2. BACKGROUND ON UKRAINE, Yanukovych 2002 – 2014
Ukraine crisis erupted with little warning & caught virtually everyone off guard on both sides of the Atlantic—Kyiv, Brussels, Washington, and Moscow. Seeds of the crisis had been planted for decades.
Here is an overview of the main stages of the crisis as it unfolded—from President Viktor Yanukovych's sudden withdrawal from negotiations with the European Union about an Association Agreement (AA), in November 2013, until September 2014, when the ceasefire agreed to by Moscow and Kyiv marked the end of the summer military campaign. We can also look beyond the crisis to examine the key factors, both internal and external to Ukraine, that built up over a period of well over a decade and culminated in the fall of Yanukovych in February 2014. This is Chapter 2 in Conflict in Ukraine, 2015, Menon and Rumer.
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(Total 9,300 words, 5,500 words in shortened version, dropdown works only on-line, not in the email.) Please follow the footnotes appended to the bottom; footnotes are an additional 1,700 words
The Domestic Setting
The three years of Viktor Yanukovych's presidency from 2010 to 2013 had been quite uneventful. The relative calm of those years stood in stark contrast to the political turbulence of the 2004–2005 Orange Revolution, when hundreds of thousands of ordinary Ukrainians took to the streets to protest the compromised presidential election. These protests propelled to power a team of reform-minded politicians who promised to restore democratic governance, clean up corruption, and forge close ties with the West. However, quickly mired in internecine squabbles and allegations of corruption, they also were unable to deliver on their promises, and the five-year presidency of their leader Viktor Yushchenko proved a disappointment to the populace.1 Ukrainians’ disappointment with the reformers was so deep that in a 2010 presidential election generally considered free and fair, they chose Viktor Yanukovych, the loser of the 2005 presidential contest.2
Tired of Politics
Ukrainians seemed to have lost their revolutionary spirit and opted for promises of stability and managerial competence over change.3 The country was sliding into political apathy. A late 2011 poll conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) showed little appetite on the part of the Ukrainian public for the kind of revolutionary activities that swept many parts of the country in 2004 and would re-appear in 2013. Fifty-five percent of those polled disapproved of protests without appropriate government permits, nearly 70 percent opposed blocking major roads, and 74 percent were against occupying buildings. Of the issues most worrisome to Ukrainians personally, the top three were high cost of living, unemployment, and social welfare.4
A strong sense of apathy and disillusionment with the country's political system and mistrust of political parties were also visible in the section of the poll dealing with political issues. By far the greatest number of respondents—41 percent—said that they would vote for a political party only if a “new political power” appeared on the scene. The second greatest number—27 percent—answered that nothing could make them vote for any political party. Sixty-three percent expected that the 2012 parliamentary election would not be free and fair.
Apathy and disillusionment with politics and politicians also manifested themselves in the Ukrainian public's reaction to the imprisonment and trial of Yanukovych's main rival in the 2010 presidential election, and the leader of the Orange Revolution, Yulia Tymoshenko. The trial of Tymoshenko, the face of the Orange Revolution who had mobilized and sustained the protest energy of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, triggered no mass protests, and only a few thousand supporters came to the courthouse to object to her trial and verdict.5 Ukrainians were tired of politics.
Their disillusionment with the political process manifested itself again in the fall of 2012, when Ukraine elected a new parliament. The election, as expected by the majority of Ukrainians, was severely compromised and heavily criticized by the international community as well as by the leaders of the opposition parties in Ukraine.6 Despite the relatively high turnout—58 percent—and the widely reported violations of the electoral laws, the election that gave a plurality of seats in the parliament to Yanukovych's Party of Regions (PoR) triggered only minor protests led by opposition politicians who claimed to have been defrauded by the government.7 The Orange revolution had receded into the past.
Yanukovych Gathers Strength
Against this backdrop of political apathy and disillusionment, Yanukovych and his circle of associates, especially his family members, accumulated both political power and wealth.8 Later, the family's wealth was on public display following Yanukovych's sudden flight from Ukraine in February 2014, although rumors about his son Oleksandr's rapidly growing fortune had circulated well before that.
Looking toward his reelection campaign in 2015, Yanukovich pushed to ensure that his own clan or friendly interests controlled major media outlets. Since 95 percent of the population of Ukraine depends on television for political information, control of this medium was essential.9 The president's associates and allies took over some television channels and pressured prominent Ukrainian businessmen who owned other channels and depended on the government's good will to keep their businesses.10 In February 2013, Inter Media Group, including the country's most popular television channel, was sold to Dmyrto Firtash, a powerful billionaire gas trader with ties to the president. Inter's previous owner Valeriy Khoroshkovskiy reportedly had had a falling out with Yanukovych and his Prime Minister Mykola Azarov.11 In June 2013, one of Ukraine's largest media conglomerates was sold to a little-known businessman reported to be acting as a front for the Yanukovych clan.12
Yanukovych also succeeded in placing his loyalists in key government posts to ensure his control of law enforcement, courts, the security apparatus, and financial flows. To the post of prosecutor general, he appointed Viktor Pshonka, who, after the overthrow of the Yanukovych government, gained notoriety for his lavish lifestyle. Other posts—head of the Security Service (SBU), Interior Ministry, and Constitutional Court— went to loyal Yanukovych supporters as well. A Yanukovych family insider Serhiy Arbuzov was appointed head of the Central Bank and, later, as first deputy prime minister.
Yanukovych also took full advantage of Ukraine's crony capitalist system. Yanukovych's relationship with the country's wealthiest oligarch, Rinat Akhmetov, reportedly predated his presidency. The two had roots in Donetsk, where Yanukovych had served as governor from 1997 to 2002 and Akhmetov began his business career.13 Other oligarchs reported to have joined the president's camp and the government at one time or another include billionaire gas trader Dmytro Firtash, banker and Deputy Prime Minister Serhiy Tihipko, as well as other lesser-known figures. Even Ukraine's next president, Petro Poroshenko served in Yanukovich's government.14
Yanukovych's relationship with Ukrainian oligarchs was hampered by the predatory nature of his own clan, whose members aggressively sought to expand their own political power and business interests at the expense of all others.15,16 This ruthless pursuit of power and money fueled frictions within the country's business and political elite and eventually contributed to Yanukovych's downfall.17
However, until the very end of Yanukovych's presidency few oligarchs dared to challenge the president openly, and those who did, paid a price for it. Some—including the current governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region, Ihor Kolomoyskyi— resisted the pressure from the president's clan, while others, including former SBU chief and Inter TV owner Valeriy Khoroshkovskiy, had to sell their media assets and flee Ukraine, reportedly fearing for their safety.18
Signs of Trouble to Come
With the public docile, the government and the media under his control, the financial resources at his disposal, Tymoshenko in prison, the opposition suffering from the legacy of the failed Orange Revolution and factional infighting, and the oligarchs cowed, Yanukovych looked unassailable. But looks were deceiving: the superficial calm of his secure position at the top of the power pyramid concealed signs of underlying weakness.
Public opinion data from the period of Yanukovych's presidency leave no doubt that, although apathetic, the people of Ukraine had few illusions about the nature of their president and the revolving door between his government and the business and political elite. Thanks in large part to Ukraine's relatively free—or free-for-all—media environment, which became an arena for competition between business groups with competing interests, the virtually unlimited sway that the moneyed interests held over Ukrainian politics and economy was clear enough. The majority of the public—71 percent—thought that the country was moving in the wrong direction, and only 13 percent said that it was moving in the right direction. “Corruption within the state bodies” was among the three most important problems in Ukraine, second only to unemployment.19 The same data illustrated the low esteem in which the public held the country's political class: 27 percent replied that they would not vote for any existing political party in Ukraine, while 41 percent said that they would vote for a political party only if a new trustworthy party emerged.
The oligarchs, notwithstanding—or perhaps because of— their enormous wealth and influence over the nation's life, were hardly a trusted source of support for the Yanukovych regime. Having benefited hugely from the crony capitalist system that gave rise to Yanukovych, the oligarchs were vulnerable to his relentless pursuit of even more power and wealth. While undoubtedly keen to protect the system, they were also mindful that Yanukovych had the power to undercut their business interests and limit their power as a class.
