22. Ancient Rus and the Great Steppe, Gumilev

Part five. From zenith to nadir XXI. The search for the guilty, 136. WHAT DOES "THE DESTRUCTION OF THE RUSSIAN LAND" MEAN?

[Note: Interesting method, Gumilev goes through the source material, one after another, and then portrays some of the events of the time. The Reader is allowed to realize the sources were biased. So what is closer to reality? Gumilev arrives at some conclusions.]

This is a strange title of an old Russian manuscript, of which only a fragment has survived. It is presumably dated to the XIII century. It is believed that it was written about one of the invasions of the Mongols - in 1223 or 1238 [1].

But let's leave this dispute to philologists - ethnologists, something else is more important: the author of the treatise not only assumes the possibility of the "destruction" of a large, strong and rich ethnic group, but is also sure that this happened in the XIII century. Why could he think so, even taking into account that in the Vladimir Principality, Batu's troops burned down only 14 wooden cities in the winter of 1238 (out of a total of about 300), and these were rebuilt in the spring? At the same time, the author’s pathos, erudition and patriotism are beyond doubt. One must think that there was something so important in the lost part of the text that it is difficult to imagine in our time.

We are people of the XX century, so accustomed to the evolutionary theory that the discreteness (discontinuity) of historical processes is not perceived by us. Nowadays it seems that the Russians come, if not directly from the Pithecanthropus, then at least from the Scythians, of course ploughmen, and the ancient Russians of the XII century. quite their own, like great-uncles. Therefore, all the talk about the aging of the ethnic group, about the culture of the "golden autumn", about the loss of traditions and the renewal of stereotypes of behavior is offensive to our great ancestors. All ordinary people, many scientists and even writers, except A.K., are sure of this.

Tolstoy, who showed in his ballads the depth of the difference between Ancient, Kievan, and Ancient Moscow Rus. It is no less than between the Rome of the Caesars and the Rome of the Popes: both here and there it is not in culture, but in mores and customs, i.e. in behavioral stereotypes, which means in ethnogenesis, and not in modifications of institutions: the state, the church, class status, architecture, etc. could not ignore the deep crisis of the XIII century. historians could not, although it was extremely difficult to explain it from the standpoint of evolutionism. But a way out was still found and was accepted by many. This crisis and the "death" that followed it have long been attributed to the southern neighbors of the Russian land. Only in the XX century this concept was criticized. Let's try to understand the problem by making an excursion into historiography.

In Russian sources of the XII-XIII centuries. The Polovtsian steppe is called the "Unknown Land". This is surprising because before 1093, and even more so in the tenth century, Russians freely traveled to the Darkness of Tarakan and to the Crimea and even through the steppes of the North Caucasus to the shore of the Caspian Sea, and suddenly in the Laurentian Chronicle under 1252 about Andrei Yaroslavich of Vladimir it is said: "Closer to the unknown land." And the same is true in "The Word about Igor's Regiment" and in "The Tale of Bygone Years". D.S. Likhachev explains that this name is not used as an exact geographical term, but as an emotional definition of the Polovtsian steppe[2]. But this is all the more strange, since the name was established for the southern steppe after the victorious campaigns of Vladimir Monomakh and the sharp reduction of the Russian-Polovtsian clashes. The idea suggests itself that the knowledge of ancient Russian geographers in the XIII century decreased and the Polovtsian steppes, previously perfectly familiar, became unknown lands. Such a regression is sometimes observed in science. Cognition and oblivion are reversed.

137. WAS THERE A "STRUGGLE OF THE FOREST WITH THE STEPPE"?

So, in the XII century. the former steppe outskirts of Kievan Rus turned first into a "Land of the Unknown", then into a "Big Meadow" and finally into a "Wild field" conquered by the Russians and their Kalmyks allies only at the end of the XVIII century. But then the study of this country had to start anew. The steppe expanses of the Northern Black Sea region have always been convenient for the development of cattle breeding. Therefore, Asian nomads migrated to Eastern Europe. Of course, these migrations caused clashes with the local population - the Slavs, whose economy was connected with forests and river valleys. However, a nomadic economy cannot exist outside of connection with agriculture, because the exchange of products is equally important for both sides. Therefore, along with military clashes, we observe constant examples of symbiosis. The Pechenegs, after the defeat at Leburn, settled in Dobrudja and became allies of Byzantium; the Torks settled on the right bank of the Dnieper and supplied border guards for the Kiev princes; the Cumans, a strong and warlike people, after the first clashes with the Rus became allies of the Chernigov Principality.

And this is not accidental. The economic and geographical unity of the region, which combined zonal and a-zonal (river valleys) landscapes, determined the need to create an integral economic system where parts do not oppose each other, but complement each other.[3] Of course, this did not exclude clashes, sometimes bloody, and this was what caught the eye of contemporaries of the events. The authors of the XIX-XX centuries created the concept of the eternal struggle of the "forest with the steppe". The beginning of this idea was laid by S.M. Solovyov, who believed that the flow of Slavic colonization went along the line of least resistance - to the northeast, where the Rostov land inhabited by Finns submitted to the Slavs without resistance, while the warlike nomads were an insurmountable obstacle for Slavic farmers. This concept was uncritically accepted by V.O. Klyuchevsky, P.N. Milyukov, A.E. Presnyakov, G.V. Vernadsky and B.A. Rybakov, not to mention historians of the "Ukrainian" direction, such as, for example, N.I. Kostomarov, V.V. Antonovich, M.S. Hrushevsky, V.G. Lyaskoronsky, etc. However, before agreeing with this concept, let's take a look at the historical and geographical facts, given that the latter were out of the field of view of S.M. Solovyov.

138. NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN NEIGHBORS OF RUSSIA

Let's take a look at the immediate past. There was no peace on the borders of Russia. Yaroslav the Wise made campaigns to the north: in 1030 - to the Chud (on their land he built the city of Yuryev, lost in 1224), to the Yatvyags - in 1038, to Lithuania and Mazovia - in 1040-1041, again to Mazovia - in 1047, and sent his son, Vladimir, in 1042, finally, in 1058, after Yaroslav's death, Goliad, a Lithuanian tribe southwest of Moscow, was conquered.

Vladimir Monomakh conquered Vyatichi with two campaigns - the last stronghold of Slavic paganism, but the Mordvins defeated Prince Yaroslav Svyatoslavich in 1104 at Murom and stopped the movement of Russians.

Mstislav the Great raised the Novgorodians and the Pskov people against the Chudis in 1116 and went to Lithuania in 1131, but after the death of this last sovereign prince in Ancient Russia, the Latvian Zemigola tribe defeated the Polotsk princes in 1166. The losses of the Russian squad were estimated at 9 thousand warriors. The offensive to the north was stopped. This short list shows that the special attention paid by historians to military clashes on the southern border is prompted by literary reminiscences, and not by a sober comparison of facts against a broad historical background.

