from different points of view and with varying degrees of detail. Therefore, repetition is unnecessary here. Suffice it to note that Batu defeated the army of the Ryazan Principality, took 14 cities in the Grand Duchy of Vladimir and defeated the army of Prince Yuri II on the Sit River, then after a two-week siege on March 5, 1238, he took Torzhok. Batu turned south and besieged Kozelsk for seven weeks, which was not helped by either the Smolensk princes, Mikhail of Chernigov, or Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, who succeeded his deceased brother Yuri II in Vladimir, although all these princes had troops; For example, during the siege of Kozelsk, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich made a victorious campaign against Lithuania. In the summer of 1238 Batu moved to the steppe and joined the southern army, after which the Polovtsy began to withdraw to Hungary. In 1239, the Mongols took Chernigov, and in 1240 - Kiev; along the way, the "black hoods" (Karakalpaks) were defeated. In addition, a significant part of the Mongol army was pulled back to the Caucasus and the Crimea. In 1241, the Mongols attacked Hungary, spending only 4 months on the way through Volhynia. Thus ended the Russian stage of the war, but the Mongol campaign lasted until 1242. The only difference is that the ninth wave of disaster has already swept through Hungary and Poland.

The Mongolian "western campaign" is an unusual phenomenon, and according to that, its interpretation was diverse. In the XIX century it was believed that the heroic resistance of Russia to the Mongol "hordes" weakened and drained them of blood, which saved Western Europe from ruin, for which this "Europe" should be grateful to Russia. However, there was no gratitude, but the pope blessed the crusade against the Schismatics (Orthodox). Oddly enough, this event was not regarded by contemporaries as a betrayal. Apparently, Russian politicians did not expect anything good from the pope.

Soviet historians, who have studied the problem in depth, bring interesting details. "Despite the immediate danger of invasion, there were no noticeable attempts to unite in Southern Russia to repel the enemy. The princely strife continued; the chronicler, next to the story about the defeat of Pereyaslavl and Chernigov by the Mongols, calmly tells about Yaroslav's campaign, during which he "took Kamenets, and Princess Mikhailova with a lot of people led to his own si." Strife continued in Kiev itself. The Kiev prince Mikhail Vsevolodovich fled "before the Tatars to the Ougry," and one of the Smolensk princes, Rostislav Mstislavich, hastened to seize the vacant Kiev table, but was soon expelled... Daniel Galitsky, who did nothing to prepare the city for defense; he did not even stay in Kiev, leaving behind "the thousand Dmitry".... Kiev did not receive any "help from other South Russian principalities"[29]. It is customary to blame the feudal princes for the defeat, but the rich Volga cities that were part of the Vladimir Principality - Yaroslavl, Rostov, Uglich, Tver and others - entered into negotiations with the Mongols and avoided defeat.

According to the Mongol rules of war, those cities that submitted voluntarily received the name "gobalyk" - a good city; the Mongols charged a moderate contribution from such cities with horses for the repair of cavalry and food supplies for warriors. But other cities that did not have time to surrender in time did not suffer for long. Since the Mongols did not leave garrisons anywhere, the "submission" was purely symbolic; after the departure of the Mongol army, the inhabitants returned home, and everything went as before [30].

The unfortunate Torzhok suffered only because its inhabitants were waiting for help from Novgorod, which is why they did not have time to capitulate. But according to Mongolian law, after the first arrow was fired, negotiations stopped and the city was considered doomed. Apparently, there were intelligent and knowledgeable people in Russia who managed to explain the "rules of the game" to their fellow citizens and thus saved them from death. But then the reason for the defeat of Vladimir, Chernigov, Kiev and other major cities was not feudal fragmentation, but the stupidity of the rulers and their boyar advisers, who did not know how, and did not seek to organize defense. When stupidity becomes an element of a behavioral stereotype, it is a symptom of the final phase of ethnogenesis - obscuration, after which the ethnos goes into homeostasis, even if it is not fragmented into parts and is not subordinated to the enemy. And Russia was neither subjugated nor subdued by the Mongols.

The plan of the Mongol command was that at a time when the Polovtsians were holding the defense on the Don, to go to their rear and hit the unprotected Dnieper nomads. The Chernigov Principality was in alliance with the Polovtsians, therefore, it was necessary to go even further north - through the Vladimir Principality. It seems that Batu did not expect active resistance from Yuri II, but, having met such, broke him and paved the way for his army.

It is noteworthy that the Mongol troops were dispersed into small detachments, which in case of active resistance would have been easily destroyed. Batu took such a risky step, obviously knowing that these detachments were not in serious danger. And so it turned out.