Despite Yanukovych's efforts to establish a firm hold on the security and law enforcement agencies, their loyalty too was uncertain. While the top leadership that was hand-picked by Yanukovych and part of his inner circle could be relied on to support his regime in a crisis, the rank-and-file would be confronted with the dilemma that any authoritarian regime's security service confronts when ordered to move against its own people—to support the regime or side with the people. With the precedent of Ukraine's security service staying on the sidelines during the Orange Revolution, and the nature of the Yanukovych regime transparent to the people of Ukraine, no one could or should have taken for granted the security personnel's loyalty to the president in a crisis.20
The opposition too was a significant factor in domestic politics—despite its lack of cohesion, the legacy of failed governance following the Orange Revolution, and pressure from the Yanukovych regime. Heavyweight boxing champion Vitaliy Klitschko's Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR) got 40 seats in the 2012 parliamentary election. Yulia Tymoshenko's Fatherland got 101 seats, and Oleh Tyahnybok's far-right Freedom got 37 seats. These results enabled the opposition to remain an important voice in the country's political life.21
In short, despite Yanukovych's pursuit of dominance in Ukrainian domestic politics, the underlying conditions were nowhere as favorable as the relatively calm surface would lead one to believe. Especially in retrospect, some of Yanukovych's strengths—support from the oligarchs and the disillusioned and apathetic public—proved also to be weak spots when the regime came under pressure. However, despite the presence of these fissures in the nation's political landscape, predicting when the regime would come under pressure and what would trigger a full-fledged crisis was just as challenging a task as predicting the Arab Spring or many other popular uprisings. It was obvious to anyone looking at these and similar situations that the status quo was not tenable indefinitely. But who could predict when and how the breaking point would come?
It's the Economy, Stupid!
For all the political fissures he faced, Yanukovych's biggest problem was economic rather than political. The list of Ukraine's economic afflictions is as familiar as it is long—inadequate reforms, corruption, dependence on energy imported from Russia and the Russian market for exports, excessive social spending. While the country experienced a period of strong growth in the 2000's, the 2008–2009 economic crisis delivered a massive blow to its economy, with GDP falling by 15 percent.22 The Yanukovych government had negotiated a $15 billion loan with the IMF in 2010 but was unable to fulfill the conditions attached to it, and the loan was suspended in 2011.
The critical vulnerability of the country's economy was its dependence on Russian gas. The opaque gas-trading arrangement—widely seen as corrupt—coupled with heavy gas subsidies for domestic consumers left Ukraine perennially indebted to Russia for gas deliveries.23 The 2010 gas deal with Russia resulted in a 30 percent cut in the price of Russian gas in exchange for extended Russian access to naval facilities in Crimea, but the deal provided only temporary relief.24 By the end of 2013, Ukraine's gas debt to Russia was estimated at $1 billion, though other estimates were considerably higher.25,26
Besides gas debts to Russia, the Yanukovych government was beset by several other major economic challenges, including a politically motivated commitment to an unrealistic currency peg and growing inability to borrow to sustain excessive government spending on social programs.27,28 With the government facing over $15 billion in maturing debt in 2014, and the Central Bank reserves around $20 billion, Yanukovych attempted to get another $15 billion loan from the IMF, but it proved impossible without accepting a strict set of conditions that the Ukrainian president, facing reelection in 2015, did not want to take on, for fear of popular backlash.29 The EU was offering a relatively small—€610 million—financial aid package for signing the AA, but it was only a fraction of what Ukraine needed to avoid defaulting on its obligations.30 Besides, the EU insisted on Ukraine resuming its program with the IMF. With Ukrainian bond yields in excess of 10 percent, the country's prospects in capital markets looked dim.31 But default, in a pre-election year, was not an option. Yanukovych would have to look for other sources of financing to avoid default and to save his reelection prospects in 2015.
The External Setting
Viktor Yanukovych's foreign policy record leading up to the crisis in many ways parallels his domestic performance. He wound up antagonizing all of his negotiating partners, who came to view their dealings with him and his government as an unpleasant necessity rather than as a welcome opportunity.
Discredited in the West
Burdened by the legacy of his governorship in Donetsk, rumors of his criminal past, and the compromised election of 2004 that triggered the Orange Revolution, Yanukovych's reputation in the West was somewhat restored by his victory in the 2010 election, recognized as free and fair by international observers. Legitimized by the outcome of the election and promising long-delayed and much-needed series of reforms, Yanukovych had initially gained a measure of respectability and was given considerable benefit of the doubt at the outset of his presidency and even well into it.32,33
However, Yanukovych's actions eventually dispelled those doubts, and his reputation abroad suffered accordingly. The widespread allegations of corruption, the lack of progress on economic reforms, the failure to sustain the program with the IMF, and— perhaps most shocking to Europe and the United States—the imprisonment of Tymoshenko: all shattered the image of Yanukovych as a transformed leader.34
No Friend of Putin's
Curiously, Yanukovych not only succeeded in ruining his reputation in, and relations with, the West, but he also managed to develop a rather difficult relationship with Russia and Putin personally. Early in his tenure, in exchange for a discount on Russian gas, he concluded an agreement to extend the Russian Black Sea fleet lease on the Sevastopol’ base for an additional twenty-five years beyond its original expiration date of 2017.35 Yanukovych also dropped the goal of eventually joining NATO from Ukrainian national security concept. Despite these concessions to Russia, Putin reportedly had a dim view of his Ukrainian counterpart.36 Putin was also reported to have good relations with Tymoshenko and was said to favor her over Yanukovych in the 2010 election.37 Some have attributed this tension to Yanukovych's resentment of Putin's treatment of him as a junior partner, rather than as an equal.
The personal relationship between the two presidents not-withstanding, the relationship between the two countries was strained. At issue were continuous disagreements about energy, trade, transit, and handling of past debts, and the very nature of the relationship between them. Moscow wanted a closer association, envisioning Ukrainian membership first in the Eurasian Customs Union (CU) and later in the Eurasian Economic Union. Kyiv resisted both—undoubtedly a major irritant to Russian policymakers, as well as to Putin personally, who embraced the cause of Eurasian integration as one of his flagship initiatives in his third presidential term and as an economic and geopolitical counterweight to the EU.38
Despite his unwillingness to join the CU, Yanukovych engaged in protracted negotiations with Putin to establish some other relationship with Russia, one that would fall short of full CU membership. An outright refusal on Yanukovych's part to join the CU undoubtedly would have led to more Russian economic and political pressure on Ukraine—particularly in the area of energy trade, but also in bilateral trade in general, which was of great importance to a large segment of the country's economy dependent on the Russian market, which accounts for some 25 percent of Ukrainian exports.39
While negotiating with Putin, Yanukovych also was engaged in protracted and complicated talks with the EU about signing the AA and DCFTA, (The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area). These negotiations began in 2007 and 2008 respectively, and in 2012 the two sides initialed the texts of both documents.40 However, the final stage of the negotiations proceeded slowly, suggesting that Yanukovych was reluctant to accept the demanding conditions of the two documents, which called for wide-ranging legislative and regulatory changes that he almost certainly was unwilling to undertake for fear of undercutting his own power and authority. In retrospect, it appears that Yanukovych was more interested in the negotiations themselves than in their outcome: because EU negotiators viewed the AA and DCFTA as incompatible with membership in the CU, the negotiations provided Yanukovych a hedge against Russian pressure.41
Putin and Yanukovych had conducted many meetings since Putin's reelection for his third presidential term, including some allegedly secret meetings; they failed, however, to arrive at a mutually acceptable deal.42 The Russian president's contempt for his Ukrainian counterpart as a weak and indecisive leader was confirmed after Yanukovych's unexpected flight for asylum in Russia.43 Contempt was perhaps the only thing that the Russian president shared with his European and U.S. counterparts with respect to Ukraine.
The United States is Busy
During the years before the crisis in late 2013, Ukraine had occupied a relatively low place on the foreign policy agenda of the United States. This low priority was the consequence of both temporal and structural factors. The temporal factor had to do with the sheer number of other major foreign policy and national security challenges on the U.S. agenda, including the 2008 war in Georgia and its aftermath, the Arab Spring, the civil war in Syria, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and nuclear talks with Iran, as well as the “reset” with Russia.