In the south: in 1036 - the defeat of the Pechenegs near Kiev, in 1060 - the victory over the Torks and their submission in 1064, in 1068 - the defeat of the Polovtsian Prince Sharukan on the Alta and a month later the revenge - his defeat at R. Snovi Svyatoslav Chernihiv. From 1092 to 1117 - the war against the Polovtsians on the initiative of Grand Duke Svyatopolk II and the complete subjugation of their western nomads by Vladimir Monomakh.

Eastern "wild" Polovtsy voluntarily enter into an alliance with the Suzdal princes. Then, for 120 years, from 1116 to 1236, Polovtsian raids on Russia - only 5; There were also 5 Russian campaigns on the Steppe, and 16 cases of Polovtsian participation in strife. And not a single large city was taken by the Polovtsians! But in 1088 the Bulgarian foresters took Murom!

Let's move on to the geography of the economy. The enclosing landscape of the ancient Rusichs was not so much woodlands as forest-steppes, opole and river valleys. With an extremely rare population of Russia in the XII century (about 5.5 million), shifting farming systems were practiced in it, requiring incomplete settlement; semi-nomadism based on cattle farming was not excluded, especially in the steppe zone [4].

The Turks were not nomads either (see above), agriculture developed near the winter roads, as did the Cossacks - Don and Zaporozhye - and the Nogais. The difference between "forest" and "steppe" was not so great, especially since in the XII century the steppe was covered with islands of forest: groves and forests. They were exterminated by people in the XIX century.[5].

And finally, in the XIII century. Russians and Polovtsy jointly repel the Seljuk landing in the Crimea and the Mongol raid on the Don and both times share the bitterness of defeat. No, it wasn't that simple! However, before making a decision, let's look at the history of the issue, but not through a microscope, so as not to lose perspective, but through a telescope to see the whole picture of opinions and doubts, for all 200 years of posing the problem.

139. "THE STATE POINT OF VIEW" IN THE XIX century.

And now we will have to break away from the presentation of the course of events for a while and understand the problem of the relationship between the Polovtsians and the Rus. This problem has two solutions, of which only one can be correct. Therefore, it is advisable to deviate from the chronological principle in order to take into account all the necessary material and get rid of transient errors that cause a lot of harm to science and everyday life. After all, what seems simple with a philistine approach is actually difficult and not at all as it seems at first and inattentive glance.

In the XIX century, it was axiomatically assumed, and even entered into high school textbooks, that "chivalrous Russia and the alarming unkind steppe, overflowing with a boundless sea from the Volga to the Danube"[6], were eternal antagonists. Nowadays, this opinion is disputed as biased and does not correspond to the facts recorded strictly and impartially.[7] In fact, the optimal conditions for the formation of culture and prosperity of the economy were not in the remote forests of the Volga region and Siberia and not in the sunny desert of Kazakhstan, but on the landscape border of forest and steppe zones, as well as in a-zonal landscapes - river valleys. The aborigines of the forest and steppe learned to live in ethnic symbiosis, exchanged excessive products of labor and did not form chimeras, despite frequent mixed marriages. At the same time, both ethnic groups - Rusichi and Cumans - each lived at the expense of the natural resources of their region and therefore were limited by the limits of their landscapes. But then why did the concept of the eternal antagonism of Russia and the Steppe appear and strengthen, and to what extent does it correspond to the undoubted facts of history? This issue will have to be given special attention.

For Russian historians (not only chroniclers) in the XVI-XVII centuries, the Polovtsian problem was not relevant. The war on the southeastern border went on incessantly, but Russia's opponents were the states that were part of the Muslim superethnos - Crimea, Kazan and the Ottoman Empire, because already during the "great jam" in the Golden Horde, the steppe superethnos in Western Eurasia broke up into its component parts and disappeared as a whole. When the Kalmyks, a true steppe ethnos, who migrated from Dzungaria, appeared, Russia concluded an alliance with them and with their help conquered the Crimea.

Therefore, when at the end of the XVIII century. interest in the past forced us to turn to antiquity, historians encountered the chronicle tradition and accepted it as material for their own theoretical constructions in the spirit of their time.

Russian historiography - from V.N. Tatishchev to G.V.Plekhanov, with rare exceptions, solved the problem of Russian-Polovtsian contact uniformly, without being embarrassed by the obvious contradictions in the sources themselves and the inconsistency of their conclusions with geography and world history.

V.N.Tatishchev wrote: "The Polovtsy and the Pechenegs, more than after many hundreds of years, raided the Russian borders, capturing and plundering, inflicted great harm”... what the disagreement and internecine strife of the Russian princes was no small reason..." Vladimir Monomakh decided to marry his sons to the Polovtsian princesses, "but he gained very little peace and usefulness through it"[8].

Vladimir Monomakh himself wrote that he had concluded "19 worlds" with the Polovtsy. It seems that he knew better where the benefits were, especially since it was he, who first brought the Polovtsian army to Russia to defeat the Polotsk principality.

N.M. Karamzin called the Polovtsians "tireless villains" and argued that "peace with such barbarians could only be a dangerous truce"[9]. Why did the Russian princes in 1223 go to rescue the Polovtsians on Kalka?

N.G. Ustryalov, although he cited the facts of the participation of the Polovtsians in civil strife as a mercenary army, calls them "fierce villains" [10]. Less emotional S.M. Solovyov believed that "Russia...it had to fight with the inhabitants of the steppes, with nomadic Asian peoples ..."[11]. This idea was developed after Solovyov by V.O. Klyuchevsky. They gave this war the character of a "struggle of the forest with the steppe",[12] more than the thesis of the "eternal antagonism" of Russia and the Steppe it was given a geographical meaning, but the salt was different: the creators of this concept considered it their duty to justify the "backwardness" of Russia from the countries of Western Europe and to prove to ungrateful Europeans that "Russia is its own in the steppe struggle which covered the left flank of the European offensive"[13]. That is, the historical merit of Ancient Russia before the world civilization is that the Russians, without sparing themselves, covered Catholic monasteries in which our ancestors were anathematized for belonging to Schism; knight castles, from where feudal lords came out to plunder Byzantium, which was of the same faith to us; city communes that traded Slavic slaves, and crooks-moneylenders expelled by the people from Kiev. And the funny thing is that for some reason this sincere worship of the West was called patriotism?!

140. ANOTHER POINT OF VIEW

N.I. Kostomarov presented the South Russian situation somewhat differently, considering the Ukrainian people, if not eternal, then very ancient and always unlike the Great Russians. In his opinion, Russian history was based on the struggle of two principles - the specific and monarchical. The South was republican, Great Russia was monarchical. And the nomads delayed the development of civilization in Ancient Russia, even the Torks and Berendei, who mixed with the Slavs and fought under the banners of the Kievan princes.

