11. What lies ahead?
The phase transition is a painful process.
And now, once again, let us turn to modernity. In the previous chapters we already came to the conclusion that in recent decades (probably since the late 1980s) the Russian super-ethnos has been going through a phase transition from overkill to the phase of inertia. And the change of phases, as we know, is always very painful. Especially if it is a phase of fracture. During such periods, said Gumilyov, the ethnos becomes completely defenseless. ("Like a snake when it changes its skin.")
Therefore, it should be noted once again that, from the point of view of ethnogenesis, the causes of our "post-perestroika" disorders and troubles are not only the pest of external and internal opponents (this is a matter of course). The main reason is that the people, weakened by the interphase transition, are not able to give the enemies a proper response.
These two processes - action and reaction - are dialectically interconnected. And, of course, it is especially difficult when there are too many of these enemies and they begin to act as an active organized force (anti-system). Obviously, in this case the phase transition may be prolonged and exceed the terms given by nature.
What Russia experienced in the 90's of the 20th century, is in fact, the second civil war, but not a hot one, like in 1918 - 1920, but a cold one, or rather a warm one. This is some new form of civil war, hitherto unknown. The results of this war: a huge loss of population, half-destroyed industry, a shattered social system. And by all appearances this internal war is not over, only its acute phase (1990's - early 2000's) has passed. After all, when the civil war ends, the ethnic system stabilizes, and ethnic unity is restored. This is not evident at the moment. Or rather - the shift is happening - the ethnic dynamics are positive, but victory has yet to come.
In 1990, Russia was a superpower, but today it is just a big power. The population loss over 20 years of "reform" was about 15 million people. Even taking into account hybrid warfare (the globalization factor) and the natural "burnout" of sub-passionaries, which always occurs at the end of a breakdown, this is a monstrous figure. In the 90's the country was losing almost a million a year, in the "zero years" - less, but the death rate exceeded the birth rate.
For the first time for 700 years (!), i.e. from the beginning of formation of the Moscow state, we have suffered such losses in "peace time", without major wars, mass starvation and epidemics. Demographic pits have occurred in Russia before. They were caused by foreign wars and revolutions. But this lasted for a relatively short time, and immediately after the end of the wars and turmoil, there was a rapid increase in population. The old demographic law worked: "...women will give birth. Today, not many women are giving birth. So, the crisis is not over.
In the phase of fracture, as we already know, there is a split of the ethnic system into opposing groups. Fracture is a constant internal struggle, now sluggish, now escalating. This, we repeat, is the ongoing civil war, which takes different forms. In our country, it has been going on for almost two hundred years. That is the maximum length of time, even if you consider the aggravating factors - globalization, digitalization, etc. (Byzantium, Kiev, etc.). (In Byzantium, Kievan Rus and Western Europe, the phase of fracture was also stretched and lasted about two hundred years.)
Let us emphasize again that the essence of any phase transition is a change in the ethnic stereotype of behavior. This means that our old - heroic, religious, collectivist (traditional) stereotype of behavior is being replaced by a new - bourgeois, individualistic, pragmatic (bourgeois) one. As already mentioned, the struggle between these two stereotypes, the Russian traditional and the Russian bourgeois, continued throughout the entire phase of the crisis. Both before 1917 and after. The new stereotype lost in this struggle, but, having lost once again (especially shatteringly in 1917), this bourgeois stereotype revived and continued to gain strength. By the end of the Soviet period, it was already seriously competing with the traditional collectivist stereotype. And it is obvious that today this struggle of worldview stereotypes is even wider - and is not over.
From the ethnological point of view, what is happening to Russia in the last 25-30 years is not a transition from socialism to capitalism, but a transition from the ethnic dominant of the phase of breakdown (double!) to the ethnic dominant of the phase of inertia (whole).
Breaking the stereotype is always very painful. Especially in modern conditions, when the natural process of ethnogenesis is interfered by organized anti-natural forces armed with new technologies, with the help of which, for example, it is possible to conduct a large-scale information war. When the stereotype of behavior is changed, people lose ground: the familiar system of values is already gone, and the new one, causing rejection among many, has not yet been fully established. At this time, emphasized Gumilyov: "systemic ties are destroyed, their restructuring takes place. The stereotype of ethnic behavior is noticeably modified and therefore easily deformed. Here we need to emphasize "deformed"! This is exactly what happened in the 1980s-1990s.