The structural factor had to do with the relatively limited toolbox available to the United States for engaging with Ukraine. Yanukovych's domestic agenda, focused on unbridled accumulation of political power and wealth, left few opportunities for U.S. promotion of reform in Ukraine. The desire to isolate the Yanukovych regime following Tymoshenko's trial and imprisonment was also undoubtedly a factor. The structural limitation on U.S. ability to sustain engagement with Ukraine was also a byproduct of Washington's having traditionally taken the lead (with Europe following) in preparing Eastern Europe's new democracies for membership in NATO.44 This course of action was not available to Washington either.
Previous President Viktor Yushchenko's government had expressed interest in joining NATO and asked the alliance to prepare a Membership Action Plan (MAP).45 Ukraine had participated in several international operations with the United States—with NATO in the Balkans, and with the international coalition in Iraq. At the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, the allies declared that they welcomed Ukraine's, along with Georgia's, Euro-Atlantic aspirations and that “these nations will become members of NATO.” 46
However, upon his election to the presidency, Yanukovych took a different path and distanced himself from his predecessor's pursuit of NATO membership.47 Yanukovych chose instead a non-aligned status for Ukraine. That stance corresponded to the mood of the Ukrainian public, which had long been divided on the issue of NATO membership. According to a Gallup poll, in 2008, 43 percent of Ukrainians saw NATO as a threat, 15 percent saw it as a source of protection, and 30 percent were indifferent.48 In 2013, 17 percent saw it as a threat, 29 percent saw it as a source of protection, and 44 percent were indifferent.
The law on non-alignment passed in the Ukrainian parliament in 2010, but it left ample room for Ukraine to continue to participate in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises and other activities. These arrangements entailed regular visits by senior NATO defense and military figures, Ukrainian participation in NATO training activities, and even NATO military exercises on Ukrainian territory. This activity had become routine, even though it triggered local protests in some areas where it was conducted, most notably in Crimea.49
Given Yanukovych's withdrawal from the path of NATO membership, U.S. engagement options with Ukraine were limited at best. Most important for U.S. policy, however, was the somewhat abstract nature of U.S. interests in Ukraine. Ukraine's decision to surrender its portion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal deployed on its territory and accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state had removed the single most important concern from the U.S. agenda in Ukraine.
[I read that Ukraine never had arming codes nor launch codes, so while they stored these missiles on their territory, they really did not possess them. They could have dismantled them and made dirty radioactive conventional bombs.]
And compared to European interests, U.S. interests in Ukraine were quite intangible. The United States had made a general commitment to help former Soviet states make a successful transition to capitalism and democracy and to integrate in the international community; it was committed to seeing Ukraine succeed in its transformation into a stable democracy, but only as a matter of general U.S. democracy-building the world over. It also had an interest, of course, in preventing the re-emergence of Russia as an imperial state, both as an extension of U.S. commitment to the security of Europe and as a consequence of the popular argument that an imperial Russia could not become a democracy and a true partner to the United States.50
^This was the interesting background^
Shortened Version Begins HERE; 5,500 words
Europe Gets to Lead
By contrast, Europe had a direct, tangible stake in Ukraine, first and foremost as a key transit state for Russian gas. A close neighbor whose stability and security are closely tied to the rest of the continent, especially to the easternmost EU member-states, Ukraine was a key concern for the EU. The burden of formulating the policy of the transatlantic community's policy toward Ukraine—and the subsequent burden of leading the community in its implementation—thus fell to Europe. As if to complement this, then Prime Minister Mykola Azarov stated, when he submitted the non-alignment legislation to the parliament, that Ukraine's priority would be European integration.51
Europe was also limited in the amount of attention it could give to Ukraine. As with the United States, this was the result of both temporal and structural factors. The EU was preoccupied with its own internal crises—in Greece, Italy, Spain—as well as with the very future of the union, threatened by disagreements among its key members about the scale and scope of integration and the role of its key political and economic institutions. In this context, Ukraine appeared neither as a serious problem needing immediate attention nor as an opportunity to be seized.
Structurally, the EU's policy toward its eastern neighbors was defined by the Eastern Partnership (EP), a subset of the EU's general European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) developed in 2004. The EP focused specifically on the EU's eastern neighbors in the former USSR, states that were not serious candidates for membership in the Union. But the ENP appeared more like a transformation and reform policy than a foreign policy. According to the official description of the ENP, its objective is:
avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and our neighbors and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all. It is based on the values of democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights.52
In any event, a common European foreign policy toward Ukraine would have been unrealistic given the diversity of European interests in Ukraine—which ranged from quite remote, in the case of Portugal, to vital, in the case of Poland. The emphasis on shared values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights made the application of this policy to Yanukovych's Ukraine a highly ambitious transformational enterprise.
For all the institutional reforms called for in the ENP and EP—emphasizing compatibility with EU laws, regulations, and practices—they did not include an explicit reference to prospects for joining the EU. Rather, the question of EU membership was left ambiguously open. Such a possibility was not ruled out, but it was not on offer either. A successful reform program was obviously a necessary condition for eventually joining the EU, but it was not sufficient. Europe's eastern borders would be secured by making its neighbors more like— but not necessarily members of—the EU.
Though the ENP did not explicitly aim to create a wider sphere of EU influence or a collection of satellites subservient to Western Europe, the ENP's practical effect would still have amounted to creating a peripheral region where it would exert considerable influence. Extensive trade and economic relations would involve the EU as the dominant partner, and the EU would enjoy expanded political and cultural influence through extension of its economic might. The Association Agreements (AA) negotiated by the EU with ENP countries carried extensive and ambitious free trade protocols under the title of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which committed ENP countries to adopt and implement EU laws in areas of trade, consumer protection, and environmental regulation.53 In a word, Brussels's writ would be extended well beyond the European Union's borders to countries that were not even on the path toward EU membership.
The ENP and the EP emerged, then, as substitutes for a common EU foreign policy, as well as for its expansion policy. The goals of making the Eastern neighbors more EU-like and binding them closer to the EU economically, but without offering them a path to membership or setting any other explicit or implicit requirements, was effectively the lowest common denominator that would suit both the newest members of the EU concerned about securing their periphery and older members worried about the costs of expansion.
Although based on the premise of expanding European values and norms, and thus an idealistic enterprise, the ENP and the EP undoubtedly had a geopolitical dimension as well. Among their most active proponents were the EU's newest members, all of which were former Soviet satellites: worried about being Europe's new edge and the prospect of instability on their periphery, they were eager to secure their borders by stabilizing and binding their eastern neighbors closer to Europe by a common European framework.54 The fact that all of Europe's eastern neighbors were vulnerable to Russian pressure only added to these anxieties. Poland and Sweden—both countries with histories of difficult relations with Russia—emerged as initiators and leading advocates of the Eastern Partnership, the EP.55,56,57
Ukraine was both the biggest and the most important country participating in the EP. By binding Ukraine to Europe and pulling it away from Russia, Poland and its EU partners could gain a huge margin of safety in the form of an additional buffer zone between Poland-Slovakia-Hungary-Romania and Russia. The EU would gain additional leverage over Russia by denying it control of the Ukrainian gas transport system that carried vast quantities of Russian gas to Europe and weaken Russia's leverage over Europe. The confluence of idealistic goals and geopolitical interests was obvious.
Talks between Ukraine and the EU on the terms of the AA began in March 2007, while talks on the DCFTA followed in February 2008. Negotiating such deals is an ambitious and lengthy undertaking with many stakeholders on both sides. Ukraine, with its chaotic transitional political system and insecure democratic governance, its widespread corruption, powerful oligarchs, and largely unreformed economy, presented a particularly difficult case for EU negotiators seeking to commit the country to the path of democracy, free market, and rule of law.
Negotiations suffered a further setback following the trial and imprisonment of Tymoshenko. Her fate and reputation as a strong advocate of European integration for Ukraine underscored the shortcomings of the Yanukovych presidency and the difficulty of negotiating with a leader who had deliberately chosen to curtail the country's democratic freedoms, pervert its justice, and engage in massive corruption and electoral fraud. Tymoshenko's release from prison became one of the key demands imposed by EU negotiators as a precondition for the signing of the AA and DCFTA with Ukraine.58 With no sign of Yanukovych's intent to pardon her and the fate of the AA at stake, the jailed opposition leader appealed to EU leaders to sign the AA with Ukraine anyway as a strategic move designed to bring Ukraine closer to Europe.59
Despite numerous EU missions and intense diplomatic pressure, the Ukrainian president would not budge.60 Presented with the choice of following the high principle and scuttling the AA and the DCFTA at the November 2013 Vilnius summit, the EU was poised to put principle aside, follow its interest, and sign the documents with Ukraine's compromised leader.