"Russia was surrounded by foreigners who were ready to interfere in its affairs. From the East, like clouds, one darker than the other, hordes of steppe nomadic peoples of Asia came out, greedy for plunder and extermination"[14], and even helping the South Russian princes, the nomads brought harm, because due to the mixing of the population, "neither a strong princely power, nor a tribal aristocracy, nor... people's rights", and frequent Polovtsian raids forced the "South Russians" to move to the north, where they apparently turned into Great Russians. The last blow to Kiev was inflicted by the Mongol invasion [15]. But for some reason, Southern Russia was conquered not by Tatars, but by Lithuanians!

The views of N.I. Kostomarov appeared in the 60s of the XIX century and found followers among Ukrainian nationalists, for example, M.S. Hrushevsky and others [16], but 120 years later this militant provincialism seems frivolous. After all, the Russians were much stronger than the steppe people: Oleg Svyatoslavich Polovtsev used them, and Monomakh defeated them. However, the psychology of N.I. Kostomarov is clear: it is more pleasant to blame your neighbor for your own troubles than yourself.

Both directions - state and "regional" - seemingly irreconcilable, have one thing in common: their representatives viewed the numerous and diverse steppe ethnic groups of Eurasia as a homogeneous gray mass of barbarians, hostile to any, and most importantly, European civilization. For Western Europe, this is a long-standing traditional opinion. The Seljuk Turkmens and Mamluks of Egypt stopped the crusading troops and drove the knights out of the "Overseas Land", or Palestine. The Polovtsians dealt a fatal blow to the Latin Empire, after which its agony lasted for half a century, and pretty much battered the vanguard of the Catholic West - Hungary. Therefore, the antipathy of Europeans to steppe Asia is understandable. But why do Russian historians support the states that organized a crusade against Russia in the XIII century?

The onslaught on the east, which began in the XI century., continued in the XIII century., and in the XIV century., when Kiev and Chernigov were conquered by the Lithuanians, and in the XVII century., when the Poles burned Moscow; in the XIX century. the French did the same and in the XX century. the Germans wanted to commit. And the Polovtsy only asked for peace or defended themselves from the victorious squads of Vladimir Monomakh. But historians of the XIX century, with excellent knowledge of the chronicles, pretended that "the forest is fighting with the steppe" and this is natural.

Finally, in 1884, P.V. Golubovsky convincingly proved that three different Turkic peoples lived in the South Russian steppes, hostile to each other, and each of them had its own history and its own destiny. These were the Pechenegs - descendants of the Kangles, the Torks - an offshoot of the Guzs and the Cumans, a people of ancient culture. Polovtsian beauties were the mothers of many Russian princes, including Alexander Nevsky.

Nevertheless, P.V. Golubovsky wrote: Russia "endured this struggle (with the Cumans) on its shoulders and covered Europe with its chest"[17]. He repeated the theses of N.I. Kostomarov and his teacher V.B. Antonovich. This is what hypnosis of preconceived opinions gives.[18]

Nevertheless, P.V. Golubovsky should be considered the founder of scientific cumanology. S.A. Pletneva quite rightly points out that "the works on Polovtsy that were published before P.V. Golubovsky's work, as a rule, are written extremely tendentiously, sometimes simply amateurishly and only indicate that scientific interest in Polovtsy arose in the first half of the XIX century."[19] But this "interest" characterized not so much the subject of study as the tastes and moods of the historians themselves. Golubovsky did not oppose the prevailing preconceived opinion about the official role of Russia in relation to Western Europe, but his research made it possible for historians of the XX century to open a series of truly scientific studies, without unnecessary and obsessive bias.

The dignity of a scientific monograph is determined by the degree of completeness of reliable material on this topic and at a given level of research. One person cannot do such a task. Therefore, it is quite a legitimate continuity, in which the baton of scientific achievements is passed from generation to generation. Nowadays, the synthesis of archeology with history, after repeated attempts by various researchers, has been most fully carried out by S.A. Pletneva and G.A.Fedorov-Davydov[20].

But while the trial is in progress, speculative historiosophy in the pre-revolutionary years unfolded on a new basis, borrowing ideas that were still floating in the air of London fogs, Parisian boulevards and quiet streets of German university campuses. Our historians, showing Slavic spontaneity, sometimes caught up, and sometimes outstripped European philosophical thought, which did not always benefit the cause.

141. "AND NOVELTY BREATHES TO THE OLD"

The increased attention to the Russian-Polovtsian relations has given rise to many private concepts, more or less witty and always contradictory. Analyzing them would take us away from ethnology into the field of historiography.[21] But this gives reason to characterize NOT Slavs and Turks, but Slavists and Turkologists, which is not part of the objectives of our study. Therefore, we can limit ourselves to analyzing two concepts: political science and economics. The first was formulated by A.E. Presnyakov[22], thereby anticipating the theory of "challenge and response" by A. Toynbee[23], the second by N.A. Rozhkov[24], the continuation of whose views was the theory of "trade capital" and the struggle for trade routes by M.N. Pokrovsky[25].

This side of Pokrovsky's views is not organically connected with his other statements, although both were rejected in the course of further research.[26]

When explaining major historical phenomena, for example, the emergence or disappearance of a particular "civilization" (we call it "culture"), the question always arises "why?"  A. Toynbee rejects all natural influences, biological and geographical, and offers his original concept: "Man does not achieve civilization as a result of a higher biological gifts (heredity) or geographical environment (meaning easy living conditions), but as a response to a challenge in a situation of special difficulty that inspires him to make an unprecedented effort" (Op. cit. P. 570). Therefore, one of the chapters of his work is called "The Virtues of Misfortune."

What are these challenges? Sometimes bad natural conditions: swamps along the banks of the Nile, a tropical forest in Yucatan, the sea around Hellas, and in Russia - snow and frost. Yes, and maybe the reason for the flourishing of England is the London fog? The author is silent about this.

The second group of challenges is the attacks of foreigners, which, according to A. Toynbee, also stimulates the development of civilizations, because attacks must be repelled. Austria appears as an example, which supposedly overtook Bavaria and Saxony because the Turks attacked it in the XVII century. But, as you know, the Turks attacked Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, and Byzantium first, to which they responded with surrender. And the Turks were driven away from Vienna by Jan Sobieski's hussars, whom the Turks "did not call" at that moment. The example does not confirm the concept, but contradicts it.

This long digression is caused by the fact that A.E. Presnyakov, independently of Toynbee and even earlier than him (1907-1908), gave the same explanation for the heyday of the Kiev Principality: the threat from nomads from the southern steppes caused the creation of a "military princely-druzhin organization in Kiev... But the Kiev region paid for its service to the cause of European culture with an early strain of its forces..."[27]. Another variant of the concept of the "eternal struggle of the forest with the steppe".

In the interpretation of A.E. Presnyakov, much, if not everything, is unclear. Kiev was captured not by the Pechenegs, but by the Varangians, the Pechenegs had long been allies of Igor and Svyatoslav, whose tragic death is an episode that deserves a separate study. And then, the Pechenegs support Yaropolk and Svyatopolk against Vladimir and Yaroslav,[28] i.e. they participate in strife, no more. The attack on Kiev in 1036 was connected with a change of religion, and at that time it meant a change of political orientation.