On the whole, let us repeat, all this fraught disease, leading to the division of "collective unconscious", can be called ethnic schizophrenia, proceeding on the background of the ethnos' decreased immunity.
Today, there are still many Soviet-type people (1) in our super-ethnos, for whom life after the 1991 coup has lost its meaning and who are disgusted with the new post-Soviet reality. They do not live in, but survive in an environment that is hostile to them. (At the same time, a small group of other, "liberal people" (2) who are very active have accepted the "wild-market" rules of the game, and are categorically unwilling to return to the old, not even Soviet, but simply traditional values. For them, ugly capitalism and sinful anti-culture, which makes the majority of the people repulsed, are a perfectly comfortable environment to live in.
Between these two extreme groups lies the largest, third (3) group. This is mainly the petty bourgeoisie of varying degrees of maturity (not necessarily entrepreneurs). They do not want to go back to socialism, but at the same time do not accept the radical liberal "wild-market" rules of the game. They are for "normal work and earnings," they are for "order," for a "strong national leader" and even for patriotism. As already noted, this is a transitional type, from the collectivist, traditional system of values to the individualist, "inertial" system (in the capitals, with a noticeable preponderance of the latter).
In addition, it is possible to identify one more small group that stands apart. They are traditionalists (4) of the conservative type. In general, these are people of an Orthodox disposition (not necessarily church-going), nationally oriented, with a strong state instinct - patriots aimed at serving. Here everything is clear according to K. Leontiev: "...they want to heal and strengthen the state organism, they rarely triumph, but as much as they can, they slow down the degradation, returning the nation, sometimes violently, to the cult of the state that created it.
History teaches us that when the dynamics of ethnogenesis is negative (in breakdown, inertia, obscuration), it is this small group that holds the entire ethnic system together. The traditionalists, as we remember, are the very "brakes-on peoples striving, often merrily, for their own demise".
Thus, at present we have four social groups with different value systems (not counting any number of intermediate groups) that are in dynamic disequilibrium. And so far there has been no constructive interaction between all these groups and subgroups. And this - despite the noticeable smoothing out of red-white contradictions.
For example, if we look at seemingly close in spirit patriotic organizations and movements, we find a striking picture that resembles an ideological vinaigrette: red patriots, white patriots, radical nationalist patriots, Eurasianist patriots, pagan patriots, Orthodox patriots. This doesn't sound like natural diversity ("flowery complexity"), it sounds like a variety of strife. Which, in fact, is an indicator of ethnic division, not completely overcome.
Thus, it turns out that (yet) there is no unified system of values in the Russian ethnos, there is no single stereotype of behavior, and, as a consequence, there is no consolidated social system either. In general, the internal mood of our society for the last 30 years can be defined as a cacophony of values and worldview in conditions of intensive breakdown of stereotype of behavior. Distemper in the country really comes from distemper in the heads. What a "national" ideology to work with!
We conclude. From the ethnogenesis point of view, that worldview and psychological crisis which led to a weakening of the "will to live" in many Russian people was caused by natural phase change in the stereotype of behavior, exacerbated by violent "liberalization of the country" in the 1990s.
During such periods of timelessness, the usual values are replaced by anti-values. As in the midst of obscuration. There comes, as they used to say in the olden days, a demonic time, and evil spirits crawl out of every crevice. We have been witnessing this for twenty-five years on television, in "modern" theater, in postmodernist literature, in negative sects and much more. At the same time, we repeat, under the conditions of the onset of Sodom globalization and the tightening of information warfare, the negative processes natural for the interphase transition are extremely aggravated. Normal people are disgusted by all this, confusion, and, most importantly, fear for tomorrow. There is an atomization of the ethnos. Systemic ties are broken. People become withdrawn into themselves. They stop visiting each other, avoid looking each other in the eye, and sit further away from each other on public transport. This is a natural reaction to prolonged, continuous stress. Fatigue sets in. When a dog is sick, it crams itself into a secluded place and lays there.
And there's also a lot of anger among the people. It has a special kind of anger - a gut feeling. Many people, especially young people, are not fully aware of it. This is not the quick anger of the early-to-mid 90s, when there was still hope for a quick resolution of all the contradictions and troubles, but the hard, slow anger of people who have been struggling for years to survive, deadly tired, and do not know when it will all end. Many of our people today are like compressed springs.