Russia's Position
Russia's policy toward Ukraine in the lead-up to the crisis was framed by two connected themes of Russian foreign policy. The first was the long-standing Russian resentment of the West's geopolitical expansion into areas of traditional Russian interest and domination. The expansion of NATO, and subsequently of the EU, has long been seen by the Russian foreign policy establishment as an attempt by the United States and its European allies to marginalize Russia, diminish its role in European and global affairs, and weaken its security and economic and political influence.
Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is well known. Almost immediately upon the start of discussions in Washington, Brussels, and elsewhere in Europe about expanding the alliance eastward, it became clear that despite claims about the end of the Cold War and willingness to cooperate with the alliance, Russia remained deeply suspicious of its purpose, maintaining that the alliance had no purpose after the end of the Cold War and should follow the example of the Warsaw pact and dissolve itself. Though explained by NATO's leaders as a step toward Russia—intended to bring the zone of stability, security and prosperity closer to Russia's borders—the expansion of the alliance has always been viewed by Moscow as Western expansion against Russia and a betrayal of the spirit, if not the letter, of the terms on which the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to end the Cold War.61
Putin delivered one of the most authoritative denunciations of NATO's expansion at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. Speaking to an audience of senior officials and prominent security experts from both sides of the Atlantic, he charged that:
“NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr. Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.” Where are these guarantees?62”
For many in Russia's national security establishment, NATO enlargement was possible only because of Russia's weakness during the 1990s. Its political stabilization and economic recovery in the new century made it possible for it to “rise from its knees,” rebuild a measure of its lost military muscle, stand up to Western pressure, and prevent further expansion of the alliance to the territories of the former Soviet Union—including to Ukraine and Georgia, both of which were marked for NATO membership at the 2008 summit in Bucharest.63
The second theme, also long-standing, but endowed with new urgency during the third presidential term of Vladimir Putin, was Eurasian integration: the gathering of former Soviet states in an economic, political, and security ring centered around Russia. Eurasian integration was intended to provide Russia with an added measure of security against perceived Western encroachment and enhance Russia's standing as a major power. As a leading Russian foreign policy expert has put it, no major power “walks alone.” 64
Perhaps the clearest formulation of Russian attitudes toward the West belongs to then-president Dmitri Medvedev, who in the aftermath of the 2008 war with Georgia declared the neighboring states a zone of Russia's “privileged interests.” 65 The implicit but transparent message to other powers, and in particular to the Unites States, was unambiguous: “respect the primacy of Russia in these lands, and best of all to keep out.” The war with Georgia, clearly intended to punish the small neighbor for its Western geopolitical orientation and desire to escape Russia's sphere of influence, sent a powerful signal to other former Soviet states not to push the boundaries of Moscow's patience. It also sent a message to the West to tread lightly in Russia's neighborhood.
[NOTE: Many western authors view smaller wars as Russia’s signaling to the west, or done for geo-political purposes. But ALL of these wars, two Chechen, Georgian, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Ukraine itself, were massive terrorist operations against Russian People who had been “deported with the stroke of Gorbachev’s pen” in 1991. Tens of thousands of Russians were brutally tortured and massacred in every case. Russia had to do something about these provocations.]
Focused on hard power and military threats, Russian leaders concentrated their energies and rhetoric on NATO as the principal challenge to Russia. The EU elicited significantly less attention and ire from Russian policymakers than did NATO, if only because it played a much smaller and less visible role in the immediate periphery of Russia, choosing instead to focus efforts and resources on countries of Central Europe with immediate prospects of membership.
The absence of a collective military dimension in the EU underscored the difference between the two organizations and contributed to Russian preoccupation with NATO. Moreover, whereas the EU did not entertain plans for expansion into the former Soviet Union beyond the Baltic states, and its engagement with the former Soviet states did not entail a path toward membership, NATO did make explicit membership commitments to Georgia and Ukraine and worked with them to devise a path to membership.
Besides NATO enlargement—or perhaps as a direct complement to it—Moscow had grown resentful of U.S. democracy promotion in former Soviet states. Moscow saw Western efforts in this area as yet another form of geopolitical encirclement of Russia and even as a deliberate policy of spreading of instability inside Russia. Western support for the so-called “color revolutions” in Georgia in 2003, in Ukraine in 2004, and in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 were seen in a similar light. Western endorsement of large-scale anti-Putin protests in the winter of 2011–2012— along with visible disapproval of the fact and the manner of the Russian leader's return to the presidency in an election viewed in the West as deeply compromised—was interpreted by Putin as evidence of Western plans to destabilize Russia through “democracy promotion”. Putin expressed Russian resentment of these policies most recently in a July 2014 speech to senior Foreign Ministry personnel and described them as a form of Cold War– style containment of Russia by the West: “The events in Ukraine are the concentrated expression of the policy of containing Russia. The roots of this policy go deep into history, it is clear that this policy, unfortunately, did not end with the Cold War.” 66
However, despite continuing Russian preoccupation with NATO, the EU began to figure more prominently as a challenge to Russian policy of rebuilding a sphere of influence in the former Soviet space. This was due to both the EU's growing attention to its eastern neighborhood and Ukraine in particular, and to Russia's reinvigorated policy of Eurasian integration as a major foreign policy objective in Putin's third term.67 The plan was to stitch together as many of the former Soviet states as possible into a Russian-dominated Customs Union. It is to be followed by closer political integration with a Russian-dominated supranational decision-making body under the name of Eurasian Union.68
Ukraine—the second most populous former Soviet state with the second largest economy after Russia—was by far the most important target of Putin's integration policy. With Russian emphasis on hard power and territorial control, Europe's pursuit of an AA with Ukraine, across whose territory Russia sends 15 percent of Europe's gas supply, no doubt looked like yet another threatening geopolitical step in a series intended to undercut Russian leverage.69 Aside from its size, its location between Russia and Europe and its infrastructure—so important to Russia's gas trade with Europe—made Ukraine absolutely critical to Putin's plans for Eurasian integration and to Russia's sense of security. For Putin, as a statesman and Russian leader, the “loss” of Ukraine to the EU for the second time, after he had “lost” Ukraine during the 2004 Orange Revolution, was not an outcome he was prepared to accept.
The Competition Heats Up
With two competing blueprints for the future of Ukraine—one from the EU and one from Russia—an outright competition was only a matter of time. By 2013, discussions between Kyiv and Moscow about the former's membership in the Russian-led CU had been going on for several years, at least since the CU's inception in 2010.70 The main attraction for Ukraine in joining the CU was the promise from Russia that Ukraine would be able to buy Russian gas at a much lower price.71
The formal obstacles to Ukraine's membership in the CU were threefold: ✓the clause in the Ukrainian constitution prohibiting delegation of decision-making authorities to supranational bodies, ✓ Ukraine's obligations to the WTO, and the ✓ incompatibility between CU and AA/DCFTA terms.72 The informal and more decisive obstacle was Yanukovych's desire to extract maximum benefits from both Europe and Russia while keeping both at arm's length and retaining flexibility to maneuver between them to suit his political preferences.73
Ukraine's progress in AA and DCFTA negotiations appears to have driven the Russian response. With talks between Ukraine and the EU entering the final stage, Moscow pushed for progress in its own talks with Kyiv about joining the CU. In June 2013, Ukraine agreed to become an observer at the CU—a step closer, but well short of membership.74 Almost immediately, Sergey Glazyev, Putin's adviser and a key advocate of Eurasian integration, publicly threatened Ukraine that it would lose its observer status in the CU should it sign a DCFTA.75
Russian pressure continued to mount. In July 2013, Russia imposed a ban on several categories of Ukrainian imports—confectionery and dairy products (because of alleged health concerns) as well as pipe. In addition, Russian customs officials introduced lengthy inspections at the border with Ukraine, halting traffic and imperiling the flow of Ukrainian goods—many of them perishable—to Russia.76 The economic toll from these punitive actions was estimated to lie between $500 million and $2.5 billion, and the threat of more sanctions from Russia posed a major threat to Ukraine's fragile economy.77 However, despite the propaganda campaign and the trade sanctions, Ukraine appeared on course to sign the AA and DCFTA at the November 28–29 EU summit in Vilnius.