The Torcs ask Vsevolod I for a union and a place to settle. A month after the accidental victory on the Alta River, the Polovtsy were completely defeated by Svyatoslav of Chernigov at Snovi, and 3 thousand Rus turned out to be enough against 12 thousand Cumans.  Russians initiated the war of 1093-1116, and in the XIII century the Russians went to Kalka to save the Polovtsians from the Mongols. Why would that be?

And the principle itself?! If necessity alone is enough to create a strong state, then why are they created so rarely? Why was not the same state created in the XIII century, when the need for it was even more acute? And why did the Kiev princes continually conquer not the Pechenegs and Polovtsians, but the Slavs? Yes, how cruel! Apparently, the Slavs did not need a strong power in Kiev, although Kiev was the center of trade with Europe. Furs and precious products, expensive fabrics, wines and spices were transported from Kiev and through Kiev.[29] And what got back to Kiev?

Here N.A. Rozhkov's economic concept, accepted by A.E. Presnyakov without criticism, enters into the dispute.[30] This is not a condemnation. Rozhkov, apparently, is quite right when he writes: "Foreign trade of that time was characterized by two distinctive and of paramount importance features; firstly, trade activity was the occupation exclusively of some social leaders - princes, their vigilantes and a small group of wealthy citizens; the mass of the population did not take any part in it, because they did not sell anything, and gave it away, in the form of tribute, the products of hunting and beekeeping; secondly, foreign trade was not affected... urgent... the needs of even these upper classes of the population who led it; they received everything they needed in kind, sending only excess to the foreign market and exchanging only luxury goods there"[31].

Yes, but it's like "trading" with the Indians of Canada and the Zulus of South Africa. This is a way of enslaving the country by deceiving and soldering the aborigines. This is the program of the colonialists of the era of the "initial accumulation of capital", ruinous for the peoples who became its victims. And it is shared by N.A. Rozhkov. He, like all the listed authors, claims that "in the XI century. with the fall of the Khazar kingdom and the triumph of the Polovtsians in the southern and southeastern steppes, trade with the Arabs weakens and finally stops completely, because the Polovtsians cut and destroy the previously existing path for this trade"[32]. Hence N.A. Rozhkov concludes that the Polovtsy represented the greatest danger to the ancient Russian state.[33]

Rozhkov should have inquired about the affairs of the caliphate, which in the X-XI centuries was divided by the Karmats, Dalemites and Seljuks. The war was going on there incessantly. There was no one to trade with and nothing to trade! It should be known that merchants in the Steppe, from China to Germany, enjoyed immunity, for which they paid duties.

But the main thing is not that, but why did the Russians have a scarce trade? This is not "forest and steppe", but worship of Mammon. Since the beginning of the XX century, the worship of scarce trade among a number of historians turns into an obsession inherited by some Soviet historians from the past era of historiography of the problem. P.I. Lyashchenko saw in the nomads of the "wild steppes of the south" the reason for the slow historical development of the Eastern Slavs.[34] How to understand this? Did the Eastern Slavs really need to give their furs to merchants and moneylenders for free, in the form of tribute?! S.V. Yushkov laments the defeat of the Khazar khaganate - the state of predatory slavers and speculators - as a "negative" phenomenon in the economic development of Russia.[35] P.P. Tolochko points out that the defense and "protection of trade routes was led by the Kievan princes and was conducted in the interests of all Russia"[36]. And why was Kiev plundered - first by the Suzdalians in 1169, and then by the Chernihiv people in 1203?

Even V.V. Kargalov, who was very unfriendly to the small peoples of our Motherland, writes that in the XII century. "a rare strife did without one or another prince inviting the filthy to his aid"[37]. Russians and Polovtsians, therefore, already formed a single ethno-social system, with the number of Russians reaching 5.5 million, and Polovtsians - several hundred thousand[38]. And, of course, the trade relations of Russia with the East in the XII century were suspended: oriental beads disappeared from the inventory of ancient burials [39]. It's a pity, of course, but Russian furs have stopped coming to the East. And foreign merchants lost most of their income. But on the other hand, the tax pressure on the population has decreased: it was easy for Slavic men to feed the prince and his retinue, but it is probably not possible to saturate the world market. Therefore, in the XII century in Russia there were people who sympathized with the Polovtsians, and there were those who hated them.

But if you think about it, then this point of view is not so original. It was shown above that the Chernigov and Seversk princes learned to find a common language with the Polovtsians. Vladimir Monomakh spoke to the Polovtsy from a position of strength. Russians, on the one hand, suppressed their independence and included the Western nomads in the Russian land, on the other hand, he concluded "19 worlds" with the Polovtsians, i.e. used them as allies against other Russian princes. Both positions excluded injustice against the Polovtsians. The princes knew how to negotiate with them, and even, perhaps, better than among themselves. To Monomakh's contemporaries, the interpretation of the events of the XII century by historians of the XIX-XX centuries would seem unrealistic.

But, as mentioned above, there was a third program, however, only in Kiev, at the court of Grand Duke Svyatopolk Izyaslavich. It was conducted by the "young companions of Svyatopolk II. The name does not indicate their true age; it is simply the name of a party that relied on merchant capital and had a Polish-German orientation. It was this party that pushed the Grand Duke to war, because the prisoners were sold into slavery to merchants who took them to Regensburg and Venice for further resale to Egypt. The Greeks were competitors of these merchants, and therefore the metropolis was in opposition to Svyatopolk II, and the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, a rival of the metropolis, supported Svyatopolk. Nestor also worked in the Lavra - the chronicler's orientation is obvious.[40]

So, Cumanophobia of the XII century was a program of foreign merchants and their hangers-on in Kiev. It was beneficial to them, and their position is understandable. Historians of the XVIII-XIX centuries have not yet had time to study the history of the Great Steppe and fantasized about it. But for the science of the XX century, these fantasies are inappropriate. The views of this particular party are repeated by the listed authors.

It cannot be said that the Russian science of the pre-revolutionary period was backward, but it was not advanced either. The law school has closed with the economic one in the most acute issue of the history of Ancient Russia - the problem of eastern neighbors. And the conclusion of both schools was the same: "Beat the savages!" As it coincides with the well-known solution of the American Indian problem: "A good Indian is a dead Indian!" And how disgusting this decision is now! Americans themselves are ashamed of the fact that their ancestors gave out bonuses for the scalp of an Indian, as for the tail of a wolf. Fortunately, we have no reason to be ashamed of the past. Our ancestors were friends with the Polovtsian Khans, married the "red girls of the Polovtsians", accepted the baptized Polovtsians into their midst, and the descendants of the latter became Zaporozhye and Sloboda Cossacks, replacing the traditional Slavic suffix belonging to "ov" (Ivanov) with the Turkic - "y" (Ivanenko).