How long can the phase transition last? It's hard to say. Sometimes it takes years, but more often decades. And it is not always peaceful. If we manage to make this transition (the internal schism is being overcome!), then the future in the long-term perspective will belong to the new, pragmatic-bourgeois stereotype of behavior. This stereotype is already dominant in the big cities, albeit in a somewhat perverted form. But again, the old, traditional stereotype will not disappear for a long time, because it is too deeply ingrained. After all, in addition to age, you need to consider other factors, primarily geographical and religious. Severe climate, vast territory, the constant threat of invasions and, finally, Orthodox Christianity - all this has left a deep imprint on the Russian soul. The mental core (archetypes), as already mentioned, is a very stable thing. Therefore it is possible to predict, that the Russian person will never become the inveterate individualist and pragmatist ("a walking calculator"), as the European from a phase of inertia. Let us repeat that Russia is not Europe at all, but a "country/continent" - It’s Eurasia.
All the more so, for all the troubles of the phase of breakdown, there were positive moments as well. Namely, four waves of emigration to the West: 1) post-revolutionary in 1917-1920; 2) post-war in 1945; 3) late-Soviet in 1970-80s; and 4) "New Russian" in 1990-2000.
This was a liberation from unwanted ballast, which for the most part consisted of pro-Western intellectuals, radical nationalists, dissidents, and the comprador bourgeoisie. Of course, the liberation was not complete (some of them remained, while others took dual citizenship), but it was enough to survive. In Gumilyov's language, an unnecessary, interfering element was removed from the ethnos, which led to increased stability of the super-ethnic system. Let us add to this, such an important fact as a sharp decrease in the number of sub-passionaries, which almost coincides with the first and the last wave (and which can be seen today with the naked eye).
Again, the laws of ethnogenesis are the laws of nature. When the body gets sick, all sorts of toxins and harmful substances come out of it when the temperature rises. The main thing here is to have enough immunity, i.e. passionarity.
If we talk about the future social structure of Russia, then, probably, in the foreseeable "early-inertial" perspective, something between collectivism and individualism, between traditional and the "civilized" awaits us. As already mentioned, we will never go back to the old Soviet-type socialism, but we are not ready for "pure capitalism" either. To use a familiar terminology, the future socio-economic structure will be something between capitalism and socialism. Although ideology in the phase of inertia no longer plays the defining role it did in previous phases of ethnogenesis, it will be necessary, especially at the beginning.
It will be something special, Eurasian, with a pronounced social and national patriotic component, with political support of a strong imperial-monarchical type state and with spiritual support of Orthodoxy. It will be a return to tradition, but in a moderate form, without the former heat. When, again, everything in moderation, everything is on an average level - religiosity, patriotism, collectivism, and the number of children in the family. You could call this system state capitalism, you could call it a social state, you could even call it an "empire-like state formation". You can call it anything else. The main thing here is not the name, but that we will continue to go our own way - the Russian way. But it will be in the next phase of ethnogenesis - that is, at a qualitatively different civilizational level.
In the quiet phase of inertia, as we know, internal ideological differences give way to ideological equilibrium. Since the ethnic division is overcome and there are very few ideological fighters-passionarians in this phase, the opposing "hot" and "revolutionary" ideologies are replaced by the conservative ideology of the "golden mean," i.e. the ideology of order and stability. Such a subideology seems boring to a few passionate idealists, but it suits the harmonious majority. (Well, how much war can you have! Let us live in peace!)
Obviously, Russia is pregnant with this kind of ideology. Which, however, does not at all rule out the need for a mobilization ideology at the current, transitional stage. And it certainly does not exclude the strengthening of the position of Orthodoxy as the foundation for a new imperial project on the old foundation of the "Third Rome". Why? Because in the 20th century the infernal factor of globalization intervened in the world ethnogenesis. And it takes a Holder, something will fill the hole opened up.
As for the situation in the world, then again, thanks to Gumilyov we can predict: despite the fact that the historical clouds thicken - humanity still has some time for reflection.
Therefore, the question: what will happen to peoples (civilizations) in the future? - The answer is: there will be a return to tradition. That is - a return to a multipolar world. To national economies and finances. To national cultures. To national religions. To ourselves. Of course, as much as possible after the terrible blows that humanity has suffered in the XX - early XXI centuries, and those that are still to come.