The November Surprise
The surprise came a week before the Vilnius summit. On November 21, Yanukovych abruptly ordered that the AA and DCFTA talks be suspended. With little explanation, both agreements were frozen, and the government of Ukraine announced that it was resuming talks with Russia about CU membership.78
Yanukovich's about-face came after unprecedented pressure from Russia and secret talks with Putin at an airport near Moscow on November 9.79 Following that, Yanukovych's prime minister, Mykola Azarov, met with his Russian counterpart, Dmitri Medvedev, for further talks that the former described as “most productive.” 80
Within a month, on December 17, Russia announced a massive aid package consisting of $15 billion in loans on terms highly favorable to Ukraine and a deep—roughly 30 percent—gas discounts amounting to between $3.5 and $7 billion in 2014.81 What Yanukovych had promised to do for Putin in exchange for such largesse was not clear. But he received the lifeline he so desperately needed to avoid default in 2014 without spending cuts, especially gas subsidy cuts, in a pre-election year.
The generous size of the aid package suggests that Putin had a strong interest in settling the issue of Russian-Ukrainian relations—if not once and for all, then at least for a considerable period of time. He certainly had a powerful incentive to do so, since the Sochi Winter Olympic Games were scheduled to start in February. Sochi had become a matter of personal prestige for Putin, who wanted to demonstrate to the world and to Russia the country’s progress under his leadership. With numerous foreign heads of state and other dignitaries invited, he did not want the unrest in Ukraine and the tug of war over it with the West to serve as the backdrop for the games.
However, in the month between Yanukovych’s abrupt withdrawal from AA and DCFTA negotiations and the announcement of the massive Russian aid package, Ukrainian domestic politics underwent a radical transformation. EU officials were stunned by Yanukovych’s about-face, so near the end of a protracted negotiation. What is more, it shocked the people of Ukraine out of their political apathy and brought them out into the streets by the tens and eventually even hundreds of thousands. The situation was beyond Yanukovych’s ability to control it—and Putin’s ability to influence it with cash.
As late as September 2013, the Ukrainian public appeared ambivalent on the issue of closer association with the EU: 42 percent favored joining the EU while 37 percent favored CU membership.82 Yet the response to Yanukovych’s backtracking from the signing in Vilnius was quick and unequivocal.
On November 24—the first Sunday after Yanukovych’s stunning announcement—an estimated 100,000 protesters went out into the streets in Kyiv in what was described as the largest public antigovernmental protests since the 2004 Orange Revolution. Protesters called for Yanukovych to rescind his decree freezing talks with the EU and for his and his government’s resignation. Some threw stones and firebombs at police, who responded with tear gas to break up the demonstrations.83 With protests continuing and police ramping up violence to crack down on protesters, most of them peaceful, Yanukovych became the target of not only domestic opposition, but also growing international condemnation.84
With neither side in the standoff willing to yield, violence escalated in the center of Kyiv. Early December protests drew an estimated 800,000 people. Protesters seized Kyiv’s city hall and set up a fortified tent city in Independence Square, triggering more violent action by police.85 On December 10, police violently attempted to storm the encampment in Independence Square, which resulted in more casualties and arrests of some of the protesters. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry issued a statement expressing “disgust with the decision of Ukrainian authorities to meet the peaceful protest in Kyiv’s Maidan Square with riot police, bulldozers, and batons, rather than with respect for democratic rights and human dignity.” 86
Despite domestic and international condemnation of Yanukovych’s actions and violence against protesters, the standoff continued. Yanukovych’s success in obtaining a major aid package from Russia failed to convince the protesters of the benefit of closer association with Russia. Protests spread beyond Kyiv to western Ukraine, and even to some cities in eastern Ukraine.
The new normal in Ukrainian politics was broken in mid-January by the parliament when it passed a set of laws intended to make protests illegal and severely constrain the ability of the opposition to resist the government. But the new legislation only breathed new energy into the opposition and led to more protests, which triggered a new violent crackdown by the authorities that resulted in new casualties, including several fatalities. By the end of January, the laws were repealed, and the cabinet of Prime Minister Mykola Azarov resigned.87
Throughout the crisis, Yanukovych and the opposition engaged in talks about a compromise solution. In mid-February, the parties agreed that the opposition would vacate some of the buildings it had occupied throughout the protests, and the government released the protesters arrested since the beginning of the protests in December.88
However, despite these signs of progress, on February 18 more violence erupted in central Kyiv. What incited it has remained unclear, but it left 18 dead on both sides, as well as hundreds wounded. On February 20, more violence followed with the number of casualties increasing rapidly—88 new deaths were reported, many of them from sniper fire against protesters.89
**[Our next essay in this thread, #3, will deeply dig into the Euro-Maidan.]
The new round of violence appears to have shocked the government into agreeing to a truce. On February 21, the opposition and the government signed a compromise agreement whose key points included restoration of the 2004 constitution that enhanced the powers of the prime minister at the expense of those of the president, formation of a new government of national unity, further constitutional reform to be completed in September 2014, and a new presidential election in December 2014.90 However, upon signing the agreement, which was endorsed by EU representatives with apparent Russian concurrence, Yanukovych fled the capital and effectively abandoned the presidency. On February 25, the parliament voted formally to remove him from office and set the new election date for May 25.91
Yanukovych's flight has never been fully explained. The most likely explanation appears to be his lack of confidence in his own security apparatus, fear of imprisonment, or even violent death at the hands of protesters, who, he probably thought, would not accept the terms of the deal negotiated by opposition leaders and would proceed to overthrow his government and hunt him down.92
The Yanukovych chapter of Ukrainian history had ended. A new chapter began.
Russia Moves on Crimea
The sudden disintegration of the Yanukovych regime was a stunning surprise to Western policymakers. It must have come as a shock to the Kremlin as well. While blaming the West for supporting unrest in Ukraine as an attempted coup, the Kremlin also spared no criticism of Yanukovych as an incompetent leader unable to deal with the crisis effectively, and, if needed, by force.93 Putin's own dismissive comments about Yanukovych soon after he fled to Russia were probably indicative of the poor relationship between the two leaders, reinforced by his handling of the crisis.94 The speed and scale of political change in Ukraine must have been breathtaking for Russian leaders, suddenly left without an obvious partner in Kyiv and, most likely, without a clear plan of action.
Russian decision-making during the pivotal phase of the crisis in Ukraine was no doubt affected by the fact that Russian leadership, and especially Putin—who by all accounts had personally taken charge of Ukraine policy—was preoccupied with the Sochi Winter Olympics.95 The tensions surrounding the games conducted near Russia's turbulent North Caucasus provinces and Georgia—along with the widespread reporting of corruption, shoddy workmanship, and poor security at the games—had ensured that Russian leaders would be focused on Sochi. The closing ceremony on February 23 proved to be a resounding success: the games went smoothly, and Russia emerged as the country receiving the most medals.
Planned as a triumph of Russian recovery and renewed international standing, the games were indeed a success. However, the fall of Yanukovych and the victory of the pro-Western and anti-Russian opposition in Kyiv cast a dark shadow on that success and presented the Kremlin with few options to repair the damage. The reputations of Russia and Putin were at stake, especially considering Putin's earlier apparent success with Ukraine. The February reversal was dramatic and put Putin at risk of a historic defeat.
The perception of a historic loss was compounded by the presence in Kyiv, throughout the crucial days of the crisis, of senior European officials who did little to conceal their support for the opposition and their disapproval of the Yanukovych presidency and its ties to Russia. This show of disapproval undoubtedly fed Russian suspicions that the fall of Yanukovych was part of a carefully planned Western action. Moreover, a well-publicized intercept of a telephone conversation between two senior U.S. officials overseeing U.S. policy in Ukraine, in which they discussed the likely composition of the post-Yanukovych government, (everybody has heard about the transcript of Leaked Nuland-Pyatt Call), undoubtedly inflamed Russian suspicions of a Western, U.S.-led plot to turn Ukraine into a U.S.-EU satellite state.96
With the Kremlin's game plan overturned by developments in Kyiv well beyond its control, and with few alternatives, it had to act quickly and decisively to prevent Ukraine from slipping away. What options were open to it? With the revolutionary fervor sweeping Kyiv—much, if not most, of it, anti-Russian, and all of it fueled by the Ukrainian public's desire for closer ties to Europe and fewer ties to Russia—political dialogue did not look promising. Economic tools—the $15 billion loan and gas discounts of up to $7 billion—had not done the job. An outright military invasion no doubt looked daunting.