Ethnoses arise and disappear in historical time; therefore, in order to understand the geographical problem of ethnogenesis, it is necessary to study historical science - the history of events in their connection and sequence. The history is not of texts, not of institutions, not of cultural influences, but of deeds, and only then can you get reliable material that would not shock a reader who knows how to understand what he has read and critically perceive it.

142. LET'S LISTEN TO THE OTHER SIDE AS WELL

It is impossible to reproach the historians listed above that they were inattentive to chronicle information, to acts, glosses and ancient Russian literature. No, they knew all this perfectly well, and their research does not lose its value... under one indispensable condition: we must remember that the chroniclers themselves were people of their time and fixed their attention on extraordinary events, devoted bright pages to them. But it would be a mistake not to notice the general background, which was so obvious to the chroniclers and their readers that they did not pay attention to it.

That is why the closest, detailed study of the chronicle information can only give a distorted picture of events. However, the involvement of broad material from the history of the surrounding countries allowed A.Y. Yakubovsky to be critical of the banal understanding of the history of Russia and the Polovtsian steppe as an eternal life-and-death war. Back in 1932 he wrote: "Historiography, filled with stories of military clashes with the Cumans, failed to notice the fact that for relations between the Russian principalities and the Polovtsian steppe, not wars and raids, but intensive commodity exchange are more characteristic and normal"[41].

Other researchers, whose competence does not cause the slightest doubt, have expressed themselves with even greater confidence about this.

"The idea of the eternal principled struggle of Russia with the steppe is clearly artificial, far-fetched origin," writes V.A. Parkhomenko[42]. V.A. Gordlevsky is even more categorical: "... the official, church-inspired idea of the people living not in cities where the Christian faith has been established, but in the steppe, is coming... from the West... through Catholic missionaries; cultural ties between Kiev and the West brought the view of the Polovtsians as the "bath of God" - the scourge of God"[43]. V.A. Gordlevsky points out that as mutual habituation was changing political relations between the Polovtsians and Russians; in the XII century. they are becoming closer and more friendly, "growing into everyday life," especially through mixed marriages in all strata of society.[44]  So, we have two mutually exclusive concepts, solidly argued on both sides, as a result of which the problem remains open. Let's try to solve it by the "panoramic" method, since we have done the analysis of the chronicle texts in a special work [45], thanks to which reliable information is separated, on which broad conclusions can be based.

Cumanophobia is based on unconditional trust in the assessments of the author of the "Words about Igor's Regiment". However, although the genius and antiquity of the poem are beyond doubt, critical perception of it, like any source, is mandatory. Assessments are often based on the author's personal sympathies, his connections, tastes and goals, which are unknown to us, descendants. The reliability of the information can be established only by the ratio of the judgment of the ancient author with indisputably established facts. It is enough to make such a comparison to make sure that the author of the "Words about Igor's Regiment" was biased [46].

But the second concept corresponds to the undoubted facts. From the X to the XIII century. trade routes from Kiev to the Black and Azov Seas functioned unperturbed and Russian cities stood in the middle of the steppe: Belaya Vezha on the Don and Belgorod in the lower reaches of the Dniester, which would have been impossible with constant military clashes that took place inside Russia itself (princely feuds).

As for the political unity of the steppe peoples, supposedly able to resist the Kievan power in the X-XII centuries, this is a myth. Constant clashes over pastures were aggravated by the institution of blood feud, which left no room for reconciliation, much less unification. The steppe khan could rather negotiate with a Russian prince who believed that "one does not judge for prowess in battle" than with another steppe man completely bound by ancestral traditions. That is why Hungarians, Bulgarians and Alans left their native steppe, giving way to the Asian Pechenegs and Torks, who were pressed by the Cumans in the Siberian and Aral steppes at a time when the mighty Kiev Kaganate was growing strong in the Russian land. So, is it possible to think that this sovereign state could be threatened by disparate groups of fugitives, especially since the nomads did not know how to take fortresses? And raids and counter-raids are a small war characteristic of the Middle Ages.

When Vladimir Monomakh brought order to Russia and in 1111-1116 moved the war to the steppe, the Polovtsy were defeated, split into several tribal unions and found use as allies of those princes who hired them for a fee. Independent, or "wild", Polovtsy remained behind the Don and became allies of the Suzdal princes.

Indeed, if the Polovtsians had not capitulated modernly, but continued the war against Russia, they would have been completely destroyed. Carts drawn by oxen move across the steppe at a speed of 4 km per hour, and over rough terrain even slower. But the Russian cavalry could trot 15 km at a trot (and at a fast pace) - 8-10 km. Russian nomads were virtually defenseless against Russian attacks, especially since the light Polovtsian cavalry could not withstand the onslaught of heavily armed Russians, and maneuverability did not matter when defending wives and children on carts. Finally, the Polovtsian winter quarters were neither mobile nor fortified, whereas the Russian fortresses reliably protected their inhabitants, and the forest is always a convenient shelter for fugitives. The Polovtsian Khans would be unreasonable if they did not take into account all these circumstances. But they were smart and preferred alliances with the princes of Chernigov, Galicia and Suzdal against the Kievan ones, since they relied on Torcs hostile to the Polovtsians. That is why the Kiev chronicle is so unfavorable to the Polovtsians. It must be assumed that Chernihiv chroniclers wrote the same thing about torcs and "black hoods", but their writings, unfortunately, have not been preserved.

The steppe inhabited by the Polovtsians is cut by wide river valleys, where the local population has remained, which did not obey the newcomers and did not merge with them. These were the descendants of the Christian Khazars - the Brodniks. Their presence deprived the Polovtsians of a reliable rear and made their position extremely unstable. And the very orders that the Polovtsians brought with them from Siberia did not correspond to the situation in which they found themselves in Europe.

The decisive role in the weakening of the Cumans was played on the one hand by their too wide spread - from the Altai to the Carpathians, and on the other by the widely practiced emigration, for example to Georgia, where at the invitation of David IV in 1118. Khan Atrak left with 45 thousand soldiers. Cumans appeared no less frequently in Bulgaria, Hungary and Byzantium, and many of them were sold in the slave markets of Iran and Egypt, where they were turned into gulyams - guards-slaves of Muslim sultans. The passionate, indomitable Turks at home had no chance of success, because talent is the main enemy for militant mediocrity. The steppe inhabitant does not differ psychologically from the village or urban. Therefore, it is not surprising that among the nomads there were people who preferred to be sold into slavery to a boring and unpromising life in their homeland. Here is an example, one of many.

In the XII century. the Polovtsians sold slaves in batches of 20 heads and gave another one to the buyer of the batch for free, as a prize. Around 1137, a merchant who was buying goods was offered as a bonus a boy, skinny and plain, named Ildegiz. The merchant refused and let the child go free, but the boy asked the merchant to take him as a slave. The kind merchant fulfilled the boy's request and put him on a cart, as he was traveling from the Don steppes to Iran. We drove for a long time, from source to source. Ildegiz got tired, fell asleep at one of the crossings and fell sleepy from the cart. They picked him up, but when he fell for the second time, the merchant told them not to stop and go to the rest stop.