Therefore, once again, the question is not "What will happen after capitalism?", but how and to what extent the complex ethno-cultural planetary system will be restored after the half-decay of recent decades.
And we assume that Russian civilization will play no small part in this Great Planetary Repair.
And the light shines in the darkness,
and the darkness has not consumed it.
(John 1:5)
About the present moment. Russia is concentrating.
Lev Nikolayevich Gumilev said: "In the course of ethnogenesis we never know if another phase has come or is coming". The reason lies in that very aberration of proximity, when recent events seem significant and those long past seem unimportant. So let's not speculate in vain on the question of when the Russian super-ethnos will enter the long-awaited phase of inertia. (It may already be, but we have not noticed it yet.) One thing is certain: the pace of the chariot of history since the end of the 20th century has been sharply accelerated, and the rapidly escalating events have led to a number of qualitative changes, both within Russia and throughout the world.
Today, for all the difficulties and problems we have inherited from the "reform era of the 1990s," we are seeing Russia finally beginning to focus. The Ukrainian events of spring 2014 caused, unexpectedly for many "observers," a surge of imperial patriotism. It was the Russian archetypes that had been crushed by "reforms" that burst out. After twenty-five years of liberal retreat, Russia began to resist - we cannot retreat any further: the enemy has invaded the Russian land!
There was hope that this popular patriotic upsurge would be the key to overcoming the nearly two hundred-year-old ethnic rift, and the coming national unity, both within Russia and throughout the Eurasian space. It seems that the historical pendulum gradually began to swing in the desired, constructive direction. In spite of everything!
From the point of view of one generation's life - this turn has been waited for too long. From the point of view of ethnogenesis - not so much. It took about twenty years for the shattered and disillusioned Russian people to begin to find, it would seem, the already lost meaning of their existence. The meaning in the struggle for the right to live in their own land in their own way.
In the 1990s, many of the regime's opponents thought that a leader would come and lead the people to the barricades. It turned out that the turning point happened somewhere inside. The instinct for self-preservation at the level of the ethnic system kicked in. Emphasize, not political, not social, namely the ethnic system! The mysterious "Russian factor" kicked in. Not all Russians realized it until now. It happened in the early to mid-2000s.
Over time it became clear that if a leader comes, he most likely won't come from below - he will be nominated by the healthiest part of the "upper" class, focused on a strong state. Even though this conservative part (the very creators) was very small, even though after the pogrom of the 1990s it had a narrow corridor of opportunity, but it was already there. And unlike the liberal majority in the power structures, it nevertheless tied its future to Russia, not to the West. For all its many bourgeois shortcomings.
By the middle of the 2000s, Russia finally had a national leader who was fully capable of meeting the challenges of the transitional period, that is, who could sit on two chairs at once - the patriotic and the liberal. (Which has long been misleading for many. This is precisely the case in which it is not the individual who influences history, but history influences the individual, who corresponds to the vector of ethnogenesis.) At the same time, a "middle way" out of the crisis emerged. Through a conservative revolution from above; with mass support from below.
Today, we are witnessing a gradual transition from the first, preparatory stage of this conservative revolution to the second, already explicit stage. The tasks of this, so far soft, oprichnina are not new: the neutralization of the oligarchy and the gradual change of the ruling class, especially its openly pro-Western segment. Something painfully similar took place in Russia in the 1920s and '30s, under Comrade Stalin. In general, it should be noted that the current internal political situation reminds of the situation of the mid-1930s, when the most furious opponents of the regime have already been deported, while the majority of the rest have not yet reached it. At the same time, the picture of the latest annual presidential addresses to the "elite" is at times reminiscent of the "congress of the winners" in 1934.
We know from history that the conservative revolution, which in our conditions is the struggle of the ethnic system with the anti-system, can not go quickly, especially given the unprecedented pressure of the globalists (more powerful than under Stalin!). Therefore, slippages and even tactical retreats on this path are inevitable. But it seems that we have no other choice.
Time will tell how further events will unfold. One thing is clear: in order to complete the conservative revolution and enter a stable "inertial" future, you will have to go through a tough mobilization period. There is a smell of a big war in the air again. And the question is once again very clear: to be Russia, or not to be. That is why the road to the future lies through a struggle. The fight for Russia.