The Kremlin did have one tool that had proved its utility as an instrument of Russian policy in its neighborhood—local separatism. It had been used and worked well in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia by creating permanent frozen conflicts that became Russian outposts for protecting and projecting Russian power and influence.
[I already said these conflicts were terrorist operations against Russian civilians, not a Russian creation.] It is a western interpretation.
Crimea, with a major Russian military base, majority Russian population, many retirees from the Soviet Armed Forces and the Russian Navy, and a history of difficult relations and separatist aspirations in the 1990s, was a prime target for inflicting a wound that would undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and create a pressure point to influence Ukraine's behavior.
Given the long history of Russian-Ukrainian tensions over Crimea, the Russian military almost certainly had prepared and refined blueprints for an operation there to seize control of the peninsula. It did not take long for the first signs of the operation to manifest themselves. Pro-Russian demonstrations began in Crimea on February 23, and by March 1 Crimea was no longer under the control of the government of Ukraine.97
Was the annexation of Crimea by Russia, which followed shortly thereafter, part of a carefully constructed plan? Unlikely. Given the speed with which events in Crimea and in Kyiv progressed, the Kremlin probably found itself in a reactive mode. The outpouring of support for its action by both the residents of Crimea and the Russian citizenry probably motivated the Kremlin to act boldly and proceed with the referendum and the annexation. Russian public opinion supportive of the annexation was fueled by a fierce propaganda campaign in the Russian media, which—with few exceptions—portrayed the revolution in Ukraine as a Western plot executed by radical Ukrainian nationalists and fascist elements. With the public firmly behind it, the Kremlin had no reason to hesitate.
However, the seizure of Crimea raised a number of new challenges for the Kremlin. Chief among them was what to do next. The annexation of Crimea had only deepened the divide between Kyiv and Moscow and stiffened the resolve of the new government of Ukraine to proceed with its plans for closer integration with Europe. Whereas in September of 2013 - 50 percent of Ukrainian citizens had a “warm” attitude toward Russia, in April 2014, 73 percent opposed Russia sending its troops to Ukraine to protect Russian-speakers.98,99 Instead of ensuring Russian influence in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea had severely eroded it.
In charting the new course, the Kremlin had to contend with a wave of international condemnation, sanctions, and threats of more sanctions to come. The relationship with Ukraine had been badly damaged and seemed destined to remain so for the foreseeable future. At the same time, domestic support for the Kremlin's policy was at an all-time high.100 Taken together, these circumstances presented a powerful argument against reconciliation, which carried the risk of appearing weak both abroad and at home. With Russia traditionally disinclined to soft power, accommodation was unlikely.
The alternative was maintaining pressure on Ukraine and—if circumstances warranted—escalation. This logic, combined with Russia's previous experience of assuring its regional influence with the help of frozen conflicts (?) and applying both hard power and the threat of using it, emerged as the key driver of Russian policy toward Ukraine in the spring and summer of 2014. It was probably reinforced by the perception that Ukraine's elite and public were overwhelmingly in favor of European integration and that without sustained Russian pressure Ukraine would be lost to Europe.
The Kremlin's actions in the months following the annexation of Crimea— ✓massing troops on the Ukrainian border, ✓threatening military intervention, ✓recruiting and dispatching combatants and weaponry to eastern Ukraine, ✓occupying government buildings there, ✓launching the concept of {Novorossiya} that would include eastern and southern Ukraine as a vast separatist enclave, ✓establishing self-proclaimed republics in Luhansk and Donetsk, ✓campaigning to disrupt the May 25 presidential election—seem to have been designed to undermine Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and to demonstrate the incompetence and the illegitimate nature of the new Ukrainian government, as well as the danger associated with the course of European integration it was following.
Russia has had to scale back its apparent ambitions for establishing a vast protectorate under the name of Novorossiya in southern and eastern Ukraine.101 That vision apparently exceeded the resources the Kremlin was prepared to commit, as well as the support of the local population.
At the same time, Russia has also demonstrated its commitment to maintain separatist enclaves in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions and to prevent Ukraine from accomplishing a victory on the battlefield and wiping out the separatist insurgency. With the separatists on the verge of being defeated by pro-Kyiv forces in late summer of 2014, the Kremlin stepped up its involvement in the conflict and sent in military personnel, weapons, and supplies. The gains of the pro-Kyiv forces were reversed; they suffered heavy losses, and the Ukrainian government was forced to sign a ceasefire agreement in September that called for significant concessions to the separatists and Russia.102
Eastern Ukraine: A Stalemate
Eastern Ukraine had settled into a stalemate. Though the ceasefire has been violated frequently and could well collapse, it was the best choice among a set of unattractive options. For Moscow, the Luhansk-Donetsk region represents an opportunity to establish a protectorate inside Ukraine and thus gain a springboard for projecting Russian influence into Ukraine. Crimea can no longer serve that purpose now that it has been annexed by Russia. For Kyiv, the ceasefire offers a respite from the fighting that was draining resources it could ill afford to spend on a conflict it could not win against insurgents backed by a superior adversary. Eastern Ukraine therefore became another frozen conflict.
[Please stay tuned, we have an impressive series lined-up, of the lead-up to the Ukrainian war.]
NOTES: Nobody Expected a Crisis
1 Gregory Feifer, “Unloved but Unbowed, Ukraine's Viktor Yushchenko Leaves Office,” RFE/RL, February 24, 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/Unloved_But_Unbowed_Ukraines_Viktor_Yushchenko_Leaves_Office/1967436.html.
2 Luke Harding, “Yanukovych Set to Become President as Observers Say Ukraine Election Was Fair,” Guardian, February 8, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/08/viktor-yanukovych-ukraine-president-election.
3 Adrian Karatnicky, “Re-introducing Viktor Yanukovych,” Wall Street Journal, February 7, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703427704575051253247492516.
4 The International Republican Institute, Public Opinion Survey, Residents of Ukraine October 30–November 11, 2011, http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2012%20January%2026%20Survey%20of%20Ukrai-nian%20Public%20Opinion%2C%20October%2030-November%20 11%2C%202011.pdf.
5 “Yulia Tymoshenko's Trials,” Economist, October 15, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21532290.
6 David Hershenzon, “Obserers Denounce Ukrainian Election, Citing Abuses by Rulers,” New York Times, October 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/world/europe/international-observers-denounce-ukrainian-election.html?_r=1&.
7 “Ukraine Opposition Alleges Election Fraud,” Al Jazeera, November 6, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/11/2012115134229319119.html.
8 Benjamin Bidder, “Profiting from Power? The Dubious Business of the Yanukovych Clan,” Spiegel Online International, May 16, 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-dubious-businees-of-ukraine-president-yanukovych-and-his-clan-a-833127.html.
9 The International Republic institute, Public Opinion Survey, Residents of Ukraine October 30–November 11, 2011, http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2012%20January%2026%20Survey%20of%20Ukrainian%20Public%20Opinion%2C%20October%2030-November%2011%2C%202011.pdf.
10 Sergii Leshchenko, “The two worlds of Viktor Yanukovych's Ukraine,” Opendemocracy.net, March 14, 2013, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/sergii-leshchenko/two-worlds-of-viktor-yanukovych's-ukraine.
11 “Khoroshkovskiy Quits, Blasts Azarov,” Kyiv Post, December 14, 2012, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/ukraine-government-no2-quits-blasts-azarov-317669.html.
12 Christoher J. Miller, “Media Grab,” Kyiv Post, June 27, 2013, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/media-grab-326233.html.
13 “Ukrainian Oligarchs: The First Steps,” Ukrainian Week, August 19, 2011, http://ukrainianweek.com/Economics/29575.
14 “Profile: Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko,” BBC News, June 7, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26822741.
15 “Yanukovych and the Oligarchs: A Short or Long-Term Relationship?”, Kyiv Post, November 11, 2010, http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/yanukovych-and-oligarchs-a-short-or-long-term-rela-89559.html.
16 “The Dictator of a Pluralistic Country,” Economist, October 27, 2012, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21565232-sense-national-defeatism-may-let-president-viktor-yanukovych-stay-power-dictator.