And indeed, why would Russian people, not only brave, but also sharp-witted, begin to expose their heads to the enemy, who will leave himself? Even Yuri's brother and heir, Yaroslav, realized this. He did not come to sit with him, although he had enough troops, which he used in campaigns against the Lithuanians and Chernigov, as mentioned above. Then in 1240-1242 he needed these regiments to save Novgorod from the Swedish-German crusaders, and in 1243 he came to bow to Batu and received a label from the khan for the great reign. In fact, it was an alliance agreement, arranged according to the etiquette of that time. Yaroslav Vsevolodovich's diplomatic flexibility saved North-Eastern Russia from unnecessary disasters and from the desolation to which Kievan Rus was subjected. But it is still unclear why it has become so bad in the south? It is considered that because of the Tatars. Is it so?

155. ABOUT THE "DESOLATION" OF KIEVAN RUS

Banal versions have the appeal that they allow you to make a decision without criticism, which is difficult and you don't want to think about it. So, it is indisputable that Kievan Rus of the XII century was a very rich country, with a magnificent craft [31] and brilliant architecture [32], and in the XIV century this country was so desolate that in the XV century it began to be repopulated by immigrants from the north, i.e. from Belarus [33]. In the interval between the epochs of prosperity and decline, Batu's army passed through these lands, which means that it is to blame for everything.

M.N.Pokrovsky [34] and B.D.Grekov [35] very reasonably believed that the decline of Kievan Rus began in the second half of the XII century or even in the XI century, when the trade route "from the Varangians to the Greeks" lost its significance due to the Crusades. who opened an easy way to the riches of the East. And the Tatar invasion only contributed to the desolation of the region, which began 200 years earlier. Important additional information on this topic was given by the Ukrainian archaeologist V.O. Dovzhenok, who studied a number of ancient settlements on the banks of the middle Dnieper.[36]

Rightly noting that the Mongols were cruel at the level of their time and assigned the Middle Dnieper the role of the rear, in which the possibility of military actions should have been excluded, and that the chronicler speaks of the cities taken by the Tatars - "they are innumerable" (Ipatiev Chronicle), the author, who knows the physical geography of his region, indicates that the Tatars could not stop at every city to destroy it. They avoided many fortresses, and "forests, ravines, rivers, swamps sheltered villages and people from the Tatar cavalry." Of course, "a lot of material and cultural values were destroyed... and a lot of people died, but life went on." And as proof, he cites a number of villages on which there are traces of fires dating back to 1240, but there are no human bones, and valuable things. According to V.O. Dovzhenka, people left these cities, taking with them valuable belongings, and after passing the danger they returned and restored their homes. They had a place to hide: the Dnieper floodplain is cut by a great many lakes and swamps, channels and branches, and even covered with forest and shrubs. Not all Russian cities perished during the Batu raid, as is "commonly believed", it is accepted because "the prevailing view of historians about the fate of the region", i.e. a biased opinion, the most cruel ulcer of science, affected this.

Why was the tired army of Batu, which aimed to attack the Polovtsians from the rear, wasting time and people on the destruction of well-fortified castles, of which 113 are mentioned in the sources (and this is far from all), and in total 209 of them were noted in Russia [37]? No, even if the Mongols were striving for the total extermination of Russians, it would not be possible for them.

Moreover, the further campaign of the Tatars was aimed at Hungary, where the retreating horde of Khan Kotyan took refuge, and "Alemania", i.e. the German Empire. In order to operate in countries so remote from their homeland, they needed a secured rear and supplies. Therefore, they searched in all ways in Southern Russia not for enemies, but for friends, and found them in Bolokhovskaya land, in the Upper Pobuzhye. These petty princes, as if they were not Rurikovichi, but a relic of ancient Slavs, supported the Galician boyars in the fight against Daniil Romanovich, and they quickly agreed with the Tatars. The Tatars released them from recruitment into their army on the condition that the Bolokhovites would supply their army with wheat and millet. It turned out that it was not necessary to quarrel with the Tatars.[38]

The fate of this ancient and rich land was sad. Daniel of Galicia, who flirted with the papacy in 1256, and destroyed the Galician "traitor boyars"[39], destroyed cities and devastated the ancient Slavic land[40]. By doing this, he undermined the supply of the Mongol troops, and at the same time his Galician Principality, which became an easy prey for Poland. However, who should be considered a "traitor": those who sought a compromise with the Tatars, or those who subordinated the Russian lands to the pope, the Germans and their satellites? Opinions on this issue differ. Science should be based not on personal opinions and tastes, but on a consistent version that should be found.