P. S. In recent years I have often heard that only a miracle can save Russia. This miracle is our passionarity. Hence everything: the amazing patience of the people, and a lively sense of patriotism, and a willingness to sacrifice, and the preserved religious consciousness. Miracle comes to the people who have kept faith in the Miracle. That is, in God. We have it. Pressed down, thrown over by a thick layer of materialism and atheism, covered in the dirt of mass anti-culture - but we have it! It means there is hope.
Glossary of terms
1. Proximity aberration is an exaggeration of the grandiosity of recent events compared to earlier ones.
2. Anti-system - the systemic integrity of people with a negative worldview.
3. Biosphere - the Earth's shell consisting of living matter and products of its activity, which has anti-entropic properties.
4. Biochemical energy - free energy absorbed by organisms from the environment.
5. Harmonious individuals (harmonious individuals) - people whose passionary impulse is equal in weight to the impulse of the instinct of self-preservation.
6. Genetic drift - the phenomenon of dispersal of a passionate trait outside the population by mating (more often illegal).
7. Incubation period - part of the ascent phase from the moment of the passionary impulse or the beginning of genetic drift to the emergence of ethnos as a new ethno-social system.
8. Complimentarity - positive (or negative) - the feeling of subconscious mutual sympathy (or antipathy) of people, determining the division into "their own" and "alien". Connected to the phenomenon of the ethnic field (biofield).
9. Negative perception of the world - the attitude to the material world, which is expressed in the desire to simplify systems.
10. Positive worldview is an attitude to the material world, expressed in an aspiration for complication, adding to the systems.
11. Nostalgia is a feeling of incompatibility with a different ethnic field.
12. Passionaries - people whose passionary impulse exceeds the impulse of the instinct of self-preservation.
13. Passionarity - a person's superpowered ability provided by an excess of biochemical energy of living matter.
14. Passionary induction - contagiousness of passionarity, when harmonious people under the influence of passionarians behave as if they were passionarians. Passionary induction has a stronger effect on people of the same ethnicity as the passionaries.
15. Passionary impulse is a micro-mutation that leads to the emergence of passionarity in a community of people and the birth of new ethnicities.
16. Reluctance - an ethnos at rest, i.e., an ethnos with zero passionarity.
17. Symbiosis - peaceful coexistence of two or more ethnic groups in one region, when each occupies its own ecological niche.
18. Displacement or result of contact - disruption of the programmed course of ethnogenesis due to external influence.
19. Stereotype of behavior - time-varying set of behavioral skills of members of an ethnos, transmitted by signal heredity.
20. Subpassionarians - people whose passionary impulse is less than the impulse of the instinct of self-preservation.
21. Sub-ethnos - An ethnic system that stands out within an ethnos, has behavioral characteristics, and opposes itself to those around it.
22. Simplification - a decrease in the density of systemic ties in an ethnic system, i.e., its weakening.
23. System Passionary Tension Level, or Passionary Tension - the amount of passionarity available in an ethnic system divided by the number of people who make up the ethnic system.
24. Complication - an increase in the density of system ties in an ethnic system, i.e., its strengthening.
25. Chimera - the coexistence of two or more alien ethnic systems in the same ecological niche.
26. Entropic process - irreversible process of energy loss.
27. Ethnic history - a function of ethnogenesis and ethnic contacts over periods where events are recorded by sources.
28. Ethnic field is a collective biofield that has a certain rhythm (frequency) of fluctuations. Confirmed by the phenomenon of complementarity and the phenomenon of nostalgia.
29. Ethnic regeneration - restoration of ethnic structure after upheavals.
30. Ethnic tradition-the sum of stereotyped behaviors transmitted by the mechanism of conditioned reflex.
31. Ethnic homeostasis, or homeostatic level, or static state of ethnicity - stable state of ethnic system (structure) in which fluctuations of biochemical energy - passionarity take place within circumscribed limits, determining ethnolandscape equilibrium and absence of change of phases of ethnogenesis.
32. Ethnogenesis - the moment of emergence and the whole process of disappearance of the ethnic system under the influence of the entropic process of loss of passionarity.
33. Ethnology - the science that studies the formation of the Earth's ethnosphere as a result of the processes of ethnogenesis in a historical epoch.
34. Ethnos is a stable, naturally formed collective of people, opposing other similar collectives, differing from them in type of behavior and sense of complimentarity. It consists of sub-ethnoses, consortia; a group of closely related ethnoses constitutes a super-ethnos.
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