17 Christian Neef, “Yanukovych's Fall: The Power of Ukraine's Billionaires,” Spiegel Online, February 25, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/how-oligarchs-in-ukraine-prepared-for-the-fall-of-yanukovych-a-955328.html.
18 Andrew Rettman, “Media Crackdown Ahead of EU-Ukraine summit,” EU Observer, February 21, 2013, http://euobserver.com/foreign/119140.
19 “IRI Releases Pre-Parliamentary Elections Survey of Ukrainian Public Opinion,” International Republic Institute, January 26, 2012. http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-releases-pre-parliamentary-elections-survey-ukrainian-public-opini.
20 C.J. Chivers, “How Top Spies in Ukraine Changed the Nation's Path,” New York Times, January 17, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/17/international/europe/17ukraine.html?pagewanted= print&_r=2&.
21 “Party of Regions Gets 185 Seats in Ukrainian Parliament, Batkivschyna 101 – CEC,” Interfax-Ukraine, November 12, 2012, http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/126937.html.
22 “Why Is Ukraine's Economy in Such a Mess?”, Economist, March 5, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/03/ukraine-and-russia.
23 Edward Chow and Jonathan Elkind, “Where East Meets West: European Gas and Ukrainian Reality,” Washington Quarterly, January 2009.
24 Roman Olearchyk, “Russia Lowers Ukraine Gas Prices,” Financial Times, April 21, 2010.
25 “Ukraine Plans to Pay Gas Debt to Russia by End-2013,” Interfax-Ukraine, November 18, 2013, http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/economic/175417.html.
26 “Ukraine Has $3.3Bln Unpaid Gas Bill – Gazprom,” RIA Novosti, February 3, 2014, http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140203/187164045/Ukraines-Gas-Debt-to-Russia-Rising–Report.html.
27 “Experts Calling on Ukraine to Cancel Hrvynia's Pegging to Dollar,” Kyiv Post, December 7, 2011, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/business/experts-calling-on-ukraine-to-cancel-hryvnias-pegg-118345.html.
28 “Yanukovych Boots Social Spending Ahead of Ukraine Vote,” RIA Novosti, April 16, 2012, http://en.ria.ru/business/20120416/172857161.html.
29 “Yanukovych Kicks Off His ‘Big Lender’ Tour: First Stop China, Next Russia,” Russia Today, December 3, 2013, http://rt.com/business/ukraine-yanukovych-china-trip-647/.
30 Jonathan Stearns, “EU Offers Ukraine Millions in Trade Aid to Steady Economy,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-11/eu-offers-ukraine-millions-in-trade-aid-to-steady-economy.html.
31 Kateryna Choursina, “Ukraine Rating Cut to Greek Level by S&P as Devaluation Seen,” Bloomberg, November 1, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-01/ukraine-rating-cut-to-b-by-s-p-as-devaluation-seen-more-likely.html.
32 Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine's New President Viktor Yanukovych is No Threat to Democracy,” American Interest, November 1, 2010, http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2010/11/01/orange-peels/.
33 Steven Pifer and William Taylor, “Yanukovich's First Year,” New York Times, March 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/opinion/02iht-edpifer02.html.
34 Pavel Korduban, “Ukraine Fails to Secure IMF Financing in 2011,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 16, 2011, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38678&no_cache=1#.U_3Q1Uu4nlJ.
35 Luke Harding, “Ukraine extends lease for Russia's Black Sea Fleet,” Guardian, April 21, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/21/ukraine-black-sea-fleet-russia.
36 “Poor Ukrainian-Russian Ties Reflect Yanukovych-Putin Relationship,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 30, 2011, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e8d75502.html.
37 Pavel Korduban, “Yanukovych and Tymoshenko Courting Moscow Ahead of Election,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 9, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35462&no_cache=1#.U72VXxa4nlI.
38 Carol Matlack, “Putin's Eurasian Union Looks Like a Bad Deal, Even for Russia,” Bloomberg Businessweek, May 29, 2014, http://www.business-week.com/articles/2014-05-29/putins-eurasian-union-looks-like-a-bad-deal-even-for-russia.
39 Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html.
40 “Information on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement,” European Union External Action. http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2012/140912_ukraine_en.htm.
41 Štefan Füle, “Statement on the Pressure Exercised by Russia on Countries of the Eastern Partnership,” Europa.eu, September 11, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-687_en.htm.
42 Christopher J. Miller, “Yanukovych's Secret Meeting with Putin Raises Questions of Customs Union Promise,” Kyiv Post, December 7, 2013, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/yanukovychs-secret-meeting-with-putin-raises-questions-of-customs-union-promise-333211.html.
43 Kathy Lally, “Deposed Yanukovych Wants Russia to Give Crimea Back to Ukraine,” Washington Post, April 2, 2014, http://www.washing-tonpost.com/world/deposed-yanukovych-wants-russia-to-give-crimea-back-to-ukraine/2014/04/02/e37124b6-561b-45c6-9390-a0d7d346ded6_ story.html.
44 Steven Pifer, “Developments in Ukraine and Implications for U.S. Policy,” Brookings Institution, February 1, 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2012/02/01-ukraine-pifer.
45 Vladimir Socor, “Ukraine's Top Three Leaders Request NATO Membership Action Plan,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 18, 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33304&no_cache=1#.U_34pEu4nlJ.
46 “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 3, 2008. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm.
47 “Ukraine's Parliament Votes to Abandon NATO Ambitions,” BBC News, June 3, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/10229626.
48 Julie Ray and Neli Esipova, “Before Crisis, Ukrainians More Likely to See NATO as a Threat,” Gallup World, March 14, 2014, http://www.gallup.com/poll/167927/crisis-ukrainians-likely-nato-threat.aspx.
49 “Crimean communists to protest against NATO's Sea Breeze exports,” Kyiv Post, May 27, 2010, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/crimean-communists-to-protest-against-natos-sea-br.html?flavour=full.
50 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (Basic Books, New York, NY, 1997).
51 “Ukraine's Parliament Votes to Abandon NATO Ambitions,” BBC News, June 3, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/10229626.
52 “What is the European Neighbourhood Policy,” European Union External Action, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm
53 Rikard Jozwiak, “Explainer: What Exactly Is An EU Association Agreement?”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 20, 2013, http://www.rferl.org/content/eu-association-agreement-explained/25174247.html.
54 David Cadier, “Is the European Neighbourhood Policy a Substitute for Enlargement?”, London School of Economics, http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR018/Cadier_D.pdf.
55 Agnieszka K. Cianciara, “‘Eastern Partnership’—Opening a New Chapter of Polish Eastern Policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy?”, Institute of Public Affairs, June 2008, http://isp.org.pl/files/8679201040703671001213792577.pdf.
56 Gunilla Herolf, “Sweden in Favour of Enlargements and Co-Initiator of the Eastern Partnership,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
http://www.eu-28watch.org/?q=node/677
57 “Joint Statement by Foreign Ministers Radek Sikorski and Carl Bildt,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, December 1, 2013, http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/joint_statement_by_foreign_ministers_radek_sikorski_and_carl_bildt_of_poland_and_sweden.
58 Christopher Alessi, “Tymoshenko Release: Ukraine's Geopolitical Future Hangs on Deal,” Spiegel Online, October 30, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/tymoshenko-release-could-pave-way-for-eu-ukraine-trade-deal-a-930917.html.
59 Tonya Tumanova, “Yulia Tymoshenko to the EU leaders: Sign the AA with Ukraine If Viktor Yanukovych Agrees (the text of the address),” Ukrainian National News, November 27, 2013, http://www.unn.com.ua/en/news/1277270-yu-timoshenko-lideram-yes-pidpishit-ua-zukrayinoyu-yakscho-v-yanukovich-pogoditsya-tekst-zvernennya.
60 Serhiy Kudelia, “When External Leverage Fails: The Case of Yulia Tymoshenko's Trial,” Problems of Post-Communism, January/February 2013, http://www.academia.edu/3080463/When_External_Leverage_Fails_The_Case_of_Yulia_Tymoshenkos_Trial.
61 Philip Zelikow and Condleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 179–185.
62 “Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munuch Conference on Security Policy,” Washington Post, February 12, 2007, http://www.washington-post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html.