156. SOMEONE ELSE'S TROUBLE. 1241-1242.

The hurricane, which raised the "ninth wave" from the east, rolled up to the Adriatic. Along the way, it swept away Poland and Hungary - the fiefs of the German Empire. These European countries suffered a much more crushing defeat than the Russian princes. Those, possessing solid military forces, skillfully evaded decisive battles with the Mongols, obviously thinking that the fewer battles, the less devastation, and the Mongols will still leave and everything will go on as before. They were reasonable and right.

The same princes who wanted to fight the Mongols even more wisely fled to the west, where the Polish-German army of Henry the Pious met the Mongols at Liegnitz on April 9, 1241, and the Hungarian-Croatian army of Bela IV decided to hit another Mongol corps at Chaillot on April 11, 1241. Both troops were completely defeated, and the population, especially in Hungary, suffered greatly.

The question arises: why did Batu invade Hungary? This campaign was carried out according to the Mongolian principle: "The friends of our enemies are our enemies." Can this principle be considered short-sighted?

Bela IV took over the Polovtsian horde of Khan Kotyan. The Polovtsy, according to the agreement, were baptized into Catholicism and formed a strong force subordinate to the king. But Hungarian magnates, concerned about the strengthening of the crown, treacherously killed Kotyan and other neophytes in Pest. Upon learning about this, the Polovtsians rebelled and went to the Balkans. Later, the surviving Polovtsy entered the service of the Emperor of Nicaea, John III Vatats.

The Russian princes who asked Bela IV for help and a marriage alliance, Mikhail Vsevolodovich Chernigov and Daniil Romanovich Galitsky, were also inhospitable. "There would be no love between them"[41].

Bela IV got rid of many allies who were unsympathetic to him and his magnates. The Hungarian people paid for this, abandoned by the king to punish the Mongol soldiers, enraged by the death of their comrades in battle and during the sieges of cities. "Many were killed in Poland and Hungary," says the pope's ambassador to the Mongol Khan, Plano Carpini.[42]

Major cities of Hungary - Pest, Varadin, Arad, Pereg, Egres, Temeshvar, Gyulafehervar - pali. Then Slovakia, Eastern Czech Republic and Croatia were defeated. Europe was in a panic, fear gripped not only Germany, but also France, Burgundy and Spain, and led to a complete stagnation of England's trade with the continent.

The only exception was Emperor Frederick II, who corresponded with Batu, openly and secretly. Batu, speaking according to the etiquette then adopted, demanded submission from Friedrich, which translated into business language meant a non-aggression pact. Friedrich made a joke and replied that, as an expert in falconry, he could become a falconer of the khan [43]. However, along with jokes, secret negotiations were conducted between the Ghibellines and the Mongols, which resulted in the isolation of Guelph Hungary and its defeat and the victories of Frederick II in Lombardy, which led to the flight of Pope Innocent IV in 1243. to Lyon, where he was able to anathematize the emperor and the khan.[44]

So, Christian Europe was divided in half. The Ghibellines and the Nicene Empire sought an alliance with the Mongols; Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, Grand Duke of Vladimir, and Getum, king of Lesser Armenia (Cilicia) followed in their footsteps. The Guelphs, led by Pope Innocent IV, and the South Russian princes Daniil Galitsky and Mikhail Chernigov tried their best to create an anti-Mongol coalition, but unsuccessfully.

The Muslim world was also divided. The Sunnis stood up against the Mongols, the Shiites treated them loyally, as a result of which they did not suffer during the Mongols' offensive on Baghdad and Jerusalem (1258-1260). But the Ismailis were mercilessly exterminated, whom all - Christians, Muslims and pagans - considered to be carriers of the evil principle, murderers.

Against the background of this extremely complicated situation, on November 11, 1241, the supreme Khan Ogedei died, military operations on the fronts were suspended until a new khan was chosen. Batu, having stated the destruction of the Polovtsian Horde, considered his task accomplished and left with his entire army through Bosnia, Serbia and Moldavia to the banks of the Lower Volga. Since 1243, a new period of history has begun, i.e. a new alignment of forces and goals has developed.

The reason for such a rapid end to the war is explained differently, as well as its consequences and "assessments". The greatest ambiguity is rooted in the extremely superficial view of historians about the character, capabilities and culture of the Mongolian ulus of the XIII century, about the phase of Mongolian ethnogenesis and the goals of its rulers. This story we will have to pay special attention.

NOTES:

[1] See: Alekseev L.V. Polotsk land//Ancient Russian principalities of the X-XIII centuries. pp. 237-238.