We reached the spring, made a halt, lit a fire and began to cook food for ourselves and for the slaves. And then Ildegiz appeared out of the darkness. The merchant was surprised, laughed and ordered to feed the boy. So, the boy came to Azerbaijan. The merchant profitably sold the muscular, broad-shouldered Polovtsians to the vizier of this country, Sijirumi, but he refused to buy Ildegiz. Ildegiz prayed and said, "Oh, good sir, buy me, I'll be useful." "Are you asking for it yourself? "Well, then I'm buying." And for pennies he bought a slave he didn't need.

Ildegiz got into the kitchen at first and began to cook pilaf so well that when Sultan Masud ibn Muhammad came to visit his vizier and tasted Polovtsian pilaf, he asked to sell him a cook who cooks food so well, and enlisted him as a warrior on general grounds.

Once at the sultan's court, Ildegiz found a way to gain the favor of the sultan's mother and, thanks to her, was appointed to the army, already as a sipahsalar. He managed to defeat the army of Georgia, after which he became the ruler of Arran, a significant part of Azerbaijan, and an important nobleman - atabek, i.e. the guardian and educator of the sultan's son. Since 1161 Ildegiz and his descendants ruled Northwestern Iran, skillfully and sometimes successfully conducting palace politics, intrigues and foreign wars. They were deposed only in 1225 by the Khorezm Shah Jalal ad-Din, who relied on the enemies of the Cumans - Kangls.

The conclusion suggests itself: the "Muslim" civilization has been pulling free energy from the homeostatic Steppe for 300 years and extinguishing it inside itself. The process was spontaneous, uncontrollable and not obvious to contemporaries of the aberration of intimacy. However, he weakened both superethnoses and made them a victim of the Mongols, who were in the ascent phase in the XIII century.

And the Polovtsy themselves? An ethnic group that has passed through all phases of development and has not lost its original integrity, "has not crumbled completely", finds itself in a state of homeostasis, unstable equilibrium with the surrounding landscape, disturbed by collisions with neighbors, the effects of climate fluctuations or natural disasters. But if such influences do not lead to the death of an ethnic group, then it restores its inherent character of life and fights all attempts to change it. In stable conditions, you can pull this for a long time, but with the appearance of predatory neighbors, such an ethnic group is doomed. So, it happened with the Polovtsians.

143. JUSTIFICATION

There is hardly any doubt that Russia was stronger than the Polovtsian unions, but it refrained from unnecessary conquest. Everything went by itself.

In the conditions of almost annually concluded worlds and marriage contracts, many Polovtsians began already in the XII century to convert (often in whole families) to Christianity. Russian prince V.T. Pashuto calculated that, despite the discord of the Russian princes, the Polovtsian raids touched only 1/15 of the territory of Russia[47], while Russian campaigns reached the Don and the Danube, bringing the Polovtsian camps to submission.

The process of ethnic aging took place among the Cumans steadily, but slowly. This leaves an opportunity to find their place in the alignment of political forces. The enemies of the Cumans - the Pechenegs in the XI century willingly accepted Islam and were friends with the Seljuks. This means that the Cumans found themselves in a conflict with the Muslim world, and thus were forced to seek an alliance with Byzantium and Russia. Until the middle of the XIII century, the Polovtsy served as a barrier against the onslaught of the Seljuks from the east and, moreover, were on the side of Russia in clashes with the Hungarians and Poles (everything changed only in the XIV century).

Russian-Polovtsian clashes according to the Laurentian Chronicle, it turns out that for 180 years (1055-1236), the Polovtsians attacked Russia 12 times, the Russians attacked the Polovtsians 12 times, and there were 30 joint Russian-Polovtsian operations in internecine wars.

But if we consider the period after the campaigns of Monomakh, who conquered the steppes from the Don to the Carpathians, the nature of the clashes will change significantly, and it is appropriate to analyze and trace the examples cited as proof of the "cruel enmity" between "their filthy" and Russian princes [48].

In 1120 "Yaroslav went to the Don for the Polovtsi, and not finding them, returned" (stb. 292). So, is it possible to walk 1000 km on enemy land without colliding with the enemy?

In 1125 "The Battle with the Polovtsians of Yaropolk" (stb. 285-296) is actually a raid of the Polovtsians "on the Torki of the curse", the blood enemies of the Polovtsians, whom Yaropolk Vladimirovich helped.

In 1152. "At the same time, God will help Mstislav Izyaslavich on the polovtsy: the sameh will be driven away, and their floodplain, and their horses and their cattle, and many souls of Christians will be filled" (stb. 339). This "at the same time" happened during Yuri Dolgoruky's campaign against Izyaslav, when in 1149 Yuri called for the help of the Polovtsians (stb. 331, 323-324, 328). In 1152, Izyaslav's son Mstislav struck at his opponent's allies, i.e. there is the usual participation of the Polovtsians in the civil strife (stb. 330-335).

In 1153 "The ambassador Izyaslav his son Mstislav on polovtsi to Pesl, zane dirty then in Court, he did not reach them and turned back" (stb. 340).

In 1154. "Toe of spring came polovtsi voevasha on Rosi" (stb. 345). In fact, Gleb Yurievich brought them, "vborze" defeated the Volyn princes (stb. 342-343), but the Berendei defeated the Polovtsians, who quarreled with Yuri Dolgoruky and left for the steppe.

In 1169 "The march of the Polovtsians to Kiev and Pereyaslavl" (stb, 357-361). There was no hike! 3 thousand Polovtsians came to conclude an agreement with Gleb Yurievich, but some of them plundered along the way and were defeated by 1,500 Berendei. Let's take into account that the average armies of that time were up to 50 thousand, which means that this time the Polovtsians were 6% of the normal army.

In 1171. "The toe of the winter came polovtsi to the Kiev side and took a lot of villages" (stb. 362). During the withdrawal of the Polovtsians, Torki and Berendei were cut down and 400 people were freed (stb. 363).

Historians correctly note the cruelty of the Polovtsians as an active force in civil strife. I won't justify them, but were the Russian vigilantes kinder? And does this have to do with political conflicts when the Russian princes used not only the Polovtsians, but also the Torks, Livs, Yatvyags as mercenary troops? One must think that the princes were not interested in the question of their kindness. After all, in 1216 in the Rostov-Suzdal land, without the participation of the Polovtsians, "sons went to the father, fathers to children, brother to brother, slaves to master, and master to slaves" [49]. Russians killed 9233 soldiers on the shores of Lipitsa in one day on April 21. Obscuration is a cruel phase. This is an ethnic old age, and nothing ages like age.

144. THE VERDICT IN THE POLOVTSY CASE

Let's try to find the reason for the passing scientific error. Apparently, the situation familiar to the inhabitants of Moscow Russia, which lasted from the XIV to the end of the XVIII century, i.e. before the conquest of the Crimea, was extrapolated to antiquity, in the IX-XIII centuries. The three-hundred-year war on the southeastern border of Russia obscured phenomena of a completely different nature, because the Crimea and the Nogai hordes could hold on for so long only because the mighty Ottoman Empire stood behind them. But the Polovtsians and Torks did not have such a hand.