63 Conversation, senior Russian national security official, July 18, 2014, Moscow.
64 Dmitri Trenin, in Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing (New York: ME Sharpe, 2007), 81.
65 Paul Reynolds, “New Russian World Order: The Five Principles,” BBC News, September 1, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7591610.stm
66 Ivan Nechepurenko, “Putin Lashes Out Against Cold War–Style Containment of Russia,” Moscow Times, July 1, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-lashes-out-against-cold-war-style-containment-of-russia/502817.html.
67 Leon Neyfakh, “Putin's Long Game? Meet the Eurasian Union,” Boston Globe, March 9, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/03/09/putin-long-game-meet-eurasian-union/1eKLXEC3TJfzqK54elX5fL/story.html; Robert Coalson, “Putin's Return to Kremlin Could Boost Eurasian Union Project,” Voice of America, March 8, 2012, http://www.voanews.com/content/putins-return-to-kremlin-could-reenergize-eurasian-union-project-142051333/180797.html.
68 Jon Henley, “A Brief Primer on Vladimir Putin's Eurasian Dream,” February 18, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2014/feb/18/brief-primer-vladimir-putin-eurasian-union-trade.
69 Elena Mazneva, “EU Drafts $2.5 Billion Ukraine Gas Debt As Cuts Looms,” Bloomberg, May 27, 2014.
70 Olga Shumylo-Tapiola, “Ukraine at the Crossroads: Between the EU DCFTA & Customs Union,” IFRI, Russia/NIS Center, April 2012; Oleksandr Sushko, “A Fork in the Road? Ukraine between EU Association and Eurasian Customs Union,” Ponars Eurasia Policy Memos, Policy Memo #293, September 2013, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/fork-road-ukraine-between-eu-association-and-eurasian-customs-union.
71 Irina Reznik and Henry Meyer, “Russia Offers Ukraine Cheaper Gas to Join Moscow-Led Group,” Bloomberg, December 2, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-01/russia-lures-ukraine-with-cheaper-gas-to-join-moscow-led-pact.html.
72 Olga Shumylo-Tapiola, “Ukraine at the Crossroads: between the EU DCFTA & Customs Union,” IFRI, Russia/NIS Center, April 2012; Oleksandr Sushko, “A Fork in the Road? Ukraine between EU Association and Eurasian Customs Union,” Ponars Eurasia Policy Memos, Policy Memo #293, September 2013, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/fork-road-ukraine-between-eu-association-and-eurasian-customs-union.
73 Steven Pifer, “Ukraine's Yanukovych Caught between Russia and the European Union,” World Politics Review, October 23, 2013, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13324/ukraine-s-yanukovych-caught-between-russia-and-the-european-union.
74 Reuters, “Ukraine Signs for Observer Status in Customs Union,” Moscow Times, June 3, 2013, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/ukraine-signs-for-observer-status-in-customs-union/480918.html.
75 Putin's Adviser Threatens Loss of Observer Status in Customs Union If Ukraine Signs Trade Treaty with Europe,” Kyiv Post, June 14, 2013, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/putins-adviser-threatens-loss-of-observer-status-in-customs-union-if-ukraine-signs-trade-treaty-with-europe-325639.html.
76 Roman Olearchyk, “Russia Accused of Triggering Trade War with Ukraine,” Financial Times, August 15, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/99068c0e-0595-11e3-8ed5-00144feab7de.html#axzz38hCBDX00; “Trading Insults,” Economist, August 24, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21583998-trade-war-sputters-tussle-over-ukraines-future-intensifies-trading-insults.
77 Ibid.
78 Ian Traynor and Oksana Grytsenko, “Ukraine Suspends Talks on EU Trade Pact as Putin Wins Tug of War,” Guardian, November 21, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/ukraine-suspends-preparations-eu-trade-pact.
79 “Putin's Gambit: How the EU Lost Ukraine,” Der Spiegel, November 25, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/how-the-eu-lost-to-russia-in-negotiations-over-ukraine-trade-deal-a-935476.html.
80 Ian Traynor and Oksana Grytsenko, “Ukraine Suspends Talks on EU Trade Pact as Putin Wins Tug of War,” Guardian, November 21, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/ukraine-suspends-preparations-eu-trade-pact.
81 Darina Marchak, Katya Gorchinskaya, “Russia Gives Ukraine Cheap Gas, $15 Billion in Loans,” Kyiv Post, December 17, 2013, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/russia-gives-ukraine-cheap-gas-15-billion-in-loans-333852.html; “Russia's Emergency Loan to Ukraine on Hold Until Gov't Forms,” Russia Today, January 30, 2014, http://rt.com/business/russia-loan-ukraine-postpone-401/.
82 The International Republican Institute, Public Opinion Survey, Residents of Ukraine, August 27–September 9, 2013. http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/IRI_Ukraine_August-September_2013_Edited%20Poll.pdf.
83 Oksna Grytsenko, “Ukrainian Protesters Flood Kiev After President Pulls Out of the EU deal,” Guardian, November 24, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/ukraine-protesters-yanukovychaborts-eu-deal-russia; “Huge Ukraine Rally over EU Agreement Delay,” BBC, November 24, 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25078952.
84 Oksana Grytsenko, “Ukraine's Bloody Crackdown Leads to Calls for Sanctions,” Guardian, November 30, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/30/ukraine-bloody-backlash-sanctions-eu.
85 BBC, “Ukraine Crisis Timeline,” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.
86 http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/12/218585.htm.
87 BBC, “Ukraine Crisis Timeline,” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275; BBC, “Parliament Abolishes Anti-Protest Law,” January 28, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25923199.
88 BBC, “Ukraine Crisis Timeline,” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.
89 BBC, “Ukraine Crisis Timeline,” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.
90 “Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine—full text,” Guardian, February 21, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/agreement-on-the-settlement-of-crisis-in-ukraine-full-text.
91 BBC, “Ukraine Crisis Timeline,” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.
92 Conversation with a senior Russian official, Moscow, July 17, 2014.
93 Shaun Walker, “Ukraine: Vladimir Putin Lays Blame at Door of Protesters and the West,” Guardian, February 19, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/19/russian-ukraine-putin-blames-westprotest.
94 Christopher Brennan, “Putin Sees No Political Future for Yanukovych,” Moscow Times, March 5, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-sees-no-political-future-for-yanukovych/495564.html.
95 Conversation with senior Russian political figure, May 22, 2014, Brussels.
96 BBC, “Ukraine: Transcript of Leaked Nuland-Pyatt Call,” February 7, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957.
97 BBC, “Ukraine Crisis Timeline,” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275; Washington Post, “Timeline: Key Events in Ukraine's Ongoing Crisis,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/timeline-key-events-in-ukraines-ongoing-crisis/2014/05/07/a15b84e6-d604-11e3-8a78-8fe50322a72c_story.html.
98 The International Republic institute, Public Opinion Survey, Residents of Ukraine August 27–September 9, 2013, http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/IRI_Ukraine_August-September_2013_Edited%20Poll.pdf.
99 The International Republic institute, Public Opinion Survey, Residents of Ukraine April 3–12, 2014, http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%2024%20Survey%20of%20Residents%20of%20Ukraine%2C%20April%203-12%2C%202014.pdf.
100 Boris Koloniskii, “Why Russians Back Putin on Ukraine,” New York Times, March 11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/12/opinion/why-russians-back-putin-on-ukraine.html.
101 Carol Matlack, “Why Putin's Ukrainian New Russia Could Be an Ungovernable Mess,” Bloomberg Businessweek, May 5, 2014, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-05-05/why-putins-ukrainian-new-russia-could-be-an-ungovernable-mess.
102 Anthony Faiola, “Ukrainian President Offers Rebels Major Concessions,” Washington Post, September 15, 2014, http://www.washington-post.com/world/heavy-fighting-between-ukrainian-forces-and-pro-russian-rebels-over-the-weekend/2014/09/15/9f522a6c-1a27-4f3a-8c6a-5432c92911a3_story.html.
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I'm not sure the article contains important facts. Why is it not written why Tymoshenko was imprisoned and where her husband fled to with the stolen money?
> Instead of ensuring Russian influence in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea had severely eroded it.
Are you sure? What sources are you drawing on? And is western Ukraine controlled by the Banderovians the same as eastern Ukraine with a Russian-speaking population? Are you questioning the referendums in the five new Russian regions?
After reading the article thoroughly, I understand that it is parroted Western propaganda.