[2] Pashuto V.T. Foreign policy... p. 228.

[3] See: Gumilev L.N. Biosphere and impulses of consciousness//Nature. 1978. No. 12. pp.97-105.

[4] See: Karamzin N.M. History of the Russian State. Vol. III. Note. 105 and 106, cit. by: Pogodin M. The ABC list of Russian princes before the Mongol yoke. 1854. p. 291.

[5] The word about Igor's regiment. M.; LD 1950. pp. 444-445.

[6] See the same.

[7] The Ipatiev Chronicle, under 1201

[8] See: Nasonov A.N. Mongols and Rus. M., L., 1940. p.6.

[9] "...There was a great rebellion: the boyars and merchants stood up more: Prince! we want good for you and we put our heads together for you, but you keep your gates simple; and behold, your and ours, the judges and the Rostovites," and demanded either the blinding or the execution of the captive princes. Gleb died in a log cabin, (wooden box prison).

[10] PSRL. Vol. 1. See under 1187

[11] Cit. by: Solovyov S.M. History of Russia...Book 1. Vol.II. pp.570-571.

[12] See: Pashuto V.T. Essays on the history of Galician-Volyn Rus. M., 1950. pp. 194-203.

[13] See: Pashuto V.T. Foreign policy...p.283.

[14] Ibid. p. 276.

[15] These mists were commanded by Jebe, Subutai and Tugarach (kungrat). Taking into account the losses during the war, there were about 20 thousand fighters in tumen.

[16] Anninsky S.A.//Historical Archive.T.Z.M.; L., 1940.P.79.

[17] Ibid. P. 79.

[18] See: Gumilev L.N. Discovery of Khazaria.Pp.176-177.

[19] See: Vernadsky G.V. Were the Mongol ambassadors of 1223 Christians? //Serninarium Kondakovianum.3. Praha, 1929; Gumilev L.N. The Search for a fictional kingdom. p. 324.

[20] Solovsv S.M. History of Russia...Book 1.T.11.P.642.

[21] Ibid. p. 641.

[22] Pashuto V.T. Foreign Policy... pp.228-234.

[23] See: Shaskolsky I.P. The struggle of Russia against crusading aggression on the shores of the Baltic in the XIX-XIII centuries. L., 1978. pp.123-124.

[24] Pashuto V.T. Foreign policy...p.233.

[25] See: Weber G. Universal History. Vol. VII. p. 237.

[26] See: Belyavsky V.A. About the "eternal antagonism" between the agricultural and nomadic population of Eastern Europe.

[27] Soloviev S.M. History of Russia... Book 1. Vol.II. p.577.

[28] Ibid. P. 606.

[29] Kargalov V.V. Foreign policy factors of the development of feudal Russia. For the bibliography, see pp. 378-415.

[30] See: Nasonov L.N. Mongols and Rus. pp.36-37.

[31] See: Rybakov B. A. Craft of ancient Russia. M. , 1948.P.521.

[32] See: Karger M.K. Ancient Kiev. Vol.1. M., L., 1958. P.238.

[33] See: Klyuchevsky V.O. Essays.Vol.1. pp.282-286. [34] See: Pokrovsky M.N. The History of Russia since ancient times. Vol.1. p. 120.

[35] See: Grekov B.D. Kievan Rus.P.500.

[36] See: Dovzhenok V.O. Middle Dnieper after the Tatar-Mongol invasion//Ancient Russia and the Slavs. M., 1978. pp. 76-82.

[37] See: Tikhomirov M.N. Ancient Russian cities. M., 1959. pp.12-42.

[38] See: Nasonov A.N. Mongols and Rus. pp. 24-25.

[39] Pashuto V.T. Decree.op.C.286.

[40] The author, participating in the archaeological expedition of Prof. M.I. Artamonov in 1946-1947, discovered pre-Scythian, Scythian and Early Slavic settlements in Podolia, after which Polish castles were built from scratch, now serving as museum premises. Daniel devastated the Slavic land for 300 years.

[41] See: Pashuto V. T. The Mongol march into the depths of Europe//Tatar-Mongols in Asia and Europe. M., 1970. pp.204- 206.

[42] Journey to the Eastern countries...p. 47.

[43] See: Pashuto V.T. Foreign policy...p.287.

[44] The "Five Sorrows" of the Catholic Church: 1) Tatars; 2) Orthodox; 3) heretics-Cathars: 4) Khorezmians, 5) Frederick II (see: Osokin N.A. The first Inquisition and the conquest of Languedoc by the French. p. 222)

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