Even in the gymnasium textbooks that formed the thinking of future historians, the invented term "steppe nomads" appeared, although in fact the ethnic groups that inhabited the Great Steppe differed from each other in the way of economy, in everyday life, in religion, and in historical destinies. It was enough not to take this into account so that the correct conclusion became unattainable.

And the sluggish Ancient Russia of the XII-XIII centuries bore little resemblance to Moscow, energetic, hardworking, swelling with a new passion. We, the people of the XX century, are familiar with the rhythms of the akmatic phase - youth and maturity of the ethnos. Therefore, it is difficult for us to imagine that our ancestors, who gave us a place in life, "lived to a very old age," which also has its own charm, but not the one we are waiting for.

The discreteness of ethnic processes is difficult to imagine for people brought up on evolutionism, but it was also difficult for those to overcome medieval ideas about history as a simple change of rulers. However, if we overcome the innate inertia of thinking, we will be able to get rid of many perplexities, avoid many tensions and get closer from answering the questions "what?" and "how?" to answer the questions "why?" and "what's what?" both in Russia and in the Polovtsian steppe.

All the authors mentioned above and those omitted, considered the problem from one side - Russian, i.e. biased. And if a miraculously surviving Polovtsian historian had written the same thing and in the same way? Everything would have turned out the other way around and just as incomplete! For example, V.V. Kargalov lists the operations of the Suzdal and Chernigov princes, in which the Polovtsy participated,[50] and concludes that the Polovtsy are bad people. And M.S. Grushevsky writes about the disastrous campaigns of the Suzdalians and Smolyans to Kiev,[51] and condemns the "katsaps". What is it: two equivalent sycophants or Science?

But you can do without profanation of the problem. B.D. Grekov proposed to abandon the traditional simplified view of nomads as a purely "external force" in relation to Russia.[52] The power of Russia in comparison with the scattered hordes was undoubted, and therefore they acted as mercenaries, then federates, gradually Russifying and being drawn into the common life of the Kievan state [53].

S.A. Pletneva made a great contribution to solving the problem by introducing the periodization of Polovtsian history.[54] Indeed, if someone wanted to compare Russia's relations with France and wrote that they had always been friends, they would hardly approve of him. The relations of states are changing, and the patterns of change are not simple. Coarsening gives not only a scientific error, but also a reason for chauvinism and racism, which is completely stupid and bad. Therefore, we will try to propose a solution that excludes violations of the scientific historiographical methodology.

The transition of three passionate groups that stood out from the three steppe peoples: Kanglov (Pechenegs), Guzs (Torks) and Cumans (Cumans), when confronted with the Kiev kaganate, created a situation of ethnic contact. But since both the steppe people and the Slavs had their own ecological niches, the chimera did not arise, but a symbiosis was created, which gave rise to another zigzag of history. Mixing at the border was going on, but as a mestization, i.e. a process that takes place not at the population, but at the organizational level. Children from mixed marriages were part of the ethnic group in which they were brought up. At the same time, racial conflicts were excluded, and confessional conflicts were resolved painlessly thanks to the then existing dual faith.

The merging of peoples, i.e. the integration of ethnic groups, was not necessary for anyone, since the Rus did not want to live in the watershed steppes, without a river and forest, and it would be too difficult for the Polovtsy to graze cattle in the forest. But the Polovtsy needed carts, ax handles, and dishes, and it was convenient for Russians to get meat and cottage cheese at cheap prices. The exchange trade, which did not give profit, connected the steppe dwellers and Slavs of the forest-steppe zone into an economic and geographical system, which led to the formation of military and political alliances characteristic of the left-bank principalities and Ryazan. The zigzag of the historical process gradually straightened out by the XIII century.

The ethnic age, or the phase of ethnogenesis, of the Rus and Polovtsians was different. In Russia, the same age as Byzantium and the Polabian Slavs, aging was going on, and the ancient people of the Kipchaks, the same age as the Scythians, had homeostasis. Which is better or, more precisely, which is worse? To answer this question, let's return to Rus.

145. AT THE END OF ETHNOGENESIS

On the eve of Batu's campaign, the "semi-states" that made up Ancient Russia were crowded (about 6 million in total) and rich, especially Novgorod. The population consisted of healthy, courageous people. These people were capable of perceiving Byzantine culture: painting, music and ethics. Unlike Western Europe, there were many literate people in Russia, since religious books in an understandable Slavic language were available to readers; and in the West, knowledge of Latin was required for the same purposes. And yet the people of the West in the XIII century went on crusades, sought charters from kings that provided citizens with rights and feudal lords with irremovability, argued in universities about the essence of ideas: are they real or just names? States expanded their borders, i.e. local processes of ethnic integration were underway, and despite the incessant wars, the integrity of the superethnos was obvious to everyone, regardless of who could lead it: the emperor or the pope. And the Russians, as we have already seen, spent their strength on strife, weakening their own military power. Catholic Europe in the XIII century was terrible for Orthodox Russia, and Russia was unable to respond to the blows inflicted on it since the pope announced a crusade against the schismatics - the Greeks and Russians. The 13th century French diplomat Wilhelm Rubruk wrote that "the brothers of the Teutonic Order... would have easily conquered Russia if they had taken up this"[55]. (But, as we know, this did not happen.)

Rubruk uttered this maxim in 1253, 13 years after the fall of Kiev, but it must be assumed that his assessment of the alignment of forces reflected the situation of the previous era - from the Batu campaign to the death of Guyuk in 1248. The Mongol raid and in the XIII century, and later made a strong impression on all historians who considered the "invasion of the Tatar hordes" so devastating that the country subjected to it could not recover.

It was easy to prove it, even too easy. At the most generalized level of the study, the sudden emergence of a huge power that existed for 240 years was stated. Hence the declaration followed: the evil Mongols killed everyone and triumphed on the corpses.

At the "small-scale" level - the selection of quotations from primary sources - a similar conclusion is obtained, since you can pick up any quotes, and omit the contradictory ones. In this way, you can "prove" everything that the historian or his client wants, and the orders were different, from praise to vilification, with many gradations.

The scientific method should be recognized as the "middle way" - the application of a systematic approach to history. In systemology, it is not individual facts-elements and not biased assessments that are considered, but connections between events that are invisible to the eyewitness and unknown to the late interpreter. But they are visible to a broad-profile historian who generalizes not quotes, but facts detached from the emotions of informants and interpreters. Of course, in this case, the researcher "steps on the throat of his own song," but this must be done to obtain a reliable result, and for the sake of historical justice.

NOTES:

[1] See: Begunov Yu.K. Monuments of Russian literature of the XH v. S.100. and so on.

[2] See: The word about Igor's regiment. M.; L.; 1950. p. 394. This is not quite true. In the "Tale of Bygone Years" under 1093, an unknown country (in the sense of "foreign land") is really an emotional turn. And in the texts of the XIII century. the same word sounds like a geographical term.

[3] See: Gael A.G., Gumilev L.N. Soils of different ages on the steppe sands of the Don and the movement of peoples over the historical period//Izv. AN USSR. Ser. geogr. 1966. No. 1.

[4] See: Shennikov A.A. Agricultural incomplete settlement and the "theory of vagrancy" // Ethnography of the peoples of the USSR. L., 1971. pp. 88-89.

[5] See: Gribanov L.N. Change of the southern border of the pine area in Kazakhstan/ /Bulletin of Agricultural Science (Alma-Ata). 1965. No. 6. pp. 78-86.

[6] Rybakov B.A. "The Word about Igor's regiment" and his contemporaries. M., 1971. p.8.

[7] See: Belyavsky V.A. About the "eternal antagonism" between the agricultural and nomadic population of Eastern Europe//Slavo-Russian ethnography. L., 1973. pp. 101-108.

[8] Tatishchev V.I. Russian History...Book 1.pp.271-274.

[9] Karamzin N.M. History of the Russian State. St. Petersburg, 1892. Vol. 1. p. 159; Vol. 2. p.46-47.

[10] Ustryalov I. G. Russian History. St. Petersburg., 1837. Ch. I. S. 143-144.

[11] Soloviev S.M. History of Russia...Book 1. p.57.

[12] Ibid. p.647; Klyuchevsky V.O. Course of Russian History: Op. in 9 vol. t.1. Part 1. M., 1987. pp.68-84.

[13] Klyuchevsky V.O. Decree. op. Vol. 1. Part 1.

[14] Kostomarov N.I. Historical monographs and research. St. Petersburg, 1903. p. 112.

[15] Ibid. p. 112, 116, 133, 158.

[16] See: Mavrodina R.M. Kievan Rus and Nomads. L., 1983. pp.19-20.

[17] Golubovsky P.V. Pechenegs, Torks, Polovtsy before the invasion of the Tatars. Kiev, 1884.

[18] See: Mavrodina R.M. Decree. op. p.23-24.

[19] Pletneva S.A. Polovtsian land//Ancient Russian principalities of the X-XIII centuries. p. 260.

[20] See: Pletneva S.A. Pechenegs, Torks, Polovtsy in the South Russian steppes//Materials and research on the archeology of the USSR. 1958. No. 62; Fedorov-Davydov G.A. Nomads of Eastern Europe under the rule of the Golden Horde Khans. M., 1966.

[21] The abundance of research on Russian-Polovtsian contacts had two consequences. On the one hand, a wealth of factual material was accumulated, on the other - individual constructions, intersecting, inevitably became eclectic (see: Mavrodina P.M. Decree.soc.25-39).

[22] See: Presnyakov A. K. Lectures on Russian History. Vol. 1. M., 1938; Vol. 2. MD 1939.

[23] Toynbee A. T. A Study of History. Abridgement of volumes I-VI by D.C. Somervell. N.Y.; Toronto, 1946. P. 570. Criticism of the theory of "challenge and response" see: Gumilev L.N. On the anthropogenic factor of landscape formation ("Landscape and ethnos", VII)//Bulletin of LSU. 1967. No. 24. pp. 104-105.

Russian History in comparative historical coverage (fundamentals of social dynamics), 4th ed. L., M., 1930. Vol. 1. [25] See: Pokrovsky M.N. Russian History in the most concise essay. M., 1933.

[26] See: Grekov B. D. Kievan Rus and the problem of the origin of Russian feudalism in M.N. Pokrovsky//Against the historical concept of M.N. Pokrovsky. M.; L., 1939.4.1.P. 112.

[27] Presnyakov A.E. Decree. op. P. 143.

[28] Ibid., p. 145.

[29] Ibid., p. 146.

[30] Ibid., p. 65.

[31] Rozhkov N.A. Review of Russian History from a sociological point of view. Ch. I. Kievan Rus. 2nd ed. M., 1905. pp. 24-25.

[32] He is the same. Russian History in comparative historical coverage (Fundamentals of social dynamics). Vol. 1. p. 152.

[33] Ibid., vol. 2. pp. 5-6.

[34] See: Lyashchenko P.I. History of the Russian National Economy. M.; L., 1927. pp. 25, 60.

[35] See: Yushkov S.V. Feudal relations and Kievan Rus//Scientific note. Saratov, State University. Vol. 2. Issue 4. 1924. pp. 9-10.

[36] Tolochko P.P. Kiev land//Ancient Russian principalities of the X-XII centuries. s.b.

[37] Kargalov V. V. Foreign policy factors of the development of feudal Russia. p. 49.

[38] See: Popov A.I. Kipchaks and Rus//Uchen. zap. LSU. Series of Historical Sciences Vol. 14. 1949. p. 98.

[39] See: Kargalov V.V. Decree.op.C.58.

[40] See: Gumilev L.N.//Russian Literature. 1974. No. 3. pp.171-172.

[41] Yakubovsky A. Yu. Feudal society of Central Asia and its trade with Eastern Europe in the X-XV century.//Materials on the history of the Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen SSR. Issue 3. Part 1. L., 1932. p. 24.

[42] Parkhomenko V. Traces of the Polovtsian epic in the annals//Problems of source studies: Sat. 3. M.; L., 1940. p. 39.

[43] Gordlevsky V.A. What is a "barefoot wolf"?//Selected works. Vol.II .M., 1961. P. 487.

[44] Ibid. P. 487. Sr.: Krzybekov D. Nomadic society: genesis, development, decline. Alma-Ata, 1984. p. 38.

[45] See: Gumilev L.N. Do humanitarians need geography?//Slavo-Russian ethnography. L., 1973. pp. 92-100.

[46] See: Gumilev L.N. Can a work of fine literature be a historical source?//Russian literature. 1972. No. 1. pp. 73-82.

[47] See: Pashuto V.T. Foreign Policy ... p. 213; and also: Kononov A.N. History of the study of Turkic languages in Russia. M., 1982. pp. 19-23.

[48] Si.: Dmitriev L. A. To the disputes about the dating of "The Words about Igor's Regiment" (about the article by L.N. Gumilev)// Russian Literature. 1972. No. 1. pp. 83-84.

[49] Solovyov S.M. History of Russia. Book 1. Vol.II. P.592. Note 411. P.710.

[50] See: Kargalov V.V.Decree. op.p.49- 54.

[51] See: Grushevsky M. S. Kievan Rus. SPb., 1911.

[52] See: Grekov B.D. Kievan Rus and the problem of the origin of Russian feudalism in M.N. Pokrovsky...

[53] See: Grekov B.D. Kievan Rus. pp.462-466.

[54] See: Pletneva S.A. Polovtsian land ... pp. 260-300.

[55] Travels to Eastern countries... p. 108

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